Omaha Property Manager, LLC v. Mustafa et al

Filing 197

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby on 3/7/2025. (ols, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
)
OMAHA PROPERTY MANAGER, LLC, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
KAMAL MUSTAFA, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

Civil Action No. 22-cv-001623-LKG
Dated: March 7, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

INTRODUCTION
In this civil action, the Plaintiff, Omaha Property Manager, LLC, a Delaware limited

liability company (“Delaware Omaha”), asserts claims for injurious falsehood – disparagement
of title, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and civil conspiracy,
against the Defendants Kamal Mustafa, Sidikatu Raji, Omaha Property Manager, LLC, a
Maryland limited liability company (“Maryland Omaha”), Omaha Property Manager, LLC, an
Illinois limited liability company (“Illinois Omaha”) and NDF1, LLC (“NDF1”), a Maryland
limited liability company (Defendants Maryland Omaha, Illinois Omaha and NDF1 are referred
herein collectively as the “Corporate Defendants”), arising from the Defendants’ issuance of
fraudulent deeds for certain properties owned by Delaware Omaha. See generally ECF No. 2.
Delaware Omaha has moved for summary judgment in its favor on these claims and for a
permanent injunction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. ECF Nos. 163 and 163-1. The motion is
fully briefed. ECF Nos. 163, 163-1, 166, 167, 167-1, 168 and 171.
In addition, the Defendants have filed the following motions: (1) Defendant Mustafa’s
motion for leave to file a response to the Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts (ECF No. 174),
(2) Defendant Raji’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 195) and (3) Defendant Raji’s motion to stay
pending appeal (ECF No. 196). ECF Nos. 174, 195 and 196. No hearing is necessary to resolve
these motions. L.R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023).
For the reasons that follow, the Court: (1) GRANTS Delaware Omaha’s motion for
summary judgment and permanent injunction (ECF No. 163); (2) AWARDS Delaware Omaha

special damages in an amount to be determined by the Court; (3) AWARDS Delaware Omaha
punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the Court; (4) ENTERS a PERMANENT
INJUNCTION enjoining the Defendants from: (a) filing any fraudulent deeds asserting
ownership or transfer of ownership relating to properties that are lawfully owned by Delaware
Omaha; (b) making any public misrepresentation that the Defendants have any interest in the
properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (c) entering or coming within 100 yards of the
premises of any properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (d) listing any of the properties
lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha for sale; and (e) renting to and/or installing tenants in any
of the properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (5) DENIES-as-MOOT Defendant
Mustafa’s motion for leave to file a response and statement of undisputed facts (ECF No. 174);
(6) DENIES-as-MOOT Defendant Raji’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 195); and (7) DENIESas-MOOT Defendant Raji’s motion to stay pending appeal (ECF No. 196).
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1

A. Factual Background
In this civil action, Delaware Omaha asserts Maryland tort claims for injurious falsehood
– disparagement of title (Count I), intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
(Count II) and civil conspiracy (Count III), against the Defendants, arising from the Defendants’
issuance of fraudulent deeds for certain properties owned by Delaware Omaha. See generally
ECF No. 2. As relief, Delaware Omaha seeks, among other things, to recover monetary damages
and punitive damages from the Defendants, attorneys’ fees and costs, and a permanent injunction
enjoining the Defendants from: (a) filing any fraudulent deeds asserting ownership or transfer of
ownership relating to properties that are lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (b) making any
public misrepresentation that the Defendants have any interest in the properties lawfully owned
by Delaware Omaha; (c) entering or coming within 100 yards of the premises of any properties
lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (d) listing any of the properties lawfully owned by
Delaware Omaha for sale; and (e) renting to and/or installing tenants in any of the properties
lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha. ECF No. 163-2.

The facts recited in this memorandum opinion are taken from the complaint; the joint record; Delaware
Omaha’s motion for summary judgment and permanent injunction, the memorandum in support thereof,
and the exhibits attached thereto. ECF Nos. 2, 2-1, 163, 163-1, 163-2 and 173. Unless otherwise stated,
the facts recited herein are undisputed.
1

2

The Parties
Plaintiff Delaware Omaha is a Delaware limited liability company, with its principal
place of business located in Chicago, Illinois. ECF No. 2 at ¶ 1.
Defendant Kamal Mustafa is a resident of Boyds, Maryland and the owner of Defendants
Maryland Omaha, Illinois Omaha and NDF1. Id. at ¶ 2. Defendant Mustafa is neither employed
by, nor affiliated with, Delaware Omaha. ECF No. 173 (Joint Record) at 23 (22:19-23).
Defendant Sidikatu Raji is a resident of Frederick, Maryland and a realtor for a real estate
company. ECF No. 2 at ¶¶ 3 and 51.
Defendant Maryland Omaha is a Maryland limited liability company, with its principal
place of business located in Boyds, Maryland. Id. at ¶ 4.
Defendant Illinois Omaha is an Illinois limited liability company, with its principal
place of business located in Boyds, Maryland. Id. at ¶ 5.
Defendant NDF1 is a Maryland limited liability company, with its principal place of
business located in Bowie, Maryland. Id. at ¶ 6.
Delaware Omaha And The Defendants’ Entities
The facts in this case are largely undisputed and are as follows. Delaware Omaha was
formed on June 11, 2020, under the name, Omaha Property Manager, LLC, for the purpose of
purchasing residential properties during lawful foreclosure sales and reselling those properties
to interested buyers. ECF No. 173 at 14 (13:20-21) and 129-31.
On July 10, 2020, Defendant Mustafa registered Defendant NDF1 in the state of
Maryland. Id. at 140-43. On November 18, 2021, Defendant Mustafa registered Defendant
Illinois Omaha in the state of Illinois under the name, Omaha Property Manager LLC. Id. at
26-27 (25:15-26:11) and 136-39. On December 4, 2020, Defendant Mustafa registered
Defendant Maryland Omaha in the state of Maryland under the name, Omaha Property
Manager, LLC. Id. at 25-26 (24:23-25:14) and 132-35. Defendants Maryland Omaha, Illinois
Omaha and NDF1 have no connection to Delaware Omaha. Id. at 21 and 27 (20:15-18 and
26:12-19).
The Properties
Between September 2020 and May 2021, Delaware Omaha acquired four properties
through lawful Maryland foreclosure actions (the “Properties”). Id. at 16 (15:6-14), 27-29
(26:20-28:16), 40 (39:9-19), 45 (44:24-46:14) and 147-68.
3

