Maul et al v. Jaddou et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING 16 Motion to Transfer Case to the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia; GRANTING 19 Motion for Extension of Time; Plaintiffs' window for proper service is extended to January 17, 2025; Defendants' time to respond to Plaintiffs' Complaint is extended by sixty days from the date the case is docketed in the transferee court. Signed by Magistrate Judge Ajmel Ahsen Quereshi on 3/11/2025. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
(SOUTHERN DIVISION)
LOUIS EUGENE MAUL, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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UR M. JADDOU, et al.,

Civil Action No. 8:24-2396-AAQ

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Defendants.

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******

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Louis and Marites Maul challenge the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services’ denial of Marites Maul’s Application to Register Permanent Residence. Currently before
the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia. ECF No.
16. The Motion to Transfer has been fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6
(D. Md. 2023). Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ unopposed Motion to Extend Time for
Summons. ECF No. 19. For the reasons discussed below, both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’
Motions will be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Mr. and Mrs. Maul filed this suit to challenge the allegedly improper denial of Mrs. Maul’s
I-485 application, or Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. ECF No. 1,
at 6-7. Plaintiffs bring their action against Defendant Frank C. Reffel, in his official capacity as
former Director of the Norfolk Field Office of the United States Citizenship and Immigration

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Services (USCIS), and Defendant Ur M. Jaddou, in her official capacity as former Director of
USCIS. 1 ECF No. 1, at 2-3.
According to Plaintiffs’ pleadings, Mr. Maul is a United States citizen who resides in the
Eastern District of Virginia. ECF No. 1, at 2; ECF No. 6, at 2. In August of 2022, Mrs. Maul
moved from the Philippines to Virginia on a K-1 Visa as Mr. Maul’s fiancé. ECF No. 1, at 6.
Shortly after marrying Mr. Maul, Mrs. Maul filed an I-485 application to obtain lawful permanent
resident status. Id. Nine months after Mrs. Maul filed her application, the Norfolk USCIS Field
Office 2 contacted Mrs. Maul asking for proof that she had undergone a physical examination. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Maul had already provided such proof to the United States Embassy in
Manila and to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which had reportedly sent the documentation
to USCIS. Id. While Plaintiffs were trying to acquire the requested proof, which was due to the
Norfolk Field Office on September 1, 2023, USCIS denied Mrs. Maul’s I-485 application on July
5, 2023. Id. Plaintiffs further allege that the Norfolk Field Office later received proof of Mrs.
Maul’s physical examination on July 21, 2023, which was before the deadline to provide
documentation but after USCIS had already denied Mrs. Maul’s application. Id. USCIS gave
Mrs. Maul thirty days to leave the United States. Id. at 7. She has since returned to the Philippines.
Id; ECF No. 7, at 1.

1

Ms. Jaddou is no longer in this role. Kika Scott is currently performing the duties of the Director
of USCIS. Leadership, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus/organization/leadership (last visited Mar. 6, 2025).
2

While Plaintiffs refer to a Virginia Beach USCIS Field Office, see ECF No. 1, at 6, Defendants
note, and Plaintiffs’ exhibits show, that the office is in Norfolk, Virginia, and is called the Norfolk
Field Office, see ECF No. 16-1, at 1 n.1; ECF No. 3-2, at 3. The Norfolk Field Office is in the
Eastern District of Virginia.
2

Plaintiffs allege that the Norfolk Field Office’s denial of Mrs. Maul’s application was
improper and inconsistent with decisions from other USCIS field offices. ECF No. 1, at 6-7. As
relief, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Mrs. Maul’s I-485 application be granted, an
award of fees and costs in pursuing this action, and any further relief the Court deems proper. Id.
at 8.
Mr. Maul previously brought suit over these same facts—USCIS’s denial of Mrs. Maul’s
I-485 application—against Defendant Reffel in his official capacity in Virginia state court. See
Dismissal Order at 1, Maul v. Reffel, No. 2:23cv529 (E.D. Va. June 10, 2024), ECF No. 7. In that
case, Mr. Maul sought only monetary damages as relief. Id. at 2. Defendant Reffel removed the
state court action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and
subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the District Court granted without prejudice on
June 10, 2024. Id. at 1.
United States District Judge Elizabeth Hanes interpreted Mr. Maul’s claim as arising under
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which contains a limited waiver of administrative
agencies’ sovereign immunity and allows “‘[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action’ to obtain ‘judicial review thereof’ and ‘seek[] relief other than money damages’ in federal
court.” Id. at 5 (alterations in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). However, Judge Hanes did not
assess the viability of Mr. Maul’s APA claim, as she dismissed the case without prejudice after
finding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

Id. at 7.

