Bond v. Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad et al

Filing 57

Judge Douglas P. Woodlock: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered granting 31 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 51 Motion to Strike and directing the Clerk to enter judgment for the Defendant. (Woodlock, Douglas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
JAMES BOND

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Plaintiff,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS BAY COMMUTER
RAILROAD, LLC
Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO.
12-10787-DPW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
November 22, 2013
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, James Bond, was an employee of the
Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad.
employer in October 2011.

He was terminated by his

The MBCR claims that it terminated Mr.

Bond because he failed to supervise the repair of a section of
commuter rail track properly, leaving it in an unsafe condition.
Mr. Bond claims that this reason is a pretext and he, in fact,
was singled out for discipline and termination because he was the
lone African American manager employed by the MBCR.
A. Factual Background
1.

Mr. Bond’s Employment with the Massachusetts Bay
Commuter Railroad

The MBCR has operated the commuter rail system in Eastern
Massachusetts since taking it over from Amtrak in 2003.

Mr. Bond

had been employed by Amtrak as a Roadmaster and was hired by the

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MBCR in that same role in the MBCR’s Track Department, which is
part of its Engineering Department.

The Engineering Department

is responsible for construction and maintenance of the track, and
other facilities of the commuter rail, and Roadmasters are (nonunion) managers of work crews performing this construction and
maintenance work.

Mr. Bond obtained his position with Amtrak as

the result of a settlement of a lawsuit alleging racial
discrimination.

From 2007 until 2011 he was the lone African

American manager in the MBCR Engineering Department.

(An African

American woman holds a clerical and management-type role, but
does not manage or supervise any employees.)
2.

Prior Disciplinary Issues
Prior to his termination, Mr. Bond was the subject of

disciplinary action by the MBCR on two occasions.
In January 2008, Mr. Bond failed a random alcohol test.

Mr.

Bond states in his affidavit that this failure resulted from
drinks consumed the prior night and that he was not intoxicated
during work hours.

As a result of this incident, Mr. Bond was

suspended from work.

Mr. Bond completed a substance abuse

program and returned to work in March of 2008.
The other discipline arose as a result of federal
regulations that require the MBCR to monitor periodically the
safety and operating performance of persons employed by or
engaged in railroad operations.

To accomplish this, the MBCR

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operates a “Tests and Observations Program.”

As a Roadmaster,

Mr. Bond performed tests and observations of his crew, which
required that he (a) submit a Test and Observation results form;
and (b) obtain the signature of employees on the form
acknowledging the tests and results.
While reviewing the Test and Observation forms, one of Mr.
Bond’s supervisors, Paul O’Leary, noticed that the name of one of
the signatories was misspelled.

Prompted by this oddity, Mr.

O’Leary reviewed all Test and Observation forms submitted by Mr.
Bond and other managers over the prior six months.

During this

review, Mr. O’Leary discovered other instances in which Mr. Bond
apparently signed his supervisees’ names to forms.

Mr. Bond

admitted to signing employees’ signatures on these forms, but
contends that doing so was a common practice among Roadmasters
and that he was singled out for discipline.

He further states

that the tests documented in the Test and Observation forms had
actually been performed, so the signatures were not forged with
any intent to defraud.

As a result of this violation, Mr. Bond

was again suspended from work.

Mr. Bond was also placed on final

warning and informed that any further violations would result in
his immediate termination.
In addition to these formal disciplinary issues, two
disciplinary letters were drafted but not sent to Mr. Bond.
first related to using a work-issued cell phone for personal

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The

calls.

Rather than sending the letter to Mr. Bond, Mr. Bond’s

supervisor, Robert Johnson, who appears to have drafted the
letter, discussed the issue with him.

Although cell phone abuse

was a constant issue at MBCR, Mr. Johnson could not recall
discussing it with or issuing a disciplinary issue to any
individual other than Mr. Johnson.

The second letter concerned

an alleged accident in which a piece of equipment broke and
became lodged in the track.

The letter reprimanded Mr. Bond for

failing to report the incident to his supervisor promptly.
However this letter was never sent and Mr. Bond testified that
the factual basis for the reprimand was inaccurate.
3.