First, on September 15, 2020, Delaware Omaha purchased a property located at 1537
Havilland Place, Frederick, Maryland 21702 (“Havilland Place Property”) at a foreclosure sale
for $261,000. Id. at 40 (39:9-19) and 147-52. The Circuit Court for Frederick County, Maryland
ratified the sale of the Havilland Place Property on or about November 19, 2020. Id. at 248. A
substitute trustee’s deed was executed, which conveyed the property to Delaware Omaha on
December 10, 2020. Id. at 40-42 (39:20-41:23) and 147-52. Delaware Omaha recorded the deed
for the Havilland Place Property in the official records of Frederick County, Maryland on or
about February 22, 2021. Id. at 248-49.
Second, on December 2, 2020, Delaware Omaha purchased a property located at 14611
Bubbling Spring Road, Boyds, Maryland 20841 (“Bubbling Spring Property”) at a foreclosure
sale for $600,000. Id. at 16 (15:6-14) and 153-58. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Maryland ratified the sale on July 16, 2021. Id. at 245; ECF No. 2-1, Ex. B. On or about July
22, 2021, a fee simple trustee’s deed was executed, which conveyed the Bubbling Spring
Property to Delaware Omaha. ECF No. 173 at 16-19 (15:18-18:15) and 153-58. Delaware
Omaha recorded the deed in the official records of Montgomery County, Maryland on or about
November 4, 2021. Id. at 245.
Third, on March 2, 2021, Delaware Omaha purchased a home located at 4800 Hamilton
Street, Hyattsville, Maryland (“Hamilton Street Property”) at a foreclosure sale for $400,000. Id.
at 27-29 (26:20-28:16) and 159-62. On or about April 27, 2021, a substitute trustee’s deed was
executed, which conveyed the Hamilton Street Property to Delaware Omaha. Id. at 29-32
(28:17-31:2) and 159-62. Delaware Omaha recorded the deed in the official records of Prince
George’s County, Maryland on or about May 17, 2021. Id. at 253.
Fourth, on May 4, 2021, Delaware Omaha purchased the property located at 5516
Vantage Point Road, Columbia, Maryland 21044 (“Vantage Point Property”) for $299,250. Id.
at 45-46 (44:24-45:14) and 163-68. The Circuit Court for Howard County, Maryland ratified the
sale of the Vantage Point Property on or about September 3, 2021. Id. at 249. On September 15,
2021, a substitute trustee’s deed was executed, which conveyed the Vantage Point Property to
Delaware Omaha. Id. at 46-48 (45:15-47:22) and 163-68. Delaware Omaha recorded the deed
in the official records of Howard County, Maryland on or about February 22, 2021. Id. at 24950.

4

The Defendants’ Attempt To Sell And Lease Properties Owned By Delaware Omaha
In late 2021 and 2022, the Defendants made several attempts to sell and rent the
Properties owned by Delaware Omaha. On or about November 24, 2021, Defendant Mustafa
executed a deed purporting to transfer ownership of the Bubbling Spring Property to Defendant
NDF1. Id. at 21-22 (20:19-21:12) and 172-76. Although Delaware Omaha held title to the
Bubbling Spring Property at the time, Defendant Mustafa’s deed represented that Maryland
Omaha and/or Illinois Omaha owned the property. Id. at 172-76. The deed for the Bubbling
Spring Property was recorded in the official records of Montgomery County, Maryland on or
about December 10, 2021. Id. at 246-47.
In March 2022, Delaware Omaha learned that someone unaffiliated with Delaware Omaha
was claiming to be the lawful owner of the Bubbling Spring Property. Id. at 20 (19:15-20).
Specifically, Delaware Omaha became aware of the Defendants’ efforts to claim ownership of
the Bubbling Springs Property, after the couple who previously owned the property—before
Delaware Omaha purchased it through the foreclosure sale—filed for bankruptcy and continued
to occupy the property. Id. at 20-21 (19:21-20:1). When Delaware Omaha requested that the
Bankruptcy Court lift a stay, so that Delaware Omaha could pursue an eviction action against the
couple, the couple objected on the basis that Defendant NDFI, rather than Delaware Omaha,
owned the Bubbling Spring Property. Id. at 21 (20:2-6).
To support their claim, the couple produced an Affidavit in the bankruptcy proceeding
that was dated March 16, 2022, and signed by Defendant Mustafa, swearing that Defendants
Maryland Omaha and Illinois Omaha owned the Bubbling Spring Property. Id. at 169-71. And
so, on March 30, 2022, Delaware Omaha filed a verified complaint with the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, Maryland to quiet title, seeking a declaration of Delaware Omaha’s
lawful acquisition of the Bubbling Spring Property. Id. at 177-89.
On April 26, 2022, approximately one month after Delaware Omaha filed the quiet title
action for the Bubbling Spring Property, Defendant Mustafa executed a deed purporting to
transfer ownership of the Havilland Place Property to Defendant NDF1. Id. at 43-45 (42:444:19) and 194-201. This deed was recorded in the official records of Frederick County,
Maryland on or about May 3, 2022. Id. at 249. And so, on June 10, 2022, Delaware Omaha
filed a verified complaint with the Circuit Court for Frederick County, Maryland to quiet title
for the Havilland Place Property. Id. at 202-12.
5

On April 26, 2022, Defendant Mustafa executed another deed, purporting to transfer
ownership of the Hamilton Street Property to Defendant NDF1. Id. at 228-31. The deed for the
Hamilton Street Property was recorded in the official records of Prince George’s County,
Maryland on or about May 17, 2022. Id. at 250. And so, on July 29, 2022, Delaware Omaha
filed a verified complaint with the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland to quiet
title. Id. at 232-42.
On May 5, 2022, Defendant Mustafa executed a third deed, purporting to transfer
ownership of the Vantage Point Property to Defendant NDF1. Id. at 213-16. The deed for the
Vantage Point Property was recorded in the official records of Howard County, Maryland on or
about May 6, 2022. Id. at 250. And so, on June 10, 2022, Delaware Omaha filed a verified
complaint with the Circuit Court for Howard County, Maryland to quiet title. Id. at 217-27.
On or about May 13, 2022, Delaware Omaha was alerted that Defendants Mustafa and
Maryland Omaha were attempting to sell the Hamilton Street Property to third-party buyers for
$250,000 with “good and marketable and insurable title.” Id. at 32 (31:17-23), 190-93 and 253.
But the sale of the Hamilton Street Property fell through when the title company discovered that
Delaware Omaha was the rightful owner of the property. Id. at 36-37 (35:21-36:5).
On or about May 25, 2022, a real estate agent employed by Delaware Omaha received a
call from Defendant Raji, who stated that her real estate company had taken over the listing for
the Havilland Place Property and demanded that Delaware Omaha’s listing for the property be
removed. Id. at 251 ¶ 39. When Delaware Omaha’s real estate agent refused to remove the
listing, Defendant Mustafa emailed Delaware Omaha’s agent on June 1, 2022, falsely claiming
that Delaware Omaha is not the owner of the Havilland Place Property and threatening to file a
complaint with the Maryland Real Estate Commission if Delaware Omaha’s agent did not
remove its listing. Id. at 256-60. As a result of Defendant Raji’s and Defendant Mustafa’s
conduct, Delaware Omaha’s agent withdrew Delaware Omaha’s listing for the Havilland Place
Property on June 1, 2022. Id. at 251 ¶ 41.
Defendants Mustafa and Raji also made similar threats to coerce the real estate agent
employed by Delaware Omaha to remove the listing for the Vantage Point Property. Id. at 25152 ¶¶ 39-44 and 261-64. After Delaware Omaha withdrew the listings for the Havilland Place
and Vantage Point Properties, Defendant Raji, acting as Mustafa’s real estate agent, listed the
Havilland Place Property and Vantage Point Property for rent online. Id. at 58-60 (57:15-59:8).
6