Specifically, Judge Hanes found that (1) the federal district court could not exercise derivative
jurisdiction over Mr. Maul’s claim because the state court in which Mr. Maul filed lacked
jurisdiction over the claim, and (2) Mr. Maul’s claim did not fall within the APA’s waiver of
sovereign immunity because the waiver applies only to claims for non-monetary relief. Id. at 5-7.

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Following the dismissal of Mr. Maul’s case in the Eastern District of Virginia, Plaintiffs
filed this Complaint in the District of Maryland on August 16, 2024. ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs
included with their Complaint a proposed summons for Defendants Jaddou and Reffel, as well as
for the U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland and the Attorney General of the United States,
as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) requires. ECF No. 1-2. On August 24, 2024, Plaintiffs
filed a “Supplement” 3 to their Complaint containing several exhibits, including communications
from the Norfolk Field Office, communications from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and
documentation regarding Mrs. Maul’s vaccination and visa status. ECF No. 3.
On September 24, 2024, the Court issued an Order noting that Mrs. Maul had failed to sign
Plaintiffs’ Complaint as required for pro se filings under this Court’s Local Rules. ECF No. 4.
The Court afforded Plaintiffs twenty-eight days “to amend the Complaint to provide their original
signatures in compliance with Local Rule 102.1.” Id. at 1. Plaintiffs filed a copy of their original
Complaint signed by both parties (Signed Complaint) on October 16, 2024, which they again
labeled as a “Supplement” to their first Complaint.

ECF No. 5.

Plaintiffs filed a final

“Supplement” to their Complaint on October 21, 2024, which consists of a “Statement of Claim”
that largely mirrors the content in their original Complaint. ECF No. 6. On October 23, 2024, the
Court entered an Order Directing Clerk to Issue Summons, ECF No. 8; the summons were issued
that same day, ECF No. 9. On December 11, 2024, Plaintiffs reached out to the Court to relay
3

While supplemental pleadings typically relate to new facts occurring after a complaint has been
filed, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d); Dicks v. Flury, No. 14-cv-1016, 2015 WL 847409, at *2 (D. Md.
Feb. 25, 2015), Plaintiffs’ “Supplements” concern the same content as the initial Complaint and
more closely resemble exhibits or amendments to their Complaint. Though amended complaints
typically replace prior complaints, the Court will consider all of Plaintiffs’ pleading materials—
ECF Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 6—in light of Plaintiffs’ pro se status. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Baltimore Cnty.
Pub. Schools, No. 17-cv-1717, 2018 WL 1505787, at *1 n.2 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2018); Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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difficulties serving Defendants, stating that the service materials Plaintiffs sent to Defendant
Jaddou had been returned to sender and that those sent to Defendant Reffel had gone out for
delivery but were returned to the post office. ECF No. 10, at 2. On January 9, 2025, Plaintiffs
filed a Motion to Extend Time for Summons. ECF No. 19. Defendants have not opposed
Plaintiffs’ Motion, and the time for doing so has passed. It was subsequently noted on the docket
that Plaintiffs had served Defendant Jaddou on December 6, 2024, and served Defendant Reffel
on January 17, 2025. ECF No. 22.
On January 7, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Transfer the case to the Eastern District
of Virginia and extend the time to respond to Plaintiffs’ Complaint until sixty days after the Court
decides the Motion to Transfer. ECF No. 16. Plaintiffs opposed Defendants’ Motion by filing a
Motion to Keep Present Venue on January 9, 2025. 4 ECF No. 20. Defendants filed a Reply in
Support of their Motion to Transfer on January 21, 2025. ECF No. 21.
DISCUSSION
I.

Motion to Extend Time for Summons

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), a plaintiff must serve a defendant “within 90
days after the complaint is filed.” If a plaintiff does not complete service within the ninety-day
period and “the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service
for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). A district court may also exercise its discretion
to extend time for service even absent good cause. Gelin v. Shuman, 35 F.4th 212, 220 (4th Cir.
2022).

