Pruell et al v. Caritas Christi et al
Filing
142
Judge George A. OToole, Jr: OPINION AND ORDER entered granting in part and denying in part 107 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The action may proceed on Pruells personal claim against St. Elizabeths under the FLSA. All other claims are dismissed. (Danieli, Chris)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-11466-GAO
ASHLEIGH PRUELL,
on behalf of herself and all other employees similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARITAS CHRISTI, CARITAS CHRISTI NETWORK SERVICES, INC., CARITAS
CARNEY HOSPITAL, INC., CARITAS GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
CARITAS HOLY FAMILY HOSPITAL, INC., CARITAS HOLY FAMILY HOSPITAL, INC.,
CARITAS NORWOOD HOSPITAL, INC., CARITAS SOUTHWOOD HOSPITAL, INC.,
CARITAS ST. ELIZABETH’S MEDICAL CENTER OF BOSTON, INC., CARITAS ST.
JOHN OF GOD HOSPITAL, INC., NORWOOD HOSPITAL, SAINT ANNE’S HOSPITAL
CORP., RALPH DE LA TORRE, M.D., RICHARD KROPP, and CARITAS CHRISTI
RETIREMENT PLAN,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
May 31, 2013
O’TOOLE, D.J.
This case arises out of the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants, a network of Catholic
hospitals, did not properly compensate employees for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”). The defendants have moved to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They alternatively
move to dismiss the Complaint as to the hospitals where the plaintiff did not physically work and
as to the individual defendants.
The case was filed in September 2009 by the plaintiff and Amy Gordon, who has since
been dismissed from the case. Along with the FLSA claim, the original complaint also alleged
violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). 1 This Court dismissed the original
complaint because the FLSA claim was deficiently pled and the ERISA and RICO claims were
derivative of that claim. Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 2010 WL 3789318 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2010).
The dismissal was without prejudice, and an amended complaint was filed. At a hearing in June
2011 this Court ruled from the bench that the FLSA claim remained deficient and again
dismissed the complaint, this time with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed, and the First Circuit
affirmed the ruling that the amended complaint was inadequate but vacated the dismissal with
prejudice, generously giving the plaintiff a final opportunity to adequately state a claim under the
FLSA. Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs filed the Second
Amended Complaint, which again was met with the present motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
To survive such a motion, a plaintiff must present facts that make her claim plausible on
its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A viable complaint must be wellpled, and the facts must support logical conclusions. Specifically, the complaint must contain
“[m]ore than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of the cause of
action.” Id. at 555. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, this Court must take “all the factual
allegations in the complaint as true.” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
I.
FLSA
Pruell works directly for (and at) Caritas St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center. She claims that
the defendants violated the FLSA’s overtime compensation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 207, by
1
The original complaint alleged violations of the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime
provisions. The minimum wage violation is not included in the Second Amended Complaint
currently before the Court.
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maintaining “Unpaid Work Policies,” which (among other things) automatically deducted time
for a meal break even though she often worked through the break, and also did not compensate
her for time spent working before or after a shift. The overtime compensation provision entitles
covered employees to payment of one-and-one-half times their regular rate for hours worked in
excess of forty in any workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). To state a claim under the FLSA, the
plaintiff must allege that she was employed by the defendants; that her work involved interstate
activity; and that she performed work for which she was improperly compensated. See id.; see
also Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946).
The prior complaints failed on the third element because they did not allege that the
plaintiff had actually worked in excess of forty hours per week. The amended complaint barely
moved the ball forward by simply adding the following: “Throughout their employment with
defendants, Plaintiffs regularly worked hours over 40 in a week and were not compensated for
such time, including premium pay.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 76 (dkt. no. 33).) In her third and final
attempt, the plaintiff has finally given enough detail to state a plausible claim against St.
Elizabeth’s Medical Center. The plaintiff states the hospital for which she worked, her period of
employment, her hourly compensation, and the number of hours in excess of forty for which she
was not compensated. Therefore, the plaintiff has stated a claim for a violation of the FLSA’s
overtime provision against St. Elizabeth’s, the hospital for which she works.
II.
Individual Defendants
The defendants also move to dismiss the claims against the two individual defendants,
Dr. Ralph de la Torre, President and CEO of Caritas Christi Health Care, and Richard Kropp,
Senior Vice President of Human Resources of “the System.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 70.) Corporate
officers may be personally liable for a corporation’s FLSA violations if they have certain
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responsibilities with respect to hiring and paying employees. See Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d
1509, 1511 (1st Cir. 1983). The First Circuit has suggested that personal liability should not be
imposed on officers who are only remotely responsible for decisions about workers’ pay. See id.
at 1513 (“It is difficult to accept . . . that Congress intended that any corporate officer or other
employee with ultimate operational control over payroll matters be personally liable.”). Rather,
considerations that could lead to personal liability can include “the individual’s ownership
interest, degree of control over the corporation’s financial affairs and compensation practices,
and role in causing the corporation to compensate (or not compensate) employees in accordance
with the FLSA.” Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal quotations
omitted).
To plead a plausible FLSA claim against an individual, a complaint needs to include
factual allegations, not just conclusory allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,
they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The Second Amended
Complaint contains no factual allegations that would support any of the factors enumerated in
Chao as a basis for imposing personal liability. The Complaint’s only non-conclusory factual
allegation relating to either individual defendant – that Dr. de la Torre played a role in hiring and
firing senior management – does not address the Chao factors or any other specific facts that
would support imposing personal liability on the individual defendants under present law.
Consequently, the FLSA claims against the individual defendants do not meet the “plausibility”
test, and accordingly must be dismissed.
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III.
Additional Hospital Defendants
The defendants have also moved to dismiss all institutions in the Caritas network other
than St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center, where Pruell worked. Under the FLSA’s overtime
provisions, liability only attaches to an “employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 207. While the FLSA does
contemplate situations involving joint employers, see Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973),
to adequately allege liability on such a theory again requires the allegation of sufficient facts to
make a plausible claim.
To determine whether an employment relationship exists under the FLSA, courts look to
“the ‘economic reality’ of the totality of the circumstances bearing on whether the putative
employee is economically dependent on the alleged employer.” Baystate Alt. Staffing, Inc. v.
Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998). Again, the First Circuit has spelled out the factors to
be considered in determining joint employment for purposes of the FLSA. Those factors are
“whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees; (2) supervised
and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate
and method of payment; and (4) maintained employment records.” Id.
As to all four Baystate factors the Complaint makes no relevant allegations or makes
merely conclusory ones. There is no allegation that any defendant other than the plaintiff’s direct
employer, St. Elizabeth’s, had any power to hire or fire her or supervised and controlled her
work schedule. The closest the Complaint comes to making a plausible allegation for joint
employment is the repeated vague assertion that there is a centralized Caritas system that handles
payroll and human resources globally. That general allegation is not enough to state a plausible
case of joint employment against any of the institutional defendants other than St. Elizabeth’s.
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IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendant’s Motion (dkt. no. 107) to Dismiss is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The action may proceed on Pruell’s personal claim
against St. Elizabeth’s under the FLSA. All other claims are dismissed.
It is SO ORDERED.
/s/ George A. O’Toole, Jr.
United States District Judge
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