The October 2, 2011 Incident Resulting in the
Termination of Mr. Bond.

Mr. Bond and the MBCR disagree on the series of events that
occurred on October 2, 2011 and which led to the termination of
Mr. Bond.
On that day, Mr. Bond was overseeing the installation of a
“track panel”--a section of track--in order to replace a culvert.
When a track panel is re-installed, federal regulations and
MBCR’s rules require that the rail cross-elevation (the
difference in elevation between the two rails of the track) fall
below certain maximums.

For Class 1 track, where speeds are

restricted to below 10 and 15 mph for commuter and freight trains
respectively, the maximum allowable rail cross-elevation is 3
inches over any 62-foot section of track.
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For Class 2 track,

where speeds are restricted to below 30 and 25 mph for commuter
and freight trains respectively, the maximum allowable rail
cross-elevation is 2.25 inches over any 62-foot section of track.
These specifications are intended to prevent, among other
problems, train derailments.
According to the MBCR, Mr. Bond was required to supervise
the re-installation of the track to a condition that was
sufficiently safe for trains to operate at Class 2 levels.

At

the time that Mr. Bond left the worksite on the afternoon of
October 2, however, the track differential exceeded the maximum
limits for even Class 1 transit.

Nevertheless, and despite being

aware of the cross-elevation problem, Mr. Bond told the head of
the Track Department (Herbert Ross) that the track “look[ed]
good” for Class 2 speeds.

Later that day, a foreman on another

project, Ronnie Allen, found and reported the track crosselevation problem.

A crew, including Mr. Bond, was assembled to

fix the track that evening.
The following day, Mr. Ross reported to Robert Johnson, the
Chief Engineering Officer at the MBCR, that there had been a
problem with the installation of track the prior evening and that
it was sufficiently serious to warrant an investigation.

Mr.

Johnson initiated an investigation and the Engineering Department
took written statements from the work crew and others present
that day.

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Written statements taken in that investigation indicated the
following sequence of events had occurred.

After the track was

installed, Andre Richards, the foreman of the crew working under
the supervision of Mr. Bond, wanted to use his “level board”1 to
measure the track cross-elevation.

Mr. Bond instructed Mr.

Richards not to use the level board to measure the crosselevation.

Mr. Bond and Mr. Richards disagreed about whether to

use the level board, with Mr. Bond insisting that he would “eyeball” the cross-track elevation instead.

Mr. Bond made the

decision that the cross-track elevation was satisfactory and
could be “given back.”

At this point, Mr. Bond told the work

crew to pack their tools and leave.

He also instructed Mr.

Richards to tell Mr. Allen that the track was ready to be
returned to service.
Mr. Allen was patrolling and inspecting a larger section of
track.

During this inspection, he saw that there was too large a

cross-elevation differential between the tracks in the area
worked on by Mr. Bond and his crew.

He measured the cross-level

elevation at 4 3/8 inches, well above the allowable maximum.

He

called Mr. Bond and assembled a work crew to fix the crosselevation that evening.

The problem was fixed promptly and the

track was returned to service for the next morning on-schedule.

1

A “level-board” is an instrument used to measure the
cross-level elevation of tracks. Use of a level-board is the
only reliable means of determining cross-level elevation.
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Mr. Bond recounts the events differently.

When he arrived

at the worksite on October 2, 2011, his foreman, Mr. Richards had
not brought a level board--he reported that his had been stolen-but found one at the worksite.

Mr. Bond had concerns about

whether the level board functioned properly and whether it would
provide an accurate reading.

After the track was installed--with

some difficulty because of equipment malfunctions--Mr. Richards
tried to measure the cross-elevation differential using the found
level-board.

Mr. Bond instructed him not to do so, because of

his concerns about accuracy of the level-board.

Instead, he told

Mr. Richards to wait for Mr. Allen to check the tracks with his
(functioning) level-board.

Although he said the track “looks

good,” he never told anyone that it could be returned to service.
Rather, he told Mr. Richards that the track would be put back
into service only pending the results of Mr. Allen’s inspection.
Mr. Allen’s deposition testimony and his written statement
confirm that he intended to inspect the full section of track
that had been taken out of service before it would be put inservice.

