Horn v. State of Maryland et al
Filing
77
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paula Xinis on 1/23/2023. (c/m ols, Deputy Clerk)
Case 8:17-cv-03633-PX Document 77 Filed 01/23/23 Page 1 of 10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
RILEY ERNEST HORN, et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No.: PX-17-3633
CHIEF OF POLICE THOMAS MANGER,
OFFICER RENEE MERRIMAN,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case concerns alleged police misconduct arising in a state robbery case. ECF No. 33.
Presently pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint filed
by Defendants Chief of Police Thomas Manger (“Chief Manger”) and Officer Renee Merriman
(“Officer Merriman”) of the Montgomery County Police Department (“MCPD”). ECF No. 49.
Plaintiffs 1 also seek to amend the Second Amended Complaint, which Defendants oppose. ECF
No. 63, 70, 76. Plaintiffs Riley Horn and Toi Horn El separately oppose the motion to dismiss
the Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 66. The motions are ripe for review and no hearing is
necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend
is DENIED.
1
Plaintiffs are Riley Ernest Horn, Toi Horn, Royster Norwood, Jordan Grant, Paul Grant, Nicola Grant,
Joshua Grant, Gabrielle Grant, Jonah Grant, Enid Grant, and Kayla Jenkins. On June 30 and July 11, 2022,
respectively, Toi Horn and Royster Norwood filed notices correcting their names for the record to Toi Horn El and
Royster Norwood Bey. ECF Nos. 59, 60. The Clerk shall be directed to amend the docket to reflect their full and
correct names.
Case 8:17-cv-03633-PX Document 77 Filed 01/23/23 Page 2 of 10
I.
Background
The Court accepts the Second Amended Complaint facts as true and most favorably to the
Plaintiffs.
On May 25, 2017, Plaintiffs Riley Horn and Jordan Grant attended a party in
Gaithersburg, Maryland. ECF No. 33 ¶ 19. The gathering broke up soon after their arrival because
someone at the party had been robbed. Id. ¶ 20. Horn and Grant left the party by car, and officers
executed a traffic stop to question them about the robbery. Both men denied any involvement in
the offense and officers allowed them to leave. Id. ¶ 21.
Sometime in August of that year, MCPD Officer Merriman obtained an arrest warrant for
Horn and Grant. Plaintiffs now contend, without factual support, that the warrant had been based
on “falsified information and lies.” ECF No. 33 ¶ 22. When officers executed the arrest warrant
as to Jordan Grant, they questioned him regarding Riley Horn’s whereabouts. Id. ¶ 23. Defendants
ultimately discovered that Riley Horn was living in Detroit, Michigan. Id. at ¶ 26.
The following month, Officer Merriman obtained no-knock warrants to search two homes
in which Plaintiffs had resided. ECF No. 33 ¶ ¶ 27-28. In executing the warrants, officers stormed
the homes in tactical riot gear and with guns drawn, broke in the doors with battering rams, and
“trashed” both homes. Id. ¶¶ 29, 32. In the home occupied by Plaintiffs Toi Horn El, Riley Horn,
and Royster Norwood Bey, officers damaged the residence and would not allow Toi Horn El to
dress. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 34. In the other home occupied by the Grant Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Kayla
Jenkins, the officers damaged the doors, locks, door frames, safe, and bedroom furniture. Id. at ¶
35. Officers also seized “legally held handguns” from the residences. Id. at ¶¶ 35, 37. Again
without factual support, the Second Amended Complaint characterizes the warrants as pretextual
and fraudulently made. Id. at ¶ 37.
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On September 19, 2017, Riley Horn was arrested in Michigan and extradited to Maryland.
ECF No. 33 ¶ 38.
Horn now claims the extradition had been effectuated without proper
documentation, and that he was held at Montgomery County Detention Center without lawful
authority.
Id. ¶¶ 39, 40. Horn remained in pretrial detention for roughly 260 days until the
robbery charges were dismissed against him and Jordan Grant. Id. ¶¶ 42, 46.
From this series of events, the Second Amended Complaint alleges seven claims against
Defendants, namely violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stemming from the arrest, search, and detention of Plaintiffs (Counts
I-III and Count VII); as well as companion state common law claims for malicious prosecution,
harassment, and fraud (Counts IV-VI). ECF No. 33 at pp. 8-17. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages,
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Id. at 17.
With this background in mind, the Court turns first to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
II.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants lodge a series of challenges to the Second Amended Complaint. The Court
focuses on the sufficiency of the claims as pleaded. For the reasons discussed below, the Second
Amended Complaint fails to make plausible any of the claims.
A. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the
sufficiency of the complaint. To survive dismissal, the plaintiffs must aver sufficient facts that
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citations omitted). Although “a plaintiff need not ‘forecast’ evidence sufficient to prove the
elements of the claim, … the complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish those elements.”
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Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In reviewing a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint” and must “draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.”
