Original Dells, Inc. et al v. Soul 1 Entertainment Group et al

Filing 55

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (JUDGMENT on Attorney Fees); granting Plaintiffs' 53 Motion in part, decreasing the amount of attorneys' fees. Fees awarded to Plaintiffs against Defendants. Signed by Magistrate Judge Ajmel Ahsen Quereshi on 1/6/2024. (dass, Deputy Clerk) (c/m 1/7/25 due to 1/6/25 court snow closure)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
(SOUTHERN DIVISION)
ORIGINAL DELLS, INC., et al.,

*

Plaintiffs,

*
*

v.

Civil Action No. 8:23-95-TDC
*

SOUL 1 ENTERTAINMENT GROUP,
et al.,

*
*

Defendants.
*
******
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a case in which members of an R&B group––The Dells—initiated suit against
Defendants for using The Dells’ name and trademark without authorization. Plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n, Maryland common law, and Maryland’s
Truth in Music Advertising Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 11-1501 to -1504 (West 2024).
The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment as to four of their five claims, ECF No.
51, and issued a permanent injunction against Defendants, ECF No. 52.

Pending before the Court

is Plaintiffs Original Dells, Inc., Michael McGill, and Laverne Allison’s Motion for Attorney’s
Fees and Costs.

ECF No. 53.

For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Plaintiffs’

Motion but reduces the fee award to $25,083.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are detailed in the Report and Recommendation this Court issued on
September 5, 2024, ECF No. 49, which Judge Chuang adopted on September 25, 2024, ECF No.

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51.

Accordingly, this Memorandum Opinion will address only those facts relevant to the Motion

for Attorney’s Fees and Costs currently before the Court.
In his September 25 Order, Judge Chuang held that “Plaintiffs will be granted reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs” and directed Plaintiffs to submit, within 21 days, a Motion for Attorney’s
Fees and Costs with supporting documentation to enable the Court to assess a reasonable award.
ECF No. 51, at 2.
2024.

ECF No. 53.

Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs on October 16,
Defendants have not filed an opposition to the Motion, though they have

had more than two months to do so.

In the Motion, Plaintiffs request a total of $30,789.45,

comprised of $27,586.27 in attorney’s fees and $3,203.18 in costs.

ECF No. 53, at 1.

In support

of their Motion, Plaintiffs have submitted a sworn Declaration from Frederick Samuels, Plaintiffs’
lead counsel, ECF No. 53-2, at 1; a report from the American Intellectual Property Law
Association outlining the median hourly billing rates for intellectual property attorneys in various
metropolitan areas, including Washington, D.C, id., at 6; a detailed account of the hours Plaintiffs’
counsel dedicated to this case, broken down by task, id. at 11; and invoices outlining the costs
associated with Plaintiffs’ service of Defendants, id. at 19.
On October 21, 2024, this case was referred back to my Chambers for the limited purpose
of resolving the pending Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs. ECF No. 54.
DISCUSSION
The Lanham Act authorizes courts to “award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party” in “exceptional cases.”

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).

The Act further provides that a plaintiff

who establishes a violation may recover the costs of the action.

Id.

Having previously decided

that this is an “exceptional case” where such an award to Plaintiffs is merited, ECF Nos. 49, at 30-

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31; 51, at 2, the Court must now assess whether the fee request in Plaintiffs’ Motion is “reasonable”
as the statute requires.
I.

Calculation of Attorney’s Fees
“To properly calculate an attorney’s fees award, courts undertake a three-step process: (1)

determine a lodestar figure; (2) subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to
successful ones; and (3) evaluate the degree of success of the plaintiffs.”
PowerComm Constr., Inc., 780 F. App’x 16, 22 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

Randolph v.

“Once a fee request

is submitted, it becomes the responsibility of the party challenging the request to articulate the
areas where an award would be inappropriate.”

Barnes v. NCC Bus. Servs., LLC, No. 18-CV-

1473, 2019 WL 4141012, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 2019).

“[T]he Court will not review any

challenged entry in the bill unless the challenging party has identified it specifically and given an
adequate explanation for the basis of the challenge.”

Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban

Dev., No. 95-CV-309, 2002 WL 31777631, at *10 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2002).
To determine the lodestar figure, the Court “multipl[ies] the number of reasonable hours
expended times a reasonable rate.”

McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009)).

In determining the

reasonableness of the billing rates and hours worked used in the lodestar calculation, the Fourth
Circuit has directed courts to consider the following factors originally set forth in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (the “Johnson factors”):
(1) The time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of
the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the
legal services rendered; (4) the attorney’s opportunity costs in
pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work;
(6) the attorney’s expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the
time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the
amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the
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case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the
nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney
and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.
McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88, n.5.

Additionally, this Court maintains guidelines outlining

presumptively reasonable rates in Appendix B to its Local Rules.

D. Md. Local R. App. B(3).

The task of assessing reasonable attorney’s fees “should not result in a second major
litigation,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983), and courts need not “become . . .
accountants” to determine the proper award, Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011).

“The

essential goal in shifting fees . . . is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.”

Id.

Though Plaintiffs’ Motion is unopposed, the determination of what constitutes a
“reasonable” number of hours and hourly rate remains a matter within the discretion of this Court.
See, e.g., Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199, 211 (4th Cir. 2005) (“We have made it clear that
the determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee award is a decision for the district court to make,
and the district court has broad discretion in that regard[.]”); First Mariner Bank v. ADR L. Group,
P.C., No. 12-CV-1133, 2015 WL 5255275, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2015) (“District courts have
wide discretion to determine the amount of legal fees upon a determination that a case is
exceptional.”).

Accordingly, the Court will review the rates and hours included in Plaintiffs’

Motion and will conclude with a final review of the lodestar figure.
A. Reasonable Rates
A fee applicant has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the requested hourly
rates.

Kubas v. 331B, LLC, No. 20-CV-2456, 2024 WL 3487890, at *3 (D. Md. July 19, 2024).

Part of this undertaking includes demonstrating that their “requested hourly rates are consistent
with ‘the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which [they]
seek[] an award.’”

McAfee, 738 F.3d at 91 (quoting Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir.

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Such a showing should be supported by “affidavits of lawyers in the [relevant] legal

1990)).

community attesting to the customary rates charged for [similar matters].”

Carranza v. Ramirez,

No. 20-CV-2687, 2022 WL 4080310, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 6, 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting
Client Network Servs., Inc. v. Smith, No. 15-CV-2207, 2018 WL 4019767, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 18,
However, the Court may “supplement” any proffered evidence on this matter “with its

2018)).

own knowledge [of the market] because it ‘is itself an expert on the question of reasonableness
and . . . may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to
value.’”

Beyond Sys., Inc. v. World Ave. USA, LLC, No. 08-CV-921, 2011 WL 1899389, at *3

(D. Md. May 18, 2011) (omission in original) (quoting Costar Grp. v. Loopnet, Inc., 106 F.Supp.2d
780, 788 (D.Md.2000)).

In the District of Maryland, “this market knowledge is embedded in”

the guidelines regarding hourly rates contained in Appendix B to the Local Rules.

Id.; Kubas,

2024 WL 3487890, at *3.
Appendix B provides presumptively reasonable hourly rates tied to an attorney’s years of
experience.

D. Md. Local R. App. B(3); Gonzalez v. Caron, No. 10-CV-2188, 2011 WL

3886979, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 2, 2011).

While “[e]nhancements above the guidelines rates

‘should be applied sparingly,’” Carranza, 2022 WL 4080310, at *4 (quoting Grayson v. Reg.
Tapes Unlimited, Inc., No. 11-CV-887, 2013 WL 1953342, at *2 (D. Md. May 9, 2013)), upward
departures may be warranted in certain circumstances, Ramnarine v. Rainbow Child Dev. Ctr.,
Inc., No. 17-CV-2261, 2022 WL 16709764, at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 4, 2022).

For example, higher

rates could be appropriate if, among other things, counsel took on representation of a party who
may not otherwise be able to find legal representation, see id., or the litigation was particularly
complex, cf. Carranza, 2022 WL 4080310, at *5 (“Courts have declined to apply a fee
enhancement where the case did not involve complex legal issues”).

