Jackson v. Social Security Administration

Filing 19

Judge Rya W. Zobel: ORDER entered granting 12 Motion for Extension of Time to File; denying 13 Motion for Order Reversing Decision of Commissioner; granting 14 Motion for Order Affirming Decision of Commissioner (Urso, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-10019-RWZ

TINA JACKSON ex. rel W.R.
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

ORDER
August 26, 2011
ZOBEL, D.J.
Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) application on behalf of her
son, W.R., on May 1, 2008. The application was denied. She now appeals for judicial
review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405.
I.

The Factual Record
At the time of the SSI application, W.R. was six years old and lived with his

mother, the plaintiff, and his two sisters. In the application plaintiff describes several
behavioral problems, primarily angry outbursts, an excess of energy, and a lack of
focus. The earliest medical evidence in the record is an evaluation by Dr. Robert
Beckmann in 2005, when W.R. was three. R. 209-10, Docket # 11. W.R. began
treatment at Arbour Counseling Services in 2008, shortly before the SSI application
was filed. The initial clinical evaluation was performed by Ms. Jennifer Rheaume, a
counselor, R. 158-60, and treatment continued with periodic progress reports through
at least May of 2009, R. 162-75, 211-36. W.R. was also seen at Arbour by Dr.

Gaticales, a psychiatrist, who prescribed several medications. T. 174-75.
Following the SSI application, W.R. was referred to Dr. David N. Husson, a
psychologist, for an evaluation to assist in determinating eligibility for benefits. R. 146151. Each of two psychologists, Dr. Therese Harris and Dr. Michael Abruzzese,
reviewed the collected medical records of W.R. at the request of the Social Security
Administration and completed a Childhood Disability Evaluation Form. R. 152-57, 20308. The record also includes assessments and a report card from W.R.’s school
district. R. 141-45. Plaintiff and W.R. testified at the hearing before the ALJ.
II.

The Denial of W.R.’s SSI Application
The application for SSI benefits was denied initially and upon reconsideration.

R. 43-45, 50-52. The initial denial relied primarily upon the report of Dr. Husson and
the denial on reconsideration was also informed by reports from Arbour Counseling.
Plaintiff requested and received a hearing before an ALJ. The ALJ evaluated
W.R.’s application for SSI using the three-step process, set forth in Social Security
Administration regulations, for determining SSI eligibility for children. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.924. First, the applicant must not be doing substantial gainful activity. Second,
the applicant must have one or more severe impairments. Third, the combination of the
severe impairment and any other impairments must meet, or medically or functionally
equal, any listed per se disabling impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpart P App. 1
(listing impairments). Functional equivalence is determined in respect to six domains:
(1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting
and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for
2

oneself; (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a. The applicant is
deemed disabled if the combination of impairments results in a marked limitation in two
or more domains or an extreme limitation in one.
The ALJ found that W.R did not engage in substantial gainful activity and had a
severe impairment, mood disorder. He concluded that the mood disorder was neither a
listed impairment nor, in combination with other non-severe impairments, functionally
equivalent. Although he found that W.R. exhibited a marked limitation in interacting
and relating with others, and a less than marked limitation in attending and completing
tasks, W.R. showed no limitation in the other four domains. Accordingly, benefits were
denied.
The denial was selected for review by the Decision Review Board, which did not
complete its review within 90 days. As a result, by rule, the denial became final.
Plaintiff filed the instant appeal.
III.

Analysis
A denial of benefits will be upheld unless there was an error of law or the factual

findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Manso-Pizzaro
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996) (Per Curiam).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support such a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to (1) identify a severe attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) impairment and consider how this impairment
3

would limit W.R.’s functioning in the six domains; and (2) give proper weight to
evidence of impaired functioning in the home.
Initially, the dispute over whether the ALJ should have identified a severe ADHD
impairment has no effect on the outcome of the case. Because he identified a severe
impairment, mood disorder, he considered whether the combined effect of all of W.R.’s
impairments, severe or otherwise, were functionally disabling. See R. 19 (identifying
“history of impulsiveness and hyperactivity”).
Regardless, the ALJ’s finding of a severe mood-disorder impairment but no other
severe impairment, ADHD or otherwise, was supported by substantial evidence. The
sole diagnosis of ADHD was by Dr. Husson following a one-time evaluative interview.
Dr. Husson does not diagnosis the ADHD as “severe” or provide any substantive
discussion of the ADHD diagnosis. At the initial clinical evaluation of W.R. at Arbour
Counseling Services, the treating counselor indicated a need to rule out ADHD. R.
158-160. The record contains dozens of pages of progress notes documenting
subsequent counseling sessions with W.R.; plaintiff has identified no diagnosis of
ADHD in those notes. Finally, while the ALJ discounted some aspects of the
evaluations performed by Drs. Abruzzese and Harris, R. 17, it is relevant that they, too,
did not diagnose ADHD.
The ALJ gave full consideration to evidence of impaired functioning in the home.
He noted plaintiff’s descriptions of W.R’s behavior, the only such evidence, specifically
his poor focus and angry outbursts. R. 17. The ALJ recognized that these descriptions
were, at least as to the severity of W.R’s limitations, contradicted by W.R.’s school
4

record and observations from a school teacher, by the increasingly positive
observations expressed in the months of progress notes written by the long-term
treating therapist, Ms. Rheaume, and the joint opinion of Ms. Rheaume and Dr.
Gaticales who found W.R.’s behavior to be within normal limits and consistent with age
appropriate mental functions. Id. The ALJ did not act unreasonably in taking into
account both the observations of plaintiff and the findings of third parties and according
more weight to the neutral, third-party findings. See, e.g., R. 19 (ALJ analysis for
domain of attending and completing tasks).
IV.

Conclusion
Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time (Docket # 12) is ALLOWED. Plaintiff’s

motion for an order reversing the decision of the commissioner (Docket # 13) is
DENIED. Defendant’s motion for an order affirming the decision of the commissioner
(Docket # 14) is ALLOWED.

August 26, 2011
DATE

/s/Rya W. Zobel
RYA W. ZOBEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5