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). The Court may consider documents attached to the complaint or the motion to dismiss
if they are integral to the allegations and their authenticity is not disputed. Philips v. Pitt Cnty.
Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009); CACI Int’l v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
566 F.3d 150, 154 (4th Cir. 2009); Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Court may also take judicial notice of documents from related state court proceedings and
other matters of public record without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.
Philips, 572 F.3d at 180 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 n.1 (1986)); Walker v. Kelly,
589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (Judicial Notice of Adjudicative
Facts).
B. Analysis
The Court first addresses whether the Second Amended Complaint avers sufficient facts to
make plausible the federal constitutional claims (Counts I-III and VII). The first three counts
challenge the constitutionality of Horn and Grant’s arrests and the execution of the related search
warrants. Read most charitably, the claims assert violations of Plaintiffs’ right to be free from
unconstitutional searches and seizures as protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.”). 2
2
Although the Second Amended Complaint also references a violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment
rights, the allegations implicate solely the Fourth Amendment.
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Beginning with the arrests, Jordan Grant and Riley Horn maintain essentially that their
arrest was based on falsified information. A § 1983 false arrest claim shall not proceed unless the
complaint facts make plausible that the arrest lacked probable cause. See Brown v. Gilmore, 278
F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1974). Probable
cause exists if “at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and
of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 91 (1964); accord Santos v. Frederick Ctny. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 466 (4th Cir.
2013); see also Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017). Probable cause must be based
on the totality of the circumstances. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983); Munday,
848 F.3d at 253; United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 58, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1988).
The Second Amended Complaint supplies no facts showing the arrests lacked probable
cause.
Instead, the Second Amended Complaint merely avers, in conclusory fashion, that
Defendants obtained arrest warrants based on “false” information, but provides no detail as to what
in the warrant had been false. Without more, the naked assertion that Plaintiffs’ arrest had been
based on false accusations must fail.
Plaintiffs’ challenges to the search warrants advance the same “false information” theory.
“When an officer improperly obtains a search warrant using deceptive falsities or omissions and
uses that ill-gotten warrant to search and seize property, the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures is violated.” Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 884 (4th
Cir. 2022) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); United States v. Colkley, 899
F.2d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 1990)). But again, the Second Amended Complaint provides no facts
which make plausible that the search warrants were supported by false information. Without more,
the Second Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual support to state a colorable claim for relief
under the Fourth Amendment.
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The Second Amended Complaint also avers that Defendant Manger failed to adequately
supervise or train officers on executing valid arrests and searches. ECF No. 33 at ¶¶ 106-09.
Plaintiffs broadly allege that the “unconstitutional policies, customs and practices of Montgomery
County” were at the root of Plaintiffs’ constitutional harms. Id. at ¶ 110. In pursuing a municipal
liability claim, a plaintiff must make plausible that the supposed constitutional violations arose on
account of an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice of the municipality. See Monell v. Dep’t
of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978). The Second Amended Complaint, most
charitably read, pleads no facts that make plausible the existence of any such department or county
policy, custom, or practice. The averred facts are silent in that respect, and mere conclusory
references to “MCPD’s policy and oversight” is not enough. See ECF No. 33 at ¶¶ 108, 109. Thus,
the municipal liability claim fails as a matter of law.
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs intend to bring a claim against Defendant Manger for
his own supervisory liability, that claim also fails. Liability under § 1983 attaches when an
individual defendant’s acts or omissions bring about the alleged constitutional violations. The
doctrine of respondeat superior, by contrast, does not apply to § 1983 claims. See Love-Lane v.
Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Rather,
supervisory liability under § 1983 is made plausible only with facts averring that: (1) the supervisor
had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct posing a
pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the
supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to
or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) an affirmative causal link exists
between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury the plaintiff had suffered.
See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). The Second Amended Complaint alleges
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no facts to support this claim. Accordingly, any such claim must be dismissed as to against
Defendant Manger.
The Court turns next to the state common law claims (Counts IV-VI). The Second
Amended Complaint fronts these claims as arising from the same course of events related to the
constitutional challenges. “When, as here, the federal claim is dismissed early in the case, the
federal courts are inclined to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice rather than retain
supplemental jurisdiction.” Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (citing
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-727 (1966). The Court thus declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. They are dismissed without
prejudice.
III.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs ask to file yet a third amended complaint to address the deficiencies raised in
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 63-1 at 1. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should permit
amendment because the prior amendments had been Court-ordered and because Defendants have
not yet filed an answer. Id. at 2.
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to amend its pleading
“once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it, or if the pleading is one to which a
responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on May 9, 2022. Plaintiffs did not file an amended
pleading within 21 days. Accordingly, they must obtain leave of Court to do so now. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave.”).
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Rule 15 dictates that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id.
