WATTLETON v. LAPPIN et al
Filing
33
Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER "In accordance with the foregoing, 1) defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (Docket No. 14 ) is ALLOWED; and 2) plaintiff's motions for a continuance and for injunctive relief (Docket Nos. 22 and 29 ) are DENIED." (Duong, Diep)
United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
________________________________
)
DAVID EARL WATTLETON,
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
Civil Action No.
)
10-10845-NMG
HARLEY LAPPIN, et al.,
)
Defendants.
)
________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
Pro se plaintiff David Earl Wattleton brings this suit
seeking injunctive relief against defendants Harley Lappin, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and “Mr. T.
Marshal”, the Director of the United States Marshal Service (“the
U.S. Marshal”).
Wattleton alleges that BOP and the U.S. Marshal
are violating his right to access the courts by refusing to
transport his legal documents and materials necessary for an
active court case, in violation of 28 C.F.R. § 553.14(a)(1), and
by refusing to forward his mail, in violation of 28 C.F.R.
§ 540.25(g).
I.
Factual Background
On June 8, 2000, in the United States District Court for the
District of Georgia, Wattleton was found not guilty by reason of
insanity of using a telephone to willfully make a threat and
maliciously convey false information, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
-1-
§ 844(e).
Ga. 2000).
United States v. Wattleton, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1380 (N.D.
The Court committed him to the custody of the
Attorney General for care and treatment.
He is currently in the
custody of the Fort Devens Federal Medical Center in Ayer,
Massachusetts (“FMC Devens”).
Wattleton alleges that, on February 1, 2008, the defendants
refused to permit him to transfer any of his legal documents or
mail to the Atlanta City Detention Center (“ACDC”) where he was
temporarily located.
As a result, he was unable to give the
clerk his change of address, did not receive notice of the
denial, on February 23, 2008, of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion
in the Northern District of Georgia, Case No. 99-00599, did not
file a timely notice of appeal and lost his right to appeal that
decision.
Wattleton suggests that the defendants’ motive was to
protect BOP doctors from litigation arising from their alleged
falsification of the plaintiff’s diagnosis and treatment.
Wattleton seeks unspecified money damages and an injunction
ordering the defendants to review their policies on temporary
inmate transfer and to ensure that his right of access to the
courts will not be violated in the future.
He has also moved for
a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to provide him
with access to his legal documents.
II.
Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 17, 2009 in the United
-2-
States District Court for the District of Columbia.
On December
2, 2009, Wattleton moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin
the defendants from delaying or refusing to submit his mail to
the United States Postal Authorities and to deliver his incoming
mail.
The motion was denied.
Meanwhile, on December 7, 2009, the defendants filed a
motion for dismissal, summary judgment or a more definite
statement which the plaintiff opposes.
Wattleton then filed a
motion for a continuance of the defendants’ motion to dismiss
pending discovery which the defendants oppose.
In April, 2010,
the case was transferred to the District of Massachusetts and
assigned to this Session.
Subsequently, on October 15, 2010,
Wattleton filed a motion for injunctive relief which the
defendants oppose.
III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment
The defendants move to dismiss this case pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (3) and(6) or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
They also move for a
more definite statement in the event that the Court denies the
motion to dismiss.
Because matters outside the pleadings have
been submitted for review, the Court treats the defendants’
motion as a motion for summary judgment.
See Wells v. S.C. Dep’t
of Corr., No. 4:05-2321, 2007 WL 120833, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 10,
2007).
-3-
A.
Summary Judgment Standard
The role of summary judgment is “to pierce the pleadings and
to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine
need for trial.”
Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822
(1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46,
50 (1st Cir. 1990)).
The burden is upon the moving party to
show, based upon the pleadings, discovery and affidavits, “that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law.”
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
“Factual disputes that are irrelevant
or unnecessary will not be counted.”
Id.
A genuine issue of
material fact exists where the evidence with respect to the
material fact in dispute “is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id.
Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine, triable issue.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Celotex Corp. v.
The Court must view the
entire record in the light most hospitable to the non-moving
party and indulge all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.
O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993).
-4-
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the record in
the non-moving party’s favor, the Court determines that no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A federal court must liberally construe pleadings filed by
pro se litigants.
B.
See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Continuance
Wattleton moves for a continuance of the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment pending discovery.
He states that he would
like to obtain affidavits from a FMC Devens mailroom official,
Mr. Amica, and from the defendants.
He expects the affidavits to
show that there is a widespread practice of refusing to forward
inmates’ incoming legal mail from the courts in order to thwart
their litigation.
Because, as explained below, Wattleton has
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the defendants caused him actual injury, the Court concludes that
the requested discovery would be futile and will deny plaintiff’s
motion.
C.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The defendants maintain that Wattleton has not exhausted his
administrative remedies by submitting an internal complaint with
the BOP with respect to the allegations raised in this case.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) provides that
prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an
-5-
action in federal court.
