M.J. Martins Enterprises, Inc. v. United States of America, Department of Agriculture

Filing 16

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER(Moore, Kellyann)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
________________________________
)
M.J. MARTINS ENTERPRISES, INC., )
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
)
AGRICULTURE,
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________ )

Civil Case No.
10-11808-NMG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
M.J. Martins Enterprises, Inc. (“plaintiff”) seeks federal
judicial review of its reciprocal disqualification from the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), which was
triggered by its prior disqualification from the Supplemental
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (“WIC”).
I.

Background
Congress created SNAP to alleviate hunger and malnutrition

among low-income households. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.

SNAP

establishes a system whereby participants receive financial
assistance to purchase certain eligible food items from
authorized retailers.

WIC is an outgrowth of SNAP which provides

supplemental foods and nutrition education to special-risk
pregnant, postpartum and breastfeeding women as well as infants
and young children from families with inadequate incomes. See 42
-1-

U.S.C. § 1786(a).

The Food and Nutrition Service (“FNS”) is the

federal agency within the United States Department of Agriculture
that administers WIC and SNAP through collaboration with
state-level entities.
If a store fails to comply with the statutes and regulations
governing the two programs, the FNS or an authorized state agency
may disqualify the store from further SNAP or WIC participation.
See 7 U.S.C. § 2021(a); 7 C.F.R. § 278.6(a).

A store

disqualified from one of the two programs may be reciprocally
disqualified from the other by the FNS without a separate
adjudication of wrongdoing. See 7 U.S.C. § 2021(g); 42 U.S.C. §
1786(n).

If a store’s disqualification would impose a hardship

on households participating in the programs, the FNS may impose a
civil monetary penalty (“CMP”) in lieu of disqualification. 7
C.F.R. § 278.6(f).
II.

Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff operates a small grocery store in Brockton,

Massachusetts called “Eastside Market.”

In May 2005, plaintiff

became eligible to participate in SNAP and WIC and began
participating in both programs.
Between February and March 2008, the Massachusetts
Department of Public Health (“MDPH”) investigated the plaintiff
for WIC violations and uncovered four incidents of overcharging.
In June 2008, the MDPH notified the plaintiff of its

-2-

disqualification from WIC.

In March 2009, the FNS notified the

plaintiff of its reciprocal disqualification from SNAP and its
ineligibility for a CMP.

Plaintiff requested administrative

review of the FNS’s decision not to impose a CMP in lieu of
disqualification.

It was informed in September 2010 that the

decision of the FNS was affirmed.
Plaintiff commenced this action against the FNS on October
22, 2010, seeking review of the final determination of the FNS
disqualifying it from the SNAP program.

Plaintiff contends that,

by allegedly failing to give it advance written notice of the
first incident of overcharging, the MDPH gave short shrift to 42
U.S.C. § 1786(f)(26):
If a State agency finds that a vendor has committed a
violation that requires a pattern of occurrences in order
to impose a penalty or sanction, the State agency shall
notify the vendor of the initial violation in writing
prior to documentation of another violation, unless the
State agency determines that notifying the vendor would
compromise an investigation.
Because the underlying WIC disqualification was contrary to
federal law, plaintiff hypothesizes, the reciprocal
disqualification from SNAP by the FNS was consequently
“arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by law.”

On May 15,

2012, plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings.
Initially, the defendant did not file a formal opposition to
plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

It later

alerted the Court to its memorandum of law filed in August 2011

-3-

entitled, “Defendant’s memorandum of facts and law in opposition
to the merits of plaintiff’s complaint.”

Because that pleading

addresses the perceived inadequacies of plaintiff’s Complaint,
the Court will treat it as a cross-motion for judgment on the
pleadings.

Defendant submits that its actions complied with

federal laws and regulations and, more to the point, that the
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review the reciprocal
disqualification decision.

In July 2012, defendant filed a

formal opposition reiterating the concerns raised in its earlier
memorandum of law.
III. Availability of Judicial Review
The Court turns to the threshold question of whether it has
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s appeal.
The statutory scheme provides for the federal judicial
review of an adverse action taken by the FNS for the direct
violation of SNAP, see 7 U.S.C. § 2023(a); 7 C.F.R. § 279.1, but
does not authorize the review of a reciprocal disqualification
from SNAP following an adverse action taken by a state agency for
the direct violation of WIC, see 7 U.S.C. § 2021(g)(2)(C); Salmo
v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 2002)
(“Congress has unambiguously stated that decisions by the FNS
disqualifying a store from participating in [SNAP] as a result of
a prior WIC disqualification are not subject to administrative or
judicial review.”); Dasmesh v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 2d

-4-

1033, 1039 (W.D. Mich. 2007) (dismissing for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction plaintiff’s challenge to its reciprocal SNAP
disqualification).

In light of the clear statutory command and

uniform judicial consensus, this Court concludes that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction to review the plaintiff’s reciprocal
disqualification from SNAP.
If plaintiff had challenged the FNS decision not to impose a
CMP in lieu of disqualification, a matter not expressly exempt
from judicial review, see 7 U.S.C. § 2021(g); 7 C.F.R. § 297.7(a),
this Court might have had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear its
appeal. Compare Dasmesh, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 1039 (dismissing
plaintiff’s reciprocal disqualification challenge but entertaining
its appeal of the denial of a CMP), with Islam Corp. v. Johanns,
No. 3:05-CV-00801-S, 2007 WL 1520930, *1-2 (W.D. Ky. May 21, 2007)
(concluding that § 2021(g)(2)(C) bars challenges to reciprocal
disqualifications and the attendant decision not to impose a
CMP).

Plaintiff’s one-count Complaint does not expressly

challenge the denial of a CMP, however, so the Court need not
reach the issue.

Any such appeal would not likely be meritorious,

in any event, because the FNS retains the discretion to deny a
CMP even if the statutory criteria are met. See 7 C.F.R. §
278.6(f) (“FNS may impose a civil money penalty as a sanction in
lieu of disqualification.”).

-5-

ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing,
1)

defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Docket No. 10) is ALLOWED;

2)

plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
(Docket No. 12) is DENIED; and

3)

the Complaint (Docket No. 1) is DISMISSED for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.

So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated August 2, 2012

-6-