Notably, it is undisputed that Defendant Mustafa also stole the spare key from the realtor’s
lockbox for the Vantage Point Property and listed the Vantage Point Property as a rental
property. Id. at 252 ¶ 45.
Delaware Omaha’s Tort Claims
Delaware Omaha contends in this matter that the Defendants committed the tort of
injurious falsehood – disparagement of title, by uttering and publicizing slanderous material with
regard to ownership of the Properties. 2 ECF No. 2 at ¶¶ 70-78. Delaware Omaha also contends
that that Defendants acted with malice, by deliberately filing fraudulent deeds and making
misrepresentations regarding Defendant NDF1’s ownership of the Properties. Id. at ¶ 76. And
so, Delaware Omaha seeks to recover actual and special damages resulting from the monetary
losses caused by its inability to freely sell the Properties, due to the Defendants’ conduct. Id. at
¶¶ 77 and 78.
Delaware Omaha also contends that the Defendants committed the tort of intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage, because the Defendants had actual
knowledge of Delaware Omaha’s rightful ownership of the Properties when they filed the
fraudulent deeds and misrepresented that Defendant NDF1 owned the Properties. Id. at ¶¶ 81
and 82. In this regard, Delaware Omaha argues that the Defendants’ actions were calculated to
interfere with its lawful ownership of the Properties. Id. at ¶ 84. And so, Delaware Omaha also
seeks to recover monetary damages from the Defendants to compensate it for the inability to sell
the Properties and for certain legal fees incurred to address the Defendants’ conduct. Id. at ¶ 86.
Lastly, Delaware Omaha contends in this case that the Defendants engaged in the tort of
civil conspiracy, by acting in concert with each other, to unlawfully slander and interfere with its
title to, and ownership of, the Properties. Id. at ¶¶ 90 and 91. And so, Delaware Omaha also
seeks to recover damages from the Defendants, including punitive damages, for this conduct. Id.
at ¶¶ 92-93.

The Court notes that Delaware Omaha did not list the Hamilton Street Property in its counts or prayer
for relief in the complaint. See ECF No. 2 at 13-19. However, because Delaware Omaha includes
extensive undisputed evidence related to the Hamilton Street Property in the motion for summary
judgment, and because some of the Defendants’ actions were uncovered after the start of this litigation,
the Hamilton Street Property is appropriately considered by the Court in Delaware Omaha’s summary
judgment motion.

2

7

Delaware Omaha’s Damages And Request For Relief
Delaware Omaha maintains that, when it acquired the Properties, it intended to sell the
Properties to third parties, but it was unable to do so due to the Defendants’ fraudulent conduct.
ECF No. 173 at 56-57 (55:25-56:4). And so, Delaware Omaha contends that it has incurred a
total of $60,193.00 in legal fees related to its litigation against the Defendants. See ECF No.
163-1 at 15; ECF No. 173 at 350-51 and 356-57.
In addition, Delaware Omaha contends that its inability to sell the Properties forced it to
pay property taxes, insurance and other costs, to maintain the properties in the following
amounts:
•

Havilland Place Property: $106,582.03;

•

Bubbling Pring Property: $80,759.81;

•

Hamilton Street Property: $64,586.70; and

•

Vantage Point Property: $78,324.37.

ECF No. 163-1 at 15-16; ECF No. 173 at 354-56 and 359-88. And so, Delaware Omaha asserts
that its total financial losses in connection with this matter are $390,715.91 ($330,522.91 for
property-related costs and $60,193.00 in quiet title legal fees). ECF No. 163-1 at 16.
Lastly, Delaware Omaha seeks a permanent injunction enjoining the Defendants from: (a)
filing any fraudulent deeds asserting ownership or transfer of ownership relating to properties
that are lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (b) making any public misrepresentation that the
Defendants have any interest in the properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (c) entering
or coming within 100 yards of the premises of any properties lawfully owned by Delaware
Omaha; (d) listing any of the properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha for sale; and (e)
renting to and/or installing tenants in any of the properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha.
ECF No. 163-2.
The Litigation History
The litigation history in this case is extensive and also relevant to the pending motion for
summary judgment and permanent injunction. Delaware Omaha originally filed this matter in
the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Maryland. See ECF No. 2. On July 1, 2022, the
Defendants removed the case to this Court. ECF No. 1.
On July 16, 2022, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against the
Defendants, which ordered that:
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A. Defendants Sidikatu Raji, Omaha Property Manager, LLC (Maryland Omaha),
Omaha Property Manager, LLC (Illinois Omaha), and NDF1, LLC, (collectively,
“Defendants”) are enjoined from filing any fraudulent deeds asserting ownership or
transfer or ownership relating to properties that are lawfully owned by Plaintiff
Delaware Omaha;
B. Defendants are enjoined from making any public misrepresentations that Defendants
have any interest in the properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha;
C. Defendants are enjoined from entering or coming within 100 yards of the premises of
any properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha;
D. Defendants are enjoined from listing any of the properties lawfully owned by
Delaware Omaha for sale;
E. Defendants must make all efforts necessary to ensure that any such listings are
removed from public websites;
F. Defendants are enjoined from renting to and/or installing tenants in any of the
properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; and
G. The Court reserves for consideration the request for all costs, attorneys’ fees, and
expenses of this action.
ECF No. 17. On August 19, 2022, the Court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of
Delaware Omaha, which provided the same relief as the TRO in all material respects, except that
the preliminary injunction also pertains to Defendant Mustafa. ECF No. 33.
Despite the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Defendants continued to engage in
improper conduct related to the Properties. ECF No. 73 at 6-10. Specifically, on July 20, 2022,
Defendant Mustafa filed an Official Form 106 A/B with the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Maryland, which falsely represented that he, as the owner of Defendant NDF1,
owned the Properties. Id. at 7; ECF No. 173 at 296-307. On August 27, 2022, Defendant
Mustafa also put tenants in the Havilland Place Property to receive rent, and when Delaware
Omaha contacted the police on August 30, 2022, Defendant Mustafa told the officers that he was
the owner of the property, and that he had leased the property to the tenants. ECF No. 73 at 7;
ECF No. 173 at 331-32. And so, Delaware Omaha filed an emergency supplemental motion for
contempt on September 2, 2022. ECF No. 37.
On February 24, 2023, the Court issued a memorandum opinion and an order that, among
other things: (1) granted Delaware Omaha’s motion for contempt and for attorneys’ fees and
sanctions (ECF No. 27) and (2) granted Delaware Omaha’s supplemental motion to find the
Defendants in contempt (ECF No. 37). ECF Nos. 73 and 74. Thereafter, the Court awarded
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Delaware Omaha attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $38,753.00, and lost profits in the
amount of $38,888.12. ECF Nos. 175 and 177. 3
B. Relevant Procedural Background
On July 29, 2024, Delaware Omaha filed a motion for summary judgment and permanent
injunction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and a memorandum in support thereof. ECF Nos. 163
and 163-1. On August 16, 2024, Defendant Raji filed a response in opposition to Delaware
Omaha’s motion. ECF No. 166.
On August 28, 2024, the Corporate Defendants filed a response in opposition to
Delaware Omaha’s motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 167. On August 28, 2024,
Defendant Mustafa also filed his response in opposition to Delaware Omaha’s motion for
summary judgment.
On September 17, 2024, Delaware Omaha filed a reply brief. ECF No. 171.
Delaware Omaha’s motion for summary judgment having been fully briefed, the Court
resolves the pending motion.
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 56
A motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 will be granted only

if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). And so, if there
clearly exist factual issues “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they
may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,” then summary judgment is inappropriate.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also Pulliam Inv. Co., Inc. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286
(4th Cir. 1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979).

