Rhoe v. Kunz et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 12/4/2018. (c/m 12/6/18 km4s, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
ROBERT LEE RHOE, II,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
Case No.: GJH-17-3757
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KUNZ, et al.,
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Robert Lee Rhoe, II brings this pro se action against various Maryland judges,
state child support attorneys, and state entities alleging that Defendants have violated several
federal laws and the U.S. Constitution during the course of an ongoing paternity proceeding.1
ECF No. 1. Presently pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ECF
No. 12. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the following reasons, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
I.
BACKGROUND2
Enma Q. Perez gave birth to a child in July 2009. ECF No. 1-5 at 4.3 On January 21,
2016, the Montgomery Office of Child Support Enforcement (MCOCSE) filed a paternity
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Defendants are Judge John M. Maloney, Judge Joseph M. Quirk, Judge John W. Debelius, III, Judge Debra L.
Dwyer, Special Magistrate Keith J. Rosa, Esq., (collectively the “Judges”), the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Maryland (the “Circuit Court”), Christopher J. Kunz, Esq., Amy Fusting, Esq., Rina M. Erhart, Esq., and
the Montgomery Office of Child Support Enforcement (MCOCSE) (collectively the “State Defendants”).
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Unless otherwise stated, these facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, and are presumed to be true.
The Court may also take judicial notice of matters of public record and consider documents attached to the
Complaint or Motion to Dismiss, to the extent that they are integral to the Complaint and authentic. See Phillips v.
Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d
650, 655 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004) (taking judicial notice of published stock prices when considering a motion to dismiss).
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complaint against Mr. Rhoe in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland (the “Circuit
Court”) regarding the minor child. ECF No. 1 ¶ 4. Attorneys Christopher Kunz, Amy Fusting,
and Rina Erhart—Defendants and employees of the Maryland Attorney General’s office—all
served as counsel for MCOCSE at various stages of the paternity proceedings. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10,
13. Plaintiff alleges that MCOCSE filed the paternity complaint in bad faith. ECF No. 1 ¶ 4.
Apparently in support of this position, Plaintiff asserts that Enma Perez is “not legally
domiciled” in Maryland and that MCOCSE failed to produce “written representations” made by
Ms. Perez about Plaintiff’s paternity status. See e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 16. Throughout the discovery
process and the ongoing proceedings, MCOCSE has raised relevance objections to Plaintiff’s
interest in Ms. Perez’s legal status in the United States. Id.; ECF No. 1 ¶ 16.
Plaintiff further alleges that the MCOCSE Defendants missed discovery deadlines and/or
failed to comply with discovery requests. ECF No. 1 ¶ 13. Specifically, he points out that
MCOCSE’s discovery responses were signed by Ms. Perez and MCOCSE and Ms. Perez made
certain objections. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13–18.
On May 18, 2016, Defendant Special Magistrate Keith J. Rosa presided over a hearing
and ordered Mr. Rhoe to submit to genetic testing to determine if he was the father of the minor
child. ECF No. 1 ¶ 27. Maryland law requires that “on the motion of the Administration, a party
to the proceeding, or on its own motion, the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged
father to submit to blood or genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded
as being the father of the child. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-1029. At the hearing, Plaintiff
argued that MCOCSE’s complaint should be dismissed as a discovery sanction and he should not
be required to submit to a paternity test because he cannot be forced to present evidence against
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Pin cites to documents filed on the Court’s electronic filing system (CM/ECF) refer to the page numbers generated
by that system.
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himself. ECF No. 1 ¶ 22; ECF No. 1-18 at 8. Plaintiff alleges that by following § 5-1029’s
mandate, Defendant Rosa conspired with MCOCSE to help the agency obtain evidence. ECF No.
¶ 25.
