Davidson et al v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC et al

Filing 733

Senior Judge Edward F. Harrington: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered.(Folan, Karen)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
**************************
KIRK DAHL, ET AL., Individually and
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.:
07-12388-EFH

BAIN CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
September 14, 2012
HARRINGTON, S.D.J.
Proposed intervenor, the New York Times Company moves to intervene in this case
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b), and to unseal the Fifth Amended Complaint and its associated
exhibits. On July 30, 2009, the Court entered a First Amended Stipulated Protective Order to
govern discovery in this case. The Protective Order permits any party or non-party to designate
discovery material or information as “confidential” or “highly confidential,” to be used only for
the purpose of the litigation, and imposes detailed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of such
material. Following the close of discovery, on June 12, 2012, the Court granted a motion to file a
Fifth Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) under seal pursuant to the protective order. The
Complaint was then filed on June 14, 2012. The Complaint incorporates information garnered
during discovery and includes citations to various discovery documents, which were not

themselves filed with the Court. The Complaint did not include any exhibits. On September 10,
2012, the Defendants filed a redacted version of the Complaint in connection with their opposition
to the present motion.
The New York Times Company seeks to intervene for the limited purpose of challenging
the sealing of the Complaint under the common law and First Amendment presumption of public
access.1 The Defendants contest the motion to unseal, arguing that the presumption of public
access is not applicable to the material contained and referred to in the Complaint. The
Defendants alternatively argue that the presumption is outweighed by their private interests in
retaining confidentiality.
There is a well-established common-law presumption of public access to judicial
documents. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir.
1987). The presumption of access exists in part to allow the public to serve its essential function
of monitoring the judiciary, fostering “the important values of quality, honesty and respect for our
legal system.” Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotations
omitted). While the access right is “not unfettered,” id. at 10, “[t]he citizens’ right to know is not
lightly to be deflected,” and “‘[o]nly the most compelling reasons can jusitify non-disclosure of
judicial records.’” Standard, 830 F.2d at 410 (quoting In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723
F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983)). “The mere fact that judicial records may reveal

