Starr v. Department of the Air Force et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby on 3/27/2024. (c/m 3/27/2024 ybs, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MAGGIE STARR,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 22-cv-02029-LKG
Dated: March 27, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

INTRODUCTION
In this employment discrimination matter, Plaintiff pro se, Maggie R. Starr, alleges that

Defendant, the United States Department of the Air Force (the “Air Force”), discriminated
against her upon the bases of race, color, and sex, by declining to give her a permanent
classroom assignment and terminating her employment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq (“Title VII”). 1 See generally, ECF No. 28-1. The
Air Force has moved to dismiss the amended complaint, or, alternatively, for summary judgment
in its favor, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 56. See generally, ECF No. 32. The motion
is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 32, 39, 40. No hearing is necessary to resolve the motion. See L.R.
105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons that follow, the Court: (1) GRANTS the Air Force’s
motion to dismiss and (2) DISMISSES the amended complaint.

Plaintiff’s original complaint also asserts claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”). See ECF Nos. 1, 3. The Court does not read Plaintiff’s amended
complaint to assert age discrimination claims under the ADEA. ECF No. 28-1.

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II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
A.

Factual Background

In this employment discrimination matter, Plaintiff alleges that the Air Force
discriminated against her, upon the bases of race, color, and sex, by declining to give her a
permanent classroom assignment and terminating her employment with the JP Hoyer Child
and Youth Development Center (the “Center”), in violation of Title VII. See generally, ECF
No. 28-1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Air Force discriminated against her by
retaining her on “floater” status during a 12-month probationary employment period and later
terminating her employment with the Center. See generally, ECF Nos. 28-1, 28-2. As relief,
Plaintiff seeks reinstatement to her position with the Center, and to recover monetary damages,
costs, and attorney’s fees from the Air Force. ECF No. 28-2 at 3-4.
The Parties
Plaintiff, Maggie R. Starr, is an African American female with dark complexion, who
resides in White Plains, Maryland. ECF No. 28-1 at 2, 5.
Defendant, the United States Department of the Air Force, employed Plaintiff in various
positions for more than 19 years, most recently as a child and youth program assistant with the
Center. ECF No. 28-2 at 1-2.
Plaintiff’s Employment With The Air Force
As background, from October 13, 2015, to October 11, 2016, the Air Force employed
Plaintiff as a child and youth program assistant with the Center, located at Joint Base
Andrews. Id. at 2. When Plaintiff began her employment with the Center, the Air Force
required that she complete a background check and receive a “favorable” result, as a condition
to maintaining her employment. Id.
Plaintiff was initially employed by the Air Force for a 12-month probationary period,
during which she was assigned to a preschool community and used as a “floater,” meaning
that she was not permanently assigned to a particular classroom. Id. at 2-3; ECF No. 3-3 at 1.
It is undisputed that the Air Force did not assign Plaintiff to a permanent classroom during her