On June 1, 2016, Defendant Judge John M. Maloney signed Defendant Rosa’s order
requiring Mr. Rhoe to submit to genetic testing. ECF No. 1 ¶ 29. Mr. Rhoe then filed two
interlocutory appeals to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, arising out of Judge Maloney’s
order requiring Mr. Rhoe to submit to genetic testing and Judge Maloney’s order denying Mr.
Rhoe’s request for sanctions for alleged discovery violations. ECF No. 1 ¶ 30–31. Although the
trial court proceedings were not stayed while his interlocutory appeals pended, Mr. Rhoe refused
to submit to genetic testing and failed to appear at subsequent hearings. ECF No. 1 at 33–34;
ECF No. 12-2 at 12.
On July 25, 2016, MCOCSE filed a petition for contempt against Mr. Rhoe based upon
his failure to submit to genetic testing. ECF No. 12-2 (certified docket entries) at 12. The hearing
on contempt was postponed multiple times over the course of the next year while MCOCSE
attempted to serve Mr. Rhoe. Id. at 12, 14, 16. MCOCSE eventually served Mr. Rhoe with the
contempt complaint. Id. at 16. Mr. Rhoe filed a motion to quash the contempt petition, which
Defendant Judge Joseph M. Quick denied. Id. at 17. The Office of the Public Defender then
entered its appearance on behalf of Mr. Rhoe. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the MCOCSE Defendants
violated his constitutional due process rights by filing their contempt petition and Defendant
Quick violated those rights by granting the petition. ECF No. 1 ¶ 37.
On July 21, 2017, the Circuit Court held a hearing on the contempt petition. ECF No. 122 at 17; ECF No. 1-24. Plaintiff’s then-counsel appeared, but Plaintiff failed to appear, instead
sending the Circuit Court a letter indicating his belief that he could not be held in contempt. ECF
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No. 12-2 at 17. As a result of Plaintiff’s failure to appear, Defendant Judge Debra L. Dwyer
issued a body attachment for Mr. Rhoe. ECF No. 1-24 at 5.
On October 24, 2017, the Montgomery County Police arrested Mr. Rhoe. ECF No. 1 ¶
41. The Circuit Court held a bond review hearing at which Mr. Rhoe was represented by counsel.
ECF No. 1 ¶ 42. At the hearing, Mr. Rhoe was released and a new court date for the petition for
contempt was scheduled for December 1, 2017. ECF No. 12-2 at 19. At the rescheduled
contempt hearing, Plaintiff argued that he could not be held in contempt by the Circuit Court
because he had appeals pending and requested a stay of the trial court proceedings. ECF No. 1 ¶
46. To determine whether a stay was appropriate, Defendant Judge Dwyer requested that the
parties provide copies of their appellate briefs and allow for a brief recess so that she could
review Plaintiff’s interlocutory appeals. Id. The parties did so, and after reviewing the appellate
briefs, Defendant Dwyer “hypothesized that Plaintiff would not prevail in his Appeal” and
denied Plaintiff’s motion to stay on this basis. ECF No. 1 ¶ 47. Defendant Judge Dwyer then
found Mr. Rhoe in contempt and ordered that he purge the contempt by submitting to genetic
testing by December 21, 2017. ECF No. 12-2 at 20. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dwyer’s
decision unconstitutionally interfered with his appeals. ECF No. 1 ¶ 47. The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals later dismissed the interlocutory appeals as premature. ECF No. 12-4.
On December 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint and requested an injunction
against the Circuit Court. ECF No. 1. Although Plaintiff did not explicitly state whether he sued
Defendants in their official or individual capacity, he served them at their employment addresses
and the Complaint addresses actions taken by Defendants in their official capacities. ECF No. 1
at 1–3. After filing his federal lawsuit, Mr. Rhoe complied with the Circuit Court’s contempt
order and submitted to genetic testing. ECF No. 12-2 at 21. The Circuit Court then held a child
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support hearing regarding paternity on March 30, 2018. ECF No. 12-2 at 26. At Ms. Perez’s
request, the MCOCSE Defendants withdrew their request for child support and focused solely on
establishing paternity. ECF No. 15-2 at 8–9. The Circuit Court established that Mr. Rhoe is the
father of the minor child. Id. Mr. Rhoe noticed a timely appeal of that order to the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals, which according to the Complaint is currently pending. ECF No. 1 ¶ 5.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff has
the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166
F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). When a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1), “the district court is to regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue, and
may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for
summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United
States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)). The district court should grant the Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving
party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id.