On July 12, 2023, the Court issued an Order staying this case, pending Defendant Mustafa’s appeal.
ECF No. 112. On October 14, 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed
the appeal. ECF No. 114-1. During the pendency of the stay, the Defendants filed seven motions. And
so, the Court issued an Order on April 18, 2024, striking these motions, as well as Delaware Omaha’s
responses to the motions. ECF No. 137. Following a telephonic status conference held on May 1, 2024,
the Court issued a Scheduling Order on May 2, 2024, that lifted the stay of proceedings, directed the
Defendants to file answers to the complaint and held-in-abeyance all pending motions pending the
resolution of the parties’ anticipated motions for summary judgment. ECF No. 144.
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When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See United States v.
Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th
Cir. 1985). In this regard, the moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. State of S.C., 978 F.2d 1334, 1339 (4th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993). But, a party who bears the burden of proof on a
particular claim must also factually support each element of his or her claim. See Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 322-23. Given this, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . .
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. And so, on those issues on which the
nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is the nonmoving party’s responsibility to
confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence to show
the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
In this regard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that “[a]
mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant’s position will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment.” Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 536 (4th Cir. 1997). And so,
there must be “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for
that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).
B. Injurious Falsehood
Under Maryland law, the tort of slander of title, or injurious falsehood, is a cause of
action derived from the traditional tort of defamation. Wal-Mart Real Est. Bus. Tr. v. Garrison
Realty Invs., LLC, 657 F. Supp. 3d 757, 763-64 (D. Md. 2023); see also Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake
Shore Inv’rs, 471 A.2d 735, 738 (Md. 1984) (concluding that it is “firmly established that . . .
injurious falsehood (sometimes known as disparagement or slander of title)” is an actionable
tort). This Court has held that “[i]njurious falsehood consists of ‘the publication of matter
derogatory to the plaintiff’s title to his property, or its quality, or to his business in general, . . . of
a kind calculated to prevent others from dealing with him, or otherwise to interfere with his
relations with others to his disadvantage.’” Davenport v. Sallie Mae, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 574,
584 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Beane v. McMullen, 291 A.2d 37, 48 (Md. 1972)). And so, to
prevail on a claim for injurious falsehood, the plaintiff must show: (1) a false statement, (2) that
11

the false statement was communicated to someone else (publication), (3) malice, and (4) special
damages. Wal-Mart Real Est. Bus. Tr., 657 F. Supp. 3d at 764 (quoting Rounds v. Md.-Nat. Cap.
Park & Plan. Comm’n, 109 A.3d 639, 663 (Md. 2015)).
C. Tortious Interference With A Business
This Court has recognized that “[t]he tort of intentional interference with contractual or
business relations is ‘well-established in Maryland.’” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Slade
Healthcare, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 3d 536, 569 (D. Md. 2019) (quoting Macklin v. Robert Logan
Assocs., 639 A.2d 112, 116 (Md. 1994)). This tort requires that “one not privileged to do so who
purposely induces or causes a third person not to perform a contract or enter into or continue a
business relation with another is liable for the harm caused thereby.” United Rental Equip. Co.
v. Potts & Callahan Contracting Co., 191 A.2d 570, 574 (Md. 1963). To prove a claim for
intentional interference with contractual or business relations, a plaintiff must show the
following elements: “(1) intentional and [willful] acts; (2) calculated to cause damage to the
plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3) done with the unlawful purpose to cause such damage and
loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendants (which constitutes malice);
and (4) actual damage and loss resulting.” See Blondell v. Littlepage, 991 A.2d 80, 97 (Md.
2010) (quoting Kaser v. Fin. Prot. Mktg., Inc., 831 A.2d 49, 53 (Md. 2003)).
Maryland courts have recognized that such tortious interference has “two general
manifestations.” Macklin, 639 A.2d at 117. The interference either induces the breach of an
existing contract, or, in the absence of an existing contract, the interference “maliciously or
wrongfully infringes upon an economic relationship.” Id. “An essential element of a tortious
interference claim is a showing that the actions undertaken were ‘wrongful.’” Baron Fin. Corp.
v. Natanzon, 471 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (D. Md. 2006) (quoting Martello v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Md., Inc., 795 A.2d 185, 194 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)). In this regard, “[w]rongful
or malicious interference with economic relations is interference by conduct that is
independently wrongful or unlawful, quite apart from its effect on the plaintiff’s business
relationships.” Id. (quoting Carter v. Aramark Sports & Ent. Servs., 835 A.2d 262, 280 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2003), cert. denied, 844 A.2d 427 (Md. 2004)). Lastly, “the defendant [must] not be
a party to the economic relationship.” Blondell, 991 A.2d at 97.

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D. Civil Conspiracy Claims
A civil conspiracy involves “a combination of two or more persons by an agreement or
understanding to accomplish an unlawful act or to use unlawful means to accomplish an act not
in itself illegal, with the further requirement that the act or the means employed must result in
damages to the plaintiff.” Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 290 (Md. 2005) (quoting Green v.
Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 269 A.2d 815, 824 (Md. 1970)). To prevail on a civil
conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) an unlawful agreement; (2) the commission of an
overt act in furtherance of the agreement; and (3) that as a result, the plaintiff suffered actual
injury. Id. In this regard, this Court has held that civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of
action; rather, a “defendant’s liability for civil conspiracy depends entirely on its liability for a
substantive tort.” 4 Hejirika v. Md. Div. of Corr., 264 F. Supp. 2d 341, 346-47 (D. Md. 2003)
(citation omitted). And so, a civil conspiracy claim is not “capable of independently sustaining
an award of damages in the absence of other tortious injury to the plaintiff.” Mackey v. Compass
Mktg., Inc., 892 A.2d 479, 485 (Md. 2006) (quoting Hoffman, 867 A.2d at 290).
E. Permanent Injunction
Lastly, a party seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate that: (1) it has suffered
an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by
a permanent injunction. Mayor of Balt. v. Azar, 973 F.3d 258, 274 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
IV.

ANALYSIS
Delaware Omaha has moved for summary judgment on its claims in this civil action and

for a permanent injunction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, upon the following six grounds. First,
Delaware Omaha argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on its injurious falsehood –
To prove a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff may rely upon “circumstantial evidence[,] because ‘in most cases
it would be practically impossible to prove a conspiracy by means of direct evidence alone.’” Windsheim
v. Larocca, 116 A.3d 954, 975 (Md. 2015) (quoting Hoffman v. Stamper, 867 A.2d 276, 290 (Md. 2005)).
And so, “a conspiracy may be established by inference from the nature of the acts complained of, the
individual and collective interest of the alleged conspirators, the situation and relation of the parties at the
time of the commission of the acts, the motives which produced them, and all the surrounding
circumstances preceding and attending the culmination of the common design.” Hoffman, 867 A.2d at
291 (citation omitted).
4

