Carlsen v. Carlsen

Filing 3

Judge George A. OToole, Jr: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (contained in the Petition for Civil Relief) is DENIED; The Petition for Civil Relief is DENIED; This action is DISMISSED in its en tirety; and Plaintiff is PROHIBITED from filing any further pleadings or requests for relief (in any form), or any new civil actions, that assert matters alleged in his prior litigation in this Court stemming from the New Hampshire Protective Order or his Massachusetts criminal conviction arising out of that Order.(PSSA, 1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
JEFFREY P. CARLSEN,
Plaintiff,
V.
CARI A. CARLSEN,
Defendant.

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)
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) CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-11650-GAO
)
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)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
O’TOOLE, D.J.
For the reasons set forth below: (1) Plaintiff Jeffrey P. Carlsen’s request to proceed in
forma pauperis (contained in the Petition for Civil Relief) is DENIED; (2) the Petition for Civil
Relief is DENIED; (3) this action is DISMISSED in its entirety; and (4) Plaintiff is
PROHIBITED from filing any further pleadings or requests for relief (in any form), or any new
civil actions, that assert matters alleged in his prior litigation in this Court stemming from the
New Hampshire Protective Order or his Massachusetts criminal conviction arising out of that
Order.
BACKGROUND
This action is Carlsen’s fourth attempt to seek relief from his Massachusetts state
conviction based on his violation of a New Hampshire Protective Order. The relevant litigation
background is set forth below.
I..

Prior Related Litigation
A.

Carlsen v. DiPaola, Civil Action No. 11-11100-RWZ

On June 13, 2011, Plaintiff Jeffrey Carlsen (“Carlsen”), a convicted prisoner in custody
at the Billerica House of Correction in Billerica, Massachusetts, filed two self-prepared
pleadings entitled Ex Parte Request for Federal Injunctive Relief seeking an immediate hearing.

See Carlsen v. DiPaola, Civil Action No. 11-11100-RWZ. Carlsen alleged that his present
incarceration was unlawful, and challenged his state conviction in Massachusetts for violation of
a New Hampshire Protective Order (restraining order) obtained by his ex-spouse, Cari Carlsen.
The relevant background, as found by Judge Zobel, is as follows. In May, 2009, Cari
Carlsen (“Cari”) sought an extension of an abuse prevention Protective Order against Carlsen in
the Lowell District Court in Massachusetts pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws § 209A, but her request
for an extension was denied. Carri also sought a Protective Order in the State of New Hampshire
(Docket No. 2010-0542), because Carlsen allegedly resided in New Hampshire. The New
Hampshire Court granted the request and issued a Protective Order on July 16, 2009. That
Protective Order later was extended on August 4, 2010 through July 2011. At some point
thereafter, Carlsen was criminally charged in Massachusetts with violating the New Hampshire
Protective Order. A jury trial was held on July 7, 2011, and he was found guilty. On June 22,
2011, Judge Zobel issued a Memorandum and Order (Docket No. 4) construing Carlsen’s
pleadings as a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his
state court conviction. Carlsen was directed to show cause why the habeas petition should not be
dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.
On June 15, 2011, Judge Zobel issued a Memorandum and Order For Dismissal (Docket
No. 7), dismissing the habeas petition for failure to exhaust state remedies.
B.

Carlsen v. Carlsen, Civil Action No. 11-11119-MLW

On the heels of the dismissal of the habeas petition, on June 20, 2011, Carlsen filed a
civil action against his ex-wife. He alleged that on May 9, 2007, Cari knowingly provided false
information to a police officer, claiming abuse of her and her children. Carlsen also alleged that

2

a week later, Cari provided false information to the New Hampshire Superior Court in Nashua,
claiming abuse. He further contended that on May 22, 2007, she knowingly provided false
information to the Lowell District Court, again claiming abuse of her and her children. Next,
Carlsen contended that she committed acts of fraud by seeking a protective order in New
Hampshire because New Hampshire was not the proper venue to seek such relief. Finally,
Carlsen alleged a conspiracy to commit fraud (generally) as well as mail fraud against the United
States, by providing the false information to the state court. As a result, Carlsen claims he was
improperly sentenced and incarcerated. He sought to have a criminal complaint against Cari
Carlsen to answer for perjury, fraud, conspiracy, and mail fraud.
On July 1, 2011, Chief Judge Wolf issued a Memorandum and Order for Dismissal
(Docket No. 2), dismissing the action sua sponte because a private citizen may not bring a
criminal action against another.
C.