B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
Defendants also move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that
it fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim that survives a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, a complaint, relying on only well-pled factual allegations, must state at least a
“plausible claim for relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The “mere recital of
elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, is not sufficient to
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survive a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th
Cir. 2012). To determine whether a claim has crossed “the line from conceivable to plausible,”
the Court must employ a “context-specific inquiry,” drawing on the court’s “experience and
common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679–80. When performing this inquiry, the Court accepts
“all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in
weighing the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com,
Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court need not, however, accept unsupported legal
allegations, Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), nor must it
agree with legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, or conclusory
factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.
2009).
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Abstention
Younger abstention requires a federal court not to interfere in state proceedings if there is
“(1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding, instituted prior to any substantial progress in the
federal proceeding; that (2) implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests; and (3)
provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claim
advanced in the federal lawsuit.” Moore v. City of Asheville, 396 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2005).
These circumstances exist here. First, the Maryland paternity proceeding—out of which
Plaintiff’s Complaint arises— is ongoing according to the Complaint and was instituted in
January 2016, almost two years before Plaintiff filed his federal suit. ECF No. 1 ¶ 4–5.
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Second, the proceeding implicates vital state interests: the State of Maryland has an
important stake in ensuring that children residing within its borders receive their basic needs
through parental support. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 55 Md. App. 299, 309–310 (1983) (citing
Townsend v. Townsend, 205 Md. 591, 596 (1954)) (“In this paternalistic role, the State imposes
the obligation upon the parents to maintain, care for and protect their children” and the State may
regulate “whenever necessary, and virtually without limitation when children's welfare is at
stake.”). Reading Plaintiff’s papers generously, Mr. Rhoe argues that MCOCSE withdrew its
request for child support, casting doubt on whether it ever had a vital interest in bringing the
paternity complaint. ECF No. 15 at 2. However, this argument is unpersuasive. MCOCSE did
not waive Ms. Perez’s right to seek child support at another time and proving parentage is the
first step that MCOCSE must take to impose obligations on parents to care for and protect their
children. ECF No. 15-2 at 12.
Additionally, the Maryland proceedings provide Plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to
raise the constitutional claims advanced in this lawsuit. In fact, Plaintiff has advanced many of
the same assertions raised here as arguments or defenses in the paternity proceedings. See e.g.,
ECF No. 1-18 at 15 (“My due process of law has been violated” and “You’re getting evidence
from me . . . that I don’t want to give and I don’t have to give”); ECF No. 12-2 at 17 (indicating
to the Circuit Court that Plaintiff did not believe he could be held in contempt); ECF No. 1-25 at
21 (“I had to make a decision between my freedom and my due process of law”); ECF No. 15-2
at 29 (explaining to the Circuit Court why he believed Ms. Perez’s legal status in the United
States relevant as a defense). To the extent that Plaintiff believes his constitutional rights have
been violated by Defendants alleged failure to comply with discovery, ECF No. 1 ¶ 13, he can
raise those concerns within the Maryland proceeding.
