Guzman v. KP Stoneymill, Inc. et al

Filing 96

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 87 MOTION for Attorney Fees and Costs filed by Raul Hernandez Guzman Signed by: Judge Magistrate Judge Ajmel Ahsen Quereshi on 3/11/2025. (c/m 3/11/2025 ybs, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
(SOUTHERN DIVISION)
RAUL HERNANDEZ GUZMAN,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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KP STONEYMILL, INC., et al.,

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Defendants.

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Case No. 8:20-cv-2410-PX

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a case concerning a restaurant’s failure to adequately pay one of its employees
according to state and federal law. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Raul Hernandez Guzman’s
unopposed Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, ECF No. 87, referred to the undersigned’s
Chambers by the Honorable Paula Xinis, ECF No. 93. For the reasons explained below, I
recommend that the Motion be partially granted: the fee award should be reduced to $91,335.00
to comport with the rates specified in Appendix B to this Court’s Local Rules, whereas the full
amount of costs requested, $15,055.31, should be awarded. This results in a total of $106,390.31.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are detailed in Judge Xinis’s Memorandum Opinion. ECF No. 67, at
1-3. Accordingly, this Report and Recommendation will address only those facts relevant to the
present Motion.
Plaintiff worked as a cook at two restaurants operated by Defendants KP Wheaton Inc. and
KP Stoneymill, Inc., which are owned by Daesung Ji. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
failed to pay him the required minimum wage and overtime for the duration of his employment,

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and that neither restaurant posted required information informing employees about their rights
under the law. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff brought the present suit in August 2020 against both corporate Defendants and
Mr. Ji, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., the
Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”), Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-419, and the
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl.
§§ 3-503 & 3-505. Id.; ECF No. 1, at 5-8. Defendants retained counsel and answered the
Complaint. ECF Nos. 6, 9. Numerous issues arose throughout discovery, ECF No. 53, at 1-5,
ultimately resulting in the imposition of sanctions against Defendants, ECF No. 60.
In the midst of these discovery issues, Defendants’ counsel withdrew from the case and Mr.
Ji filed for personal bankruptcy, resulting in a stay of the case against him. ECF No. 67, at 2-3,
2 n.2. Although the Court provided Defendants time to obtain new counsel, no new counsel
entered an appearance, and Defendants failed to submit any additional filings despite repeated
notice of the proceedings via mail. Id. Following these developments, the Clerk entered default
against Defendants in January 2023. ECF No. 61. Plaintiff subsequently moved for default
judgment, which the Court granted. ECF Nos. 67, 68. In a January 22, 2024, Order, Judge Xinis
directed Plaintiff to file a petition for attorneys’ fees and costs. ECF No. 68. Plaintiff filed his
Motion on March 6, 2024. ECF No. 87. Defendants have not filed an opposition to the Motion,
though they have had more than a year to do so.
In his Motion, Plaintiff requests $106,495.50 in attorney’s fees and $15,055.31 in costs.
ECF No. 87. In support, Plaintiff has submitted: his attorney’s—Melehy & Associates LLC’s—
contemporaneous billing records, ECF No. 87-3; the Affidavit of Omar Vincent Melehy, ECF
No. 87-4; the Affidavit of Bill Day, Esquire, an attorney operating in the same field, ECF No. 87-5;