Although Mr. Richards repeatedly tried to use the level

board that he found, Mr. Bond insisted that he await Mr. Allen’s
inspection.

At this point, Mr. Bond received a call from home

telling him that there had been a minor kitchen fire.

Mr. Bond

went home to deal with that issue, leaving Mr. Richards with
instructions to await Mr. Allen’s inspection.

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Only later that afternoon did Mr. Bond receive a call from
Mr. Allen in which Mr. Allen said that there was an issue with
the cross-elevation differential.

Mr. Bond called his crew

together, returned to the worksite, and fixed the problem.
Based upon the results of the investigation and crediting
written statements from members of the work crew over Mr. Bond’s
account, Mr. Johnson made the decision to terminate Mr. Bond and
informed Mr. Bond on October 12, 2011.

The MBCR replaced Mr.

Bond with Ronnie Allen, who is Caucasian.
4.

Comparator Evidence

Mr. Bond contends that his treatment and discipline was
harsher than that doled out to comparably situated white
employees.
Mr. Bond compared his disciplinary actions to two unionized
employees--referred to as Union Employee #1 and Union Employee
#2.

Union Employee #1 was a foreman who was charged with

dishonesty, misappropriation of pay, and other similar
derelictions of his duties.

An investigation was undertaken

pursuant to the grievance process set out in the collective
bargaining agreement.

After a hearing, Union Employee #1 was

terminated, but subsequently, following an appeal to a labor
arbitration panel, the employee was reinstated.
Union Employee #2 was charged with falsifying a report
regarding a “close call” with a truck crossing tracks.

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After an

investigation, Union Employee #2 was terminated from his
position.

However, as with Union Employee #1, Union Employee #2

successfully appealed his termination to an arbitration panel and
was reinstated.
In addition to the two union employees, Mr. Bond also
testified in his deposition regarding a series of incidents
involving other managers.

He describes an incident in which Joe

Rodriguez performed work which had to be subsequently repaired by
a surface crew, an incident in which Herbert Ross laid down
tracks in warm temperatures causing “sun kinks,” an incident in
which Mr. Ross backed a dump-truck into a lamp-post damaging the
truck, a third incident involving Mr. Ross in which he left a
piece of equipment on the tracks where it was struck by a train,
an incident in which an employee supervised by Patty Mallon was
killed during a snow-storm, and an incident involving a
derailment on a segment of track supervised by Jim Ferrero.

None

of these individuals were terminated as a result of these
incidents.

Mr. Bond, however, does not appear to have first hand

knowledge of these incidents, or of any investigations or
disciplinary action resulting from the incidents.

No other

competent evidence providing further information about these
events appears in the record.
More broadly, Mr. Johnson’s affidavit indicates that he is
unaware of any incidents during his tenure (2004 to the present)

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in which a manager in the Engineering Department who was on his
final warning following two incidents committed a third violation
of safety standards.

In addition, Mr. Johnson states that he is

unaware of any incident in which any manager left a track project
in a dangerous condition similar to the condition in which Mr.
Bond left the track panel installation project on October 2,
2011.
In addition to the incidents above, Mr. Bond contends that
on October 2, 2011 and more generally, he was provided equipment
that was inferior to that provided to other work crews headed by
white Roadmasters.

The MBCR responds that the equipment provided

was sufficient to perform the assigned tasks and that such
complaints are near-universal among Roadmasters.

In addition,

the “big tamper”--the equipment preferred by Mr. Bond for the
October 2, 2011 job--was in use that day on repairs being
performed on a larger piece of track.

Finally, it points out

that the equipment provided to Mr. Bond’s crew was ultimately
used the evening of October 2, 2011 to put the tracks in suitable
condition for service the next morning.
B. Procedural Background
Mr. Bond initially filed a complaint in this court on May 1,
2012; he filed an amended version on June 27, 2012.

