Dacruz-Crossely v. U.S. Bank National Association

Filing 19

Judge Joseph L. Tauro: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM and ORDER (Geraldino-Karasek, Clarilde)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
LEIDE F. DACRUZ-CROSSELY,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
AS TRUSTEE FOR ASSET BACKED
PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES
SERIES 2004-WWF1,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 12-10692-JLT

MEMORANDUM
March 4, 2013
TAURO, J.
I.

Introduction
Leide DaCruz-Crossely (“Plaintiff”) brings this suit against U.S. Bank National

Association as Trustee for Asset Backed Pass Through Certificates Series 2004-WWF1
(“Defendant”) seeking an injunction against foreclosure and a declaratory judgment that
Defendant is not the proper “holder” of her mortgage. Because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by
claim preclusion, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [#2] is ALLOWED.
II.

Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges the following facts in her Verified Complaint. On September 29, 2004,

Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan from Argent Mortgage Company, LLC (“Argent”) and
executed a promissory note in favor of Argent in the amount of $358,150 (“Note”).1 To secure
the loan, Plaintiff granted Argent a mortgage on her property located at 25 Hilldale Road,
1

State Ct. R. 34 (V. Compl. ¶ 19) [# 4] [hereinafter “V. Compl.”].

Ashland, Massachusetts (“Mortgage”).2
Argent ceased operations on August 31, 2008.3 On February 25, 2009, Argent
purportedly assigned the Note and Mortgage to Defendant.4 The assignment was executed before
a notary public, signed by Patricia Olvera as vice-president of Argent, and recorded at the
Middlesex County Registry of Deeds.5
The Defendant trust’s governing documents, including the Prospectus Supplement and
Pooling and Servicing Agreement, state that the corpus of the trust must be transferred to the
trust by the “Depositor” and by the “Closing Date.”6 The governing documents further define the
“Depositor” as Park Place Securities Inc., and the “Closing Date” as November 12, 2004.7
Plaintiff filed this action on March 27, 2012. Plaintiff seeks an injunction against
foreclosure and a declaratory judgment that Defendant is not the proper “holder” of her
Mortgage. Plaintiff seeks these remedies on three grounds: (1) the assignment of the Mortgage
from Argent to Defendant was invalid because Argent did not exist at the time of the assignment,
(2) the assignment was invalid because it did not comply with the trust’s governing documents,
and (3) Defendant has not produced the original Note. Plaintiff also brings a claim for slander of
title based on Defendant’s act of recording the allegedly erroneous assignment.

2

V. Compl. ¶ 20.

3

V. Compl. ¶ 29.

4

V. Compl. ¶ 28.

5

V. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 80; V. Compl. Ex. C, D (Assignment) [#1-3].

6

V. Compl. ¶¶ 37-40.

7

V. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 41.
2

Plaintiff previously brought another action against Defendant in relation to this Mortgage
in Massachusetts Superior Court on April 8, 2009.8 In that action, Plaintiff sought a declaration
of the rights of the parties and sought to enjoin Defendant from foreclosing under Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 93A, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Mass. Gen. Laws 183C.9 On May
11, 2009, the Superior Court granted a temporary restraining order against foreclosure.10 On
October 20, 2009, the court denied a preliminary injunction.11 Ultimately, the Superior Court
granted summary judgment to Defendant on September 15, 2011.12
Defendant moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on several
grounds. Because this court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by claim preclusion, this court
need not address Defendant’s alternative grounds for dismissal.
III.

Discussion
A.

Legal Standard

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”13 The court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.14 The court need not, however,

8

V. Compl. ¶¶ 4-5.

9

V. Compl. ¶ 6; V. Compl. Ex. B (Amended Complaint) [#1-3].

10

V. Compl. ¶ 7.

11

V. Compl. ¶ 8.

12

V. Compl. ¶ 13.

13

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

14

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
3

accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true.15 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
allege sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”16
B.

Claim Preclusion

In federal courts, Massachusetts law governs the preclusive effect of prior Massachusetts
state court judgments.17 Accordingly, this court applies the Massachusetts doctrine of claim
preclusion and finds that the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant on
September 15, 2011, bars Plaintiff’s present claims.
Under Massachusetts law, the doctrine of claim preclusion prevents a party from litigating
a claim that the party “had the opportunity and incentive to fully litigate . . . in an earlier action.”18
The doctrine rests on the policies of finality and judicial economy and protects parties from
repeated litigation arising out of the same subject matter.19 There are three essential elements for
claim preclusion: “(1) the identity or privity of the parties to the present and prior actions, (2)
identity of the cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the merits.”20

15

Id.

