Christine Varad v. Reed Elsevier Incorporated

Filing 75

Judge Judith G. Dein : MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER entered granting 58 Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena Issued to "Thomas J. Quinn, Chairperson, Maine Board of Bar Examiners." (Dambrosio, Jolyne)

Christine Varad v. Reed Elsevier Incorporated

Doc. 75

Case 1:06-cv-11370-MLW

Document 75

Filed 10/12/2007

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CHRISTINE VARAD, Plaintiff, v. REED ELSEVIER INCORPORATED, d/b/a LexisNexis, Lexis Nexis Risk & Information Analytics Group, Inc., Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-11370 MLW

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH PLAINTIFF'S THIRD-PARTY SUBPOENA ISSUED TO "THOMAS J. QUINN, CHAIRPERSON, MAINE BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS"
October 12, 2007 DEIN, U.S.M.J. I. INTRODUCTION Proceeding pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), defendant Reed has moved to quash plaintiff Varad's subpoena, dated July 11, 2007, issued to Thomas J. Quinn ("Quinn"), Chairman of the Maine Board of Bar Examiners ("MBBE"). (See Docket No. 58). The subpoena, issued by the United States District Court for the District of Maine, commanded Quinn to appear for a deposition at MBBE's Augusta, Maine office on August 1, 2007, and to bring documents pertaining to MBBE's relationship with Reed and to MBBE's examination and scoring methods. (See Reed's Mot. Ex. A). Reed has objected to the subpoena on the grounds that: (1) the discovery sought by Varad is not

Dockets.Justia.com

Case 1:06-cv-11370-MLW

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relevant to the claims raised in the underlying litigation; and (2) the subpoena was untimely in that it sought a deposition scheduled to occur over two weeks after the close of discovery. (See Reed's Mot. at 1). This court agrees and the motion to quash, properly considered as a motion for a protective order, is ALLOWED. II. ANALYSIS Reed has brought its motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), which authorizes a party to seek a protective order that "discovery not be had" when justice requires such an order "to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). In the instant case, Varad is seeking documents and testimony which are irrelevant to the underlying litigation. This court has denied Varad's motion to join MBBE as a party. (See Docket No. 65). Moreover, much of the information Varad is seeking relates to MBBE's alleged unfair examination grading and scoring techniques, which Varad claims caused her to receive a failing score on the Maine Bar Examination. Such information has no bearing on Varad's claims against Reed for its alleged publication of a single false address inconsistent with personal information that she had provided to MBBE. In addition, MBBE has attested to this court that it did not receive any information concerning Varad from Reed, and Varad has not put forth any evidence to call this assertion into question. Finally, the discovery is not appropriate as this court has previously ordered that fact discovery be completed by July 13, 2007, but the deposition was not scheduled to go forward until August 1, 2007.

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(See Docket No. 43). For all these reasons, Reed's motion for a protective order is allowed. This court does note that Reed has entitled its motion a "motion to quash subpoena." This court does not have authority to quash a subpoena issued by the District of Maine. Any motion to quash pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 would have to be decided in that jurisdiction. See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 711-12 (1st Cir. 1998) (where subpoena required production of documents in Massachusetts in connection with litigation pending in Washington D.C., subpoena properly issued by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and motion to compel properly brought in Massachusetts as well); Productos Mistolin, S.A. v. Mosquera, 141 F.R.D. 226, 228-29 (D.P.R. 1992) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 requires that a motion to quash a subpoena "be presented to the court for the district in which the deposition would occur. Likewise, the court in whose name the subpoena is issued is responsible for its enforcement."). Nevertheless, as the court in which the litigation is pending, this court has authority to issue a protective order precluding the discovery from going forward. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons detailed herein, Reed's motion to quash the subpoena, brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (Docket No. 58), is ALLOWED. /s/ Judith Gail Dein Judith Gail Dein United States Magistrate Judge

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