The facts recited herein are taken from the amended complaint, the Air Force’s dispositive motion, and
the memorandum in support thereof. ECF Nos. 28-1, 32, 32-1. Unless otherwise stated, the facts
contained in this memorandum opinion are undisputed.
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employment at the Center. ECF No. 28-2 at 3; ECF No. 32-1 at 11. It is also undisputed that
a receipt of a “favorable” background check was a condition of Plaintiff’s continued
employment with the Center. ECF No. 3-3 at 1; ECF No. 32-1 at 12.
During her 12-month probationary period, Plaintiff informed the Air Force that her
background check would reveal that she had been charged with first-degree and second-degree
assault in October 2002. ECF No. 28-2 at 3; ECF No. 3-3 at 1. Plaintiff explained that these
charges stemmed from an incident in which her then-husband “put his hands on [her] in an
inappropriate manner.” ECF No. 3-3 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that she was told by the assistant
director at the Center, Sharon Iriate, that the assault charges would not preclude Plaintiff from
passing her background check. Id. at 1; ECF No. 1-22 at 2; ECF No. 28-2 at 3.
On October 11, 2016, the Air Force sent a notice of separation during probationary
period to Plaintiff. ECF No. 1-9 at 1. In the notice, the Air Force advised that Plaintiff failed
to satisfy all conditions of employment with the Center, because her background check result
was “unfavorable.” Id. The Air Force further advised that Plaintiff was “being separated from
[her] . . . position at [the] Child Development Center on Joint Base Andrews . . . for failure to
satisfactorily complete [her] probationary period.” Id. And so, the Air Force terminated
Plaintiff’s employment on October 11, 2016. Id.
Plaintiff’s EEO Complaint
On January 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination with the 11th
Wing Equal Opportunity Office at Joint Base Andrews. See generally, ECF No. 32-3. In the
charge of discrimination, Plaintiff alleged that “I . . . believe that I have and [was]
discriminated [against] due to my being an African American that is dark in complexion and
52 years of age.” ECF No. 32-1 at 8.
On February 2, 2017, the Air Force informed Plaintiff that it would investigate the
following issues raised in her charge of discrimination:
Whether on 11 October 2016, the complainant, Ms. Maggie R. Starr, was
discriminated against . . . on the basis of Race (African-American), Color (dark in
complexion) and Age (02/24/1964), when she received a notice of separation one
day prior to the expiration of her probationary period at the Child Development
Center based on adverse information, from a 2002 event, revealed during the
background investigation although previously disclosed by complainant to the
former assistant director who advised that it would not be a problem.
ECF No. 32-3 at 1. During the investigation, Center Director Chandre Coleman stated in a
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sworn declaration that she made the decision to find that Plaintiff’s background check was
unfavorable, because “assault charges are viewed as unfavorable[,] and an employee must be
able to obtain a favorable background [check].” ECF No. 32-5 at 2. And so, Ms. Coleman also
stated that, if “employees cannot obtain a favorable background check, [Ms. Coleman] cannot
retain them.” Id. at 3.
Following the investigation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) Cleveland Field Office found that the record evidence did not establish any
discrimination by the Air Force Department towards Plaintiff, and denied Plaintiff’s claims.
See ECF No. 32-8. On January 25, 2022, the EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations affirmed
the finding of no discrimination. See ECF No. 32-9. Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration
was subsequently denied on May 16, 2022. See ECF No. 32-10.
Plaintiff’s Allegations
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Air Force discriminated against her
upon the bases of race, color, and sex, by declining to permanently assign her to a classroom
and terminating her employment with the Center. ECF No. 28-2 at 2. To support her claims,
Plaintiff identifies other Center employees who she alleges were treated more favorably than
she was by the Air Force, despite having failed to successfully complete a background check
during the 12-month probationary period.
First, Plaintiff alleges that another Center employee, Monique Robinson-Brown, an
African American woman with brown skin, received a permanent classroom placement while
Plaintiff did not. Id. In this regard, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Robinson-Brown received the
permanent classroom assignment despite having exceeded the 12-month probationary period
without receiving a favorable background check. Id.
Second, Plaintiff alleges that several other unnamed employees, who were hired by the
Air Force after her, received permanent classroom assignments even if their background
checks were not yet complete. In this regard, Plaintiff contends that these other employees
“were much younger in age,” had “various [tones] of Color Light and Dark Skin[,]” were
Hawaiian and African American, and were male and female alike. Id.
Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that the Air Force treated another Center employee, Donte Holt,
who is an African American male with light skin, more favorably than her, by offering him
post-probation employment at the Center, despite the fact that Mr. Holt had a driving under the
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influence (“DUI”) charge on his record. Id. at 3.
As a final matter, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Coleman “made insulting comments”
concerning Plaintiff’s hair, by describing her “[n]atural [t]wo [s]tring” hairstyle as
“manageable,” on August 19, 2016. Id.; ECF No. 3-3 at 2.
B.

Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this civil action on August 12, 2022. See generally, ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 30, 2023. ECF Nos. 28, 28-1.
On August 16, 2023, the Air Force filed a renewed motion to dismiss, or, alternatively,
for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 56. ECF No. 32.
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Air Force’s dispositive motion on
September 25, 2023. ECF No. 39. The Air Force filed a reply brief on October 3, 2023. ECF
No. 40.
The Air Force’s dispositive motion having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the
pending motion.
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Pro Se Litigants

Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter without the assistance of counsel. And so, the Court
must construe the amended complaint liberally. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980).
But, in doing so, the Court cannot disregard a clear failure to allege facts setting forth a
cognizable claim. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 787, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Bell
v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Although a pro se
plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court
is not obliged to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague [,] or
otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”) (quotations omitted).
And so, if Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts setting forth a cognizable claim, the Court must
dismiss the complaint.
B.

Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and (d)

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must
allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible
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when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556). When evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Nemet Chevrolet, Inc. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir.
2009); Lambet v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted). But the complaint must contain more than “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of
action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement . . . .” Nemet Chevrolet, 591
F.3d at 255. And so, the Court should grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if “‘it
is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with
the allegations.’” GE Inv. Priv. Placement Partners II, L.P. v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th
Cir. 2001) (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989)).
Lastly, a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) “must be treated as one for
summary judgment” when “matters outside of the pleadings are presented” to the Court. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). But, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held
that documents are not considered to be matters outside of the pleadings if they are “explicitly
incorporated into the complaint by reference,” or are “integral to the complain and there is no
dispute about the document’s authenticity.” Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159,
166 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Tellabs, Inv. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322
(2007)).
C.

Fed R. Civ. P. 56

A motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 56 will be granted only if there
exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). And so, if there clearly exist factual
issues “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party,” then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 250; see also Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987);
Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979).

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When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595
(4th Cir. 1985). In this regard, the moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1339
(4th Cir. 1992). But, a party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must also
factually support each element of his or her claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Given this, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . . necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. And so, for those issues on which the nonmoving party
will have the burden of proof, it is the nonmoving party’s responsibility to confront the motion
for summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence in order to show the existence
of a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256
In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has held that, “[a] mere scintilla of evidence in support
of the nonmovant’s position will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Detrick v.
Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 536 (4th Cir. 1997). And so, there must be “sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted). In addition, conclusory assertions of a
defendant’s state of mind and motivation are not enough to withstand summary judgment.
Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Foreman v. Weinstein,
485 F. Supp. 2d 608, 612 (D. Md. 2007) (“[A] subjective, even if genuine, belief of
discrimination will not shield a nonmoving plaintiff from a grant of summary judgment.”).
Rather, a plaintiff must advance specific material evidentiary facts, not unsupported speculation.
Ash v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 800 F.2d 409, 411-12 (4th Cir. 1986)
D.

Title VII Claims

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Title VII requires that a plaintiff file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC before filing suit in federal court. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (permitting
civil suit by the “person claiming to be aggrieved” after the filing of a charge with the EEOC and
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upon receipt of a right-to-sue letter); see also Puryear v. Cnty of Roanoke, 214 F.3d 514, 518
(4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he aggrieved person may initiate a civil action based on the Title VII claims
made in her EEOC charge only after receipt of a right-to-sue letter.”). And so, this “exhaustion
requirement ensures that the employer is put on notice of the alleged violations so that the matter
can be resolved out of court if possible.” Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2005).
Title VII requires that an aggrieved party file a charge with the EEOC “within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(e)(1). Relevant here, the Fourth Circuit has long held that this Court cannot consider
matters that were not properly raised during the EEOC process, even when a plaintiff filed a
timely claim with the EEOC. See, e.g., Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir.
2009) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996)
(“‘Only those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the
original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint
may be maintained in a subsequent Title VII lawsuit.’”); Miles, 429 F.3d at 491; 3 see also
Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 2005); Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 436
F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (D. Md. 1977) (if a Title VII suit were not limited to the administrative
charged, it would permit the “[u]nrestrained expansion of the scope of Title VII,” resulting
ultimately in the destruction of its remedial aspects). And so, Plaintiff may only advance those
claims which are “reasonably related to [the] EEOC charge and can be expected to follow from a
reasonable administrative investigation” in this employment discrimination matter. Smith v.
First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000).
There are two methods for proving intentional discrimination in employment under Title
VII: (1) through direct evidence of intentional discrimination or (2) through circumstantial
evidence under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme. Relying on the former, a
plaintiff may utilize “ordinary principles of proof using any direct . . . evidence relevant to and
To determine whether a plaintiff has “properly alleged [a claim] before the EEOC” in a manner
satisfying the exhaustion requirement, courts “may look only to the charge filed with the agency.” Balas
v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., 711 F.3d 401, 408 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Evans v. Techs. Applications &
Serv. Co., 80 F.3d, 954, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The allegations contained in the administrative charge
of discrimination generally operate to limit the scope of any subsequent judicial complaint.”) (emphasis
added); Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) (“This charge frames the scope of
future litigation.”).