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the Affidavit of Suvita Melehy, ECF No. 87-6; the Retainer Agreement for this case, ECF
No. 87-7; records of the costs incurred in this case, ECF No. 87-8; a Wolters and Kluwer survey
of rates charged in similar cases, ECF No. 87-9; the Affidavit of Emily Wilson, a paralegal who
worked on this case, ECF No. 87-10; the Legal Services Index (“LSI”) Adjustment of Appendix B
hourly rates, ECF No. 87-11; a copy of the Fitzpatrick Matrix, ECF No. 87-12; and the Affidavit
of Joe Espo, another attorney operating in the same field, ECF No. 87-13.
On February 11, 2025, this case was referred to my Chambers for the limited purpose of
preparing a Report and Recommendation on the pending Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs.
ECF No. 93.
ANALYSIS
“Prevailing plaintiffs in wage and hour disputes are entitled to recover their attorneys’ fees
and legal expenses” under the FLSA and MWHL. Velasquez Flores v. Elite Com. Cleaning, LLC,
No. AAQ-20-3600, 2024 WL 916250, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2024). Both statutes provide that the
Court “shall” award “reasonable” attorney’s fees and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (FLSA); Md. Code
Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-427(d)(1)(iii) (MWHL). The MWPCL provides courts with discretion in
awarding attorney’s fees and costs. Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-507(b)(1) (“[T]he court may
award . . . reasonable counsel fees and other costs.”). In all circumstances, “the amount of such
fees ‘is within the sound discretion of the trial court.’” Velasquez Flores, 2024 WL 916250, at *2
(quoting Lippe v. TJML, LLC, No. DKC-12-260, 2013 WL 5234230, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 13,
2013)).
For this case, the proper award amounts to $91,335.00 in attorney’s fees and $15,055.31 in
costs. The Court addresses both below.
I.

Attorney’s Fees

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“To properly calculate an attorney’s fees award, courts undertake a three-step process:
(1) determine a lodestar figure; (2) subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated
to successful ones; and (3) evaluate the degree of success of the plaintiffs.”

Randolph v.

PowerComm Constr., Inc., 780 F. App’x 16, 21 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). “Once a fee request
is submitted, it becomes the responsibility of the party challenging the request to articulate the
areas where an award would be inappropriate.”

Barnes v. NCC Bus. Servs., LLC,

No. PJM-18-1473, 2019 WL 4141012, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 2019). “[T]he Court will not review
any challenged entry in the bill unless the challenging party has identified it specifically and given
an adequate explanation for the basis of the challenge.” Id. (quoting Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev., No. MGJ-95-309, 2002 WL 31777631, at *10 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2002)).
To determine the lodestar figure, the Court “multipl[ies] the number of reasonable hours
expended times a reasonable rate.” McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009)). In determining the
reasonableness of billing rates and hours worked to be used in the lodestar calculation, the Fourth
Circuit has directed courts to consider the following factors originally set forth in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (the “Johnson factors”):
(1) The time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the
attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee
for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the
time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in
controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of
the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which
the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between
attorney and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.
McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88 & n.5. This task “should not result in a second major litigation,” Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983), and courts need not “become . . . accountants” to

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determine the proper award, Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). “The essential goal in shifting
fees . . . is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Id.
Though Plaintiff’s Motion is unopposed, the determination of what constitutes a
“reasonable” number of hours and hourly rate remains a matter within the Court’s discretion. See,
e.g., Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 211 (4th Cir. 2005) (“We have made it clear that the
determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee award is a decision for the district court to make, and
the district court has broad discretion in that regard[.]”); First Mariner Bank v. ADR L. Group,
P.C., No. MJG-12-1133, 2015 WL 5255275, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2015) (“District courts have
wide discretion to determine the amount of legal fees upon a determination that a case is
exceptional.”). Accordingly, the Court will first review the rates and hours included in Plaintiff’s
Motion, and then will conclude with a final review of the lodestar figure.
A.

