Uhler et al v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/12/2018. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
STACEY UHLER, et al.
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 17-3462
:
OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE OF FLORIDA,
LLC t/a Outback Steakhouse
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC (“Defendant” or
“Outback”) filed a motion for summary judgment in this personal
injury case on May 2, 2018.
(ECF No. 18).
The issues have been
fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed
necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons, the
motion for summary judgment will be denied.
I.
Background1
On February 9, 2017, Plaintiff Stacey Uhler (“Plaintiff”) and
her friend, Virginia Wills (“Ms. Wills”), visited Defendant’s
restaurant in Prince Frederick, Maryland (the “restaurant”).
No. 21-4, at 19-20).
(ECF
Plaintiff arrived at the restaurant sometime
between 11:30 am and 11:40 am.
(Id. at 33).
Plaintiff and Ms.
Wills were seated at booth 18 (ECF No. 21-6, at 7, p. 23), which
1
Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are
undisputed and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
Additional facts are discussed in the analysis section below.
was situated at floor level (ECF No. 21-4, at 34) and set with two
sets of silverware rolled in separate cloth napkins (ECF Nos. 214, at 21-23; 21-6, at 7, p. 24).
Ms. Shannon Mundo (“Ms. Mundo”),
a server at Defendant’s restaurant, served Plaintiff and Ms. Wills.
(ECF Nos. 21-6, at 4, p. 13; 21-7, at 5, p. 14).
Shortly after
taking her seat, Plaintiff placed her napkin on her lap and
arranged her silverware on the table.2
(ECF No. 21-4, at 22).
Outback staff brought no additional napkins to the table during
the time that Plaintiff and Ms. Wills dined.
(Id. at 23).
After
Plaintiff paid for lunch (ECF No. 21-5 ¶ 4), Ms. Mundo placed the
receipt in a checkbook and delivered it to Plaintiff’s table around
12:55 pm.
(ECF No. 21-6, at 6, p. 21).
In an effort to use the restroom while Ms. Wills engaged in
a phone call, Plaintiff stood up to exit the booth.
4, at 24-25).
(ECF No. 21-
Immediately after standing up and taking a step
toward the restroom, Plaintiff fell in front of booth 18, within
Ms. Wills’ line of vision.
(ECF No. 21-4, at 34).
Plaintiff
states that she wore rubber-soled boots on the day of the accident
(id. at 36), and previously encountered no trouble walking in the
boots (id.).
Plaintiff alleges that an Outback employee had
dropped a cloth napkin next to Plaintiff’s booth and “her foot
2
Ms. Mundo described the napkins as “black” and “big, like a
square mat.” (ECF No. 18-3, at 7, pp. 24-25).
2
touched down on the napkin[,] causing her foot to go out from under
her . . . resulting in her landing on the floor.”3
(ECF No. 2 ¶
5).
After the fall, an ambulance transported Plaintiff to Calvert
Memorial Hospital, where Plaintiff learned that her ankle was
fractured and dislocated. (ECF No. 21-4, at 39-46).
Physicians at
Calvert Memorial Hospital twice attempted to reset Plaintiff’s
ankle.
(Id. at 38-40).
Plaintiff
was
relocated
Due to the severity of her injuries,
to
Washington
Hospital
Center,
where
physicians again attempted to reset her ankle.
(Id. at 41).
next
Hospital
morning,
upon
release
from
Washington
The
Center,
physicians informed Plaintiff that her injuries required surgery.
(Id. at 42).
After waiting for the swelling in her ankle to
subside, Plaintiff underwent initial surgery on February 15, 2017
and additional surgery on February 23, 2017.
(Id. at 43-45).
Beginning May 9, 2017, Plaintiff sought treatment through a course
of physical therapy.
(Id. at 53-54).
Plaintiff testified that
she continues to experience occasional pain and stiffness due to
the
permanent
plates
implanted
in
her
ankle.
(Id.
at
55).
Plaintiff also has ongoing pain in her knees, shoulder, and lower
back.
(Id. at 60).
3
Defendant disagrees, stating that “there is no evidence that
there was a napkin on the floor at any time prior to Plaintiff’s
fall.” (ECF No. 18 ¶ 13).