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sufficiently probative of the issue.” Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 606-07
(4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 374 (4th Cir. 1992)). The Fourth
Circuit has held that direct evidence of discrimination is that which demonstrates the defendant
“‘announced, or admitted, or otherwise unmistakably indicated that the [discriminatory
consideration] was a determining factor.’” Palmer v. Liberty Univ., Inc., 72 F.4th 52, 63 (4th
Cir. 2023) (resolving an intentional discrimination claim in the ADEA context) (citation
omitted). And so, a plaintiff must provide “‘evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect
directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment
decision.’” Brinkley, 180 F.3d at 607 (quoting Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir.
1995)).
If the plaintiff cannot point to direct evidence of intentional discrimination in the
employment context, she may proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. See Tuck, 973 F.2d at 374. Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973). “[T]he precise formulation of the required prima facie showing will vary in ‘differing
factual situations.’” Hemphill v. ARAMARK Corp., 2014 WL 1248296, at *9 (D. Md. Mar. 25,
2014). Specifically relevant to this employment discrimination dispute, a plaintiff may establish
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) her membership in a class protected by Title
VII; (2) her satisfactory job performance; (3) that she was subjected to an adverse employment
action; and (4) that other similarly situated employees who were not in the protected class were
treated more favorably. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The failure to demonstrate one of
these required elements is fatal to a plaintiff’s ability to establish a prima facie case. See
Hemphill, 2014 WL 1248296, at *19.
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action
alleged. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citing Tex.
Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)) (holding the McDonnell Douglas
framework applies to ADEA actions as well as those brought under Title VII). If the defendant
succeeds in doing so, that showing will rebut the presumption of discrimination raised by the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. See Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 429
(4th Cir. 2000) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10). The plaintiff then must “prove by a
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preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. And so, “[t]he
plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employer intentionally
discriminated against her.” Evans, 80 F.3d at 959 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
IV.

ANALYSIS
The Air Force has moved to dismiss this matter, or, alternatively, for summary judgment

in its favor, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 56, upon several grounds. First, the Air
Force argues that Plaintiff fails to state plausible Title VII discrimination claims in this matter,
because she: (1) did not exhaust administrative remedies with regards to her sex discrimination
claim; (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to show race, color, and sex were the bases of the Air
Force’s decisions not to assign her to a permanent classroom and to terminate her employment;
(3) fails to allege facts to show that her job performance was satisfactory; (4) fails to allege facts
to show that declining to grant a permanent classroom assignment is an adverse employment
action; and (5) fails to allege facts to show that similarly situated employees received more
favorable treatment. ECF No. 32-1 at 7-13. In addition, the Air Force argues that the amended
complaint fails to satisfy the minimum standards needed for this litigation to proceed. Id. at 1516. And so, the Air Force requests that the Court either dismiss this matter, or enter summary
judgment in its favor.
Plaintiff does not substantively respond to many of the Air Force’s arguments in her
response in opposition. See generally, ECF No. 39. Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that she has
exhausted her administrative remedies and that the Air Force has discriminated against her upon
the bases of race, color, and sex, by declining to assign her to a permanent classroom and
terminating her employment on October 11, 2016. Id. at 9-12. And so, Plaintiff requests that the
Court deny the Air Force’s dispositive motion. Id. at 12.
For the reasons that follow, a careful reading of the amended complaint shows that
Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her sex discrimination
claim. The amended complaint also makes clear that Plaintiff cannot show either intentional
discrimination by the Air Force, or that her job performance was satisfactory, to prevail on her

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Title VII discrimination claims in this case. And so, the Court (1) GRANTS the Air Force’s
motion to dismiss and (2) DISMISSES the complaint. 4
A. Plaintiff Failed To Exhaust Her Sex Discrimination Claim
As an initial matter, the Air Force persuasively argues that the Court should dismiss
Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim in this case, because Plaintiff did not exhaust her
administrative remedies with respect to that claim before commencing this litigation. ECF No.
32-1 at 7-9. Title VII requires that Plaintiff file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC before
commencing this litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (permitting civil suit by the “person
claiming to be aggrieved” after the filing of a charge with the EEOC and upon receipt of a rightto-sue letter); see also Puryear v. Cnty of Roanoke, 214 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
aggrieved person may initiate a civil action based on the Title VII claims made in her EEOC
charge only after receipt of a right-to-sue letter.”). This “exhaustion requirement ensures that the
employer is put on notice of the alleged violations so that the matter can be resolved out of court
if possible.” Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2005).
In this regard, the Fourth Circuit has long held that this Court cannot consider matters
that were not properly raised during the EEOC process. See, e.g., Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd.,
551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d
954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996) (“‘Only those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those
reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of
the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent Title VII lawsuit.’”); Miles, 429 F.3d
at 491; see also Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 2005); Hubbard v.
Rubbermaid, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1184, 1189 (D. Md. 1977) (if a Title VII suit were not limited to
the administrative charge, it would permit the “[u]nrestrained expansion of the scope of Title
VII,” resulting ultimately in the destruction of its remedial aspects). And so, Plaintiff may only
advance those claims which are “reasonably related to [the] EEOC charge and can be expected to
follow from a reasonable administrative investigation” in this employment discrimination matter.
Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000).