Carlsen v. DiPaola, Civil Action No. 11-11498-RGS

Again, on the heels of dismissal of his prior action, Carlsen filed, on August 23, 2011, a
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his June 7, 2011
conviction, essentially on the same grounds asserted in his prior civil actions (i.e., that the trial
judge improperly admitted evidence, that there was no probable cause for the criminal complaint
against him to issue, and that Massachusetts law was not followed by Cari or by the Lowell
District Court staff). This time, Carlsen asserted he had exhausted all of his state remedies.1

1

In an attachment to his habeas petition, Carlsen submitted a copy of his Motion to Reconsider
(the denial) of his Motion to Dismiss, in the case Commonwealth v. Carlsen, Docket No.
11CR1890, 1011CR3364, 1011CR5340, 1011CR 5239 and 1011CR6639. On that copy is a
judicial endorsement dated April 20, 2011 denying the motion, stating that “[t]his Court shall
give full faith and credit to an order for protection issued in another jurisdiction. The language
3

This action was referred to Magistrate Judge Collings for a Report and Recommendation,
and remains pending.
II.

The Instant Action
On September 16, 2011, Carlsen filed a four-page self-prepared pleading entitled

“Petition for Civil Relief.” Compl. (Docket No. 1). He did not include a caption in the pleading;
however, his Civil Cover Sheet attached to the pleading identifies the case as Jeffrey P. Carlsen
v. Cari A. Carlsen. In the Petition for Civil Relief (which this Court construes as his Complaint
for purposes of this Memorandum and Order), Carlsen purportedly seeks civil relief under 28
U.S.C. § 1441, but he fails to provide any facts or allegations supporting removal. Among other
things, he asks this Court for an expedited hearing “due to being incarcerated by the State of
Massachusetts.” Comp. at 4. He also seeks a Declaration that the New Hampshire Protective
Order issued to Cari was invalid and void (since July 16, 2009). In support of his requests, he
reasserts his allegations that the New Hampshire Protective Order issued to his Cari was based
on false information supplied by her. He also contends that because she could not obtain an
extension of a protective order in Massachusetts, she “forum-shopped” in order to obtain one in
New Hampshire. Further, he asserts that New Hampshire improperly issued the Protective Order
to a non-resident. Finally, he contends that he has exhausted his state remedies to the highest
court in New Hampshire, to no avail.
In the body of his petition, Carlsen asks that the filing fee be assessed against his canteen
account; however, he failed to file an application to proceed without prepayment of the filing
fee.

of the second paragraph of c. 209A, § 5A is discretionary.” Exh., (Docket No. 1-1 at 34).
4

DISCUSSION
I.

The Filing Fee
A party bringing a civil (non-habeas) action must either (1) pay the $350.00 filing fee,

see 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); or (2) seek leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, see 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (proceedings in forma pauperis).2 Where, as here, Carlsen is a prisoner, a motion
for waiver of prepayment of the filing fee must be accompanied by “a certified copy of the trust
fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint . . . obtained from the appropriate official of
each prison at which the prisoner is or was confined.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Additionally,
any plaintiff moving to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee must submit an affidavit
that “includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses [showing] that the person is
unable to pay such fees or give security therefor” and “state[s] the nature of the action, defense
or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
As noted above, Carlsen seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, but he has not complied
with the requirements of the statute either in submitting his prison account statement, or in filing
the required financial affidavit.3

2

The same is true with respect to the $350.00 removal fee.

3

The affidavit requirement contained in the in forma pauperis statute serves a deterrent function.
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 205 (1993).
In Rowland, the United States Supreme Court stated: “[o]ne who makes this affidavit exposes
himself ‘to the pains of perjury in a case of bad faith.’ ... This constitutes a sanction important in
protection of the public against a false or fraudulent invocation of the statute’s benefits.” Id. at
205 (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338, (1948) quoting
Pothier v. Rodman, 261 U.S. 307, 309 (1923)). The perjury sanction is an important
requirement in protecting the public against misuse of public funds by a litigant who has
sufficient funds of his or her own, and against the filing of “frivolous or malicious” lawsuits
5

Accordingly, this Court DENIES Carlsen’s request to proceed in forma pauperis
(contained in the Petition for Relief). In light of the sua sponte dismissal of this action, however,
for the reasons set forth below, the Court need not afford Carlsen an opportunity to cure the
defects in his in forma pauperis request.
II.

