Martin v. Roden

Filing 22

Judge Rya W. Zobel: Memorandum of Decision entered denying 5 Motion to Stay; denying 19 Motion for Reconsideration. A certificate of appealability is denied. (Urso, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-10312-RWZ

ANTHONY MARTIN
v.
GARY RODEN
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
April 4, 2013

ZOBEL, D.J.
Petitioner was convicted in state court on four counts of aggravated rape, one
count of rape, and one count of kidnapping. He appealed that conviction to the state
Appeals Court, which affirmed it; he then filed an application for leave to obtain further
review (an “ALOFAR”) before the Supreme Judicial Court, which was denied.
Petitioner subsequently sought federal habeas relief. His petition originally
included four claims. As described in this court’s order issued February 28, 2013, the
petition’s first claim fails to state a question of federal law; the second claim is
unexhausted; and the third and fourth claims have been voluntarily dismissed.
Petitioner sought to stay his petition in order to exhaust his second claim; in response,
this court ordered petitioner to explain what he has done to exhaust his second claim
and why he was unable to exhaust that claim before filing his federal habeas petition.
See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (“[S]tay and abeyance is only
appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s

failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.”)
Since that order was issued, petitioner has filed a motion to reconsider the
decision on his first claim. He has also filed a two-page written statement, accompanied
by thirty pages of exhibits, explaining his efforts to exhaust his second claim.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration asserts that his first claim presents a
properly exhausted federal constitutional claim based on the Speedy Trial Clause. On
its face, the petition’s first claim asserts only a violation of Rule 36 of the
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is “wholly separate” from a Speedy
Trial Clause claim. Commonwealth v. Lauria, 576 N.E.2d 1368, 1371 (Mass. 1991). But
even if the petition’s first claim could be construed as a Speedy Trial Clause claim, no
such claim was exhausted in the state courts. Petitioner correctly asserts that he
mentioned a Speedy Trial Clause claim—briefly—in his ALOFAR seeking review by the
Supreme Judicial Court. But he made no mention of any such claim before the Appeals
Court, whose decision he sought to have the Supreme Judicial Court review. “Raising a
claim for the first time to the state’s highest court on discretionary review is not fair
presentation for purposes of exhaustion.” Gunter v. Maloney, 291 F.3d 74, 82 (1st Cir.
2002). Because petitioner did not present any federal Speedy Trial Clause claim before
the Appeals Court, that claim is unexhausted. The motion for reconsideration is
therefore denied.
Petitioner’s written statement regarding his second claim fails to show good
cause for his failure to exhaust that claim. First, petitioner’s statement fails to explain
why he was not able to seek collateral relief on this claim in state court between
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February 9, 2011, when the Supreme Judicial Court denied direct review, and February
9, 2012, when he filed his federal habeas petition. Neither his written statement nor his
exhibits describe any obstacles that should have prevented petitioner from seeking
state court relief in that period. Petitioner’s written statement refers generally to
conflicts with his appellate counsel and his inability to proceed pro se while
represented; however, he does not explain whether those problems persisted
throughout the time period at issue or why they could not be resolved. As for the
exhibits petitioner has submitted, namely letters showing conflict between petitioner
and his counsel, they date back only to September 13, 2012. Moreover, petitioner
apparently still has not filed any motion or pleading in state court seeking relief on this
claim. Since nothing in the record indicates petitioner had good cause for failing to
exhaust his state remedies, this case does not present the “limited circumstances” in
which a stay is appropriate. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277.
For the reasons above, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (Docket # 19) is
DENIED; petitioner’s motion for a stay (Docket # 5) is DENIED; and the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of exhaustion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509 (1982). A certificate of appealability is DENIED.

/s/Rya W. Zobel

April 4, 2013
DATE

RYA W. ZOBEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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