To the extent the Court relies on evidence beyond that in the amended complaint to resolve the Air
Force’s motion, the Court treats the motion as one for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

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In this case, a careful review of Plaintiff’s January 11, 2017, complaint of discrimination
shows that she did not raise a sex discrimination claim during the administrative proceedings
before the Air Force and the EEOC. Rather, the complaint of discrimination states that “I . . .
believe that I have and [was] discriminated [against] due to my being an African American that
is dark in complexion and 52 years of age.” ECF No. 32-1 at 8. The Air Force’s February 2,
2017, notice to Plaintiff accepting her complaint of discrimination similarly makes clear that the
Air Force would investigate discrimination claims based upon race, color, and age:
Whether on 11 October 2016, the complainant, Ms. Maggie R. Starr, was
discriminated against . . . on the basis of Race (African-American), Color (dark
in complexion) and Age (02/24/1964), when she received a notice of separation
one day prior to the expiration of her probationary period at the Child
Development Center based on adverse information, from a 2002 event, revealed
during the background investigation although previously disclosed by
complainant to the former assistant director who advised that it would not be a
problem.
ECF No. 32-3 at 1 (emphasis added). Given this, neither Plaintiff’s complaint of discrimination,
nor the Air Force’s notice of acceptance, makes reference to a sex discrimination claim. ECF
No. 32-1 at 8; ECF No. 32-3 at 1. And so, these undisputed facts make clear that Plaintiff did
not raise her sex discrimination claim in her charge of discrimination.
Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her sex
discrimination claim, the Court must DISMISS this claim.
B. Plaintiffs Cannot Prevail On Her Race And Color Discrimination Claims
1. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege Facts To Show Discriminatory Intent
The Court also agrees with the Air Force that Plaintiff’s remaining discrimination claims
in this civil action are not plausible. To state a discrimination claim in this matter, Plaintiff must
sufficiently allege facts to show direct evidence of discriminatory intent or evidence of
discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Plaintiff must prove
discriminatory intent by alleging facts in the amended complaint to allow for a reasonable
inference that the Air Force treated her adversely because of her race and/or color. See
McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585-86 (4th Cir.
2015). The amended complaint, when construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, fails to
give rise to a reasonable inference of discrimination for several reasons.
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First, the amended complaint lacks sufficient facts to show that Plaintiff’s race or color
was the reason for the Air Force’s decision not to give her a permanent classroom assignment
and to ultimately terminate Plaintiff’s employment. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that the Air Force declined to assign her to a permanent classroom during her 12-month
probationary period with the Center, while providing several other employees with permanent
classroom assignments, even though those individuals had not yet passed their background
checks. ECF No. 28-2 at 2-3.
To support these claims, Plaintiff alleges that another Center employee, Monique
Robinson-Brown, an African American woman with brown skin, received a permanent
classroom placement despite having exceeded the 12-month probationary period without
receiving a favorable background check. Id. at 2. Plaintiff also alleges that multiple other
employees, who were hired by the Air Force after her, received permanent classroom
assignments, even though their background checks were not yet complete. Id. Plaintiff
describes these unidentified employees as “much younger in age,” having “various [tones] of
Color Light and Dark Skin [sic][,]” and being Hawaiian and African American. Id.
In addition, Plaintiff contends that the Air Force treated another Center employee, Donte
Holt, who is an African American male with light skin, more favorably than her, by offering him
post-probation employment at the Center, despite the fact that he had a DUI charge on his record.
Id. at 3. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that the Center’s director, Chandre Coleman, “made insulting
comments” concerning Plaintiff’s hair, by describing her “[n]atural [t]wo [s]tring” hairstyle as
“manageable,” on August 19, 2016. Id.; ECF No. 3-3 at 2.
Taken as true, these factual allegations are simply not sufficient to establish an inference
that the Air Force intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff upon the bases of her race and
color. See McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585-86. While it is undisputed that Plaintiff is an
African American woman with dark complexion, and, thus, a member of a protected class, the
factual allegations in the amended complaint neither show, nor allow for the reasonable inference
that, the Air Force’s decisions not to provide Plaintiff with a permanent classroom assignment
and to terminate her employment were because of Plaintiff’s race or color. ECF No. 28-1 at 5.
Rather, Plaintiff acknowledges in the amended complaint that receiving a favorable background
check was a condition of her employment with the Center. ECF No. 28-2 at 2-3; ECF No. 3-3 at
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1. Plaintiff also concedes that prior charges for first-degree and second-degree assault were
disclosed to the Air Force during her background check. ECF No. 28-2 at 3; ECF No. 3-3 at 1.
The amended complaint also makes clear that the Air Force declined to grant Plaintiff a
permanent classroom assignment, and ultimately terminated her employment at the Center,
because Plaintiff did not receive a favorable background check due to the assault charges
contained in her record. See ECF No. 28-2 at 2; ECF No. 3-3 at 2. Notably, Ms. Coleman stated
during the investigation of Plaintiff’s complaint of discrimination that she decided that Plaintiff’s
background check was unfavorable, because “assault charges are viewed as unfavorable[,] and
an employee must be able to obtain a favorable background [check].” ECF No. 32-5 at 2. And
so, Ms. Coleman concluded that she could not retain Plaintiff without a favorable background
check. Id. at 3.
The fact that Plaintiff believed that the subject assault charges would not impact her
ability to pass a background check, and to obtain a permanent classroom assignment with the
Center, does not negate the undisputed facts showing that Plaintiff’s unfavorable background
check was the reason the Air Force terminated her employment. ECF No. 28-2 at 3; ECF No. 33 at 2. Given this, Plaintiff fails to establish a reasonable inference that the Air Force
discriminated against her on the bases of race or color, by declining to assign Plaintiff to a
permanent classroom and terminating her employment. 5 And so, the Court must also DISMISS
Plaintiff’s race and color discrimination claims.
2. Plaintiff Cannot Show A Satisfactory Job Performance
The discrimination claims in this case also fail because Plaintiff cannot show that her job
performance was satisfactory to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell
Douglas. To prevail on her discrimination claims, Plaintiff must show: (1) her membership in a
class protected by Title VII; (2) her satisfactory job performance; (3) that she was subjected to an