The amended

complaint asserted claims of racial discrimination in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Massachusetts General Law Chapter 151B

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and named as defendants the MBCR, and Dana Rodrick, Herbert Ross,
John Mitchell, Patricia Maloney, and Robert Johnson.
The individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
claims against them, which I granted on October 1, 2012.

That

same day I set a schedule for the completion of fact and expert
discovery, and for the filing of dispositive motions.
Following discovery, the MBCR filed a motion for summary
judgment.

Also pending before me is the MBCR’s motion to strike

the plaintiff’s additional statement of undisputed facts and
portions of plaintiff’s response to the MBCR’s statement of
undisputed facts.2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

2

The question

I will not grant defendant’s motion to strike. I do not
view plaintiff’s submission of an additional statement of facts
as inappropriate or inconsistent with Local Rule 56.1, which
provides that “[a] party opposing the motion shall include a
concise statement of the material facts of record as to which it
is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.”
L.R. 56.1. However, to the extent that facts are unsupported by
the record evidence presented to me or appear to be based upon
hearsay or other inadmissible evidence, I have not relied upon
them in my description of the relevant facts set forth above.
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is whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, there is a “genuine dispute as to any material
fact.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Casas Office Machines, Inc. v.

Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668, 684 (1st Cir. 1994).
In the context of discrimination cases, summary judgment is
a “disfavored remedy” because “the ultimate issue of
discriminatory intent is a factual question” and the “question of
the defendants’ state of mind is elusive and rarely is
established by other than circumstantial evidence.”

Blare v.

Husky Injection Molding Systems Boston, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 111, 114
(Mass. 1995).

See also Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R.

Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[C]ourts should
exercise particular caution before granting summary judgment for
employers on such issues as pretext, motive, and intent.”).
Nevertheless, summary judgment is appropriate where “the
plaintiff’s evidence of intent, motive, or state of mind is
insufficient to support a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.”
646 N.E.2d at 114.

Blare,

See also Feliciano De La Cruz v. El

Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000)
(“Even in employment discrimination cases where . . . motive or
intent are at issue, [summary judgment is compelled] if the
non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations,
improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”)

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III. ANALYSIS
A.

The Legal Framework
Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of race-based

discrimination, the case is evaluated according to the standard
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973).3

Under

that standard, the initial burden is placed upon the plaintiff to
set forth a prima facie case by showing he (1) is a member of a
protected class; (2) performed his job satisfactorily; (3)
experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by
a person with roughly equivalent job qualifications who is not a
member of his protected class.

See Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol

Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 95 (1st Cir. 1996).
A plaintiff’s successful production of evidence sufficient
to make out a prima facie case creates a presumption of
discrimination.
(1993).

St. Mary’s Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506

Upon such a showing, the burden then shifts to the

employer to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
plaintiff’s termination.

Id.

3

Although developed in the context of Title VII of the
Civil Rights act, the McDonnell Douglas principles are applicable
to claims of intentional discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
T&S Associates, Inc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722, 724 (1st Cir.
1981), and discrimination claims brought under Mass. Gen. Laws c.
151B, Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, 33 N.E.2d 309, 314-15 (Mass. 1976).
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If the employer supplies such a reason, the plaintiff is
required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer’s proffered reason is pretextual and that the actual
reason for the adverse employment decision is discrimination.
Johnson v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 714 F.3d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 2013).
The plaintiff may meet this burden by showing that the employer's
proffered reason for the challenged employment action was
pretextual, from which the factfinder in turn may find the
alleged discriminatory animus.

Gonzales v. El Dia, Inc., 304

F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2002); Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 751 N.E.2d
360, 368 (Mass. 2001) (“[I]f if the fact finder is persuaded that
one or more of the employer's reasons is false, it may (but need
not) infer that the employer is covering up a discriminatory
intent, motive or state of mind.”).
B.

Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case.
As an African American who was terminated from his job and

replaced by a Caucasian, the plaintiff easily satisfies the
first, third, and fourth prongs of the prima facie analysis.
The defendant contends, however, that the two prior
suspensions received by Mr. Bond and the track panel incident
demonstrate that he was not adequately performing his job
responsibilities.

