Atwater v. Driscoll et al

Filing 32

Judge Richard G. Stearns: ORDER entered granting 14 17 Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment; denying 21 Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (RGS, law1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-11550-RGS
THOMAS A. ATWATER
v.
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS, AND MANCHESTER-ESSEX REGIONAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON CROSS SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOTIONS REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S ENGLAND RESERVATION
June 20, 2012
STEARNS, D.J.
Plaintiff Thomas A. Atwater, formerly a high school teacher with tenure,
challenges an arbitrator’s decision affirming his dismissal by defendant ManchesterEssex Regional School District for inappropriate sexual conduct towards a pupil.
Atwater, having litigated and lost in state court, now seeks to resuscitate his claims in
federal court. The parties cross-move for summary judgment on the res judicata effects
of Atwater’s state court litigation.
BACKGROUND
Atwater was dismissed in 2005. Pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 42,
Atwater invoked his right to arbitrate the dismissal. As required by the statute, the
Commissioner of Education facilitated the selection of an arbitrator. A five-day

proceeding took place, resulting in a 99-page decision affirming the School District’s
dismissal of Atwater.
Atwater brought suit against the Commissioner and the School District in Essex
Superior Court in August of 2006. His amended complaint listed six claims – three
based in state law and three based in federal law.1 Atwater noted in his complaint that
the inclusion of the federal claims was only “for completeness,” and that he reserved
the right to have them adjudicated in federal court pursuant to England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
Four weeks after filing his state court complaint, Atwater filed the instant case
in this court.2 Citing the state court litigation already underway, the parties jointly
sought to stay this case pending the state outcome.

The court agreed and

administratively closed the case. See Electronic Order of March 1, 2007.
The parties then litigated the state court claims to a final conclusion, culminating

1

Atwater’s state law claims alleged that the arbitrator applied an improper
statutory standard (Count I) in excess of his (or her) statutory authority and with
manifest disregard of the law (Count II), and with bias and misconduct (Count III).
Atwater’s federal law claims alleged ineffective administrative supervision in violation
of procedural due process (Count IV), impermissible delegation of a governmental
function (Count V), and impermissible insulation of a determination by a private
individual from meaningful judicial review (Count VI).
2

The federal complaint listed the same six claims, but similarly indicated that the
state law claims were only included for completeness.
2

in a decision by the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). See Atwater v. Comm’r of Educ.,
460 Mass. 844 (2011).

Consistent with his amended complaint, Atwater only

presented, and the state courts only adjudicated, his state law claims. See id. at 852 n.7
(noting that only the state law claims were before the Court). The SJC agreed with the
Superior Court’s order confirming the arbitrator’s decision. The SJC also found no
irregularities in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. See id. at 857-861. The
SJC further held that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 42, requiring arbitral review of a
teacher’s dismissal, complied with the Massachusetts state constitution and did not
violate the separation of powers. Id. at 853-857. After the conclusion of the state court
litigation, Atwater moved to reopen this case in January of 2012.
DISCUSSION
The only issue currently before the court is whether Atwater is barred by res
judicata from proceeding with his federal claims in this court. Defendants contend that
an absolute bar exists because the state court litigation, involving the same parties and
the same dispute, reached a prior final judgment on the merits. See DaLuz v. Dep’t of
Corr., 434 Mass. 40, 45 (2001) (“Three elements are essential for invocation of claim
preclusion: (1) the identity or privity of the parties to the present and prior actions, (2)
identity of the cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the merits.”) (citation
omitted). See also Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, 438 F.3d 113, 115-116 (1st Cir.
3

2006) (“[A] federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect
as would be given that judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was
entered.”), citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81
(1984).
Defendants further contend that although Atwater attempted to preserve his
federal law claims under the “England reservation,” England is inapplicable. In
England, the Supreme Court held that when a litigant is “shunted from federal to state
courts by application of the abstention doctrine,” England, 375 U.S. at 418, “he may
inform the state courts that he is exposing his federal claims there only for the purpose
of complying with [Gov’t & Civic Emp. Org. Comm., CIO v.] Windsor[, 353 U.S. 364
(1957)], and that he intends, should the state courts hold against him on the question
of state law, to return to the District Court for disposition of his federal contentions.”
Id. at 421. The England reservation is of narrow application – “[t]he right to reserve
claims [under England] only arises where a federal court abstains from deciding a
federal issue [under R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)] to
enable the state court to address an antecedent state law issue.” Geiger v. Foley Hoag
LLP Ret. Plan, 521 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir. 2008). In contrast, Atwater was not “shunted”
from federal court for Pullman abstention reasons, but chose of his own volition to seek
relief in the first instance from the state courts.
4

Atwater, for his part, contends that this court’s stay and administrative closure
of the federal case at the parties’ request was tantamount to Pullman abstention
because he had suggested in the joint scheduling statement that the court stay the case
based on Pullman abstention principles. There is nothing, however, in the record to
suggest that the court adopted Atwater’s reasoning. The court did not analyze
Atwater’s claims to determine if there were any difficult and potentially dominant state
law issues that might complicate the resolution of the federal constitutional claims.
Rather, the court assumed that, like many similarly situated plaintiffs, Atwater had
chosen to proceed first in the local forum because he thought he had a greater
likelihood of success there.3
Atwater next argues that the reservation of his federal law claims is effective
because: (1) defendants waived any objections to his claim-splitting by agreeing to stay
this case, see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(a); and/or (2) the SJC
acknowledged his reservation. See id. §26(1)(b). However, defendants consistently
voiced objection to the validity of Atwater’s purported reservation in their answers to
Atwater’s state and federal complaints, in the joint statement to this court, and in their
3

Atwater cites Wicker v. Bd. of Educ. of Knott Cnty., Ky., 826 F.2d 442, 445447 (6th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that his having filed the state court complaint
before the federal complaint does not bar the application of England. However, Wicker
does not vitiate the requirement that the federal court must abstain on Pullman grounds
to perfect an England reservation, which this court did not do.
5

opposition to Atwater’s motion to reopen this case. Moreover, it is disingenuous for
Atwater to suggest that the SJC reserved his federal claims or validated his reservation.
The High Court only noted that Atwater sought to do so, and therefore his federal
claims were not before the state courts.
Finally, Atwater asserts that res judicata principles do not bar his federal law
claims because: (1) an arbitration decision has no res judicata effects on subsequent §
1983 civil rights litigation, see Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 308 n.21 (1986); and/or (2) a state court judgment does not
foreclose subsequent § 1983 civil rights litigation in federal court unless the claims
were actually presented to and decided by the state court. See New Jersey Educ. Ass’n
v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764, 774 (3d Cir. 1978). The first argument is a non-starter as
defendants do not rely on the preclusive effects of the arbitration decision, but that of
the lengthy state court litigation that concluded in the highest court of the state. The
second argument is not the law in the First Circuit, where res judicata bars any
subsequent claims, including § 1983 claims, that could have been brought in an earlierdecided state litigation. See Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261, 1263 (1st Cir. 1974)
(barring federal civil rights suit when claims were not, but could have been brought in
an earlier eviction proceeding). See also Sylvander v. New England Home for Little
Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1108 (1st Cir. 1978) (recognizing that Burke diverges from
6

the law in this Circuit.)
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions for summary judgment are
ALLOWED, and plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. The
Clerk will enter judgment for defendants and close the case.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
_______________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7