Merit Construction Alliance et al v. City of Quincy
Filing
46
Judge Rya W. Zobel: Memorandum of Decision entered denying 44 Motion for Reconsideration (Urso, Lisa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-10458-RWZ
MERIT CONSTRUCTION ALLIANCE, et al.
v.
CITY OF QUINCY
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
August 21, 2013
ZOBEL, D.J.
The City of Quincy moves for reconsideration of my decision awarding attorneys’
fees to plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). It argues that neither plaintiffs nor their
cause of action is covered by that statute.
A motion for reconsideration seeks an extraordinary remedy that should rarely
be granted. See Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006). Such
motions “are not to be used as ‘a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures
[or] allow a party to advance arguments that could and should have been presented to
the district court prior to judgment.” United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir.
2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st
Cir. 2006)). “Instead, motions for reconsideration are appropriate only in a limited
number of circumstances: if the moving party presents newly discovered evidence, if
there has been an intervening change in the law, or if the movant can demonstrate that
the original decision was based on a manifest error of law or was clearly unjust.” Id.
Quincy does not present any newly discovered evidence or any intervening
change in the law. Instead, it raises legal arguments that could and should have been
presented in its original opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees. I will
therefore reconsider my previous decision only if it was based on a manifest error of
law or was clearly unjust.
The fee-shifting statute at issue states: “In any action under this subchapter . . .
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a
reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
Quincy raises two arguments for why that statute cannot apply here. First, Quincy
argues that none of the plaintiffs were a “participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary” in any
relevant ERISA plan. It concedes that named plaintiff David Ross is a participant in an
ERISA plan administered by his employer, named plaintiff Grasseschi Plumbing &
Heating, Inc. (“Grasseschi”). Quincy argues, however, that the present suit did not
involve the ERISA plan in which Ross is a participant. Second, Quincy contends that
the present action was not brought “under” ERISA, as required by § 1132(g)(1). It notes
that the complaint cites the state and federal declaratory judgment acts for its causes of
action, rather than any ERISA-specific provisions, and argues that ERISA cannot
support a claim for declaratory judgment of preemption.
In the typical case, § 1132(g)(1) provides for fee-shifting in a dispute over the
operation of a particular ERISA plan. See, e.g., Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 705 F.3d
58, 68 (1st Cir. 2013) (affirming award of fees under § 1132(g)(1) where plaintiff, a plan
2
participant, claimed she had been wrongly denied benefits). This case is different.
Here, plaintiffs seek fees under § 1132(g)(1) for litigating a preemption question:
namely, whether ERISA preempted the Quincy ordinance requiring public works
contractors to maintain an apprenticeship program. If that ordinance were valid, it
would have required Grasseschi to include an apprenticeship program as part of the
benefit package that it offers to Ross and its other employees. Grasseschi currently
offers an apprenticeship program that is funded from general corporate assets, and
therefore not governed by ERISA; it is not clear how Quincy’s ordinance would affect
that program (if at all).
It is a close question whether § 1132(g)(1) should be read to allow attorneys’
fees for a participant who challenges a city ordinance as preempted under ERISA,
especially when that ordinance has at best an indirect effect on the participant’s own
plan. The Sixth Circuit has indicated, though not explicitly held, that attorneys’ fees may
be available under § 1132(g)(1) in ERISA preemption cases. See Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 556-58 (6th Cir. 1987) (reversing the district
court’s award of fees to a defendant in an ERISA preemption case on the ground that
the district court misapplied the traditional five-factor test). On the other hand, the Ninth
Circuit has refused to award fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in ERISA preemption cases,
though not explicitly addressing whether fees might be available under § 1132(g) in an
appropriate case. See Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Smith, 74 F.3d 926, 930-31 (9th Cir.
1996); Dillingham Constr. N.A. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 57 F.3d 712, 722 (9th Cir. 1995),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Dillingham Constr. N.A. v. Cal. Div. of Labor
3
Standards Enforcement, 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
In isolation, the language of § 1132(g)(1) indicates that attorney’s fees may be
appropriate in certain ERISA preemption cases. Again, the statute authorizes feeshifting “[i]n any action under this subchapter . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). One such “action under this subchapter” appears in
§ 1132(a)(3), which provides a civil action for “a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary . . .
to enforce any provisions of this subchapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B)(ii). That
provision has been interpreted to allow an appropriate plaintiff to seek declaratory or
injunctive relief to “enforce” ERISA’s preemption provision, § 1144(a), against a
preempted state regulation. See Denny’s, Inc. v. Cake, 364 F.3d 521, 524-28 (4th Cir.
2004); Thiokol Corp v. Dep’t of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 380 (6th Cir. 1993); see also
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1983) (“[A]
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary of a plan covered by ERISA may bring a
declaratory judgment action in federal court to determine whether the plan’s trustees
may comply with a state levy on funds held in trust.”) cf. NGS Am., Inc. v. Jefferson,
218 F.3d 519, 524-30 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding a fiduciary cannot “enforce” § 1144(a) by
a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief against a beneficiary); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v.
Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520, 1523-24 (11th Cir. 1987) (same). In other words, ERISA
provides a civil action by which a plan participant can seek a declaratory judgment that
ERISA preempts a particular state regulation. That is exactly what happened here:
Ross, a plan participant, sought a declaratory judgment that ERISA preempted
Quincy’s regulation. If § 1132(a)(3) afforded Ross a cause of action to bring this suit,
4
then
§ 1132(g)(1) clearly authorizes him to seek his attorneys’ fees.
On the other hand, the present suit is likely not what Congress had in mind when
it enacted § 1132(a)(3) and § 1132(g)(1). The fact that Ross participates in an ERISA
plan administered by Grasseschi is only tangentially related to Ross’s interest in
Quincy’s apprenticeship requirement and in this lawsuit. And plaintiffs’ complaint does
not characterize the suit as one brought under § 1132(a)(3) to “enforce any provisions”
of ERISA; it cites only the state and federal declaratory judgment acts in support of its
claim for declaratory relief.
The proper interpretation of § 1132(g)(1) in these circumstances thus remains
unclear. But since neither the statutory text nor any relevant precedent demonstrates
that plaintiffs are plainly ineligible for attorneys’ fees under § 1132(g)(1), Quincy has
failed to show that the court’s prior ruling was based on a manifest error of law or was
clearly unjust. Its motion for reconsideration (Docket # 44) is therefore DENIED.
August 21, 2013
DATE
/s/Rya W. Zobel
RYA W. ZOBEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?