Johnson v. The Scott Sears #5563 et al. et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 7/9/2019. (c/m 7/11/19 nu, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JOSEPH PATWYNE JOHNSON,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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TFC SCOTT SEARS #5563,
BARRACK "V" OCEAN GATEWAY,
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Civil Action No. PWG-18-1948
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Defendants.
***
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Joseph Patwyne Johnson, who is representing himself in this suit, is an inmate
currently housed at Eastern Correctional Institution ("ECI") in Westover, Maryland.
this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
S
He brings
1983 against two defendants: Maryland State Police
Trooper Scott Sears and Maryland State Police Barrack V in Berlin, Maryland (collectively,
"Defendants").l
Sears knowingly
CompI., ECF No.1.
and intentionally
In a Complaint filed on June 27, 2018, Johnson alleges that
lied on .the statement-of-charges
application that led to
Johnson's arrest in the Circuit Court for Worcester County, Maryland. Id. at 2-3. Johnson seeks
injunctive, compensatory, and punitive damages. Id. at 3-4.
On September 18, 2018, Sears filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Johnson failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ECF No. 11. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison,
528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the Court informed Johnson that the failure to file a response in
opposition to Sears's Motion could result in dismissal of the Complaint.
ECF No. 12. Johnson
I Johnson has not alleged any acts on the part of Barrack V. To the extent that he seeks
relief from Barrack V for employing Sears, his claims necessarily fail, because the doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply to S 1983 claims. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782
(4th Cir. 2004). Therefore, Barrack V shall be dismissed without prejudice.
opposed the Motion to Dismiss on October 4,2018, and Sears replied on October 19,2018.
ECF
Nos. 14, 15. On November 16,2018, Johnson filed a Motion for Leave to File Surreply along with
a proposed surreply. ECF No. 18. That motion is granted nunc pro tunc, and Johnson's attachment
has been construed as a surreply.
A hearing is not necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons that follow, Sears's Motion
to Dismiss shall be denied without prejudice.
Background
Johnson alleges that on June 13, 2016, Sears came before a Maryland district court
commissioner and knowingly and intentionally lied on a statement of charges application in order
to obtain an arrest warrant for Johnson.
Compi. 2, ECF No. 1.2 Subsequently, Johnson was
arrested and held without bond. Id. According to Johnson, Sears also lied before the grand jury,
leading to Johnson's indictment in Case No. 23-K-16-000247 ("Case No. 247") for the charges of
first-degree attempted murder, second-degree attempted murder, first-degree assault, seconddegree assault, reckless endangerment, illegal possession of a firearm, use of a firearm in a crime
of violence, disorderly conduct, and malicious destruction of property. Id. Johnson states that on
August 3, 2016, the charges of first- and second-degree attempted murder, first- and second-degree
assault, and use of a firearm in a crime of violence were nolle prossed. Id. at 3. He also states that
on October 13,2016, the prosecutor nolle prossed the remaining charges. Id.
On April 2, 2017, Johnson was indicted on the same charges, but involving a different
victim, in Case No. C-23-CR-17-000150
("Case No. ISO").
A trial in that case resulted in
Johnson's convictions. See ECF No. 11-2.
On November 13,2017, Johnson filed a complaint in this Court, challenging his conviction
2
All references to exhibits reflect their electronic pagination.
2
and sentence in Case No. 150. Johnson v. Sears (Johnson 1), No. PWG-17-3381.
Johnson
similarly alleged that Sears lied in the statement-of-charges application that led to his arrest. Id. I
dismissed Johnson's complaint because the relief sought-suspension
defendants-is
and investigation of the
a form or relief that is unavailable, as "Johnson has no legally protected interest in
the prosecution of others." See Mem. Gp. 2, Johnson I (Dec. 20,2017), ECF 4. I also ruled that
monetary relief was unavailable to Johnson based on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
because "[t]he state court docket shows that Johnson was convicted of offenses in the Circuit
Court for [Worcester]
County" and, "considering
he was improperly recharged-
Johnson's
allegations
in this Court-that
'ajudgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.'"
Id. at 2-3 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). I dismissed
Johnson's complaint without prejudice. Id. at 3.
In the instant case, Johnson alleges he was improperly jailed for 43 days because Sears lied
to have him arrested in Case No. 247. CompI. 3.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a complaint in light of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6), the
Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the facts and
reasonable
inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418,420
See
(4th Cir. 2005); Ibarra v. United States, 120
F.3d 472,474 (4th Cir. 1997). To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'''
Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
3
Id.
Although courts should construe pleadings of self-represented
litigants liberally, Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), unsupported legal conclusions and conclusory factual allegations
devoid of any reference to actual events do not suffice, see Revene v. Charles Cty. Comm'rs, 882
F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989); United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847
(4th Cir. 1979).
Analysis
In his Motion to Dismiss, Sears argues that Johnson "apparently misunderstood the effect"
of the Court's dismissal of the previous complaint "without prejudice," as he "has once again
brought suit prematurely" against Sears. Def.'s Mem. 4, ECF No. 11-1. Sears contends that
injunctive relief is still not available to Johnson, and that under Heck, Johnson may bring a claim
for damages only if and when his conviction is overturned and re-trial is not available. ld. Sears
further avers that because Johnson's conviction in Case No. 150 is presently on appeal, this aspect
of Johnson's Complaint is premature and must be dismissed. ld.
In Johnson's
response in opposition to Sears's Motion, he clarifies that his present
Complaint relates to Case No. 247 and not Case No. 150. Opp'n, ECF No. 14. Johnson thus
argues that Sears's Motion is unrelated and has no merit. ld. at 2.
In Sears's reply to Johnson's response, he urges this Court to reject Johnson's contentions,
arguing that the principles of Heck still apply because the first set of charges in Case No. 247 were
dismissed not because of a lack of probable cause, but because of a mistake. Reply 3, ECF No.
15. According to Sears, the second set of charges in Case No. 150 constituted a continuation of
the same criminal proceeding and "[t]he mere fact that Cpl. Sears made a mistake the first time he
charged Plaintiff should not create civil liability when the new set of charges resulted in a
conviction."
Id. Sears further argues that Johnson should not be allowed to challenge Sears's
4
actions unless the convictions are reversed on appeal. Id. at 4.
Construing the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most
favorable to Johnson, the claims presently before the Court do not appear to be barred by Heck.
"Heck held that a prisoner may not file suit under S 1983 as long as a S 1983 judgment in his favor
would imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction."
Owens v. BaIt. City State's Attorneys
Office, 767 F.3d 379, 391 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). Here, Johnson was never
convicted in Case No. 247, despite serving 43 days in jail. AS 1983 judgment in his favor would
not invalidate any conviction.
Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that the statute
of limitations on a plaintiff s S 1983 claim commences when the plaintiff knows or has reason to
know of his injury, or "at the date of the nolle prosequi."
Id. at 392. Johnson's Complaint was
timely filed on June 27, 2018. Accordingly, the Complaint survives Sears's Motion to Dismiss.
In light of the foregoing, Sears's Motion to Dismiss shall be denied without prejudice.
Sears shall be directed to file a responsive pleading addressing Johnson's claims relating to Case
No. 247.
Conclusion
Barrack V is dismissed from this suit and Sears's Motion to Dismiss is denied without
prejudice.
Sears is granted 28 days to file a resp
Order follows.
Date
5
've pleading as directed herein. A separate
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