The Complaint is Subject to Preliminary Screening
As noted above, Carlsen has not indicated who the adverse party is in this action.4 He

names Cari in the Civil Cover Sheet, but his claims appear to be directed against the State of
New Hampshire. Thus, to the extent that he seeks an Order vacating the New Hampshire
Protective Order, the Court presumes that some unidentified governmental entity would be the
proper Defendant, rather than his ex-wife Cari. In the event this action involves a governmental
defendant, this Court would have authority to screen this action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.5 In
any event, no matter who the Defendant is, this Court has inherent authority to review Carlsen’s
action to determine if it is frivolous as that term is used in legal parlance. See Mallard v. United
funded by the public. Rowland, 506 U.S. at 205.
4

In this regard, Carlsen materially fails to state plausible claims upon which relief may be
granted, in accordance with the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to include in the complaint, inter alia, “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
This statement must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests,’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir.
2005). It must afford the defendant(s) a “[‘]meaningful opportunity to mount a defense,’”
Díaz-Rivera v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 377 F.3d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Rodríguez v. Doral
Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1172 (1st Cir. 1995)).
5

Section 1915A authorizes the Court to review prisoner complaints in civil actions in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or officers or employees of a governmental
entity, and to dismiss the action regardless of whether or not the plaintiff has paid the filing fee,
if the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, fails to state a claim, or seeks relief from a
defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
6

States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (courts have authority to dismiss a frivolous
or malicious lawsuits even in absence of any specific statutory provision); Fitzgerald v. First
East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (“district courts are
especially likely to be exposed to frivolous actions, and thus have an even greater need for
inherent authority to dismiss such actions quickly in order to preserve scarce judicial resources”
and district court properly dismissed frivolous case, even in a fee-paying case).6
A court may also dismiss a complaint on its own motion for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. See Gaffney v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 294 Fed. Appx. 975,
977 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished decision). Further, apart from the authority to screen cases on
the merits, the Court also has an independent obligation to inquire, sua sponte, into its subject
matter jurisdiction.7
In connection with this preliminary screening, Carlsen’s pleadings are construed
generously. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); Instituto de Educacion Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Education, 209 F.3d 18, 23 (1st

6

See also Bustos v. Chamberlain, 2009 WL 2782238, *2 (D.S.C. 2009) (noting that the court has
inherent authority “to ensure a plaintiff has standing, that subject matter jurisdiction exists, and
that a case is not frivolous”) citing, inter alia, Mallard, 490 U.S. at 307-308; Pillay v. INS, 45
F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (where a § 1915 screening was not applicable because a pro se
party paid the filing fee, the Court still had inherent authority “wholly aside from any statutory
warrant” to act sua sponte); and Rolle v. Berkowitz, 2004 WL 287678, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (sua
sponte dismissal in fee-paying pro se case is warranted where the claims presented no arguably
meritorious issue to consider).
7

See McCulloch v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court
determines ... it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."). See also
In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1988) ("It is too elementary to warrant
citation of authority that a court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its subject matter
jurisdiction, and to proceed no further if such jurisdiction is wanting.”).
7

Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, even under a broad reading, this action must be dismissed for the
various reasons set forth below.
III.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars Claims
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court lacks jurisdiction to declare the New

Hampshire Protective Order null and void, or to otherwise render an opinion that calls into
question the New Hampshire Court’s determination as to the validity of the Protective Order.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a distillation of two Supreme Court decisions: Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine precludes a federal action if the relief requested in that action
would effectively reverse a state court decision or void its holding or if the plaintiff’s claims are
“inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997, 1005-1006 (1994); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., Inc., 544 U.S. 280
(2005) (doctrine applies to cases by state court losers seeking review and rejection of state court
judgments rendered prior to commencement of federal suit). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is
jurisdictional, and [it] . . . cannot be ignored.” Maymó-Meléndez v. Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d
27, 33 n.7 (1st Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).8