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Plaintiffs propose the following rates for the involved attorneys: (1) Frederick Samuels,
who has thirty-four years of experience, at $500 per hour; and (2) Min-soo Choi, who has less than
one year of experience, at $240 per hour.

ECF No. 53-2, at 1-2.

These both exceed the rates

outlined in Appendix B, which calls for rates ranging from $300–$475 per hour for an attorney
with more than twenty years of experience, such as Mr. Samuels, and $150–$225 per hour for an
attorney with fewer than five years of experience like Mr. Choi.

D. Md. Local R. App. B(3).

Plaintiffs have not sufficiently demonstrated that an upward departure from Appendix B’s
rates is merited in this case.

As an initial matter, while Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted an affidavit

on their behalf, ECF No. 53-2, at 1, they did not submit affidavits from other attorneys attesting to
the reasonableness of their requested hourly rates.

While they did include a report from the

American Intellectual Property Law Association, ECF No. 53-2, at 6, the Fourth Circuit has
indicated that affidavits are the preferred method of supporting the reasonableness of counsel’s
requested rates.

Beyond Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1899389, at *3 (citing Robinson, 560 F.3d at 245;

Grissom v. Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 323 (4th Cir. 2008)).
More importantly, the Court does not find—and Plaintiffs do not contend—that this case
was particularly novel or complex.

All of Plaintiffs’ motions, including the present one, have

been unopposed, which has reduced the possibility that their motions would be denied.

The Court

recognizes that bringing claims against disengaged defendants can present additional obstacles.
For example, Plaintiffs faced challenges serving several Defendants, resulting in additional time
and costs expended by counsel.

ECF No. 53-1, at 4-5.

However, the Court will reimburse

counsel for those costs and compensate them for that time.

Finally, an award within the

guidelines is consistent with this Court’s typical fee awards in Lanham Act default judgment cases.
See, e.g., NextHome, Inc. v. Jenkins, No. 20-CV-1210, 2022 WL 4558138, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 29,

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2022), Cabinet Discounters, Inc. v. Serkisian, No. 16-CV-1887, 2017 WL 2930461, *3-4 (D. Md.
July 10, 2017), AAMCO Transmissions, LLC v. Up to Parr, LLC, No. 22-CV-3212, 2023 WL
5510081, at *3-4 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2023).
Accordingly, the Court will reduce Mr. Samuels’ rate to $475 per hour and Mr. Choi’s rate
to $225 per hour, both representing the top of the respective Appendix B ranges.
B. Time and Labor Expended
In support of their Motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel have submitted an itemized list of hours and
expenses along with a description for each entry explaining how the time was spent.
53-2, at 11.

ECF No.

As noted above, “it is the responsibility of the party challenging the request to

articulate areas where award would be inappropriate,” Barnes, 2019 WL 4141012, at *2, and “the
Court will not review any challenged entry in the bill unless the challenging party has identified it
specifically and given an adequate explanation for the basis of the challenge,” Thompson, 2002
WL 31777631, at *10.

Thus, in its review of Plaintiffs’ time records, the Court need only address

specific concerns raised by a challenging party.

See Barnes, 2019 WL 4141012, at *2.

As

Plaintiffs’ Motion is unopposed and the Court has been given no reason to question the accuracy
of Plaintiffs’ request, the Court is under no obligation to assess each entry in counsel’s time
records.

However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court has reviewed the hours Plaintiffs’

counsel submitted.
Based on this cursory overview, the Court has identified inconsistencies in Plaintiffs’
recorded hours and subsequent lodestar calculation that merit further investigation.

Plaintiffs’

counsel have thoroughly documented all hours spent on this case over the course of the litigation.
ECF No. 53-2, at 11.

Further, the documented tasks and time allotted to each appear reasonable,

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as does Plaintiffs’ reported total of 61.86 hours spent working on this case.

ECF No. 53-2, at 16.

However, it is Plaintiffs’ summary chart, shown below, which gives the Court pause.