13

disparagement of title claim in Count I of the complaint, because the undisputed material facts
show that the Defendants made and communicated false statements about their ownership of the
Properties with malice, and Delaware Omaha has suffered special damages as a result of this
conduct. ECF No. 163-1 at 17-20. Second, Delaware Omaha argues that it is entitled to
summary judgment on its intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim in
Count II of the complaint, because the Defendants intentionally and willfully made and
communicated false statements about their ownership of the Properties for the unlawful purpose
of damaging Delaware Omaha’s business, and Delaware Omaha suffered significant financial
damages as a result. Id. at 20-22. Third, Delaware Omaha argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment on its civil conspiracy claim in Count III of the complaint, because the undisputed
material facts show that: (1) the Corporate Defendants were created by, and acted at the behest
of, Defendant Mustafa in furthering his fraudulent goals; (2) Defendant Raji also participated in
the fraud scheme; and (3) the Defendants engaged in this conduct for the purpose of hindering
Delaware Omaha’s business. Id. at 22-24.
Fourth, Delaware Omaha argues that it is also entitled to summary judgment on its claim
for special and actual damages in this matter, because it has suffered harm and incurred damages,
lost profits, attorneys’ fees and costs, as a result of the Defendants’ tortious conduct. Id. at 2425. Fifth, Delaware Omaha argues that it is entitled to punitive damages, because it sought such
damages in the complaint and the undisputed material facts show that the Defendants acted with
actual malice. Id. at 25-27. Lastly, Delaware Omaha argues that it is entitled to a permanent
injunction, because the balance of the relevant factors weighs in favor of granting this relief. Id.
at 27-30. And so, Delaware Omaha requests that the Court grant its motion for summary
judgment and permanent injunction and award the damages and injunctive relief that it seeks in
this matter. Id. at 30.
The Defendants fail to substantively respond to Delaware Omaha’s arguments in their
respective responses in opposition to Delaware Omaha’s motion. See generally ECF Nos. 166,
167 and 168. But, the Defendants have generally maintained in this case that: (1) there are
material facts in dispute in this matter that preclude summary judgment; (2) the Rooker-Feldman
and res judicata doctrines bar Delaware Omaha’s claims; (3) Delaware Omaha lacks standing;
(4) Delaware Omaha acted in bad faith; (5) Delaware Omaha committed perjury and failed to
pay Maryland taxes; (6) Delaware Omaha has operated without a license; (7) Delaware Omaha’s
14

Vice President falsely claimed that Delaware Omaha purchased the Properties; and (8) Delaware
Omaha’s requested injunctive relief would violate their civil rights. See ECF Nos. 147, 148, 150,
166, 167 and 168. And so, the Defendants request that the Court deny Delaware Omaha’s
motion. ECF Nos. 166 at 9, 167-1 at 14 and 168 at 12.
For the reasons set forth below, the undisputed material facts in this case show that
Delaware Omaha is entitled to summary judgment on its injurious falsehood – disparagement of
title claim in Count I of the complaint, because the Defendants made false statements about their
ownership of the Properties with malice, and Delaware Omaha has suffered special damages due
to the Defendants’ conduct. The undisputed material facts also show that Delaware Omaha is
entitled to summary judgment on its intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage claim in Count II of the complaint, because the Defendants intentionally and willfully
made and communicated false statements about their ownership of the Properties for the
unlawful purpose of damaging Delaware Omaha’s business, and Delaware Omaha has suffered
significant financial damages as a result. The undisputed material facts similarly show that
Delaware Omaha is entitled to summary judgment on its civil conspiracy claim, because the
Defendants acted together to hinder Delaware Omaha’s business by committing the
aforementioned torts.
In addition, the unrebutted evidence in this case shows that Delaware Omaha is entitled
to recover actual, special and punitive damages from the Defendants. Lastly, the unrebutted
evidence also shows that Delaware Omaha is entitled to the injunctive relief that it seeks in this
matter. And so, the Court: (1) GRANTS Delaware Omaha’s motion for summary judgment and
permanent injunction (ECF No. 163); (2) AWARDS Delaware Omaha special damages in an
amount to be determined by the Court; (3) AWARDS Delaware Omaha punitive damages in an
amount to be determined by the Court; (4) ENTERS a PERMANENT INJUNCTION enjoining
the Defendants from: (a) filing any fraudulent deeds asserting ownership or transfer of ownership
relating to properties that are lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (b) making any public
misrepresentation that the Defendants have any interest in the properties lawfully owned by
Delaware Omaha; (c) entering or coming within 100 yards of the premises of any properties
lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (d) listing any of the properties lawfully owned by
Delaware Omaha for sale; and (e) renting to and/or installing tenants in any of the properties
lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (5) DENIES-as-MOOT Defendant Mustafa’s motion for
15

leave to file a response and statement of undisputed facts (ECF No. 174); (6) DENIES-as-MOOT
Defendant Raji’s motions to dismiss (ECF No. 195); and (7) DENIES-as-MOOT Defendant
Raji’s motion to stay pending appeal (ECF No. 196).
A. Delaware Omaha Is Entitled To Summary Judgment
On Its Injurious Falsehood – Disparagement Of Title Claim
As an initial matter, the undisputed material facts in this case show that Delaware Omaha
is entitled to summary judgment on its injurious falsehood – disparagement of title claim. In
Count I of the complaint, Delaware Omaha alleges that the Defendants committed the tort of
injurious falsehood – disparagement of title, because the Defendants uttered and publicized
slanderous material with regard to Delaware Omaha’s lawful title to the Properties. ECF No. 2
at ¶¶ 70-78. To prevail on this claim, Delaware Omaha must show: (1) a false statement; (2) that
the false statement was communicated to someone else (publication); (3) malice; and (4) special
damages. Wal-Mart Real Est. Bus. Tr., 657 F. Supp. 3d at 763-64 (quoting Rounds, 109 A.3d at
663). Delaware Omaha can make such a showing here for several reasons.
First, the undisputed material facts show that the Defendants made numerous false
statements about the ownership of the Properties. In this case, it is undisputed that Defendant
Mustafa executed and recorded four separate deeds that purported to transfer ownership of the
Properties from Defendants Maryland Omaha or Illinois Omaha to Defendant NDF1. ECF No.
173 at 172-76, 194-201, 213-16 and 228-31. It is also undisputed that Defendant Mustafa
executed these deeds after Delaware Omaha had already recorded deeds showing that it owned
these Properties. Id. at 147-68, 245, 248-50 and 253. Given this, the Court has previously
determined that the deeds executed by the Defendants “were knowingly false.” Id. at 107-08
(106:22-107:1).
The undisputed material facts also show that Defendant Mustafa made a false statement
regarding the ownership of the Bubbling Springs Property on March 16, 2022, when he submitted
a sworn affidavit in a bankruptcy proceeding falsely stating that Defendants Maryland Omaha
and Illinois Omaha owned the Bubbling Spring Property. See id. at 20-21 (19:15-20:6) and 16971. The undisputed material facts similarly show that Defendants Mustafa and Maryland Omaha
made false statements about the title and ownership of the Hamilton Street Property on April 29,
2022, when they attempted to sell this property and claimed “good and marketable and insurable
title.” Id. at 32 (31:17-23), 190-93 and 253.
16