Plaintiff’s allegation that Chandre Coleman “made insulting comments” about her hair, by describing
her “[n]atural [t]wo [s]tring” hairstyle as “manageable,” is also insufficient to create a reasonable
inference of intentional discrimination. See ECF No. 28-2 at 3. Plaintiff fails to explain how this
comment shows she was treated adversely because of her race or color. See generally, ECF No. 39.
Plaintiff also argues that her “work performance was indicated as being admirable” by a supervisor. ECF
No. 28-2 at 2. But, Plaintiff does not dispute receiving an unfavorable background check result. See
generally, ECF No. 39.

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adverse employment action; and (4) that other similarly situated employees who were not in the
protected class were treated more favorably. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). And so, Plaintiff must establish, among other things, that her job performance at the
Center was satisfactory. Id.
The undisputed facts in this case show, however, that Plaintiff was not performing
satisfactorily when the Air Force declined to assign her to a permanent classroom and terminated
her employment. Plaintiff acknowledges in this action that a favorable background check was a
condition of her employment with the Center and that she did not receive such a favorable
background check, due to the prior assault charges on her record. See ECF No. 28-2 at 2; ECF
No. 1-9 at 1. While Plaintiff understandably disagrees with the Air Force’s decisions not to
assign her to a permanent classroom and to terminate her employment due to the results of the
background check, the Fourth Circuit has made clear that Title VII is not a “vehicle for
substituting the judgment of a court for that of the employer.” 6 DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133
F.3d 293, 298-99 (4th Cir. 1998).
Because Plaintiff received an unfavorable background check, there can be no genuine
dispute that she failed to meet a mandatory condition of her employment with the Center. Given
this, Plaintiff was not performing her job in a satisfactory manner when the Air Force declined to
assign her to a permanent classroom and ultimately terminated her position. For this
independent reason, the Court must also DISMISS Plaintiff’s discrimination claims.
V.

CONCLUSION
In sum, a careful reading of the amended complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her sex discrimination claim. The amended
complaint also makes clear that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to show either intentional
discrimination by the Air Force, or that her job performance was satisfactory, to prevail on her
Title VII discrimination claims.

Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to establish a reasonable inference of intentional
discrimination and to show a satisfactory job performance, the Court does not reach the other issues
raised in the Air Force’s dispositive motion.

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And so, for the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the Air Force’s dispositive motion; and
(2) DISMISSES the amended complaint.
A separate Order shall issue.

s/Lydia Kay Griggsby
LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY
United States District Judge

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