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Defendants interpret this filing as an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Transfer. ECF No.
21, at 1 n.1. The Court agrees and will treat the filing as an Opposition rather than as an
independent motion.
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The Court will first consider when Plaintiffs’ ninety-day period to serve Defendants began.
Then, if an extension is necessary, the Court will determine whether good cause exists to extend
Plaintiffs’ time for service.
Due to the nature of Plaintiffs’ Complaint and other filings, it is not clear when exactly
Plaintiffs’ Rule 4(m) period started to run. At earliest, the Rule 4(m) period began when Plaintiffs
filed their Signed Complaint on October 16, 2024, ECF No. 5—two months after Plaintiffs filed
their initial Complaint, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs filed the Signed Complaint in response to the Court’s
instruction that they “amend the Complaint to provide their original signatures[.]” ECF No. 4, at
1 (emphasis added). As such, the Signed Complaint functions as an amended complaint, which
typically tolls the ninety-day Rule 4(m) period. See, e.g., Want v. Bulldog Fed. Credit Union, No.
19-cv-2827, 2021 WL 1662456, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 28, 2021) (counting the Rule 4(m) period from
the date plaintiff filed his amended complaint); Sparks v. Transit Mgt. of C. Maryland, Inc., No.
21-cv-1598, 2021 WL 5742336, *2 (D. Md. Dec. 2, 2021) (same). This understanding also accords
with the fact that the Court did not order the Clerk to issue the summons until after Plaintiffs filed
the Signed Complaint. ECF No. 8. Cf. Murrill v. Merritt, No. 17-cv-2255, 2022 WL 4080308, at
*9 (D. Md. Sept. 6, 2022) (“[T]he Court concludes that the Rule 4(m) period did not begin to run
until . . . [plaintiff] filed the operative third amended complaint . . . [because] the court did not
authorize the issuance of summons or truly allow the case to proceed until then.”).
Out of an abundance of caution, the Court, in its consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion, will
adopt this earliest potential start of the Rule 4(m) period, though there are other tenable dates on
which the Rule 4(m) period could have begun. 5 Counting from the date of the Signed Complaint,

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For example, the Court could reasonably determine that the ninety-day period for service began
when Plaintiffs filed the final Supplement to their Complaint on October 21, 2024. See, e.g.,
Dorsey, 2018 WL 1505787, at *1 n.3 (“Even when counting from [plaintiff’s most recently filed
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the ninety-day Rule 4(m) period ended on January 14, 2025. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ December
6, 2024, service of Defendant Jaddou was clearly timely, even if Plaintiffs were not yet aware of
this fact when filing their Motion on January 9, 2025. ECF Nos. 19, 22. However, Plaintiffs’
January 17, 2025, service of Defendant Reffel occurred three days after the expiration of the
ninety-day period.
Though Plaintiffs’ service of Defendant Reffel may have been untimely, good cause exists
to extend Plaintiffs’ time for service. “‘Good cause’ requires a ‘showing of diligence on the part
of the plaintiffs.’” Gelin, 35 F.4th at 218 (quoting Attkisson v. Holder, 925 F.3d 606, 627 (4th Cir.
2019)). A court is more likely to find good cause when “failure of service is due to external
factors,” such as a defendant’s evasion of service or a plaintiff’s difficulty in obtaining a
defendant’s proper address. Id. (quoting Attkisson, 925 F.3d at 627). See also Henderson v. S &
K Sec. Consultants, Inc., No. 21-cv-2484, 2023 WL 1107995, at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 2023).
Conversely, “significant periods of inactivity” or a plaintiff’s “fail[ure] to seek extension of time
before [the] deadlines [has] lapsed” make a court less likely to find good cause. Gelin, 35 F.4th at
218 (alterations in original) (quoting Attkisson, 925 F.3d at 627).
Here, Plaintiffs have been dilligent in their attempts to serve Defendants. In their Motion
and Correspondence with the Court, Plaintiffs explained that they struggled to obtain accurate
address information for Defendants and that multiple service attempts were either lost in the mail
or returned to sender. ECF No. 10, at 2; ECF No. 19, at 2. Plaintiffs also began their attempts at
service promptly after the Clerk issued the summons, and sought assistance from a case
administrator, the U.S. Marshalls, and a process server in their efforts to properly serve

