Payne v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al

Filing 129

Judge Rya W. Zobel: Memorandum of Decision entered granting 126 Motion for Summary Judgment. Judgment may be entered for defendants. (Urso, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-10355-RWZ

HOWARD D. PAYNE
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, et al.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
March 7, 2014

ZOBEL, D.J.
Plaintiff Howard D. Payne is serving a life sentence for second-degree murder.
He sued the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and several individuals and businesses,
alleging that they violated state tort law and his federal due process rights when they
sold his vehicle without prior notice and without giving him the opportunity to conduct
DNA testing on blood stains found therein. Only plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
remains, and in previous orders, the court dismissed all defendants except Dennis
Harris and Richard Daley (“defendants”), both of whom are detectives in the Boston
Police Department. Defendants move for summary judgment (Docket # 126). The
motion is ALLOWED.
I.

Background
The murder occurred on February 10, 2006. Compl. ¶ 11. The next day,

defendants located and seized plaintiff’s 1998 blue Chevrolet Suburban. Id. ¶ 12.

They obtained a warrant and searched the vehicle. Docket # 1-2. Suffolk County
District Attorney Daniel F. Conley performed DNA tests on the blood stains found
inside. Compl. ¶ 15. The tests confirmed the stains were from plaintiff’s blood. Id.
Plaintiff claims the stains were used to secure his July 2, 2007 conviction. Id. ¶ 16.

On July 9, 2007, after he had been convicted, plaintiff allegedly learned for the
first time that his vehicle had been sold in July 2006. Id. ¶ 18. He asserts that a
private business, Auto Service & Tire Repair (“Auto Service”), sold it with help from
defendants. Id. ¶ 27. Auto Service told plaintiff it tried to contact him prior to the sale,
but it could not reach him because plaintiff was detained awaiting trial. Id. ¶19. Thus,
plaintiff had no notice of the sale, nor was a hearing conducted beforehand. Id. ¶ 18.
II.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant and draw all justifiable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). If the evidence presented would allow a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant, summary judgment must be
denied. Id. at 248.
III.

Analysis
Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment because (1)

plaintiff’s claim is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey,
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512 U.S. 477 (1994); (2) the Parratt-Hudson doctrine bars plaintiff’s claim, see Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); (3) no
constitutional violation took place; and (4) even if a constitutional violation occurred,
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. I need not delve into any of these
arguments, because defendants are entitled to summary judgment for a simpler reason:
the record contains no evidence that they are responsible for the constitutional violation
plaintiff alleges.
The record shows only that defendants seized the vehicle from Payne’s home in
Weymouth, Massachusetts and transported it to an “evidence bay” at Boston Police
Department headquarters. Affidavit of Richard Daley, Docket # 127-1, at ¶ 5.1 From
then on, they did not supervise plaintiff’s vehicle. Defendants are not responsible for
removing vehicles from the evidence bay. Id. ¶ 8. Once a vehicle is removed from the
evidence bay, it is no longer considered evidence and defendants have no influence
over it. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. They are not responsible for notifying owners of the whereabouts
of their vehicles, nor are they involved in the sale of vehicles seized by police. Id. ¶¶
10-11. In short, defendants simply had nothing to do with plaintiff’s vehicle once it left
the evidence bay. Id. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. Indeed, he professed not to know the
specifics of the transport and sale in his deposition:
Q. I’d like to talk a little bit about how you found out about the sale of

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Each defendant filed an affidavit. Other than paragraphs one and two, which contain only
biographical information, defendants’ affidavits are identical. I cite only defendant Daley’s affidavit for
the sake of simplicity.

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your vehicle. I know we touched upon it a little bit, but we’re going to
flush it out now. Who do you allege sold your vehicle?
A. I don’t know how they did it. I don’t know how they retitled it and sold
it to this lady up in – up in Deerfield.
Q. When you say “they,” who are you referring to?
A. Whoever, whoever. I don’t know how it got out of police possession
and sold to a lady in Deerfield. I know it had to be retitled in July for her
to register [it] in August.
Deposition of Howard D. Payne, Docket # 127-6, at 53. Another exchange more
pointedly affirms the lack of record evidence:
Q. You mentioned that you had reason to believe that Dennis Harris and
Richard Daley might have participated in the auction in which your car
was sold because you mentioned that they were the ones who initially
took your vehicle; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any other facts that you can point to besides the fact that
they happen to be involved in the initial taking of your vehicle to support
your conclusion that they participated in the auction?
A. You were the one that allowed me to know that it was auctioned off
today. That’s [the] first I’ve ever known that it was auctioned.
Q. It was auctioned off by the Boston Police Department, correct?
A. That’s what’s on the documents, but there are no names on the
documents, period. Just Boston Police Department and some review of
the vehicle, but it doesn’t say who actually sold it from the Boston Police
Department.
Q. But as you sit here today, you can’t point to any facts that Dennis
Harris and Richard Daley specifically participated in this auction?
A. But as we sat [sic] here today, you can’t either say that they didn’t
participate in this, right?

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Id. at 79-80. To accept plaintiff’s assertion that defendants were involved in the sale of
his vehicle merely because they seized it would permit unsupported allegations and
speculation to defeat summary judgment. That, however, is not allowed. Rivera-Colon
v. Mills, 635 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador
Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000)). Because there is no genuine
dispute of material fact regarding defendants’ involvement in the alleged deprivation of
plaintiff’s federal due process rights, summary judgment is proper.
IV.

Conclusion
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket # 126) is ALLOWED.

Judgment may be entered for defendants.

March 7, 2014

/s/Rya W. Zobel

DATE

RYA W. ZOBEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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