In addition, the undisputed material facts show that on July 20, 2022, Defendant Mustafa
filed an Official Form 106 A/B with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Maryland, which falsely represented that he, as the owner of Defendant NDF1, owned the
Properties. Id. at 296-307. Lastly, it is undisputed that Defendants Raji and Mustafa also made
false statements about the ownership of the Havilland Place and Vantage Point Properties, when
they contacted Delaware Omaha’s real estate agents and claimed ownership over these Properties
and demanded that the listings of these properties be removed. Id. at 256-64.
The undisputed material facts also make clear that the Defendants communicated these
false statements to a third party. See id. at 20-21 (19:15-20:6), 32 (31:17-23), 169-71, 190-93,
249-53, 256-64 and 296-307; see also Beane, 291 A.2d at 49. And so, the first two elements of
Delaware Omaha’s injurious falsehood – disparagement of title claim are established by the
undisputed material facts.
The undisputed material facts also make clear that the Defendants communicated false
statements regarding the ownership and titles of the Properties with malice. Maryland courts
have held that one method of establishing malice is to show that “the defendant knows that what
he says is false, regardless of whether he has an ill motive or intends to affect the plaintiff at all.”
Beane, 265 A.2d at 49 (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts, at 919-20 (4th ed. 1971)).
Here, the undisputed evidence makes clear that the Defendants knew that their statements
regarding the ownership of, and title to, the Properties were false. Notably, the undisputed
material facts show that Defendant Mustafa registered Defendants Maryland Omaha and Illinois
Omaha in Maryland and Illinois respectively, after Delaware Omaha had been created,
suggesting that he intended to use these entities as copycat real estate companies. ECF No. 173
at 132-39. The undisputed material facts regarding the timing of the recording of the
Defendants’ fraudulent deeds also show that the Defendants knew their statements about the
ownership of the Properties were false. Specifically, Defendant Mustafa executed three
fraudulent deeds purporting to transfer title for the Hamilton Street Property, the Havilland Place
Property and the Vantage Point Property, after he knew that Delaware Omaha filed a quite title
action to address the fraudulent deed for the Bubbling Spring Property. Id. at 177-89, 213-16
and 228-31. In fact, the undisputed material facts show that Defendant Mustafa not only
executed these three deeds after Delaware Omaha filed a quiet title action, but he did so in rapid

17

succession, in an apparent effort to transfer title to the Properties before the quite title case was
resolved. See id. at 249-53.
Perhaps even more troubling, the litigation history for this case makes clear that the
Defendants continued to falsely claim ownership of the Properties notwithstanding the Court’s
issuance of a TRO and a preliminary injunction enjoining the Defendants from claiming
ownership of the Properties. ECF No. 17; ECF No. 73 at 7; ECF No. 173 at 107 (106:22-107:1)
296-307 and 331-32. And so, the undisputed material facts show that the Defendants made and
communicated the false statements at issue with malice, thereby satisfying the third element of
this tort. See Wal-Mart Real Est. Bus. Tr., 657 F. Supp. 3d at 764.
Lastly, Delaware Omaha has shown that it suffered special damages as a result of the
Defendants’ conduct. See Rite Aid Corp., 471 A.2d at 742 (“Special damages are those which
result in a pecuniary loss directly or immediately from the conduct of third persons.”). Maryland
courts have held that pecuniary loss in the context of the tort of injurious falsehood includes loss
“from the impairment of vendibility or value by the disparagement and the expense of measures
reasonably necessary to counteract the publication, including litigation to remove the doubt cast
upon vendibility or value by the disparagement.” Id. Here, Delaware Omaha argues that it has
incurred the following special damages as a result of the Defendant’s tortious conduct:
(1) $60,193.00 in attorneys’ fees from March 2022 – December 2023 for the four
state quiet title actions;
(2) $106,582.03 in losses related to the Havilland Place Property, including taxes,
insurance, maintenance, repairs, utilities, and miscellaneous expenses;
(3) $80,759.81 in losses related to the Bubbling Spring Property, including taxes,
insurance, homeowner’s association fees, maintenance, repairs, utilities,
miscellaneous expenses, and escrow advances;
(4) $64,856.70 in losses related to the Hamilton Street Property, including taxes,
insurance, maintenance, repairs, utilities, and miscellaneous expenses; and
(5) $78,324.37 losses related to the Vantage Point Property, including taxes,
insurance, homeowner’s association fees, maintenance, repairs, utilities, and
miscellaneous expenses.
See ECF No. 163-1 at 24-25; ECF No. 173 at 351, 355-56 and 359-88. And so, Delaware
Omaha seeks to recover $390,715.91 in damages from the Defendants for their tortious conduct.
ECF No. 163-1 at 25.

18

The Court agrees that Delaware Omaha is entitled to recover special damages from the
Defendants for its costs and losses. As the undisputed material facts make clear, Delaware
Omaha was required to bring four separate quite title actions in state court, and this litigation,
due to the Defendants’ false statements about the ownership of the Properties. ECF No. 173 at
177-89, 202-12, 217-27 and 232-42. The undisputed material facts also show that Delaware
Omaha incurred the other losses and expenses that it claims, because it was unable to
immediately sell the Properties due to the Defendants’ tortious conduct. Id. at 351, 355-56 and
359-88.
Given this, Delaware Omaha has satisfied the final element of its injurious falsehood –
disparagement of title claim. And so, the Court GRANTS Delaware Omaha’ motion for
summary judgment on this claim.
The Court observes, however, that it does not currently have before it sufficient evidence
to support and establish the specific amount of special damages that Delaware Omaha is entitled
to recover. And so, the Court will award Delaware Omaha special damages in amount to be
determined by the Court after Delaware Omaha submits a bill of costs for its special damages.
B. Delaware Omaha Is Entitled To Summary Judgment
On Its Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage Claim
The undisputed material facts also show that Delaware Omaha is entitled to summary
judgment on its tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim in Count II of
the complaint. To prevail on this claim, Delaware Omaha must show: “(1) intentional and
[willful] acts; (2) calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3) done
with the unlawful purpose to cause such damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on
the part of the defendants (which constitutes malice); and (4) actual damage and loss resulting.”
See Blondell, 991 A.2d at 97 (quoting Kaser, 831 A.2d at 53). Again, the undisputed material
facts show that Delaware Omaha can make this showing.
First, the undisputed material facts show that the Defendants’ committed intentional and
willful acts by falsely stating that they owned the Properties. As discussed above, the
Defendants made and communicated numerous false statements regarding the ownership of, and
title to, the Properties in deeds and in court proceedings. ECF No. 173 at 20-21 (19:15-20:6), 32
(31:17-23), 169-76, 190-201, 213-16, 228-31, 256-64 and 296-307.

