Barbosa v. Conlon
Filing
129
Magistrate Judge Judith G. Dein: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER denying 112 Defendants' Motion for New Trial. (Dambrosio, Jolyne)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
MARIA BARBOSA, HENRIQUETA
BARBOSA, MANUEL BARBOSA,
and ANGELA BARBOSA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THOMAS HYLAND, JESSE DRANE,
BRIAN DONAHUE, STEVEN JOHNSON,
FRANK BAEZ, EMANUEL GOMES,
and LEON McCABE,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 11-11997-JGD
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
April 28, 2014
DEIN, U.S.M.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises out of an altercation between the plaintiffs and various Brockton
police officers on November 15, 2008 at the plaintiffs’ home. A jury-waived trial was
held before this court on July 15, 16, 17 and 18, 2013, and this court issued extensive
Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law on December 2, 2013, ruling in favor of the
plaintiffs on most of their claims and awarding them monetary damages. (Docket No. 98,
hereinafter “Findings”).
This matter is presently before the court on the defendants’ motion for a new trial,
brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(B) and 59(a)(2). Fundamentally, the defen-
dants challenge this court’s credibility assessments and argue that the court erred in
believing the plaintiffs’ versions of events. After careful consideration of the written and
oral arguments of the parties, this court concludes that the defendants have not established any significant errors of law or fact, and have not convinced this court that its
judgment is against the weight of the evidence or otherwise in error. Therefore, the
motion for a new trial is DENIED.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1)(B), after a nonjury trial, the court
may grant a new trial on all or some of the issues “for any reason for which a rehearing
has heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal court.” Pursuant to Rule
59(a)(2), after a nonjury trial the court may “take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law or make new ones, and direct the entry of a new judgment.”
The decision whether to grant a new trial lies within the discretion of the trial court. See
Goulet v. New Penn Motor Express, Inc., 512 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 2008) (“We review
the district court’s denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion only.”). As a
general statement, however, “a district court may order a new trial under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(a) ‘only if the verdict is against the law, against the weight of the
credible evidence, or tantamount to a miscarriage of justice.’” Crowe v. Marchand, 506
F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Casillas-Diaz v. Palau, 463 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir.
2006)). Thus, in a nonjury case, a motion for a new trial “should be based upon manifest
error of law or mistake of fact, and a judgment should not be set aside except for substan2
tial reasons.” 11A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2804, at 68
(2012). After careful consideration of the defendants’ objections, this court concludes
that there is no basis to set aside the detailed findings and rulings previously issued by
this court.
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Findings of Fact
The defendants challenge various findings of fact made by this court. (See Defs.
Mem. (Docket No. 113) at 4-17). In this court’s view, many of the challenges raise
insignificant objections. While all the objections have been considered, this court
declines to engage in a detailed analysis of all of them, and will focus, instead, on the
major points raised. The court continues to rely on its previous Findings and Rulings.
1.
A Call for Backup? The defendants challenge this court’s supposition that
Officer Hyland may have called for backup even before he entered the house, given the
timing of events. (Id. at 5). As this court’s Findings make clear, however, this court did
not rely on this possibility in determining that the warrantless entry into the home was
unlawful. There is no reason to modify the court’s prior decision on this basis.
2.
Application of Community Caretaking Doctrine. The defendants spend a
considerable amount of time arguing that this court should make additional factual
findings to the effect that they were justified in entering the home in order to insure the
safety of the children in the home. This court continues to reject this testimony as not
being credible, and stands by the detailed analysis of the facts and the law in its Findings.
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In the recent decision of MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, 745 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.
2014),1 the First Circuit concluded “that the scope and boundaries of the community
caretaking exception are nebulous.” Id. at 14. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that
the existence of the doctrine did not give carte blanche to the police to enter into homes
under any circumstance. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is still “whether, at the time of
the incident, there were either controlling cases or a consensus of persuasive authorities
such that reasonable police officers could not have thought that their actions were
lawful.” Id. This is such a case. As this court previously detailed, this court rejects the
testimony that concern for the welfare of the children inside the house was in any way a
factor in the defendants’ decision to enter the home. The police here made a warrantless
entry, without attempting to engage the occupants of the home, for the sole purpose of
turning down the music. It was well-established at the time of this incident that this
constituted a violation of the home owners’ Fourth Amendment rights. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Kiser, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 647, 651, 724 N.E.2d 348, 352 (2000). As
previously detailed, this court finds that the community caretaking doctrine has no factual
or legal application to the instant case.
3.
The Effect of Pleading to Sufficient Facts. The defendants contend that this
court must find, as a matter of fact, that Henriqueta threw the strainer at Officer Hyland,
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This court discussed the District Judge’s decision in Macdonald v. Town of Eastham,
946 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D. Mass. 2013), in its Findings. The same analysis applies to the First
Circuit decision, which affirmed Judge Stearns’ decision.
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that Angela threw her phone at Officer Hyland, and that they both resisted arrest, because
these allegations were disclosed at the District Court criminal proceedings at which the
plaintiffs admitted to sufficient facts. Further, according to the defendants, if this court
accepts these facts as true, this court must conclude that the defendants acted reasonably
and did not use excessive force. This court finds these arguments unpersuasive.
To the extent that the record is unclear, this court does find that the police reports
were read aloud at the plea hearings in Brockton District Court. Therefore, the assertions
in the police reports that the plaintiffs threw items and resisted arrest were part of the plea
colloquy. Nevertheless, as detailed in this court’s Findings, this court does not believe
that, as a matter of law, these “facts” are binding on this court in connection with
assessing whether excessive force was used in arresting the plaintiffs. Rather, as a matter
of “fact,” this court finds not only that they did not throw items at the police, but also that
the plaintiffs did not care whether they were charged with throwing things or with
resisting arrest — they were prepared to admit to sufficient facts to end the expensive
criminal proceedings since the charges were going to be dismissed.