8

Here, by Carlsen’s own statements, he is the “state-court loser.” The assertion that he cannot
obtain justice in the state courts raises a challenge to those decisions, suggesting that application
of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is warranted. “Post-Exxon, the lower courts cannot rely on
Rooker-Feldman to dismiss a case unless, inter alia, the federal plaintiff seeks redress of an
injury caused by an allegedly erroneous state court decision; if the plaintiff alleges a
constitutional violation by an adverse party independent of the injury caused by the state court
judgment, the doctrine does not bar jurisdiction.” Davison v. Government of Puerto Rico-Puerto
Rico Firefighters Corps., 471 F.3d 220, 222 (1st Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). Here, Carlsen
alleges constitutional violations by the New Hampshire Court (as well as the Massachusetts state
courts in upholding the validity of the New Hampshire Protective Order by applying full faith
and credit to that Order). In light of Carlsen’s challenges effectively seeking to reverse those
8

IV.

The Claims are Barred by the Favorable Termination Rule
Even if Rooker-Feldman did not apply, Carlsen’s claims nevertheless are barred by the

“Favorable Termination Rule” of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under the Favorable
Termination Rule:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal ... or called into question by a federal court's issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). Without such a showing of a favorable
termination, a person’s cause of action [for civil rights violations] has not yet accrued. Id. at
489. The Favorable Termination Rule has been extended to a wide variety of prisoner
challenges to state disciplinary and parole procedures for damages where success “would, if
established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation....” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641, 646 (1997). When considering the potential intersection of habeas relief and civil rights
claims:
... the [Supreme] Court has focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners use
only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the
duration of their confinement - either directly through an injunction compelling
speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily
implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005). In other words, a state prisoner’s civil rights claim
is barred “if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement
or its duration.” Id. at 81-82. If the civil rights claim would either directly or indirectly result in

adverse state decisions, application of Rooker-Feldman is warranted.
9

speedier release, which properly lies at “the core of habeas corpus,” it cannot be brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)).
Here, it is clear that Carlsen is, again, attempting to challenge his state criminal
conviction (and his continued detention), by couching his pleading as a Petition for Civil Relief.
The relief he seeks is substantially identical to that initial sought in Carlsen v. DiPaula, Civil
Action No. 11-11100-RWZ, where he filed two pleadings entitled Ex Parte Request for Federal
Injunctive Relief seeking an immediate hearing. As noted above, Judge Zobel construed the
pleadings as a petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This Court finds there is
no basis to treat the instant Petition for Relief any differently. It is clear that Carlsen’s claims are
the same that are the subject of his pending § 2254 habeas petition before Judge Stearns and
Magistrate Judge Collings. Thus, until Carlsen is able to vacate his criminal conviction, he may
not obtain civil (non-habeas) relief in any form (such as a Declaratory Judgment that the New
Hampshire Protective Order was invalid and void). The Favorable Termination Rule squarely
applies to bar the claims for relief raised in this Petition for Relief.
V.

Lack of Removal Jurisdiction
As a final matter, Carlsen has raised his claim for civil relief purportedly pursuant to the

Court’s removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Carlsen’s attempt to remove his case to
this Court, however, is to no avail, as this Court lack’s removal jurisdiction over his claims,
either under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, or 28 U.S.C. § 1443.
Section 1441 of Title 28 provides, in relevant part, that:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
10

action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (underline added).
Even if this Court construed Carlsen’s pleading as a Notice of Removal under § 1441, it
is defective. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this Court has authority to examine a notice of removal
to determine if removal is proper. If it appears that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the Court must issue an order for summary remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Adorno Enters., Inc. v.
Federated Dep’t. Stores, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1565, 1567 (D. R.I. 1986) (§ 1447(c), which
authorizes court to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, requires district court to act
sua sponte where appropriate). Carlsen, as the party seeking to remove a case to federal court,
has the burden of demonstrating the existence of federal jurisdiction. See BIW Deceived v.
Local S6, 132 F.3d 824, 831 (1st Cir.1997); In re Whatley, 396 F. Supp. 2d 50, 53 (D. Mass.
2005). The removal statute must be strictly construed, and any doubts about the propriety of
removal should be resolved against the removal of an action. In re Whatley, 396 F. Supp. at 53,
citing Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1999).
Here, Carlsen utterly fails to meet his burden. Apart from the complete lack of
identification of the state case(s) which Carlsen seeks to remove to this Court, there does not
appear to any pending state case subject to removal, particularly where Carlsen has alleged in
Court pleadings that he has exhausted all state court avenues for relief. Thus, Carlsen has not
demonstrated sufficiently that this Court has removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Next, under 28 U.S.C. § 1443, the following classes of civil actions or criminal
prosecutions may be removed by a defendant to federal court: (1) a prosecution “[a]gainst any
person who is denied or cannot enforce” in state court “a right under any law providing for the