3
On August 23, 2017, Plaintiff and her husband Richard Uhler
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court for Calvert County, Maryland, against Defendant as a result
of injuries suffered by Plaintiff after she slipped and fell at
Defendant’s restaurant.4
(ECF No. 2).
Defendant removed the case
to this court based on diversity jurisdiction on November 21, 2017.
(ECF No. 1).
Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition on May 21,
2018 (ECF No. 21), and Defendant replied on June 5, 2018 (ECF No.
22).
II.
Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if “there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);
see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Emmett v.
Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).
To prevail on a motion
for summary judgment, the movant generally bears the burden of
showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248-50.
A dispute about a material
fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
4
Id. at 249.
In
Richard Uhler filed a claim for loss of consortium based on
Stacey Uhler’s injuries.
4
undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United States
v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also EEOC v. Navy
Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir. 2005), but a “party
cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere
speculation or compilation of inferences.”
Shin v. Shalala, 166
F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation omitted).
If a party
“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case . . . which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial[,]” there can be no “genuine
issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323.
III. Analysis
A.
Negligence
To establish a prima facie case for negligence under Maryland
law, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant owed a duty to
protect the plaintiff from injury; (2) the defendant breached that
duty; (3) the defendant’s breach proximately caused plaintiff’s
5
injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an injury. See Rosenblatt
v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 76 (1994).
Analysis
of
any
negligence
cause
of
action
begins
determining whether a legally cognizable duty existed.
by
The duty
Defendant owed to Plaintiff depends on Plaintiff’s status while
present
on
Defendant’s
property.
Jackson
v.
A.M.F.
Bowling
Centers, Inc., 128 F.Supp.2d 307, 311 (D.Md. 2001) (citing Rowley
v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 305 Md. 456, 464–65 (1986)).
“A business invitee is ‘one invited or permitted to enter another’s
property for purposes related to the landowner’s business.’”
Id.
(quoting Tennant v. Shoppers Food Warehouse Md. Corp., 115 Md.App.
381, 388 (1997)).
Plaintiff entered Defendant’s establishment as
a consumer and was thus a business invitee.
Here, neither party
disputes that Plaintiff was a business invitee on Defendant’s
property and that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care in
maintaining the restaurant.
(ECF Nos. 18; 21-1, at 3, 15).
Maryland applies the standard articulated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF
TORTS § 343 (1965) when analyzing a private landowner’s duty to
an invitee:
A possessor of land is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a)
knows or by the exercise of reasonable
care would discover the condition, and
should realize that it involves an
6
unreasonable risk
invitees, and
of
harm
to
such
(b)
should expect that they will not discover
or realize the danger, or will fail to
protect themselves against it, and
(c)
fails to exercise reasonable care
protect them against the danger.
to
See Maans v. Giant Of Maryland, L.L.C., 161 Md.App. 620, 626
(2005).
Although a business owes an invitee the highest duty of
care, the proprietor of a restaurant “is not an insurer of his
customers while they are on the premises, and no presumption of
negligence on the part of the proprietor arises merely from a
showing that an injury was sustained in his store.” Rawls v.
Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 118 (1955).
In a successful premises liability case, the plaintiff must
first “prove the existence of an unsafe or dangerous condition on
the premises.”
Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360 F.3d 446, 451-
52 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Kendrick v. Vaz. Inc., 244 Va. 380, 385
(1992)).
Second, the plaintiff must also produce evidence to
demonstrate that defendant: (1) created the dangerous condition;
or (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of its existence.
Tennant, 115 Md.App. at 389; see also Rawls, 207 Md. at 120 (“In
an action by a customer to recover damages resulting from a fall
in a store caused by a foreign substance on a floor or stairway,
the
burden
is
on
the
customer
to
7
produce
evidence
that
the
storekeeper created the dangerous condition or had actual or
constructive
knowledge
of
its
existence.”);
Lexington
Market
Authority v. Zappala, 233 Md. 444, 446 (1964) (“But the burden is
upon the customer to show that the proprietor created the dangerous
condition
or
had
actual
or
constructive
knowledge
of
its
existence.”).
The parties dispute whether a napkin, the purported dangerous
condition, was on the floor when Plaintiff fell.
Plaintiff admits
that she did not see Ms. Mundo drop a napkin, but asserts that she
was informed of a napkin’s presence beside her foot after the fall.