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A third party seeking to challenge the sealing of a court document in a civil case may
move to intervene for that limited purpose pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). See Pub. Citizen v.
Liggett Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 783 (1st Cir. 1988). Neither party contests The New York
Times Company’s Motion to Intervene. Accordingly, the Motion to Intervene is allowed.
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potentially embarrassing information is not in itself sufficient reason to block public access.”
Siedle, 147 F.3d at 10.
Where the presumption of access applies, the Court must “weigh the presumptively
paramount right of the public to know against the competing private interest at stake.” Standard,
830 F.2d at 410. Such balancing must take place “in light of the relevant facts and circumstance
of the particular case.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978). The burden
of persuasion rests with “those seeking to keep the datum hidden from view,” not with the party
seeking access. Standard, 830 F.2d at 411.
The presumption of access “extends, in the first instance, to ‘materials on which a court
relies in determining the litigants’ substantive rights.’” Standard, 830 F.2d at 408 (quoting
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986)). While the presumption does not
apply to discovery material, it is applicable to civil complaints. See Siedle, 147 F.3d at 7, 9-10
(applying the presumption to a complaint); Anderson, 805 F.2d at 13 (declining to extend
presumption to discovery material).
The Defendants contend that the documents cited in the Complaint are not exhibits to the
Complaint but rather discovery material that is not subject to the common law and First
Amendment presumptive right of access. The documents cited in the Complaint were not filed
with the Court as exhibits to the Complaint and were not considered by the Court in ruling on any
Complaint-related motion. The citations to these documents contained in the Complaint are
merely superfluous. The Court, therefore, concludes that the documents to which the citations
refer are neither relevant to the instant motion, which requests the unsealing of the Complaint’s
exhibits, nor subject to the presumption of public access.
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The Defendants next contend that certain information contained in the text of the
Complaint, which was reportedly garnered during discovery should likewise be exempt from the
application of the presumption of access because such information can be characterized as
discovery material. The Court disagrees. The rule is plain: allegations in a complaint are subject
to the presumption of public access. See Siedle, 147 F.3d at 7, 9-10; Standard Fin. Mgt., 830
F.2d at 408 (“relevant documents, which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent
jurisdiction in the course of adjudicatory proceedings, become documents to which the
presumption of public access applies”). Accordingly, the Court shall weigh any private interests
against the presumption of access in determining whether the redacted text of the Complaint shall
remain sealed.
The Defendants assert that their private business interests outweigh the presumption of
public access. Specifically, they argue that the disclosure of certain information in the Complaint
would negatively affect their business operations. The Defendants direct the Court to various
paragraphs of the Complaint which they assert contain such allegedly critical business information
as (1) “[t]he identity of investors in defendant funds”; (2) “[v]aluations of acquisition companies
and methods, and internal rates of return on investments”; (3) “business, investment, and bidding
strategies”; (4) “[p]otential investment opportunities”; (5) “[d]etails regarding negotiation with
targets”; and (6) “[t]he investment breakdown of particular defendant funds by portfolio
company”; and (7) “business plans for portfolio companies.” Defendants assert that allowing this
information to be disclosed would hinder their ability to identify and attract fund investors,
execute leverage buyouts, and run portfolio companies. They further assert that the information,
if disclosed, could be used by competitors “to copy critical aspects of the defendants’ business,
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which defendants have spent significant time and money developing and refining.”
Various courts have determined that similar business information affecting such business
interests is at least relevant to matters of confidentiality. See, e.g., Blanchard & Co., Inc. v.
Barrick Gold Corp., No. 02-3721, 2004 WL 737485, at *10 (E.D.La. Apr. 5, 2004) (“[A]mple
precedent exists for limiting disclosure of highly sensitive, confidential or proprietary information .
. . .”) (internal citation omitted); Bank of New York & JCPL Leasing Corp., v. Meriden Biao
Bank Tanzania Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting the “broad spectrum of
internal corporate documents that courts regularly hold to be confidential business information”);
In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The
courts have long recognized the protection of trade secrets as an important interest underlying
confidentiality.”). The interests set forth by the Defendants must, therefore, be considered if
present. Siedle, 147 F.3d at 10 (the district court may abuse its discretion by ignoring material
factors in its analysis).
The Court, however, is unable to balance those interests on the current record. While the
Complaint appears to contain information related to relevant business interests, the Defendants
have failed to explain how the particular information that they have redacted causes specific and
severe harm. It is further unclear to the Court whether the redactions are narrowly tailored to
addressing that harm. The Defendants at this time have only supported their position with general
assertions of harm, which are insufficient to overcome a presumption of public access. See
Standard, 830 F.2d at 412 (To overcome the presumption, an appellant must give “a particular
factual demonstration of potential harm”) (quoting Anderson, 805 F.3d at 7).
Nevertheless, the Court will give the Defendants an opportunity to demonstrate with
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greater particularity how their asserted interests may overcome the presumption of public access
and to file, if they so desire, a second redacted version of the Fifth Amended Complaint in
accordance with this Memorandum and Order. The Court at that time shall determine whether
the Complaint shall be unsealed in its entirety or whether the final redacted version shall stand.
The Court, however, shall not approve a filing where pages of the Complaint are redacted with
insufficient explanation or solely because they contain quoted material from documents garnered
during discovery. The Defendants should furthermore not use this opportunity to shield blocks of
information solely because some of the information tangentially touches on a legitimate business
interest. Any redactions should be limited and narrowly tailored to preventing the specific harm
to their asserted interests.
Accordingly, the Defendants should file, within twenty-one (21) days of this Memorandum
and Order, a redacted Fifth Amended Complaint and a memorandum setting forth (1) how the
specific redacted material is important to their interests; (2) the specific harm that will result if
such material is disclosed; (3) any case law where such interests were deemed to be
considerations in the analysis; and (4) how the redaction has been limited to address the harm to
those interests while maintaining extensive public access. The Defendants may file their
memorandum under seal. The Plaintiffs and the New York Times Company may reply within
twenty-one (21) days of the Defendants’ filing.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ Edward F. Harrington
EDWARD F. HARRINGTON
United States Senior District Judge

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