11

equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction
thereof”; and (2) a prosecution “[f]or any act under color of authority derived from any law
providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be
inconsistent with such law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)-(2).
In order to remove a case pursuant to § 1443(1), a defendant must assert a “law providing
for equal civil rights.” In re Whatley, 396 F. Supp. at 54. This does not include [civil rights]
laws such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “that confer equal rights in the sense, vital to our way of life, of
bestowing them upon all.” Id. citing 28 U.S.C.§ 1443(1); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792
(1966); Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261, 1263 (1st Cir. 1974). Rather, under § 1443 (1), a
party must demonstrate that the right allegedly denied him: (1) arises under a federal law
providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality; and that (2) he cannot enforce
that specified civil right in state courts. Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1975)
(citations omitted). See also McCullough v. Ligon, 430 F. Supp. 2d 846 (E.D. Ark. May 11,
2006); Akhlaghi v. Berry, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D. Kan. 2003); Davis v. Glanton, 921 F. Supp.
1421, 1423 (E. D. Pa.1996) (Section 1443 (1) is rarely used as a basis for removal and is
unavailable where assertions are grounded solely in the 1st and 14th Amendment).
Here, there are no allegations of racial bias the state criminal proceedings against
Carlsen, nor has he alleged any facts that would reasonably fall into either type of prosecution
set forth in § 1443. Thus, this Court lacks removal jurisdiction under § 1443.
Finally, Carlsen has failed to comply with the deadlines and procedures for removing a
state action, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Accordingly, the case may be summarily
remanded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(4).

12

Here, however, since there is no information concerning the state case(s) sought to be
removed, remand cannot be accomplished in any meaningful fashion. Therefore, this action
shall be DISMISSED sua sponte instead, and in light of all the reasons discussed above
regarding the legal impediments to Carlsen’s claims.
VI.

Order Prohibiting Filing of Further Pleadings on Civil Actions Raising Same Issues
As noted above, this is Carlsen’s fourth attempt to seek relief from his conviction based

on the New Hampshire Protective Order. He currently has a § 2254 habeas petition pending. In
light of this, his claims must be raised in the context of that pending action, and that action only.
In order to ensure that the Court’s scarce judicial resources are not wasted by further attempts by
Carlsen to seek immediate relief based on the issues that have been raised in his prior cases,
Carlsen is hereby PROHIBITED from filing any further documents, letters, motions, affidavits,
petitions, amendments, supplements, or new Complaints which seek to obtain relief from the
New Hampshire Protective Order, or from matters stemming from the Massachusetts criminal
conviction.
Failure to comply with this directive may result in the imposition of sanctions against
Carlsen.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby Ordered that:
1.

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (contained in the Petition for Civil
Relief) is DENIED;

2.

The Petition for Civil Relief is DENIED;

3.

This action is DISMISSED in its entirety; and

4.

Plaintiff is PROHIBITED from filing any further pleadings or requests for relief (in any
13

form), or any new civil actions, that assert matters alleged in his prior litigation in this
Court stemming from the New Hampshire Protective Order or his Massachusetts criminal
conviction arising out of that Order.9

SO ORDERED.
/s/ George A. O’Toole, Jr.
GEORGE A. O’TOOLE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: September 22, 2011

9

This Order does not apply to the filing of a Notice of Appeal, or payment of the appellate filing
fee or filing of a Motion for Leave to Proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. It also does not
apply to any filings properly made in the pending habeas petition, Civil Action No. 11-11498RGS.
14