Eddington v. Roden

Filing 11

Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. In view of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 6) is ALLOWED and the petition is DISMISSED. 2. A COA is DENIED as to all claims.(Hohler, Daniel) (Main Document 11 replaced on 4/2/2012) (Hohler, Daniel).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
WILBERT EDDINGTON,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.
GARY RODEN,
Respondent.

C.A. No. 11-10490-MLW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WOLF, C.J.

March 31, 2012

A petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§2254, was filed pro se by Wilbert Eddington on March 23, 2011. On
June 13, 2011, respondent Gary Roden filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the Petition is time-barred under 28 U.S.C.
§2244(d)(1), the statute of limitations governing federal habeas
relief. This contention is correct. Therefore, the Motion to
Dismiss is being allowed.
On June 27, 2000, in Massachusetts Superior Court, Eddington
was found guilty at the conclusion of a jury-waived trial.1 See
Commonwealth v. Eddington, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 138, 139 (2008). On
September 12, 2001, Eddington filed his appeal in the Massachusetts
Appeals Court, seeking reversal of his state court convictions. See
1

The court convicted Eddington of: (1) one count of felony child
abuse; (2) three counts of assault and battery on a child causing
substantial bodily injuries;(3) five counts of assault and
battery on a child causing bodily injury; (4) two counts of
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon; and (5) two
counts of the lesser included offense of assault and battery. See
Eddington, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 139.
1

Resp. Exh. 2, at 1-2. That initial appeal was dismissed by the
Appeals Court on the ground that Eddington failed to file a brief
and appendix within the time required by Massachusetts Appeals
Court Standing Order 17A. See id. at 1. On March 15, 2007,
Eddington's motion to reinstate his appeal was allowed by the
Appeals Court. See Resp. Exh. 2, at 2. Subsequently, on January 31,
2008,

the

Appeals

Court

affirmed

Eddington's

convictions.

Eddington, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 139.
On April 25, 2008, Eddington filed an application for leave to
obtain

further

appellate

review

by

the

Massachusetts

Supreme

Judicial Court ("SJC"). See Resp. Exh. 3, at 1. On June 5, 2008,
the SJC denied further appellate review. See Commonwealth v.
Eddington, 451 Mass. 1106 (2008). On September 3, 2008, ninety days
after the SJC denied Eddington's request for further appellate
review, the time for filing a certiorari petition expired and his
conviction became final. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113,
119 (2009).
On June 4, 2009, Eddington filed a motion for post-conviction
relief and new trial. See Resp. Exh. 1, at 4. The motion was denied
by the trial judge on June 8, 2009. See id. On May 11, 2010, the
Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Eddington's
motion for new trial. See Commonwealth v. Eddington, 76 Mass. App.
Ct. 1130 (2010) (unpublished table decision); see Resp. Exh. 4, at
2. On September 15, 2010, the SJC denied further appellate review.

2

Commonwealth v. Eddington, 458 Mass. 1102 (2010); see Resp. Exh. 5,
at 1.
The statute of limitations for federal habeas relief, 28
U.S.C. §2244(d)(1), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, provides a one-year period in which
review of state convictions may be sought in federal court, to be
assessed from the latest of "the date on which the judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the
time for seeking such review." However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§2244(d)(2), "[t]he time during which a properly filed application
for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending" is not included in
the calculation of the one-year statute of limitations period.
Therefore, §2244(d)(2) tolls the one-year statute of limitations
period during the pendency of any such properly filed application.
As the First Circuit has written, "[s]ection 2244(d)(2) does
not reset the clock on the [one-year] limitations period . . . but
merely stops it temporarily, until the relevant applications for
review are ruled upon." Trapp v. Spencer, 479 F.3d 53, 58-59 (1st
Cir. 2007) (citing Cordle v. Guarino, 428 F.3d 46, 48 n.4 (1st Cir.
2005)); see also Dunker v. Bissonnete, 154 F. Supp. 2d 95, 103 (D.
Mass. 2001) (tolling provision "only stops, but does not reset, the
[statute of limitations] clock from ticking." (internal citations
and

quotations

omitted)).

Several

other

circuits

have

also

interpreted §2244(d)(2) in this way. See, e.g., Moore v. Crosby,
3

321 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11th Cir. 2003); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d
13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000); Granger v. Hurt, 90 Fed. App'x 97, 100-01
(6th Cir. 2004).
The instant case requires the application of the foregoing
principles. Eddington filed his petition in this court on March 23,
2011. The SJC denied further appellate review on June 5, 2008. His
conviction became final on September 3, 2008, when the deadline to
petition for certiorari expired. See Jimenez, 555 U.S. at 119.
Therefore, under §2244(d)(1), Eddington had one year from September
3, 2008, to file the instant Petition. However, the one-year period
was

tolled

from

June

4,

2009

to

September

15,

2010,

while

Eddington's motion for new trial and post-conviction relief was
pending in state court. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). Therefore, the
statute of limitations was tolled for one year, three months, and
twelve days. Once the tolling is accounted for, the statute of
limitations required that the instant petition be filed by December
15, 2010. It was not, however, filed until March 23, 2011. It is,
therefore, time-barred.
Eddington seeks to escape this conclusion by arguing that the
one-year limitations period should be deemed to have begun when the
SJC denied further appellate review of his request for postconviction relief on September 15, 2010. However, as explained
earlier, the First Circuit has rejected this interpretation of the
statute, as have other circuits. See Trapp, 479 F.3d at 58-59;
Moore, 321 F.3d at 1381; Smith, 208 F.3d at 17; Granger, 90 Fed.
4

App'x at 100-01. Therefore, the petition is time-barred and the
Motion to Dismiss is being allowed.2
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings,

the

court

must

issue

or

deny

a

certificate

of

appealability ("COA") when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant. A COA may issue only where a petitioner has made a
substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, meaning
a petitioner must show that a reasonable jurist would find the
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable. See
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-338 (2003). As explained
earlier, the First Circuit has decided the issue of whether tolling
resets the clock with regard to the one-year statute of limitations
for habeas petitions, see Trapp, 479 F.3d at 58-59, and its holding
that tolling stops the clock but does not reset it is consistent
with the holdings of several other circuits. See Moore, 321 F.3d at
2

Although the petitioner did not argue that equitable tolling
applies, the court has considered the issue. Under the doctrine
of equitable tolling, a petitioner must demonstrate facts
sufficient to prove both: (1) that the petitioner diligently
pursued his rights; and (2) the existence of "extraordinary
circumstances," which stood in petitioner's way and prevented
timely filing. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562
(2010). The party seeking the protection of equitable tolling has
the burden of establishing the basis for it. See Delaney v.
Matesanz, 264 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2001). The petitioner has
presented no evidence that this case involves any "extraordinary
circumstances," which are "necessary to support equitable
tolling." Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 337 (2007); see also
David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 346 (1st Cir. 2003) ("If equitable
tolling is available to extend section 2244(d)'s limitations
period, it can only do so for the most exceptional reasons."). In
fact, Eddington provided no information in response to paragraph
18 of the habeas petition, which seeks explanation for the
untimeliness of the petition. See Petition at 13, ¶18.
5

1381; Smith, 208 F.3d at 17; Granger, 90 Fed. App'x at 100-01.
There is no contrary authority in other circuits. A reasonable
jurist in the First Circuit, therefore, would not find the court's
assessment of the claims debatable in the instant case.
Accordingly, a COA is being denied. Petitioner is advised that
he may seek a COA from the First Circuit pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1.

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 6) is ALLOWED
and the petition is DISMISSED.

2.

A COA is DENIED as to all claims.

/s/ Mark L. Wolf
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6