supplement] . . . well over ninety (90) days have passed.”). Under that timeline, Plaintiffs’ January
17, 2024, service of Defendant Reffel would have been timely and their Motion currently before
the Court would be moot.
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Defendants. ECF No. 10, at 2; ECF No. 19, at 2. Lastly, Plaintiffs sought an extension of time
before the Rule 4(m) deadline had lapsed. ECF No. 19. Given Plaintiffs’ significant good faith
efforts to timely serve Defendants, the Court finds good cause to extend Plaintiff’s time to effect
service. See, e.g., Hecker v. Garner, No. 22-cv-02152, 2023 WL 1415957, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 31,
2023) (finding good cause where Plaintiff had “shown her extensive efforts to serve Defendant”);
LPUSA, LLC v. Wheelz Up Garage, Inc., No. 24-cv-1385, 2024 WL 4252986, at *2 (D. Md. Sept.
20, 2024) (finding that plaintiff’s good faith, unsuccessful attempts to serve defendant constituted
reasonable and diligent efforts to effect service and amounted to good cause to extend the Rule
4(m) deadline); G&G Closed Cir. Events, LLC v. Elevation Cigars & Lounge, LLC, No. 23-cv2477, 2024 WL 4287908, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2024) (same). Cf. Grier v. U.S. Dep't of Hous.
and Urb. Dev., No. 21-cv-2165, 2022 WL 17467671, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 6, 2022), aff'd sub nom.
Grier v. HUD, No. 23-1310, 2023 WL 6421120 (4th Cir. Oct. 2, 2023) (finding plaintiff failed to
establish good cause when she did not make multiple attempts to effectuate service and did not
seek an extension of time prior to the expiration of the deadline); Attkisson, 925 F.3d at 627
(finding plaintiffs failed to establish good cause because plaintiffs’ “significant periods of
inactivity” throughout the litigation showed a lack of diligence in pursuit of their claims).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend Time for Summons, ECF No. 19, is GRANTED.
II.

Motion to Transfer

Having extended Plaintiffs’ time for service, the Court will now assess whether, as
Defendants assert, the Eastern District of Virginia is the better venue for this case moving forward.
A plaintiff may file suit against an officer or employee of the United States in “any judicial
district in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of

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the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.” 28
U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). However, “[a] court may transfer a civil action to any other district ‘[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,’ as long as the transferee district is
one where the case ‘might have been brought.’” Manne v. Jaddou, No. 21-cv-1092, 2022 WL
102853, at *6 (D. Md. Jan. 11, 2022) (second alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
A party moving to transfer a case under § 1404(a) must establish “both (1) that the plaintiff could
have brought the action in the proposed transferee court and (2) that the action should have been
brought there.” Id. Ultimately, however, “whether to transfer is within the district court’s
discretion.” Bulut v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. 23-cv-00995, 2023 WL 5153638, at *1 (D.
Md. Aug. 10, 2023).
Defendants have shown that the Eastern District of Virginia is a viable venue as it is (1)
where Defendant Reffel resides in his official capacity, see ECF No. 1, at 3; (2) where the decisionmaking process for adjudicating Mrs. Maul’s application occurred, see Manne, 2022 WL 102853,
at *6 (“The decisionmaking process for adjudicating Plaintiffs’ visa applications occurs in USCIS
service centers and field and regional offices, and any delay or improper denial—that is the ‘events
or omissions’ giving rise to their claims—occurred in the judicial districts covering those
offices.”); and (3) where Mr. Maul resides, see ECF No. 1, at 2. See also ECF No. 16-1, at 3-4.
The more difficult question is whether Plaintiffs should have filed their claim in the Eastern
District of Virginia rather than the District of Maryland. When considering this aspect of a motion
to transfer under § 1404(a), district courts analyze four factors: “(1) the weight accorded to
plaintiff’s choice of venue; (2) witness convenience and access; (3) convenience of the parties;
and (4) the interest of justice.” Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Plumbing
Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 436, 444 (4th Cir. 2015).