But where the proposed amendment is futile, the Court may deny such leave to amend. Futility is
apparent if the proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim under the applicable rules and
accompanying standards: “[A] district court may deny leave if amending the complaint would be
futile—that is, if the proposed amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of the federal
rules.” Katyle v. Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc. 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing United States
ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Because the proposed third amended complaint still fails to state a federal constitutional
claim, allowing the amendment would be futile. Plaintiffs seek to add Montgomery County,
Maryland (“the County”) as a defendant, alleging generally that the County failed to adequately
train its officers on proper “investigation and arrest procedures and that the County improperly
uses no-knock warrants.” ECF No. 63-3 ¶¶ 130-31.
Additionally, the proposed pleading
summarily asserts that the County engages a “widespread pattern and practice” of unconstitutional
execution of no-knock warrants arising from failures in training, and thus reflect a wholesale
adoption of an unconstitutional no-knock procedure. Id. at ¶ 135. Again, as in the Second
Amended Complaint, the allegations are conclusory and devoid of factual basis. Therefore, the
proposed amendment would be futile in stating a municipal liability claim against the County.
Next, as to the false arrest and search claims, the proposed amendments are also futile.
Regarding Grant’s arrest, the amendment merely adds that the robbery suspects were “tall” where
Grant is “short;” and that Officer Merriman refused to talk to Grant’s father, Paul Grant, about the
investigation. ECF No. 63-3 ¶¶ 20, 24, 26. As to Riley Horn, the proposed amendment now claims
that Defendants did not properly apply for a Michigan arrest warrant or seek his extradition, and
that Horn’s pretrial detention was unlawful as a result. Id. ¶¶ 64, 72, 73.
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These allegations are insufficient. The discrepant height information alone does not make
plausible that the arrest lacked probable cause. Nor does the proposed amendment offer any facts
to make plausible that Horn’s arrest in, and extradition from, Michigan was constitutionally infirm.
Merely saying as much does not make it so. Thus, the proposed amendment as to the false arrest
claims is futile.
On the search warrant claims, the relevant proposed amendments add that the warrant had
been executed after midnight; the Grant Plaintiffs believed their home was being burglarized; that
officers had confronted the Plaintiffs with guns drawn and “ushered” them to the kitchen; that Paul
Grant remained handcuffed for hours during the search; that all details regarding the homes and
their occupants were omitted from the affidavit supporting the search; and that the affidavit did
not describe the weapon used in the robbery. ECF No. 63-3 at ¶¶ 35, 42,132-134.
Again, the proposed amendment does not make the Fourth Amendment challenge
plausible. It is axiomatic that a search warrant affidavit need not include “all the details” of why
the places to be searched more probably than not will contain evidence of a crime. See, e.g., United
States v. Cobb, 970 F.3d 319, 327 (4th Cir. 2020). By extension, the mere averment that a search
warrant affidavit omitted certain facts, by itself, does not plausibly support that the omission
defeats probable cause or misled the judicial officer who authorized the search. Particularly as to
the supposed omitted description of the firearm, or investigative conversations regarding
“ownership” of weapons, nothing in the amendment explains how these omissions are false or
misleading. 3 Thus, as to these claims, the amendments are futile.
3
Notably, the actual affidavit in support of the search warrant includes a robust summary as to the details of
the armed robbery and facts suggesting that the firearms used in the crime may be found in the target residences. The
affidavit describes that all suspected robbers, including Grant and Horn, “had guns” and were “known to carry guns;”
that Grant had been seen placing a gun in his gym bag shortly before the robbery; and that Grant had told one of his
confederates that he had been briefly “kicked out” of his house by his father who had found the firearm in the residence.
ECF No. 70-4 at 5. Although the Court does not rely on the affidavit for its futility analysis, the affidavit can hardly
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Last, the proposed amendments now seem to challenge the length of Paul Grant’s detention
during the search warrant execution. This is a legal nonstarter. Officers may detain an individual
incident to a search absent particularized suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal
activity or poses a danger. Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 193 (2013) (citing Michigan v.
Summer, 452 U.S. 692, 705) (1981) and Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 (2005)). That Paul
Grant had been detained for the duration of the search alone does not state a viable Fourth
Amendment claim.
In short, viewing all factual allegations included in the proposed third amended complaint
as true and most favorably to Plaintiffs, the amendments are nonetheless futile. Thus, the motion
to amend will be denied. Moreover, because Plaintiffs have been given two prior opportunities to
amend their complaint, and the Court has considered the sufficiency of yet a third proposed
amendment, the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss the claims with prejudice. Weigel v.
Maryland, 950 F. Supp. 2d 811, 825-26 (D. Md. 2013) (citing 180s, Inc. v. Gordini U.S.A., Inc.,
602 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638-39 (D. Md. 2009).
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’
Motion for Leave to Amend the Second Amended Complaint is DENIED. A separate Order
follows.
/S/
_____________________________
Paula Xinis
United States District Judge
1/23/23
________________
Date
be described as failing to offer sufficient specificity that firearms used in the offense would be found in the places to
be searched.
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