42 U.S.C. § 1997(e); Booth v. Churner,
532 U.S. 731, 733-34 (2001).
The PLRA does not, however, apply
to someone who, like the plaintiff, is civilly committed.
Perkins v. Hedricks, 340 F.3d 582, 583 (8th Cir. 2003); King v.
Greenblatt, 53 F. Supp. 2d 117, 138 (D. Mass. 1999).
As a
result, Wattleton need not show that he exhausted his
administrative remedies.
D.
Mail Forwarding
First, Wattleton’s claim that his mail was not forwarded to
ACDC is barred by this Court’s decision in Wattleton v.
Bollinger, Civ. A. No. 09-40116, at *7 (D. Mass. July 10, 2009).
In Bollinger, this Court dismissed Wattleton’s claim for denial
of right of access to the courts because he failed to allege
sufficiently actual injury.
In that case, he alleged that the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied his appeal because the
defendants failed to provide him with the option of having his
mail forwarded temporarily to the ACDC.
This Court held that
such an allegation did not constitute actual injury because
the Court cannot infer any connection between the library
and mail policy of which Wattleton complains and the
defendants’ failure to forward his mail to Georgia.
Id.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
bars Wattleton from re-litigating whether he had an excuse for
missing the filing deadline for his Eleventh Circuit appeal.
-6-
For
an issue to be precluded it must have been 1) actually litigated
and resolved, 2) in a valid court determination and 3) essential
to that prior judgment.
(2008).
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892
Given that Wattleton has already litigated the mail
forwarding issue and this Court has already resolved it, the
doctrine of issue preclusion bars Wattleton from raising that
issue again in this case.
E.
Causation of Actual Injury
With respect to Wattleton’s claim that he was denied access
to his legal materials, the Court will allow the defendants’
motion for summary judgment because, even viewing the record in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no evidence
from which a jury could reasonably find that the defendants
caused Wattleton actual injury.
In order to prevail on a claim for a denial of the
constitutional right of access to the courts, a plaintiff must
prove that the failure to provide access resulted in actual
injury.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348 (1996) (citing Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)); see also Marshall v. Knight, 445
F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[O]nly if the defendants’ conduct
prejudices a potentially meritorious challenge to the prisoner’s
conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement has this right
been infringed.”).
Here, the docket in Wattleton’s Northern
-7-
District of Georgia case demonstrates that the defendants did not
prejudice his appeal in that case.
First, the Northern District of Georgia found that
Wattleton’s failure to file timely was not due to excusable
neglect.
On September 15, 2008, Wattleton filed a notice of
appeal with respect to several of the District Court’s rulings,
including his Rule 60(b) motion.
The notice was untimely and, on
December 22, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit remanded Wattleton’s
appeal for the purpose of determining whether Wattleton’s appeal
should be reopened despite its untimeliness.
Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(5) provides that the district court may extend the time to
file a notice of appeal if the moving party shows excusable
neglect or good cause for failing to timely file a notice of
appeal.
United States v. Wattleton, No. 08-15363 (11th Cir. Dec.
22, 2008).
On January 23, 2009, the Northern District of Georgia
found no excusable neglect in Wattleton’s case.
In light of that
finding, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Wattleton’s appeal on
February 19, 2009.
Wattleton then filed for a writ of Certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court which was denied on June 8,
2009.
Wattleton should have raised the arguments that he proffers
in this case, i.e. his alleged inability to receive his legal
materials and mail, when the issue of excusable neglect was
before the Georgia court.
If he did raise those arguments, the
-8-
Georgia court found them unpersuasive and re-litigation of that
issue is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion.
Second, the docket in the Georgia case shows that Wattleton
filed a notice of a change of address on March 17, 2008.
Thus,
his notice of appeal, filed on September 15, 2008, was six months
after he recorded his change of address with the court and almost
seven months after the court’s February 23, 2008 judgment.
the intervening months, Wattleton filed numerous motions.
In
As
such, it is difficult to accept that Wattleton did not know about
the February, 2008 judgment.
Even if he was unaware of that
judgment until 180 days later, Wattleton still inexplicably
delayed filing his notice of appeal for another two months.
Thus, no reasonable jury could find that the defendants caused
Wattleton to file his notice of appeal late and the Court will
allow the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
IV.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief
To the extent that the plaintiff claims that the defendants
are currently denying him access to the courts, he alleges the
same injury as above.
As previously explained, no reasonable
jury could find that such injury was caused by the defendants.
Moreover, the defendants have proffered evidence that legal
papers were delivered to Wattleton on September 30, 2010.
As a
result, plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction will be
denied as moot.
-9-
ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing,
1)
defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment
(Docket No. 14) is ALLOWED; and
2)
plaintiff’s motions for a continuance and for
injunctive relief (Docket Nos. 22 and 29) are
DENIED.
So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated May 2, 2011
-10-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?