16

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

17

Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2008); McDonough v. City of Quincy,
452 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2006).
18

Giragosian, 547 F.3d at 63 (citing Korbin v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 832 N.E.2d
628, 634 (Mass. 2005)).
19

See Id. at 65 (“[T]he purposes of claim preclusion . . . are to protect against the expense
and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r] reliance on
judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Saint Louis v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 568 N.E.2d 1181, 1185-86
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
20

Korbin, 832 N.E.2d at 634 (quoting DaLuz v. Dep’t of Corr., 746 N.E.2d 501, 505
(Mass. 2001)).
4

All three elements are satisfied in this case. The first and third elements are not in dispute.
The parties to both actions are the same, and the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment
was a final judgment on the merits.
Under the second element, causes of action are identical if they arise out of the “same
transaction or series of connected transactions.”21 “What factual grouping constitutes a
transaction is to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such factors as whether the facts
are related in time, space and origin or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations.”22
Claim preclusion bars litigation even if the plaintiff is prepared to present different
evidence or legal theories in the second case.23 “Discrete theories of liability may constitute
identical causes of action for claim preclusion purposes if they are based on the same nucleus of
operative facts.”24 “[T]he guiding principle is that [a plaintiff] is precluded from litigating not only
those claims that were actually decided in the [prior] case but also those that could have been
brought in that action.”25

21

McDonough, 452 F.3d at 16 (quoting TLT Const. Corp. v. A. Anthony Tappe, 716
N.E.2d 1044, 1052 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999)); see Andrew Robinson Int’l, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 547 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Massachusetts deems causes of action identical for claim
preclusion purposes if they grow out of the same transaction, act, or agreement, and seek redress
for the same wrong.”).
22

McDonough, 452 F.3d at 16 (quoting Mancuso v. Kinchla, 806 N.E.2d 427, 438 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2004)).
23

Massaro v. Walsh, 884 N.E.2d 986, 990 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (citing Heacock v.
Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. 1988)).
24

25

Andrew Robinson Int’l, 547 F.3d at 52.

Bui v. Ma, 818 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (citing Charlette v. Charlette
Bros. Foundry, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 1268, 1277 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)).
5

Plaintiff’s claims in this action and in the Superior Court action are identical for claim
preclusion purposes because they arose from the “same transaction or series of connected
transactions” and involve the “same nucleus of operative facts.”26 In both actions, Plaintiff
challenged Defendant’s ability to enforce the Mortgage and foreclose on her property. Both
actions arose from the same Mortgage contract and sought the same objectives: (1) an injunction
against foreclosure, and (2) a declaration of the parties’ rights vis-a-vis the Mortgage. Here,
Plaintiff “merely introduced a new ground to support the same cause.”27 Plaintiff could have
brought her present claims in the first action. All the facts that form the basis of her present
claims existed at that time. Defendant is entitled to protection from multiple, consecutive suits
challenging its ability to foreclose on the same property under the same Mortgage.28
Plaintiff advances one argument in opposition to preclusion. She argues that claim
preclusion does not apply because, in this suit, Plaintiff is challenging Defendant’s “standing” to
foreclose, and standing is not waivable. Plaintiff’s argument confuses the concept of Article III
standing (which is non-waivable) with the use of the term “standing” in foreclosure law.29 Article

26

See Kucharski v. Tribeca Lending Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150-51 (D. Mass. 2009)
(holding plaintiff’s Truth in Lending Act, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty claims barred by
plaintiff’s prior suit against mortgagee challenging the validity of foreclosure); see also R.G. Fin.
Corp. v. Vergara-Nunez, 446 F.3d 178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 2006); Kelly v. NovaStar, 637 F. Supp.
2d 34, 37-39 (D.D.C. 2009) (reaching a similar result under the transactional test); Fassas v. First
Bank & Trust Co., 233 N.E.2d 924, 925 (Mass. 1968).
27

Fassas, 233 N.E.2d at 925.

28

See Kucharski, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 150-51; Saint Louis v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 568
N.E.2d 1181, 1187 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (“The defendants were entitled to have the case
concluded rather than embracing another three-year (or more) round, with a concomitant period
of legal skirmishing.”).
29

See McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 10-10417-JLT, 2011 WL 1100160, at *1-2 (D.
Mass. Mar. 21, 2011).
6

III standing is the constitutional requirement that a plaintiff suffer an injury-in-fact, caused by the
defendant and redressable by the court, in order to bring a lawsuit in federal court.30 Defendant
does not need Article III standing to defend this suit or to proceed with non-judicial foreclosure.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the doctrine of claim preclusion.
IV.

Conclusion
Because Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to challenge foreclosure in the Superior

Court action, Plaintiff’s present claims are barred by claim preclusion. Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss [#2] is ALLOWED.

AN ORDER HAS ISSUED.
/s/ Joseph L. Tauro
United States District Judge

30

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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