(ECF No. 21-4, at 29).
Ms. Wills states in her affidavit that she
saw a black Outback napkin next to Plaintiff’s foot after Plaintiff
fell.
(ECF No. 21-5 ¶ 8) (“I immediately looked to my left while
seated in the booth and saw a black Outback napkin, beside where
I was seated and next to Ms. Uhler’s foot.”).
Defendant
argues
that
Plaintiff’s
allegation
In contrast,
is
unsupported
because Plaintiff’s only evidence that a napkin caused her fall is
a “gut feeling.”
(ECF No. 18-2, at 9, pp. 30-31).
John Dixon
(“Mr. Dixon”), the restaurant manager on duty at the time of
Plaintiff’s fall, testified that there was no napkin in Plaintiff’s
presence after the fall.
(ECF No. 18-4, at 11, p. 38).
However,
Mr. Dixon did hear Plaintiff state that “she had fallen on her own
napkin and . . . was very embarrassed that she had caused this
8
sort of scene.”
(Id., at 11, p. 40).
When viewed in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff, there is evidence that there was
a napkin on the floor next to Plaintiff’s booth.
The parties also dispute how the napkin reached its location
on
the
floor.
Plaintiff
argues
that
Defendant
created
the
dangerous condition, stating that Ms. Mundo dropped the napkin on
the floor while clearing the table.
(ECF No. 21-4, at 28).5
Plaintiff asserts that, after she and Ms. Wills completed their
meal, she paid the check and Ms. Mundo cleared the table of all
items, including Plaintiff’s napkin, except for two drink glasses
and the checkbook.
(ECF No. 21-4, at 25-26).
However, when asked
how she knew the “napkin . . . had fallen when the waitress had
cleared the table,” Plaintiff answered that she “was told that the
napkin was by [her] foot after the fall.”
(Id., at 29).
Plaintiff
also testified that she did not see Ms. Mundo drop the napkin, she
did not see the napkin on the floor at any time prior to her fall,
and Ms. Wills did not see Ms. Mundo drop the napkin.
(Id.).
Ms. Mundo’s testimony revealed a different version of events,
stating that, in addition to the beverage glasses, both customers
5
When asked if she believed Ms. Mundo dropped the napkin,
Plaintiff testified, “Hmm! That would be my thought, yes.” (ECF
No. 21-4, at 28).
Additionally, Plaintiff indicated in her
interrogatory answers that, when she “[g]ot up from the table to
go to the restroom . . . her foot touched on a napkin that had
fallen when the waitress had cleared the table.” (Id.).
9
also retained their napkins when she delivered the checkbook to
Plaintiff’s table.
(ECF No. 18-3, at 16, p. 61).
Ms. Mundo also
testified that, although she has no “independent recollection of
clearing their table,” she maintained a practice of removing used
napkins from the table after patrons vacated the table.
(Id., at
11, pp. 38-39; at 9, p. 33).
Plaintiff testified that she removed her napkin from her lap
and placed it on the table before Ms. Mundo cleared the table and
returned with the checkbook.
(ECF No. 21-4, at 27).
Therefore,
again when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she
was not the party who dropped the napkin because she no longer
possessed the napkin when she stood up to exit the booth.
Whether
the
Defendant
or
another
restaurant
patron
was
responsible for the napkin’s rogue appearance on the floor requires
a
more
intricate
analysis.
Although
evidence
supporting
the
conclusion that Defendant dropped the napkin is thin, the facts
here diverge from similar cases finding an outright absence of
evidence indicating that the proprietor created the dangerous
condition.
Albeit unpublished, Myers v. TGI Friday’s Inc., No.
CIV. JFM 07-333, 2007 WL 4097498 (D.Md. Nov. 9, 2007), is a
strikingly similar case wherein the trial judge parsed the degree
of affirmative evidence a plaintiff must provide to show that a
proprietor created a dangerous condition.
10
There, the plaintiff
alleged that an unknown substance located on the restaurant floor
caused her to slip and fall while en route to the bathroom, but
asserted that she did not see any substance on the floor before or
after she fell.6
Id. at *1.