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Plaintiff’s argument that Younger abstention should not apply because “Defendants
prosecuted the Plaintiff in bad faith; are part of a pattern of harassment against the Plaintiff and
perhaps thousands of other alleged fathers; and the law being enforced by the Defendants is
utterly and irredeemably unconstitutional,” ECF No. 15 at 2, fails. Plaintiff offers only the bare
assertion, with no plausible supporting factual allegations, to claim that Defendants brought the
paternity complaint against him in bad faith as part of a pattern of harassment. ECF No. 1 ¶ 4. To
be sure, Plaintiff asserts that Enma Perez is “not legally domiciled” in Maryland and that
MCOCSE failed to produce “written representations” made by Ms. Perez about Plaintiff’s
paternity status, ECF No. 1 ¶ 16, but these factual allegations are irrelevant to whether MCOCSE
initiated the paternity action in bad faith, see e.g., Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 5-1002, 5-1010,
5-1011. Further to the extent that Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of § 5-1029(b) of the
Maryland Family Law Code, which mandates that “on the motion of the Administration, a party
to the proceeding, or on its own motion, the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged
father to submit to blood or genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded
as being the father of the child,” Plaintiff’s challenge is now moot because he already submitted
to a genetic test or not yet ripe because he has not alleged facts to transform his fear that his
DNA will be misused, ECF No. 15 at 2, into a concrete, particularized, and imminent injury that
is required for a plaintiff to maintain an action in federal court. Additionally, for the reasons
described in more detail below, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to deny paternity.
For the foregoing reasons this Court will not interfere with the ongoing state court
proceeding from which Plaintiff’s Complaint arises.
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B. Immunity
Even if Younger abstention doctrine did not bar Plaintiff’s Complaint from proceeding,
the Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment and/or absolute judicial immunity would. Under the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state, its agencies, and departments are
immune from suits in federal court brought by its citizens or the citizens of another state, unless
it consents. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). While
the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of cases brought in
state courts, see Md. Code, State Gov’t § 12-202(a), it has not broadly waived its immunity to
suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. See Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 431-32 (4th
Cir. 1995) (noting that “it is well established that an unconsenting State is immune from suits
brought in federal courts by her own citizens....” (internal citations omitted)). MCOCSE is a state
agency, see Md. Code Ann., Hum. Servs. § 2-301, and the claims against it will be dismissed
because it is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
Further, suits for damages against a public employee “in his official capacity” imposes
liability on the public entity, and is also precluded under the Eleventh Amendment where the
state has not consented to be sued in federal court. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72
(1985) (citing Monell v. New York Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (internal
quotation omitted)). Although the Complaint is silent as to whether the allegations are raised
against individual Defendants in their official or personal capacities, or both, Plaintiff served the
Defendants at their places of employment and the allegations revolve around actions taken in
their official capacities. To the extent Mr. Rhoe’s claims against the MCOCSE attorneys and
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Circuit Court judges are made in their official capacities, these claims are tantamount to claims
against the State of Maryland, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and must be dismissed.4
Additionally, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Defendant Circuit Court and the
Defendant judges because of absolute judicial immunity. “[I]t is a general principle of the
highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871).
Judicial immunity applies to any action taken in a judge's judicial capacity. Thus, the only time
judicial immunity does not apply is when the action was not taken in the judge's judicial capacity
or the action, though judicial in nature, was taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. See
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). A judge is acting in
his or her judicial capacity when the function is one “normally performed by a judge” and when
the parties “dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362
(1978). Regarding the issue of jurisdiction, “no immunity is granted if there is clearly no
jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . [and] the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge.”
King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 357 (4th Cir.1992) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
Plaintiff takes a leap of logic to conclude that because Ms. Perez is “not legally domiciled
in the United States,” the Defendants lacked jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 ¶ 16. Even assuming the
truth of Plaintiff’s factual allegation about Ms. Perez’s legal status, as the Court must, that fact
does not ultimately support Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that Defendants lack jurisdiction.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants lack “jurisdiction because the Complaint
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Prosecutors are also absolutely immune from civil liability claims arising from this role in the judicial process, and
this prosecutorial immunity extends to civil cases like child welfare suits. Imbler v. Pachtman, 429 U.S. 409, 422-23
(1976); Ostrzenski v. Siegel, 177 F.3d 245, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1999). Thus, for the reasons described by Defendants,
ECF No. 12-1 at 14–16, prosecutorial immunity also bars Plaintiff’s suit against the MCOCSE Defendants.