Reasonable Rates
“A fee applicant is obliged to show that the[ir] requested hourly rates” are reasonable, in

that they “are consistent with ‘the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type
of work for which [they] seek an award.’” McAfee, 738 F.3d at 91 (quoting Plyler v. Evatt, 902
F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990)). The fee applicant bears the burden of proving reasonableness.
Robinson, 560 F.3d at 244. In this District, the Court’s market knowledge is “embedded in”
Appendix B to this Court’s Local Rules, which provides presumptively reasonable hourly rates
tied to an attorney’s years of experience. Gonzalez v. Caron, No. CBD-10-2188, 2011 WL
3886979, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 2, 2011); see D. Md. Local R. App. B(3). While enhancements
above the guideline rates are atypical, id., significant upward departures may be warranted in
particular circumstances, Ramnarine v. Rainbow Child Dev. Ctr., Inc., No. PWG-17-2261, 2022
WL 16709764, at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 4, 2022). For example, higher rates could be appropriate if,

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among other things, counsel took on representation of a party who may not otherwise be able to
find legal representation, the litigation established new important legal precedent, or the case
involved complex issues with multiple parties. Id.
Plaintiff proposes the following rates for the involved attorneys, all are greater than those
in Appendix B: (1) Omar Vincent Melehy, who has 37 years of experience, at $625 per hour;
(2) Suvita Melehy, who has 28 years of experience, at $575 per hour; (3) Andrew Balashov, who
has 8 years of experience, at $350 per hour, and (4) paralegals and paraprofessionals at $180 per
hour. ECF No. 87-1, at 4-5. In contrast, Appendix B provides the following ranges: $300-$475
per hour for an attorney with more than 20 years of experience, covering both Mr. and Ms. Melehy;
$165-$300 per hour for an attorney with 5 to 8 years of experience like Mr. Balashov; and
$95-$150 per hour for paralegal and paraprofessional work. D. Md. Local R. App. B(3).
An upward departure from the guidelines is not warranted here because this is a typical
wage and hour case. Importantly, the Court does not find—and Plaintiff does not contend—that
this case was particularly novel or complex. ECF No. 87-1, at 23 (stating “this case did not present
any truly novel or difficult questions”). Although the litigation presented procedural challenges—
such as discovery disputes, the bankruptcy of a Defendant, and the abandonment of the litigation
by the remaining corporate Defendants—each was standard and familiar to experienced wage and
hour counsel. See id. Further, many of “Plaintiff’s motions, including the present one, have been
unopposed, which has reduced the possibility that the[] motions would be denied.” Original Dells,
Inc. v. Soul 1 Ent. Grp., TDC-23-95, 2025 WL 35927, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2025). Nevertheless,
the Court recognizes that pressing litigation under such circumstances presents its own difficulties.
See id. However, the proper way to address those issues is to compensate counsel for that time,
not to apply an upward adjustment of the hourly rates.

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Plaintiff raises several arguments supporting an upward departure. None are convincing,
and most have been addressed numerous times within this District. See Camara v. Black Diamond
Rest., LLC, No. AAQ-23-1782, 2024 WL 4644635, at *3-6 (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2024). Specifically,
Plaintiff advocates that: Appendix B rates should be adjusted for inflation, ECF No. 87, at 3-6,
8-10; Judges in this District have utilized higher rates in other circumstances, id. at 4, 6, 23-26;
and supporting affidavits from legal practitioners in the area, combined with an industry survey,
suggest higher rates are customary, id. at 6, 8. Each of these arguments has been “previously (and
recently) rejected.” Camara, 2024 WL 4644635, at *4 (quoting Fowler v. Tenth Planet, Inc., No.
JRR-21-2430, 2024 WL 3738347, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2024)) (addressing each of the preceding
arguments). In brief, although the Court acknowledges the increase in the rate of inflation, and
further takes note of “affidavits and survey as useful datapoints, they do not supersede Appendix
B’s authority given the routine nature of this case.” Id. at *5.
Plaintiff points to several instances where his counsel was awarded higher rates, but most
are distinguishable. Several involve multiple plaintiffs, which merit a higher award, but this case
has only one plaintiff. ECF No. 87-1, at 23-25 (citing Quijano v. Mizpah Build. Servs., LLC,
No. PJM-19-38 (D. Md.) (multiple plaintiffs); Boyd v. SFS Comms., LLC, No. PJM-15-3068 (D.
Md.) (Rule 23 class action); Alvarenga v. CCC USA LLC, No. DLB-22-283 (D. Md.) (multiple
plaintiffs); Butler v. PP&G, Inc., No. JRR-20-3084 (D. Md.) (FLSA collective action)). Others
entail fees agreed upon through settlement, a situation which warrants higher rates due to the
consent of the parties. Id. at 25 (citing Black v. Commodore Mgmt., No. TDC-23-864 (D. Md.);
Hernandez Velasquez v. Nelson Precast Prods. LLC, No. LKG-21-2814 (D. Md)). Although one
case presents similar circumstances, id. at 24 (citing Orellana v. ACL Contractors, DKC-19-2318
(D. Md.)), far more support application of rates within Appendix B’s ranges in cases like this one.