ECF No. 53-2, at 3. While counsel’s itemized list indicates a total of 61.86 hours allotted to this
litigation—60.96 hours from Mr. Samuels and 0.9 from Mr. Choi, ECF No. 53-2, at 11-16—the
summary chart provided in Mr. Samuels’ affidavit––which reflects the fee totals requested in the
Motion, ECF No. 53, at 1—suggests that Mr. Samuels logged 57.28 billable hours.
3.

Plaintiffs do not address this discrepancy.

ECF 53-2, at

Upon review of the complete filing, the Court has

determined that the reduced figure accounts for the subtraction of 3.68 “no charge” hours, which
are indicated in the itemized records.

ECF No. 53-2, at 11-16.

However, the summary chart poses further challenges.

If Mr. Samuels billed 57.28 hours

at $500 per hour, as the chart indicates, his fee request would total $28,640, not $27,370.27.

The

$27,370.27 figure included in the chart would represent the fee award for approximately 54.74
hours at $500 per hour. This inconsistency in hours is not explained in Mr. Samuels’ affidavit or
elsewhere in Plaintiffs’ materials.
As such, the Court reviewed Plaintiffs’ submitted time sheets to identify a new total number
of hours to use in calculating the lodestar.

Of the 61.86 hours logged in the time sheets, ten

entries totaling 3.68 hours are indicated as “no charge” hours, lowering the total to 58.18 hours—

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ECF No. 53-2, at 11-16. Plaintiffs’ affidavit

57.28 from Mr. Samuels and 0.9 from Mr. Choi.

also makes clear that they intend to only request fees for “activities related to Defendants Soul 1,
Greg Hill, Carol Hamilton, and James Burris,” and that “[t]ime entries excluded from the total
attorneys’ fee request are indicated by strikethrough.” ECF No. 53-2, at 3.

However, these

strikethrough entries—accounting for 16 separate entries totaling 4.9 hours, ECF No. 53-2, at 1116—do not appear to have been deducted from Plaintiffs’ fee request.

With both the

strikethrough and “no charge” hours deducted from the total hour calculations, Mr. Samuels
billable hours total 52.38 and Mr. Choi’s total 0.9.

The Court will use these totals in calculating

the final lodestar.
C. Lodestar Calculation
After reducing the hourly rate to comport with Appendix B and reducing counsel’s hours
to align with their own representations regarding which hours should be included in the fee request,
the Court adopts the following lodestar calculation:
Attorney

Billing Rate

Hours

Fees

Frederick N. Samuels

$475/hr

52.38

$24,880.50

Min-soo Choi

$225/hr

0.9

$202.50

53.28

$25,083

Total

The Court will not subtract additional fees for time spent on unsuccessful claims.

Counsel

have already struck several time entries from their fee calculation; additionally, counsel’s work on
Plaintiffs’ one unsuccessful claim was closely related to their efforts on Plaintiffs’ four successful
claims, all of which involved common core facts.

See McAfee, 738 F.3d at 92 (reducing a fee

award by just six percent where plaintiff prevailed on only one of three counts because the counts
“involved common core facts” and “much of counsel’s time was devoted generally to the litigation
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as a whole.”). The Court also will not reduce the award based on the “degree of success enjoyed
by the plaintiff,” id. at 88, as Plaintiffs succeeded on four of their five claims and the Court granted
them a permanent injunction, ECF Nos. 51, 52.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs experienced a high

degree of success meriting full attorney’s fees.
II.

Costs
Plaintiffs have also requested $3,203.18 in recoverable costs. ECF No. 53, at 1.

The

most significant of these are related to service of Defendants, ECF No. 53-2, at 16-17, which
Plaintiffs note was particularly cumbersome, ECF No. 53-1, at 5-4.

The Court has reviewed the

itemized expenses, ECF No. 53-2, at 16-17, and is satisfied that each requested expense is duly
compensable.

Defendants have not suggested otherwise.

Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover

costs in the amount of $3,203.18.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ Motion, in part, decreasing
the amount of attorney’s fees.

Accordingly, the Court will award Plaintiffs’ counsel $25,083 in

attorney’s fees and $3,203.18 in costs.
So ordered.
Date: January 6, 2025

______/s/__________________
Ajmel A. Quereshi
United States Magistrate Judge

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