Johnson v. Patrick et al

Filing 42

Judge Richard G. Stearns: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, entered. "For the foregoing reasons, Johnson's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk will now close the case." (Flaherty, Elaine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-11543-RGS
RONALD L. JOHNSON
v.
DEVAL L. PATRICK, MAUREEN WALSH,
MARK A. CONRAD, DORIS DOTTRIDGE,
CANDICE KOCHIN, PAMELA LOMBARDINI,
THOMAS F. MERIGAN, and DEBORAH MCDONAGH.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
July 7, 2011
STEARNS, D.J.
Plaintiff Ronald L. Johnson is serving a life sentence as a result of a 1964
conviction for first-degree murder. Under the state commutation guidelines that were
in effect prior to 1987, the Advisory Board of Pardons evaluated petitions for
commutation based, in part, on a prisoner’s responsible use of rehabilitative programs,
including furloughs. At that time, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 90A and 103 CMR
463.00, et. seq. (the Department of Correction regulations), make inmates serving life
sentences for first-degree murder eligible for furloughs. From approximately 1973 to
1987, Johnson accumulated over 2900 furlough hours. See Compl. ¶ 46. On
December 30, 1987, the Department of Correction changed its policy and inmates

serving life sentences for first-degree murder became ineligible for furloughs. The new
state commutation guidelines eliminated the use of furloughs as a consideration in
granting a commutation of sentence.
Johnson filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Maureen
Walsh, Mark A. Conrad, Doris Dottridge, Candice Kochin, Pamela Lombardini,
Thomas F. Merigan, and Deborah McDonagh (Parole Board Members), and Governor
Deval L. Patrick, challenging the constitutionality of the post-1987 state commutation
process. Specifically, Johnson alleges that the state laws, regulations, and procedures
barring inmates serving life sentences from furloughs amount to an ex post facto
enhancement of his sentence and deprive him of a liberty interest without due process.
Johnson seeks a declaratory judgment, as well as a permanent injunction, ordering the
Massachusetts Parole Board to grant him an immediate commutation hearing in
accordance with the laws, regulations, and guidelines in effect at the time of his
conviction. Johnson also seeks money damages against all defendants.
DISCUSSION
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.

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U.S. Const. Amend. XI. “The Supreme Court . . . has expanded the doctrine of
sovereign immunity beyond the literal words of the Eleventh Amendment, holding that
state governments, absent their consent, are not only immune from suit by citizens of
another state, but by their own citizens as well.”

Guillemard-Ginorio v.

Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 529 n.23 (1st Cir. 2009), citing Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 728-729 (1999). Under the Eleventh Amendment , a State, its agencies, and
agency officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” for purposes of
section 1983, and therefore are not subject to suit for money damages in the federal
courts without the State’s consent or the abrogation of State sovereignty by Congress
acting under its Fourteenth Amendment powers. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-67 (1989); Lopes v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 170, 175
(2004); Laubinger v. Dep’t of Revenue, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 598, 601-602 (1996). The
scope of any alleged waiver of immunity is construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.
See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). The Commonwealth has not consented
to being sued for money damages in either the federal courts or in its own courts under
section 1983. See Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 44-45 (1981).
Cf. Commonwealth v. ELM Med. Labs., Inc., 33 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 76-77 (1992)
(same, State Civil Rights Act).
While the Eleventh Amendment prevents the bringing of a suit against a State
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in federal court, it does not prohibit suits against State officers acting in their official
capacity when a party seeks prospective equitable relief from a continuing violation of
federal law. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 159-160 (1908). However, the Eleventh Amendment does not give federal courts
jurisdiction to award injunctive relief against State officials based on violations of state
law.

See Pennhurst Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldermann, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).

Accordingly, Johnson’s claims for damages and injunctive relief against all of these
defendants must be dismissed.1
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Johnson’s Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Clerk will now close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
______________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

An alternative basis for dismissal is the three-year statute of limitations on Johnson’s
§ 1983 claim. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-250 (1989) (Section 1983
claims are governed by the applicable state statute of limitations pertaining to personal
injury); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A (in Massachusetts, the statute of limitations for
personal injury claims is three years from the date of accrual of the cause of action).
Johnson’s cause of action accrued on December 30, 1987, the date on which a
moratorium on all furloughs for prisoners serving life sentences was imposed. See
Compl. ¶ 46. Johnson filed his Complaint on September 14, 2009.
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