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See Guillen v. Armour Home Improvement, Inc., No. DLB-19-2317, 2024 WL 1346838, at *3 (D.
Md. Mar. 29, 2024). Indeed, there is a “clear consensus among judges in this district in [wage and
hour] fee petition decisions . . . that the Guidelines rates are reasonable—including in cases
involving [Plaintiff’s counsel].”

Id. (citing De Parades v. Zen Nail Studio, LLC,

No. TDC-20-2432, 2023 WL 8235753, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 28, 2023); Carrera v. EMD Sales, Inc.,
No. JKB-17-3066, 2021 WL 3856287, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2021); Ramnarine, 2022 WL
16709764, at *7). Decisions from this Court as recently as October 2024 underscore this point.
Camara, 2024 WL 4644635, at *3-6.
Although the conditions warranting increased rates are not present here, the Court
recognizes Plaintiff’s attorney’s wealth of experience and skill; thus, the Court recommends
application of rates at the top end of Appendix B’s respective ranges: $475 per hour for Mr. Melehy
and Ms. Melehy, $300 per hour for Mr. Balashov, and $150 per hour for paralegals and
paraprofessionals. 1 The Court notes, as it did in Camara, that this conclusion is limited to this
particular case—“[a] departure, even a significant one, may be appropriate in a different case.”
2024 WL 4644635, at *6.
B.

Time and Labor Expended
In support of their Motion, Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted an itemized list of hours and

expenses along with a description for each entry explaining how the time was spent. ECF No.
87-3. As noted above, it is “the responsibility of the party challenging the request to articulate
areas where an award would be inappropriate,” Barnes, 2019 WL 4141012, at *2. “[T]he Court
will not review any challenged entry in the bill unless the challenging party has identified it

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Plaintiff proposes that the Court adjust Appendix B rates for inflation using the Legal Services
Index. ECF No. 87-1, at 8-10. Because the Court declines to make an adjustment, it need not
assess the particular methodology proposed.
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specifically and given an adequate explanation for the basis of the challenge,” Thompson, 2002
WL 31777631, at *10. As Plaintiff’s Motion is unopposed and the Court has been given no reason
to question the accuracy of Plaintiff’s request, the Court is under no obligation to assess each entry
in counsel’s time records. Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court has reviewed
the hours.
The documented tasks and time allotted to each phase of litigation appear reasonable,
particularly in light of the many procedural challenges encountered in this litigation and the
numerous hours counsel no charged upon review. ECF No. 87-3, at 1 (summarizing the total
number of hours spent on each phase of the litigation, as well as the total hours sought after no
charges). Counsel reports the following totals, excluding no-charged time:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Pre-Filing Factual Investigation: 3.9 hours
Drafting Pleadings and Service: 6.4 hours
General Client Communication and Case Management: 20.8 hours
Written Discovery and Depositions: 101.4 hours
Calculating Damages: 20.8 hours
Settlement Discussions and ADR: 2.7 hours
Interpretation: 28.9 hours
Fee Petition and Quarterly Reports: 11.8 hours
Discovery Disputes and Discovery Motions: 30.7 hours
Motions Practice: 16.8 hours
Ji Bankruptcy: 76.2 hours
Post Judgment Collection: 7.2 hours

ECF No. 87-3, at 1. Counsel provides an overview of the allocation of time in the Motion and
gives specific detail for each time entry in its records document, adequately supporting their
request. ECF No. 87-1, at 12-22; ECF No. 87-3.
C.