In any event, and most significantly, as this court previously found, even assuming
the facts as alleged by the police, this court continues to find that the police used
excessive force in connection with the arrest of these two women. The fact that the
police may have had probable cause for the arrest did not authorize them to use excessive
force in connection with the arrest. See Campos v. City of Merced, 709 F. Supp. 2d 944,
961 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (while conviction precludes a defendant from challenging whether
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arrest was made with probable cause, “it will not preclude him from arguing that the
police used excessive force” because a claim of excessive force does not “impugn the
underlying conviction”). See also Sholley v. Town of Holliston, 49 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18-19
(D. Mass. 1999) (conviction precludes a claim of false arrest). Similarly, viewing the
totality of the circumstances presented, this court continues to find that the amount of
force used in arresting Henriqueta, who had previously been cooperative with the police,
and Angela, who had just gotten out of the hospital, was excessive. Therefore, this court
finds no basis to modify its Findings.
4.
The Missing Video. The defendants contend that this court erred in
drawing an adverse inference from the destruction of the video relating to Maria’s arrest
because the individual who lost the tape was disciplined for not preserving the tape. This
court does not find this argument persuasive. For the reasons detailed in the Findings,
this court concludes that an adverse inference should be drawn. As an initial matter, the
destruction of the tape violated fundamental principles of an investigation. Moreover, in
light of the numerous unsupportable charges brought against the members of the Barbosa
family, this court concludes that the police officers’ own actions undermine the defendants’ contention that the tape was destroyed accidently or for an innocent reason. Maria
was forced to defend herself without a tape that could have easily resolved the factual
dispute. The fact that the individual who was responsible for the tape may have been
disciplined does not alter the equation.
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5.
The Typographical Error in the Hospital Records. The defendants take
exception to this court’s conclusion that references in Maria’s medical records to an
altercation in May 2008 was a typographical error, and that the reference was intended to
be to the altercation with the Brockton Police in November 2008. For the reasons
detailed in the Findings, this court continues to believe that this is the only logical reading
of the records.
B.
Rulings of Law
1.
Warrantless Entry. The defendants continue to argue that their warrantless
entry into the plaintiffs’ home is protected either under the Sixth Circuit decision of
United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996), or the community caretaking
doctrine as described in MacDonald v. Town of Eastham. These decisions are discussed
extensively in this court’s Findings. This court continues to find them factually and
legally inapplicable to the instant case.
2.
Damages for Warrantless Entry. The defendants challenge “the damage
award of $25,000 to Henriqueta and Manuel Barbosa for the finding of a warrantless
entry into the home,” arguing that they are only entitled to nominal damages. This court
disagrees. As an initial matter, Manuel was awarded $7,500 for the warrantless entry, not
$25,000. Moreover, the defendants’ contention that Manuel did not even know if the
officers’ had entered without consent, since he was sleeping at the time of entry, is not
persuasive. Manuel tried to engage the police and requested an explanation for their
presence, but he was ignored. He witnessed his wife being pushed during the arrest of
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Andrade, and then forcibly arrested. Witnessing the melee with the police, it would be
logical for Manuel to understand that the police were there without permission. Even
more fundamentally, however, the police were there unlawfully. None of the injuries the
plaintiffs sustained would have been incurred if the police had not entered unlawfully.
The damages Mr. and Mrs. Barbosa suffered were a direct result of the violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights.
In addition, this court finds that the emotional distress the plaintiffs suffered as a
result of the home invasion by the police justifies the monetary award.
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must prove actual injury
as a prerequisite to the recovery of damages in a § 1983 claim.
“[D]amages are available under [§ 1983] for actions ‘found ... to
have been violative of ... constitutional rights and to have caused
compensable injury....’” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255, 98
S.Ct. 1042, 1048, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), quoting Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319, 95 S.Ct. 992, 999, 43 L.Ed.2d 214
(1975) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has defined
compensable injury to include “not only out-of-pocket loss and other
monetary harms, but also such injuries as ‘impairment of reputation
..., personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.’”
Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 106
S.Ct. 2537, 2543, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3012, 41 L.Ed.2d 789
(1974). This requirement that damages be shown is in accord with
the basic purpose of § 1983 which is to “compensate persons for
injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.”
Carey v. Piphus, supra, 435 U.S. at 254, 98 S.Ct. at 1047.
Tyree v. Keane, 400 Mass. 1, 10, 507 N.E.2d 742, 747-48 (1987).
In the instant case, as this court has previously explained, there was ample
evidence of the “personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering” that Manuel and
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Henriqueta suffered as a result of the defendants’ unconstitutional actions in entering
their home without a warrant. Henriqueta, having observed the unlawful behavior over a
more extended period of time, and having personally cooperated with the police only to
have them disregard her constitutional rights and evict her guests, is entitled to a larger
award. Having considered the defendants’ arguments, this court sees no reason to modify
the amount of damages it awarded.
3.
Excessive Force. Finally, the defendants argue that Henriqueta and Angela
are precluded from claiming excessive force since they pleaded to sufficient facts on the
assault and battery and resisting arrest charges brought against them. As detailed above,
this court rejects this argument. While the plaintiffs’ decision to plead to sufficient facts
precluded any claim of false arrest, it does not bar their claim of excessive force as a
matter of law. Moreover, the fact that there may have been probable cause for their arrest
did not authorize the police to use excessive force. For the reasons detailed in the
Findings and above, this court concludes that the force used was excessive.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons detailed herein and in this court’s Findings of Fact and Rulings
of Law, the defendants’ motion for a new trial is DENIED.
/ s / Judith Gail Dein
Judith Gail Dein
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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