Mr. Bond contends that these incidents are

pretextual and he was singled-out for punishment on account of
his race.
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The burden of establishing a prima facie case is not
onerous.

Brennan v. GTE Gov. Sys. Corp., 150 F.3d 21, 26 (1st

Cir. 1998).

Here, Mr. Bond was employed for more than a decade

as a Roadmaster for the MBCR and Amtrak.

During that time he was

not cited for any direct violations of federal regulations nor
did his supervisors identify any persistent issues with the
quality of his work, apart from the discrete issues identified
above.

This history suggests that Mr. Bond was qualified and

able to perform his job successfully.

See Briddell v. Saint-

Gobain Abrasives, Inc., 2007 WL 1101158, *7 (D. Mass. March 30,
2007) (decade long work-history and satisfactory reviews were
sufficient to establish prima facie case despite claimed rule
violations); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 n. 10
(1st Cir. 1979) (“the fact that he was hired initially indicates
that he had the basic qualifications for the job”).
C.

The Reason for the Termination of Mr. Bond.
There is no serious dispute that the MBCR has articulated a

legitimate reason for Mr. Bond’s termination.

He was suspended

on two occasions from his job for violations of rules--the second
suspension accompanied by a final warning that any further
violations would be grounds for his termination.

After receiving

that warning, Mr. Bond was involved in the October 2, 2011
incident in which he allegedly left a portion of the track in an
unsafe condition and in violation of federal regulations.
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This shifts the burden back onto Mr. Bond to demonstrate
that this articulated reason was in fact a pretext for
discriminatory motive.

Mr. Bond attempts to accomplish this in

multiple ways.
First, Mr. Bond attempts to undermine the credibility of the
October 2, 2011 investigation.

Mr. Bond principally relies on

the facts that (i) he never actually instructed anyone that the
tracks could be returned to service--which was to be done by Mr.
Allen; and (ii) the tracks were successfully repaired and placed
into service on-time for the commute the following day.
The MBCR responds that this is beside the point.

It was Mr.

Bond’s job to repair the track and ensure that it was returned to
safe operating condition.

Rather than accomplishing that task,

he refused to use the available level-board to ensure that the
track condition met the applicable safety standards, reported
that the track “look[ed] good” for 30 MPH service, and ultimately
left the track in unsafe operating condition.

The fact that Mr.

Allen subsequently inspected the track did not alter or excuse
Mr. Bond’s dereliction of his duty.
In assessing the credibility of this investigation, the
ultimate issue for the factfinder is “the perception of the
decisionmaker, that is, whether the employer believed its stated
reason to be credible.”

Caesar v. Shinseki, 887 F. Supp. 2d 289,

299 (D. Mass. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks

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omitted).

Mr. Bond has a different view from Mr. Johnson

regarding the events of October 2, 2011 and the severity of any
problems that might have occurred that day.

The role of this

court is not to arbitrate whether Mr. Bond or Mr. Johnson’s
interpretation is more accurate.

Mesnick v. General Elec. Co.,

950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991) (“Courts may not sit as super
personnel departments, assessing the merits-or even the
rationality-of employers’ nondiscriminatory business decisions.”)
(citations omitted).

Instead, my role is to determine whether

there exist facts indicating that the investigation was a pretext
for discriminatory conduct.

Here, Mr. Johnson’s factual

determinations are supported by credible statements from a number
of witnesses.

Based upon his factual determinations, his

decision to terminate Mr. Bond does not appear unreasonable in
light of the prior disciplinary actions, including a warning that
further incidents would lead to termination.

Mr. Bond obviously

disagrees with these decisions, but disagreement with the outcome
of the investigation and the weighing of the severity of the
incident, without more, fails to demonstrate pretext.
Second, Mr. Bond seeks to demonstrate that Caucasian peers
were treated more leniently while he was singled out for harsh
disciplinary punishments.

“The most probative means of

establishing that the plaintiff’s termination was a pretext for
racial discrimination is to demonstrate that similarly situated

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white employees were treated differently.”