Lodestar Calculation
Equipped with the reasonable rates and reasonable hours expended, the Court determines

the lodestar figure by multiplying them together:

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Timekeeper
Omar Melehy
Suvita Melehy
Andrew Balashov
Paralegals/Paraprofessionals

Reasonable Rate
$475
$475
$300
$150

Total Lodestar

$91,335

Reasonable Hours 2
0.4
50.0
172.10
105.10

Lodestar
$190.00
$23,750.00
$51,630.00
$15,765.00

Given that most of the Johnson factors are “subsumed in the rate and hour analysis,”
Andrade v. Aerotek, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 637, 646 (D. Md. 2012), there is no need to adjust this
award further. Plaintiff succeeded on his claims, managing to recover $44,374.08 in actual
damages and $44,374.08 in liquidated damages. ECF No. 67, at 9-11. “As discussed above, a
review of Plaintiff’s time records does not reveal any overly redundant, excessive, or unnecessary
billing beyond that which has been subtracted from the fee award.” Saman v. LBDP, Inc.,
No. DKC-12-1083, 2013 WL 6410846, at *8 (D. Md. Dec. 6, 2023). For these reasons, I
recommend that the Court award the full lodestar of $91,335 without any additional downward
departures.
II.

Costs

A prevailing FLSA plaintiff may recover costs for “reasonable litigation expenses” subject
to the Court’s discretion. Jones v. Dancel, 792 F.3d 395, 404 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Daly v. Hill,
790 F.2d 1071, 1084(4th Cir. 1986)); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Roy v. Cnty. of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533,
549 (4th Cir. 1998). However, “[c]ourts may deny costs if supported by ‘good reason,’” like
“misconduct by the prevailing party . . . [or] excessiveness of the costs in a particular case.”
Ramnarine, 2022 WL 16709764, at *15 (first quoting Ellis v Grant Thornton LLP, 434 Fed. App’x

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The total number of hours worked per timekeeper is drawn from Plaintiff’s supplemental filing,
ECF No. 95-1.
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232, 235 (4th Cir. 2011), then quoting U.S. EEOC v. Enoch Pratt Library, No. PX-17-2860, 2022
WL 4017294, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 2, 2022)).
In addition to attorney’s fees, Plaintiff also seeks reimbursement for the following costs in
this litigation: (1) $400.20 in filing fees; (2) $236.15 to conduct online research; (3) $2,650.90 for
photocopies; (4) $108.12 in postage; (5) $4,915.55 for the services of court reporters for
depositions; (6) $2,050.00 for the services of interpreters; (7) $219.30 for document retrieval from
Bank of America; and (8) $4,475.09 for costs associated with Mr. Ji’s bankruptcy, including online
research fees. ECF No. 87-8, at 1-4. In total, Plaintiff requests $15,551.31. Given their failure to
respond, Defendants do not oppose any of these requests. All costs will be awarded because each
item is a “reasonable out-of-pocket expense[] incurred by the attorney which are normally charged
to a fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services.” Spell v. McDaniel, 852 F.2d 762,
771 (4th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has provided detailed supporting documentation for each expense
and explained how they relate to the case. ECF No. 87-8; ECF No. 87-4, at 8-9. The costs are not
excessive; accordingly, after reviewing the itemized records, the Court is satisfied that each
requested expense is duly compensable. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to recover $15,055.31 in costs.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Fees and
Costs be partially granted in the amount of $91,335 in fees and $15,0551.31 in costs, for a total of
$106,390.31.
Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed within fourteen
(14) days, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and Local Rule 301.5(b).
Date: March 11, 2025

________/s/______________
Ajmel A. Quereshi
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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