Dickinson et al v. Crabs on Deck, LLC et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 32 Plaintiff's Motion to Seal; granting 29 Motion to Dismiss, treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 10/16/2018. (tds, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
*
MICHAEL DICKINSON, et al.,
*
PLAINTIFFS,
*
v.

Case No.: PWG-17-3347
*

CRABS ON DECK, LLC, et al.,
*
DEFENDANTS.
*
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this employment litigation, brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C § 201 et seq., and related state law, Michael Dickinson, one of four
Plaintiffs, has reached a settlement with the Defendant employers, Defendants Crabs on Deck,
LLC d/b/a Southern Maryland Blue Crabs (“Crabs on Deck”) and Southern Maryland Baseball
Club, LLC (the “Club”), and executed what the parties view as a fair and reasonable release
agreement (“Agreement”). ECF No. 26 (paperless order memorializing conference call). He
continues to litigate his claim for attorneys’ fees, however. In its pending motion to dismiss,
Crabs on Deck argues that Dickinson cannot recover attorneys’ fees for two reasons: because he
is not a “prevailing party” and because he already received compensation for his attorneys’ fees
through the Agreement. Def.’s Mot. & Mem. 1.1 Because the undisputed evidence shows that

1

  Crabs on Deck’s Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support to Dismiss
Plaintiff Michael Dickinson’s Claim for Attorneys’ Fees with Prejudice, ECF No. 29, now is
fully briefed, see ECF Nos. 31, 34. A hearing is not necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6.  

Dickinson is not a prevailing party, I will treat Crabs on Deck’s motion as one for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) and grant it.
Background
Plaintiffs Michael Dickinson, Gerald Morrison, Bradley Clark, and Vernon Koslow
allege that their former employers, the current and former owners of the professional baseball
team the Southern Maryland Blue Crabs, underpaid them, in violation of the Maryland Wage and
Hour Law (“MWHL”), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401 et seq., and the Maryland Wage
Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501 et seq. Am.
Compl., ECF No. 6. Morrison, Clark and Dickinson also claim that Defendants retaliated against
them, in violation of the FLSA and the MWHL. Id. Morrison, Clark and Dickinson filed suit on
November 11, 2017, ECF No. 1, and Koslow joined the suit when they amended their pleading
on December 19, 2018, Am. Compl. 1.
Shortly thereafter, on January 3, 2018, Dickinson and Crabs on Deck signed a settlement
agreement (“Agreement”), releasing Crabs on Deck “and the Atlantic League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, Inc. (‘ALPB’) and any and all Member Clubs . . . their agents, employees,
successors and assigns and their respective heirs, personal representatives, affiliates, and any and
all persons, firms or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable” from all of the
claims Dickinson brought in this litigation, as well as those “arising from” it. Agr., ECF No. 294. Specifically, it settled all of Dickinson’s claims “arising out of or in any way relating to any
and all employment or wage claims, injuries and damages of any and every kind, to both person
and property, and also any and all injuries and damages that may develop in the future, as a result
of or in any way relating to [his] employment with the Southern Maryland Blue Crabs and the
ALPB.” Id. The Agreement stated that Dickinson received $3,500 “in full and complete

2 

settlement and satisfaction of the causes of action, claims and demands mentioned [in the
Agreement.” Id. It required Dickinson to “withdraw and remove any written claims, suits,
pleadings, protests or complaints” in any way related to his employment. Id.
On February 22, 2018, I held a pre-motion conference call with regard to Crabs on
Deck’s request to file a motion to dismiss Dickinson’s claims based on the Agreement, ECF No.
18. ECF No. 26. I noted that the parties did not dispute that the Agreement was executed and
was a fair release of all of Dickinson’s claims.2 Id. I set a schedule for Crabs on Deck to file a
motion to dismiss Dickinson’s claim for attorney’s fees.

Id. The motion now is ripe for

resolution.
Standard of Review
Along with its Motion and Memorandum, Crabs on Deck filed the Agreement, ECF No.
29-4, as well as an affidavit from Courtney Knichel, General Manager of the Southern Maryland
Blue Crabs, ECF No. 29-1; a December 30, 2017 email from Dickinson to Knichel (“Email”),
ECF No. 29-2; a January 2, 2018 email chain between Dickinson and Knichel, ECF No. 29-3;
and a copy of the $3,500.00 settlement check, ECF No. 5. Dickinson also filed exhibits,
attaching a news article about this litigation, ECF No. 31-1; affidavits from Plaintiffs’ attorneys,

2

While the FLSA requires “compromises of FLSA back wage or liquidated damages claims” to
be approved by the District Court in determining whether a settlement is fair and reasonable, the
Court does not need to review parties’ settlements of other FLSA claims that do not relate to
back pay or liquidated damages. Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355
(11th Cir. 1982); Saint-Preux v. Kiddies Kollege Christian Ctr., Inc., No. PWG-16-3276, 2017
WL 2693484, at *1 (D. Md. June 21, 2017) (quoting Lynn’s); Galvez v. Americlean Servs. Corp.,
No. 1:11CV1351 (JCC/TCB), 2012 WL 2522814, at *4 n.4 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2012) (“The
Court need not engage in an in-depth review of the parties’ settlement of [an FLSA] retaliation
claim, provided its terms do not contaminate the settlement of claims relating to unpaid overtime
and unpaid wages.”). Here, Dickinson’s only FLSA claim was for retaliation; he claimed unpaid
wages under state law only. See Am. Compl.