19

Delaware Omaha has also shown that the Defendants’ willful and intentional acts were
calculated to cause damage to the Delaware Omaha’s lawful business. Again, as discussed
above, the undisputed material facts show that Defendant Mustafa created the Corporate
Defendants for the purpose of establishing copycat entities that could mirror Delaware Omaha’s
business activities. Id. at 132-39. The undisputed material facts also show that, shortly after he
created the Corporate Defendants, Defendant Mustafa executed four fraudulent deeds that
purported to convey the Properties to Defendant NDF1. Id. at 172-76, 194-201, 213-16 and 22831.
It is also undisputed that Defendant Mustafa attempted to sell the Hamilton Street
Property to a third-party buyer and that Defendants Mustafa and Raji interfered with Delaware
Omaha’s attempts to sell the Properties in May and June of 2022, by threatening Delaware
Omaha’s real estate agents with litigation and professional charges for listing properties that
Delaware Omaha lawfully owned for sale. See id. at 251-52 ¶¶ 39-44 and 256-64. Given this
evidence, the Court agrees with Delaware Omaha that the Defendants’ conduct was calculated to
cause damages to its business. See id.; see also Medical Mut. Liability Soc’y of Md. v. B. Dixon
Evander & Assocs., Inc., 660 A.2d 433, 439 (Md. 1995) (holding that to “establish causation in a
wrongful interference action, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s wrongful or unlawful
act caused the destruction of the business relationship which was the target of the interference”).
The undisputed evidence similarly shows that the Defendants’ actions were done
maliciously and with an unlawful purpose, and that Delaware Omaha has incurred damages as a
result, thereby satisfying the third and fourth elements of this tort. The Supreme Court of
Maryland has held that the tort of injurious falsehood can “supply the element of malice” and,
thus, satisfy the unlawful purpose element of the tort of tortious interference with business
relations. See Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc., 650 A.2d 260, 270
(Md. 1994). In this case, the Court has determined that the Defendants committed the tort of
injurious falsehood – disparagement of title, by falsely stating that they owned the Properties.
And so, the undisputed material facts also show that the Defendants’ actions were done
maliciously and with an unlawful purpose. See id. at 271 (holding that a plaintiff may show
malice by proving conduct that is independently wrongful or unlawful); see also Baron Fin.
Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (D. Md. 2006) (noting that “[w]rongful or malicious interference

20

with economic relations is interference by conduct that is independently wrongful or unlawful,
quite apart from its effect on the plaintiff’s business relationships” (citation omitted)).
Lastly, the undisputed material facts show that Delaware Omaha has incurred damages
that are a “natural, proximate and direct effect of the tortious misconduct” by the Defendants.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 569 (D. Md. 2019). As discussed above, the
unrebutted evidence shows that Delaware Omaha was forced to bring four separate quiet title
actions to address the Defendants’ conduct, as well as this civil action. ECF No. 173 at 177-89,
202-12, 217-27 and 232-42. Given this, the attorneys’ fees and litigation costs that Delaware
Omaha has incurred in those cases naturally arose from the Defendants’ tortious conduct. See
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 F. Supp. 3d at 569. The unrebutted evidence also shows that
the Defendants’ tortious conduct prevented Delaware Omaha from selling the Properties and
that, as a result, Delaware Omaha incurred property taxes, insurance fees and other costs to
maintain the Properties. See ECF No. 173 at 352-88.
Given this, the undisputed material facts show that Delaware Omaha is entitled to recover
damages resulting from the Defendants’ tortious interference with its business. And so, the
Court GRANTS Delaware Omaha’s motion for summary judgment on its tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage claim.
C. Delaware Omaha Is Entitled To
Summary Judgment On Its Civil Conspiracy Claim
Turning to Delaware Omaha’s civil conspiracy claim in Count III of the complaint, the
Court is also satisfied that the undisputed material facts show that Delaware Omaha is entitled to
summary judgment in its favor on this claim. Maryland courts have held that a civil conspiracy
involves “a combination of two or more persons by an agreement or understanding to accomplish
an unlawful act or to use unlawful means to accomplish an act not in itself illegal, with the
further requirement that the act or the means employed must result in damages to the plaintiff.”
Hoffman, 867 A.2d at 290 (quoting Green, 269 A.2d at 824). And so, to prevail on its civil
conspiracy claim here, Delaware Omaha must prove: (1) an unlawful agreement; (2) the
commission of an overt act in furtherance of the agreement; and (3) that as a result, the plaintiff
suffered actual injury. Id. Because civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action, the
Defendants’ liability for civil conspiracy will depend entirely on their liability for the underlying
substantive tort. Hejirika, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 346-47.
21

As discussed above, the undisputed material facts in this case show that the Defendants
have committed the torts of injurious falsehood – disparagement of title and intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage, by making and communicating numerous
false statements about the ownership of the Properties and interfering with Delaware Omaha’s
ability to sell the Properties. And so, these two torts may support Delaware Omaha’s civil
conspiracy claim. See id.
The unrebutted evidence in this case also shows that the Defendants entered into an
unlawful agreement to commit these torts and that the Defendants committed tortious acts in
furtherance of their agreement. In this regard, it is undisputed that Defendant Mustafa created
the Corporate Defendants and that the Corporate Defendants operated and functioned on
Defendant Mustafa’s behalf to execute the fraudulent deeds at issue in this case. ECF No. 173 at
132-43. It is also undisputed that Defendant Raji, acting as Defendant Mustafa’s real estate
agent, improperly listed the Havilland Place Property and Vantage Point Property for rent online,
even though these Properties were owned by Delaware Omaha. Id. at 58-60 (57:15-59:8). The
unrebutted evidence also shows that Defendants Raji and Mustafa contacted Delaware Omaha’s
real estate agents for the Havilland Place and Vantage Place Properties to force the agents to
remove Delaware Omaha’s listings for these properties. Id. at 251-52 ¶¶ 39-44 and 256-64.
While this evidence does not provide direct evidence of the Defendants’ conspiracy,
Delaware Omaha can establish a conspiracy by inference, based upon, among other things, the
nature of the tortious acts complained of here, the individual and collective interest of the
Defendants, and the situation and relation of Delaware Omaha and the Defendants at the time of
the commission of these tortious acts. See Hoffman, 867 A.2d at 290 (“[A] conspiracy may be
established by inference from the nature of the acts complained of, the individual and collective
interest of the alleged conspirators, the situation and relation of the parties at the time of the
commission of the acts, the motives which produced them, and all the surrounding circumstances
preceding and attending the culmination of the common design.”). The Court is satisfied that
Delaware Omaha has established such an inference here.
Lastly, as discussed above, the unrebutted evidence also shows that Delaware Omaha has
suffered actual injury as a result of the Defendants’ tortious conduct, due to its need to file
multiple lawsuits against the Defendants and its inability to sell the Properties. ECF No. 173 at

22

177-89, 202-12, 217-27, 232-42 and 352-88. And so, the Court GRANTS Delaware Omaha’s
motion for summary judgment on its civil conspiracy claim.
D. Delaware Omaha Is Entitled To Punitive Damages And Injunctive Relief
Having determined that Delaware Omaha can prevail on its three tort claims, and that
Delaware Omaha is entitled to recover actual and special damages, the Court considers as a final
matter, whether Delaware Omaha is entitled to punitive damages and injunctive relief. Under
Maryland law, punitive damages may be recovered in cases involving interference with business
relations and injurious falsehood – disparagement of title. See Rite Aid Corp., 471 A.2d at 742
(internal quotations omitted). And so, upon an award of actual and special damages for these
torts, Delaware Omaha may also seek to recover punitive damages. Id. at 743.
To recover punitive damages in this case, Delaware Omaha must show that the tortious
acts at issue were committed with “actual malice.” Id.; see also Alexander & Alexander Inc.,
650 A.2d at 269 (Actual malice is “conduct by the defendant characterized by evil motive, intent
to injure, ill will, or fraud.”). Delaware Omaha must also show that the proposed punitive
damages are warranted based upon the following factors which the Court considers before
awarding such damages:
(1) The gravity of the defendants’ wrong;
(2) The defendants’ ability to pay;
(3) The deterrence value of the amount awarded by the jury, under all the circumstances
of the case;
(4) Comparison of the punitive damages award to the civil or criminal penalties that
could be imposed for comparable misconduct;
(5) Comparison of the punitive damages award to other final punitive damages awards in
the jurisdiction;
(6) Other final and satisfied punitive damages awards against the same defendant for the
same conduct;
(7) If the punitive damages award is based on separate torts, whether all the torts grew
out of a single occurrence or episode;
(8) Plaintiff's reasonable costs and expenses resulting from the defendant's malicious and
tortious conduct which are not covered by the award of compensatory damages; and
(9) The relationship between the punitive and compensatory awards in the case.
CMH Mfg. v. Neil, 620 F. Supp. 3d 316, 323-24 (D. Md. 2022).

