Hoffman v. Target Corporation et al
Filing
48
Judge Rya W. Zobel: memorandum of Decision entered granting 35 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 38 Motion for Summary Judgment (Urso, Lisa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-11613-RWZ
HARRIET HOFFMAN
v.
TARGET CORPORATION,
d/b/a TARGET STORES, INC., et al.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
July 12, 2013
ZOBEL, D.J.
Plaintiff Harriet Hoffman injured herself by falling down the bottom few steps of a
flight of stairs at a Target store. She alleges negligence on the part of defendant Jeffrey
M. Brown Associates (“JMBA”), which managed the construction of the store; defendant
Target Corporation (“Target”), doing business as Target Stores, Inc., which operates
the store; and defendant Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (“Sedgwick”),
which processed Hoffman’s claim as Target’s third-party claims administrator.
Defendants now move for summary judgment.
I.
Background
On February 16, 2009, Hoffman was shopping on the second floor of a Target
store in Stoughton, Massachusetts. She was seventy-nine years old. After purchasing
some hand towels, she began to leave the store by walking down a set of stairs to the
ground floor. Both sides of the staircase had handrails; Hoffman was holding the
handrail on her left as she descended. About two steps from the bottom of the
staircase, she lost her footing and fell. She was badly injured, suffering deep abrasions
on her leg.1
Hoffman testified at her deposition that she did not know why she fell, except
that she thought she slipped on the stair tread. She did not see any water, snow, dirt, or
rubbish on the stair, or any cracks or problems with the stair tread that could have
caused her fall.
Two Target security cameras, one in front of the staircase and one behind it,
recorded video footage of Hoffman’s fall. Though grainy, the videos indicate that
Hoffman simply missed her step as she came down the last few stairs.
Hoffman sought compensation from Target’s third-party claims administrator,
Sedgwick. Sedgwick denied her claim on the ground that neither Target nor its
employees negligently caused Hoffman’s fall.
Hoffman subsequently hired an individual named David Melo to examine the
staircase. Melo found that the staircase largely complied with the Massachusetts state
building code, but that the handrail next to the stair potentially violated that code
because it was an open guard2 with no balusters3 underneath the handrail. At the time
1
Hoffman subsequently died of an unrelated gastrointestinal condition. This suit is carried on by
her estate.
2
As used here, the term “guard” refers to a “contrivance of metal, wood, or other material, made
. . . to prevent accidents by falling, etc.” “guard, n.,” OED Online, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/82132
(last visited July 11, 2013).
3
The term “balusters” refers to the “upright posts or rails which support the handrail, and guard
the side, of a staircase.” “baluster, n.,” OED Online, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15068 (last visited
July 11, 2013).
2
the Target was built, the Massachusetts building code required open guards in stores
to “have balusters or be of solid material such that a sphere with a diameter of four
inches (102mm) cannot pass through any opening.” 780 Mass. Code Regs. § 1021.3
(6th ed. 2006) (expired 2009).
Hoffman claims that JMBA and Target were negligent for building and operating
a store with a staircase that was not built to code. She also claims that Sedgwick is
liable for unfair and deceptive business practices in denying her claim for
compensation.
II.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment will be granted if there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
draw all justifiable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986). If the evidence presented would allow a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the nonmovant, summary judgment must be denied. Id. at 248.
III.
Analysis
To succeed on her claims against JMBA and Target, Hoffman must prove “the
familiar elements of negligence, including duty, breach, causation, and harm.” Katz v.
Pershing, LLC., 672 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2012); see Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 582
N.E.2d 954, 958 (Mass. 1991). She has failed to produce any evidence of either breach
or causation, meaning her claim must fail.
As to breach: Hoffman claims JMBA and Target breached their duty to her by
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failing to take due care to prevent her from falling down the staircase. Her only
evidence that JMBA and Target were negligent is her assertion that the lack of
balusters violates the state building code. “[V]iolation of a statute or regulation . . .
constitutes evidence of negligence,” of course, but only as to “consequences that the
statute or regulation was intended to prevent.” Matteo v. Livingstone, 666 N.E.2d 1309,
1311 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); see also Juliano v. Simpson, 962 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Mass.
2012). Here, the Massachusetts building regulations clearly indicate that the purpose of
requiring guards and balusters in a “guardrail system . . . located near the open sides
of elevated walking surfaces” is to “minimiz[e] the possibility of an accidental fall from
the walking surface to the lower level.” 780 Mass. Code Regs. § 1021.1 (6th ed. 2006)
(expired 2009). In other words, the safety regulation requiring balusters was intended
to prevent Hoffman from falling off the side of the staircase to the floor. It was not
intended to prevent her from slipping on a step and falling down the staircase.
Cf. Matteo, 666 N.E.2d at 1311 (“[W]hen building regulations . . . prescribe protective
walls or rails, the consequence they are designed to prevent is that a person will fall off
accidentally.”) But as described above, “violation of a regulation is relevant to the
question of negligence only if the risk that materialized was within the contemplation of
the regulation.” Id. at 1312; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286(c)-(d) (West
2012). So the asserted violation might be evidence that JMBA and Target failed to use
due care to keep Hoffman from falling off the staircase; but it is not evidence that they
failed to use due care to keep Hoffman from falling on the staircase. Because Hoffman
has produced no evidence to show that JMBA and Target were negligent in failing to
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prevent the accident that actually occurred, her claims against them cannot survive.
Hoffman’s causation problem is similar. “The general rule is that one cannot be
held liable for negligent conduct unless it is causally related to injury of the plaintiff.”
Wainwright v. Jackson, 195 N.E. 896, 897 (Mass. 1935). Here, Hoffman claims that
JMBA and Target were negligent because they failed to place balusters along the side
of the staircase. But she has presented no evidence to show she would not have fallen,
or her injuries would have been less severe, if balusters had been in place. This failure
to show causation independently dooms Hoffman’s negligence claims.
Finally, Hoffman concedes in her opposition that she cannot succeed on her
claim against Sedgwick. That concession makes summary judgment in Sedgwick’s
favor appropriate as well.
IV.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Docket ## 35, 38) are ALLOWED.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.
/s/Rya W. Zobel
July 12, 2013
DATE
RYA W. ZOBEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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