However, the accident in Myers took
place around 9:00 p.m., after the restaurant had been operational
for many hours and filled with a high volume of patrons who trekked
back-and-forth
restroom.
over
the
Id. at *7.
slip-and-fall
location
to
access
the
The court concluded that the plaintiff
failed to provide evidence demonstrating that Friday’s caused the
dangerous
condition
“because
it
[was]
equally
customer caused Friday’s floor to be slippery.”
likely
that
a
Id. at *8; see
also Joye v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 405 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.
1968)
(finding
that
Defendant
did
not
cause
the
dangerous
condition, a banana on the floor, because numerous customers next
to the display prior to the Plaintiff’s slip-and-fall could have
dropped the banana); Ronk v. Corner Kick, Inc., 850 F.Supp. 369,
371 (D.Md. 1994) (“Where the presence of a foreign substance on
the floor is explainable by causes beyond a proprietor’s control
as well as within it, it is impermissible for a trier of fact to
conclude that the proprietor’s cause was the cause-in-fact.”);
Haj-Mabrouk v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 395 F.App’x 43 (4th Cir.
6
Similarly, Ms. Mundo testified that the restaurant layout
requires patrons to pass by Plaintiff’s booth when accessing the
bathrooms. (ECF No. 21-6, at 10, p. 36).
11
2010) (affirming District Court decision finding that there was
not enough evidence to demonstrate Wal-Mart created the puddle,
located in a high-traffic area where many other patrons walked and
pushed carts prior to the accident, that caused Plaintiff to fall).
The facts here are distinguishable.
Plaintiff testified that
the restaurant was “busy” on the day of her accident and gradually
became busier as her lunch transpired.
Plaintiff’s testimony also
states that a paramedic dined nearby, asserting that he was “right
there” and appeared by her side immediately after she fell. (ECF
No. 21-4, at 33). However, Ms. Mundo testified that the restaurant
was “light” and there were few other patrons present during the
time leading up to Plaintiff’s fall.
35).
(ECF No. 21-6, at 10, p.
Mr. Dixon confirmed Ms. Mundo’s recollection, indicating
that only two other tables contained patrons at the same time as
Plaintiff and Ms. Wills’ visit.
(ECF No. 21-7, at 5, p. 14).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
Plaintiff dined at a time when few other patrons were present and
the
restaurant
was
open
for
only
a
short
period
prior
to
Plaintiff’s slip-and-fall, making it implausible that another
patron dropped the napkin beside Plaintiff’s booth.
Moreover, the
brief time between the clearing of the table and Plaintiff’s fall,
approximately five minutes, did not present an opportunity for
another patron to drop a napkin.
The absence of an alternative
12
explanation for the napkin’s location on the floor leads to the
inference that Ms. Mundo negligently dropped the napkin next to
Plaintiff’s booth when clearing Plaintiff’s table.7
Finally, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges damages based on the
injuries
that
resulted
from
her
slip-and-fall
at
Defendant’s
restaurant, satisfying the final requirement of her negligence
claim.
B.
Contributory Negligence
Defendant
also
argues
that
it
is
not
responsible
for
Plaintiff’s accident due to Plaintiff’s contributory negligence.
Defendant specifically relies on Ms. Uhler’s statement that she
fell on her own napkin.
(ECF No. 18, at 10).
However, Plaintiff
testified that she removed the napkin from her lap and placed it
on
the
table
several
minutes
before
exiting
the
booth.
Additionally, Plaintiff refrained from consuming alcohol and wore
sturdy footwear at the time of the accident, making it even more
unlikely that she personally contributed to the fall.
See Myers,
2007 WL 4097498, at *6 (Because Plaintiff wore heeled shoes and
consumed multiple alcoholic beverages immediately prior to her
fall, the court noted an increased likelihood that she slipped-
7
It is likely that Ms. Mundo did not realize she dropped the
napkin if she did. Under Maryland law, when there is enough
evidence to show that Defendant created the dangerous condition,
knowledge does not appear to be required.
See, e.g., Rybas v.
Riverview Hotel Corp. 21 F.Supp.3d 548, 562-567 (D.Md. 2014).
13
and-fell of her own volition rather than falling prey to a slippery
substance on the floor.).
Viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, the evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff would not have
been contributorily negligent.
Accordingly, Defendant is not
entitled to summary judgment.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment will be denied.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?