23

In this case, Delaware Omaha seeks to recover punitive damages in the amount of ten
times the amount of its special damages. See ECF No. 163-1 at 27. The Court is satisfied that
there is ample evidence in this case to show the Defendants acted with actual malice in
committing the torts at issue, to support an award of punitive damages in his case. Notably, the
undisputed material facts show that the Defendants knowingly and repeatedly made and
communicated false statements to third parties regarding the ownership of, and title to, the
Properties, and interfered with Delaware Omaha’s ability to sell the Properties. As also
discussed above, the Defendants’ tortious conduct continued in this regard even after the Court
issued a TRO and a preliminary injunction enjoining the Defendants from claiming ownership of
the Properties.
Delaware Omaha has not shown, however, that the specific amount of punitive damages
that it seeks to recover—10 times the amount of special damages—is appropriate under the
factors that the Court must consider in awarding this relief. Given this, the Court will hold-inabeyance a determination on the amount of the punitive damages to be awarded in this case,
pending the submission of a bill of costs and supplemental briefing on this issue. And so, the
Court GRANTS-in-PART Delaware Omaha’s motion for summary judgment on this issue and
AWARDS Delaware Omaha punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the Court.
Lastly, the Court is also satisfied that Delaware Omaha is entitled to the permanent
injunctive relief that it seeks in this matter. Delaware Omaha seeks a permanent injunction
enjoining the Defendants from: (a) filing any fraudulent deeds asserting ownership or transfer of
ownership relating to properties that are lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (b) making any
public misrepresentation that the Defendants have any interest in the properties lawfully owned
by Delaware Omaha; (c) entering or coming within 100 yards of the premises of any properties
lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha; (d) listing any of the properties lawfully owned by
Delaware Omaha for sale; and (e) renting to and/or installing tenants in any of the properties
lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha. ECF No. 163-2.
To obtain such relief, Delaware Omaha must show: (1) “actual success” on the merits; (2)
it has suffered an irreparable injury; (3) the remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (4) the balance of hardships show a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (5) the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent

24

injunction. Mayor of Balt., 973 F.3d at 274 (citing eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391). Delaware
Omaha has made such a showing here.
First, Delaware Omaha has succeeded on the merits of its tort claims in this case, because
the Court has determined that the undisputed material facts show that the Defendants committed
the torts of injurious falsehood – disparagement of title, tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage and civil conspiracy, by making and communicating false statements about
the Properties and interfering with Delaware Omaha’s real estate business. Second, Delaware
Omaha has also shown that it has suffered, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm absent
the requested permanent injunctive relief, because the Defendants have harmed, and continue to
harm, Delaware Omaha’s business and reputation. ECF No. 173 at 64-65 (63:11-64:19) and 108
(107:17-25); see also Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating
Co., 22 F.3d 546, 552 (4th Cir.1994), abrogated on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (When the harm relates to “permanent loss of customers to a
competitor or the loss of goodwill, the irreparable injury prong is satisfied.”). Third, the Court
also agrees with Delaware Omaha that monetary remedies are insufficient to compensate for, and
deter, the Defendants’ tortious conduct, because the undisputed material facts show that the
Defendants have continued to falsely claim that they own the Properties after being confronted
by Delaware Omaha in multiple quite title actions and the filing of this litigation.
Lastly, the balance of hardships also favors awarding the requested injunctive relief.
Without an injunction to ensure that the Defendants do not interfere with Delaware Omaha’s
lawful business, Delaware Omaha will remain under threat of future interference with its
properties. While the Defendants argue that the requested injunctive relief will violate their civil
rights, this argument is unsubstantiated and also belied by the fact that the injunctive relief
sought here pertains only to properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha. See ECF No. 173 at
109 (108:7-9) (finding at the preliminary injunction hearing that “in terms of balancing the
equities of an injunction, it is effectively just asking [the Defendants] to cease committing
fraudulent activity”). In addition, the Court has previously held that “certainly it’s in the public
interest that the Court issue an injunction requiring [the Defendants’ fraudulent scheme] to
cease.” Id. at 109 (108:1-6). And so, the Court GRANTS Delaware Omaha’s motion for
summary judgment on this final issue of injunctive relief.

25

V.

CONCLUSION
In sum, the undisputed material facts in this case show that Delaware Omaha is entitled to

summary judgment on its injurious falsehood claim, because the Defendants made false
statements about their ownership of the Properties with malice, and Delaware Omaha has
suffered special damages due to the Defendants’ tortious conduct. The undisputed material facts
also show that Delaware Omaha is entitled to summary judgment on its intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage claim, because the Defendants intentionally and willfully
made and communicated false statements about their ownership of the Properties for the
unlawful purpose of damaging Delaware Omaha’s business, and Delaware Omaha has suffered
significant financial damages as a result. The undisputed material facts similarly show that
Delaware Omaha is entitled to summary judgment on its civil conspiracy claim, because the
Defendants entered into an unlawful agreement to commit these torts, thereby hindering
Delaware Omaha’s business.
In addition, the unrebutted evidence shows that Delaware Omaha is entitled to recover
actual, special and punitive damages from the Defendants for committing these tortious acts.
Lastly, the unrebutted evidence also shows that Delaware Omaha is entitled to the injunctive
relief that it seeks in this matter. And so, for the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS Delaware Omaha’s motion for summary judgment and permanent
injunction (ECF No. 163);
(2) AWARDS Delaware Omaha special damages in an amount to be determined by the
Court;
(3) AWARDS Delaware Omaha punitive in an amount to be determined by the Court;
(4) ENTERS a PERMANENT INJUNCTION enjoining the Defendants from:
(a) filing any fraudulent deeds asserting ownership or transfer of ownership
relating to properties that are lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha;
(b) making any public misrepresentation that the Defendants have any interest in
the properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha;
(c) entering or coming within 100 yards of the premises of any properties lawfully
owned by Delaware Omaha;
(d) listing any of the properties lawfully owned by Delaware Omaha for sale; and
(e) renting to and/or installing tenants in any of the properties lawfully owned by
Delaware Omaha;
(5) DENIES-as-MOOT Defendant Mustafa’s motion for leave to file a response and
statement of undisputed facts (ECF No. 174);
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(6) DENIES-as-MOOT Defendant Raji’s motions to dismiss (ECF No. 195); and
(7) DENIES-as-MOOT Defendant Raji’s motion to stay pending appeal (ECF No. 196).
A separate Order shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Lydia Kay Griggsby
LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY
United States District Judge

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