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A. The Weight Accorded to Plaintiff’s Choice of Venue.
“A plaintiff’s choice of forum is typically afforded deference.” Manne, 2022 WL 102853,
at *7. However, such deference may not be appropriate when “none of the conduct complained of
occurred in the forum selected by the plaintiff and said forum has no connection with the matter
in controversy.” Chakrabarti v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., No. 21-cv-1945, 2021 WL
4458899, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2021) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Salomon v. Wolff, 268 F. Supp. 3d
770, 774 (D. Md. 2017)). See also Lebbin v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., No. 17-cv-1870, 2018
WL 2013054, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2018) (“The deference accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of
forum should be proportional to the relationship between the forum and the cause of action.”). “In
particular, when a plaintiff chooses to bring suit in a forum that is not plaintiff’s home forum,
deference is less likely.” Chakrabarti, 2021 WL 4458899, at *4.
Here, Plaintiffs’ choice of forum demands little deference. The District of Maryland is not
Plaintiffs’ home forum. Additionally, the conduct Plaintiffs complain of—the allegedly improper
adjudication of Mrs. Maul’s I-485 application—occurred at the Norfolk USCIS Field Office in
Virginia, not in Maryland. See, e.g., Chenari v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., No. 23-cv1649, 2024 WL 895111, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2024); Chakrabarti, 2021 WL 4458899, at *6;
Manne, 2022 WL 102853, at *6. The presence of the USCIS headquarters in Maryland is the only
connection between this District and Plaintiffs’ case. As such, Plaintiffs’ decision to sue in this
venue does not carry significant weight.
B. Witness Convenience and Access
As neither witnesses nor administrative records relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim are located at
the USCIS headquarters in Maryland, this factor weighs in favor of transfer. Though the location
of witnesses is generally “not a significant factor” in cases involving agency action, the “location

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of the administrative record . . . carries some weight.” Chakrabarti, 2021 WL 4458899, at *4
(quoting Melnattur v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 20-cv-3013, 2021 WL 3722732, at
*7 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2021)). Any administrative records relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim are located
at the Norfolk Field Office where Mrs. Maul’s application was evaluated. See id. at *4 (“[A]ny
relevant administrative records will be located in the service centers or field offices where
Plaintiffs’ applications are currently pending, which is to say all the records are outside of
Maryland.”). See also Manne, 2022 WL 102853, at *7; Chenari, 2024 WL 895111, at *2-3.
Additionally, while witness convenience is a less significant factor in agency claims like this one,
the USCIS personnel most familiar with Mrs. Maul’s application are also located at the Norfolk
USCIS Field Office.

See Chakrabarti, 2021 WL 4458899, at *4.

Accordingly, witness

convenience and access are best served by transfer.
C. Convenience of the Parties
Because Plaintiffs do not live in Maryland and their claim has no ties to Maryland,
Plaintiffs enjoy no convenience in litigating their claim here. See, e.g., Reyes v. U.S. Citizenship
and Immigr. Servs., No. 24-cv-316, 2024 WL 1806515, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 25, 2024) (finding that
“[the District of Maryland] presents no conveniences for [p]laintiff” when both plaintiff and the
USCIS Field Office that denied his petition were based in Virginia); Fuentes Ayala v. U.S.
Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., No. 24-cv-00550, 2024 WL 4165272, at *2 (D. Md. July 30, 2024)
(finding that “the convenience of the parties is also best served by [transfer]” when neither plaintiff
nor the relevant USCIS field office were based in District of Maryland). Rather, Defendants seek
transfer of this case to Mr. Maul’s home district, which they argue is a more convenient location
for Plaintiffs. ECF No. 16-1, at 6 (citing Aishat v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 288 F. Supp. 3d
261, 270 (D.D.C. 2018)). Plaintiffs, in response, contend only that both venues are inconvenient,

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as Mr. Maul lives far away from both courts. ECF No. 20, at 4. They do not claim that the District
of Maryland is more convenient for their litigation than the Eastern District of Virginia.
Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of granting Defendant’s Motion for Transfer.
D. Interest of Justice
The interest of justice “is broad, encompassing all the factors beyond Plaintiffs’ preferred
forum and the convenience of witnesses and parties[.]” Chakrabarti, 2021 WL 4458899, at *5.
More specifically, this factor “encompasses public interest factors aimed at systemic integrity and
fairness.” Menk v. MITRE Corp., 713 F. Supp. 3d 113, 139 (D. Md. 2024) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 708, 721 (E.D. Va.
2005)).
Plaintiffs believe that this case will be “biased by previous rulings” if transferred to the
Eastern District of Virginia where Mr. Maul’s last complaint was dismissed without prejudice.
ECF No. 20, at 4. Courts generally do not consider individualized concerns when weighing the
interests of justice. See, e.g., Karaoglu v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., No. 23-cv-749, 2023 WL
4627277, at *3 (D. Md. July 19, 2023) (“Nor has Plaintiff identified a significant public interest in
the final ‘interest of justice’ category, focusing on his own interest in avoiding further delay and
his potential difficulty in securing counsel.”); Chakrabarti, 2021 WL 4458899, at *5 (“[W]hen
Plaintiffs speak of the interest of justice, it is primarily from their personal standpoint. . . on the
larger picture, Plaintiffs come up short.”). Nonetheless, the factor “allows a court to consider many
things.” Kimber v. Plus3 IT Sys., LLC, No. 18-cv-3046, 2019 WL 1518970, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 5,
2019)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs’ concerns do not weigh against transfer in this case. Plaintiffs are not concerned
with “bias” as the Court typically understands it: “a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion

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that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, . . . rests upon
knowledge that the subject ought not to possess[,] . . . [or] is excessive in degree.” Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994). Rather, Plaintiffs seem worried that the Eastern District of
Virginia will issue a judgment against them as a matter of precedent. Plaintiffs’ argument
misunderstands that court’s prior decision; Mr. Maul’s claim was never adjudicated on the merits
in the Eastern District of Virginia. See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v.
OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A dismissal for . . . [a] defect
in subject matter jurisdiction[] must be one without prejudice, because a court that lacks
jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.”). The court held
only that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Maul’s case because Mr. Maul sought only
money damages and initially filed in a state court that lacked jurisdiction over his claim. See
Dismissal Order at 5-7, Maul v. Reffel, No. 2:23cv529 (E.D. Va. June 10, 2024), ECF No. 7.
Plaintiffs have already addressed these two issues in their current filing by seeking declaratory
relief and filing directly in federal court. Given the circumstances, the interest of justice does not
demand that Plaintiffs retain venue in the District of Maryland.
There are, however, public interest concerns that weigh in favor of transfer. To begin,
Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that courts have an interest in having local controversies
decided at home. ECF No. 16-1, at 7; Chakrabarti, 2021 WL 4458899, at *5 (“First and foremost,
courts have an interest in having local controversies decided at home.”). The allegations in this
case arise entirely from actions taken at the Norfolk USCIS Field Office. Because this is a
localized controversy, it is best handled by the district court that covers the relevant office.
Additionally, as this Court has noted, if all plaintiffs challenging a local USCIS decision
were permitted to maintain venue in Maryland “simply because USCIS has moved its headquarters

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here, this District ‘could become deluged with immigration cases.’” Manne, 2022 WL 102853, at
*9 (quoting Melnattur, 2021 WL 3722732, at *8). This Court has observed:
Given the thousands – perhaps better said, tens of thousands of visa application
cases that might descend upon this District should the Court decide that this
particular case belongs here, one or more members of this Court may be required
to become full-time reviewers of these visa application cases, an outcome which
would obviously derogate from the other important matters the Court must attend
to.
Chakrabarti, 2021 WL 4458899, at *6. Adopting this reasoning, the interest of justice is better
served if Plaintiffs’ claim is adjudicated in the Eastern District of Virginia.
Because Plaintiffs’ choice of venue demands little deference and the other factors all weigh
in favor of transfer, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion. Such a decision is consistent with
this Court’s previous holdings in similar cases. See, e.g., Bulut, 2023 WL 5153638, at *1 (“As
this court has consistently determined, ‘the fact that USCIS is headquartered here . . . alone is
insufficient to establish proper venue in Maryland.’”) (quoting Dhimar v. Blinken, No. 22-cv-2175,
2022 WL 17540972, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 8, 2022)); Karaoglu, WL 4627277, at *3 (holding that,
when none of plaintiff’s claims against USCIS related to Maryland, “[a]lthough Maryland is a
possible venue, it is not the proper or most convenient venue and is therefore an inconvenient and
unsuitable forum to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims”); Manne, 2022 WL 102853, at *9 (“The Court
therefore concludes that on balance the interests at stake favor transferring these cases to the
federal district courts where the [relevant] USCIS service centers [are located].”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend Time for Summons, ECF No.
19, is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ window for proper service is extended to January 17, 2025.
Defendants’ Motion to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 16, is also GRANTED. This civil action
will be transferred to the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant
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to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Defendants’ time to respond to Plaintiffs’ Complaint is extended by sixty
days from the date the case is docketed in the transferee court.
So ordered.
Date: March 11, 2025

/s/
Ajmel A. Quereshi
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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