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came to the Defendant Circuit Court through an illegal presentation of intervention” is neither
alleged in the Complaint nor relevant given MCOCSE’s right to serve as complainant. Md. Code
Ann., Fam. Law § 5-1011. Reading Plaintiff’s Complaint generously, it also alleges that
Defendant Judge Quick lacked jurisdiction over the MCOCSE Defendant’s contempt petition.
ECF No. 1 ¶ 137. This is plainly incorrect: “The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all
courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due
administration of justice.” Dorsey v. State, 295 Md. 217, 227 (1983) (quoting Ex Parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 22 L.Ed. 205 (1873)). Similarly, based on a generous interpretation of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, it includes an allegation that Defendant Judge Dwyer lacked jurisdiction
when she requested that the parties provided copies of their appellate briefs and allowed for a
brief recess so that she could review Plaintiff’s interlocutory appeals to determine how to rule on
Plaintiff’s motion to stay the trial court proceedings. ECF No. 1 ¶ 47. However, as alleged,
Defendant Judge Dwyer was exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s motion to stay, not
improperly exercising appellate jurisdiction to decide the outcome of Plaintiff’s appeals. Id.
Thus, because all of Plaintiffs claims against the Judges involved their respective judicial
acts for which they had jurisdiction, Mr. Rhoe’s claims against the Judges are barred by absolute
judicial immunity and must be dismissed.
C. Failure to State a Claim
Even assuming Plaintiff’s Complaint did not face various jurisdictional bars, the Court
would be compelled to dismiss it because it fails to state any claims upon which relief can be
granted. A complaint cannot survive a motion to dismiss if it includes only “unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s].” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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“[N]aked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” do not suffice. Id. Although the
Court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as true, the Court is “not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice” and “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
Plaintiff repeatedly asserts the legal conclusion that Defendants violated his constitutional
rights but fails to plead supporting factual allegations. E.g., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 4, 5, 33–37, 46–47.
For example, Plaintiff labels MCOCSE’s contempt petition “frivolous and coercive” and alleges
that it was filed “in retaliation for Plaintiff Rhoe’s appeal and [to] further interfere with his Due
Process of Law.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 33. But this “defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation” is not
supported with factual allegations. Additionally, where the Complaint does assert factual
allegations, those allegations do not lead to the conclusion that Plaintiff’s rights were violated.
For example, as previously explained, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Perez is not legally domiciled in
the United States, but this factual allegation is not relevant to Plaintiff’s constitutional claims.
Ultimately, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to deny paternity or to “terminate
his duties of support under state law for a child that he has fathered, no matter how removed he
may be emotionally from the child.” N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We
cannot imagine that any federal court would agree with plaintiff's principle that the concept of
“procreative privacy” should be stretched to include the constitutional right for a father . . . the
right to deny paternity and deny the duty of financial support.”). Because Plaintiff’s Complaint
hinges on this “novel legal theory” that has “no foundation, no chance of success,” the
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.5
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Plaintiff also alleges violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (Bringing in and Harboring Certain Aliens), 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(Prohibited Activities (Racketeering via Extortion)), and 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (Perjury) but private lawsuits cannot be
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted. A separate Order
shall issue.
Date: December 4, 2018
________/s/__________________
GEORGE J. HAZEL
United States District Judge
maintained under these federal criminal statutes and, in any event, Mr. Rhoe does not plead sufficient elements to
establish any violation. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 14, 16, 20, 26, 29, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 43, 47. Additionally,
Plaintiff repeatedly alleges violations of the “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” which do not apply in the Circuit
Court and which provide no private cause of action. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 29, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39. Moreover, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendment are not
applicable based on the facts Plaintiff alleges, and Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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