3 

Jeremy Greenberg and Denise Clark, ECF No. 33, at 1, 3; and March 13, 2018 emails between
Greenberg and Dickinson, ECF No. 33, at 6.3 Accordingly, as both parties have filed their briefs
along with evidence that is not integral to the Amended Complaint, they are on notice that I may
treat the pending motion as one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Ridgell v.
Astrue, DKC-10-3280, 2012 WL 707008, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012). Because I consider this
evidence in resolving the motion before me, I will convert it to one for summary judgment. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Ridgell, 2012 WL 707008, at *7.
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates, through “particular
parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials,” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A); see Baldwin v. City of
Greensboro, 714 F.3d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 2013).

If the party seeking summary judgment

demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the burden shifts to
the nonmoving party to identify evidence that shows that a genuine dispute exists as to material
facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 & n.10
(1986). I view the facts in the light most favorable to Dickinson as the party opposing summary

3

Plaintiffs’ counsel, “out of an abundance of caution,” filed a Motion to Seal the affidavit “to
ensure compliance with the Maryland Attorney’s Rules of Professional Conduct and the local
rules governing professional conduct enforced by this Federal Court.” ECF No. 32. In the
Motion, counsel noted that “Mr. Dickinson has granted his written consent to the disclosure of
the information.” Id. Additionally, Dickinson waived the attorney–client privilege with respect
to his communications with his attorneys regarding settlement by putting at issue his attorneys’
role in negotiating the Agreement. See Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 718, 720 (9th Cir.
2003). Accordingly, there is no reason to justify the sealing, and therefore the motion, ECF No.
32, IS DENIED. See Loc. R. 105.11(a).
4 

judgment. See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 363 (4th Cir. 2003); Lynn v. Monarch Recovery
Mgmt., Inc., No. WDQ-11-2824, 2013 WL 1247815, at *1 n.5 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 2013).
Discussion
According to Crabs on Deck, “Plaintiff Dickinson is not entitled to receive an award of
his counsel’s fees and costs because he is not a ‘prevailing party’ for purposes of fee-shifting
under the [FLSA], 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).” Def.’s Mot. & Mem. 1. Pursuant to § 216(b), “[t]he
court in [an FLSA] action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b); see Smith v. Touching Angels Healthcare, Inc., No. RDB-17-673, 2018 WL 1035769,
at *5 (noting that “[t]he FLSA . . . require[es] attorneys’ fees awards to prevailing parties, but
this Court must still determine a reasonable amount”). But, the Court has not awarded any
judgment to Dickinson; he and Crabs on Deck signed a settlement agreement. And, unlike
instances where the Court refers the case to a Magistrate Judge to initiate court-ordered (and
supervised) settlement discussions that result in a settlement, here the parties reached a
settlement agreement without any assistance by, or knowledge of, the Court.
Indeed, for a plaintiff “to be ‘considered a “prevailing party” there must be a “material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,” and there must be “judicial imprimatur on the
change.”’” Price v. Berman’s Auto., Inc., No. 14-763-JMC, 2016 WL 4805570, at *2 (D. Md.
Sept. 13, 2016) (quoting Grissom v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604–05)). Certainly, when a court approves a settlement agreement,
“there is [a] judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,” such that the
plaintiff qualifies as a prevailing party. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.V. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001); see also id. at 604 (“In addition to judgments on

5 

the merits, we have held that settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve
as the basis for an award of attorney’s fees.” (citing Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980));
Price, 2016 WL 4805570, at *3 (“Buckhannon ‘established a bright-line boundary on what
constitutes “relief on the merits” of a particular claim: only “enforceable judgments on the merits
and court-ordered consent decrees create the material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees.”’ Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 336 Fed. Appx. 332, 335 (4th Cir. 2009), (rev’d on other grounds) (citing Buckhannon 560
U.S. at 242); see also Goldstein v. Moatz, 445 F.3d 747, 751 (4th Cir. 2006) (‘in Buckhannon,
the Court instructed the lower courts that only enforceable judgments on the merits and courtordered consent decrees create the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties
necessary to permit an award of attorney’s fees’) (internal citations omitted).”).
Here, given that Dickinson’s FLSA claim was for retaliation, not unpaid wages or
liquidated damages, the parties did not need to (and indeed did not) seek Court approval. See
Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 1982); Saint-Preux v.
Kiddies Kollege Christian Ctr., Inc., No. PWG-16-3276, 2017 WL 2693484, at *1 (D. Md. June
21, 2017); Galvez v. Americlean Servs. Corp., No. 11CV1351 (JCC/TCB), 2012 WL 2522814, at
*4 n.4 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2012). Thus, there is no Court order confirming the resolution of
Dickinson’s claims, and consequently, Dickinson does not qualify as a prevailing party. See
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604–05 (holding that “a party that has failed to secure a judgment on
the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result
because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct” does not
qualify as a “prevailing party” for purposes of a statutory attorneys’ fees award); Price, 2016 WL

6 

4805570, at *3. Therefore, Dickinson cannot prevail on his claim for attorneys’ fees as a matter
of law.

ORDER
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, it is, this 16th day of
October, 2018, hereby ORDERED that
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal, ECF No. 32, IS DENIED, and
2. Crabs on Deck’s motion, ECF No. 29, treated as a motion for summary judgment, IS
GRANTED.

/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

lyb

7