Matthews v. Ocean

Spray Cranberries, Inc., 686 N.E.2d 1303, 1309 (Mass. 1997).
Although such comparator evidence need not present a perfect
match, “[a] claim of disparate treatment based on comparative
evidence must rest on proof that the proposed analogue is
similarly situated in all material respects.” Perkins v. Brigham
& Women’s Hosp., 78 F.3d 747, 751 (1st Cir. 1996).
The evidence presented regarding the two unionized employees
does not satisfy this standard for two reasons.

First, such

employees are not similarly situated--rather than acting as
managers, like Mr. Bond, they were foremen of work crews.

These

employees thus did not share the same supervisory
responsibilities as Mr. Bond.

Second, and more importantly, Mr.

Bond cannot show that the unionized workers were treated
differently by the MBCR.

In each case, the MBCR terminated the

union employees--the same treatment given to Mr. Bond.

The fact

that they were reinstated on the basis of an arbitration process
provided for under their collective bargaining agreement does not
change the fact that the MBCR made the decision to terminate
them.
In addition to the union workers, Mr. Bond has testified in
his deposition to incidents involving other managers--Herbert
Ross, Joe Rodriguez and Patty Mallon--who were not fired.

This

evidence, however, is not sufficiently substantial and well-

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developed to demonstrate that these managers were similarly
situated and treated differently.

First, it appears that Mr.

Bond does not have direct personal knowledge of these incidents
or any follow-up investigations or discipline which resulted from
them.

This alone makes these examples insufficient as comparator

evidence.

See Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 479

(1st Cir. 1993) (“the material creating the factual dispute must
herald the existence of ‘definite, competent evidence’ fortifying
the plaintiff’s version of the truth.”).

Second, without more

detailed information about these incidents--which Mr. Bond
appears unable to provide--I cannot conclude that these events
were similar in ways that are relevant, including the degree of
fault (if any), the severity of the incidents, or the conclusions
reached from any investigation.

Finally, without information

about the prior disciplinary records of any of these individuals,
I cannot conclude that they were similarly situated to Mr. Bond,
who had previously been suspended on two occasions.

Thus it is

impossible to determine that any of these individuals was
situated similarly but received more lenient treatment for
similar violations.
Mr. Bond also questions the viability of the two predicate
offenses which led to his placement on “final warning” status
contending that he was singled out for unfair punishment.

For

the first offense, involving failing an alcohol test, there

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cannot be any serious argument that this demonstrates race-based
animus or was a fabricated pretext.

Mr. Bond failed a

presumptively objective alcohol test and does not dispute that.
And he presents no evidence that other managers failed alcohol
tests but were treated more leniently.

With regard to the second

incident, involving falsely signing Testing and Observation
forms, Mr. Bond testifies that he had observed others--Caucasian
managers--doing the same thing.

Here again, however, my task is

not to determine whether others committed similar offenses.
Rather, it is to examine the information available to the
relevant decisionmaker.

In this instance, the investigation of

the Testing and Observation forms was performed by Paul O’Leary.
Mr. O’Leary testified in his affidavit that (i) he became aware
of that a form submitted by Mr. Bond had a misspelled signature;
(ii) troubled by this, he investigated and reviewed other forms-submitted by Mr. Bond as well as other individuals--and found
similar discrepancies on other forms submitted by Mr. Bond; and
(iii) he is unaware of any other Roadmasters signing forms on
other employees’ behalf.

Mr. O’Leary reported this information

to Mr. Johnson who made the decision to discipline Mr. Bond.

Mr.

Bond has produced no evidence which contradicts these events or
suggests that either Mr. O’Leary or Mr. Johnson knew of and
ignored similar conduct by white employees.

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Mr. Bond clearly disagrees with the grounds for his
termination and believes that he was treated unfairly.

What he

has failed to do, however, is produce evidence showing that the
legitimate reasons for his termination articulated by the MBCR
were pretextual and a cover for illegitimate motive.
For this reason, I will grant summary judgment in favor of
the defendant.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth more fully above, the defendant’s
summary judgment motion (Docket No. 31) is GRANTED, and the Clerk
is directed to enter judgment for the defendant.

/s/ Douglas P. Woodlock
DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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