Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Research, Development and Technical Employees Union

Filing 38

Judge William G. Young: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, the Court (1) DENIES MIT's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and request for declaratory judgment, ECF No. 20 , (2) DENIES MIT's request for a permanent injunction, ECF No. 1 ; and (3) ORDERS the case administratively closed. It may be reopened upon motion of any party once the arbitration has concluded. SO ORDERED. (Paine, Matthew)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY,
Plaintiff,
v.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND
TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES UNION,
Defendant,

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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 12-11315-WGY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YOUNG, D.J.

I.

November 4, 2013

INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(“MIT”), brings this action against the Research, Development and
Technical Employees Union (the “Union”), seeking declaratory
judgment that the revocation of unrestricted access to a nuclear
research facility is not an arbitrable grievance under the
collective bargaining agreement MIT has with the Union, and
asking the Court to enjoin the Union from arbitrating the
unrestricted access revocation issue.

A.

Procedural Posture

MIT commenced this action against the Union on July 19,
2012.
1.

Compl. Declaratory Injunctive Relief (“Compl.”), ECF No.

The Union filed its answer along with an assented-to motion

for leave to file the answer late on September 14, 2012.

Answer,

ECF No. 8; Assented-To Mot. Leave File Answer, ECF No. 7.

The

Court granted the motion to file by order on September 17, 2012.
Elec. Order, Sept. 17, 2012, ECF No. 9.

On November 21, 2012,

MIT filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings accompanied by a
supporting memorandum.

Pl.’s Mot. J. Pleadings, ECF No. 20;

Pl.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. J. Pleadings (“Mem. Supp.”), ECF No.
21.

Along with the motion for judgment on the pleadings, MIT

also filed a supporting affidavit of Scott A. Roberts, its
counsel, accompanied by a series of attachments.

Aff. Scott A.

Roberts Supp. Pl.’s Mot. J. Pleadings (“Roberts Aff.”), ECF No.
22.

On December 12, 2012, the Union filed an opposition to the

motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Def.’s Opp’n Mot. J.

Pleadings (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 26.
On January 10, 2013, this Court heard argument on MIT’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings and issued an oral order to
“stay its hand and remand the matter to the Arbitrator for
arbitration,” including a determination of the arbitrability
issue, but permitted either side to move to re-open the
administratively closed case upon completion of the arbitration.
2

Elec. Clerk’s Notes, Jan. 10, 2013, ECF No. 28.

The parties

briefed the issue of arbitrability of unescorted access for the
Arbitrator and the Arbitrator issued his award finding
arbitrability of the issue on April 4, 2013.

See Pl.’s Status

Report (“Status Report”), Ex. 1, Award Arbitrator (“Award”) 30,
ECF No. 30-1.

On May 3, 2013, MIT requested a case management

conference and filed an accompanying status report apprising the
Court of the developments in the case.

Pl.’s Request Case Mgmt.

Conference, ECF No. 31; Status Report.

A status conference was

held on May 14, 2013, and the Court decided to hear argument at
its motion session on June 3, 2013 and took the matter under
advisement thereafter.

See Elec. Clerk’s Notes, May 14, 2013,

ECF No. 33; Elec. Clerk’s Notes, June 3, 2013, ECF No. 35.
B.

Factual Background
1.

Facts As Alleged

MIT is a co-educational, privately endowed research
university with a location in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
1.

Compl. ¶

The Union is a labor organization representing a number of

MIT’s employees in collective bargaining.

Id. ¶ 2.

As part of

its research facilities, MIT maintains an interdepartmental
Nuclear Reactor Laboratory (the “Laboratory”), which operates a
six-megawatt nuclear research reactor (the “Reactor”) under a
license granted by the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (the “Commission”).

Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.
3

The Reactor and its

surrounding containment building constitute a restricted area
(“Restricted Area”), to which access rights, in particular
unescorted access, are limited to specially authorized employees.
Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.
MIT is subject to an order (the “Order”) issued by the
Commission in April 2007, which imposes fingerprinting and
criminal history record check requirements for unescorted access
on its licensees.

Id. ¶¶ 12, 15; Compl., Ex. 1, Order Imposing

Fingerprinting & Criminal History Records Check Requirements
Unescorted Access All Research Test Reactor Licensees Identified
Attach. 1 (Effective Immediately) (“Order”), ECF No. 1-2.

The

Order places the duty of determining whether an individual may
have, or may continue to have, unescorted access on a licensee’s
reviewing official.

Order 5-6.

Furthermore, the Order

stipulates that in making this determination, the reviewing
official must “determine whether the individual demonstrates a
pattern of trustworthy and reliable behavior . . . .”

Id. at 2.

Ms. Rice (“Rice”) is employed by MIT’s Environment, Health
and Safety Office as a Project Technician.

Compl. ¶¶ 6, 17.

She

was formerly assigned to perform certain duties at the
Laboratory, and for that purpose was given unescorted access to
the Restricted Area.

Id. ¶¶ 6, 18.

In September 2009, one of

Rice’s colleagues lodged a complaint with the Laboratory alleging
that Rice removed mail from his mailbox three times without the

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authority to do so.

Id. ¶ 19.

Thereupon, MIT’s Human Resources Department conducted an
investigation during which time Rice’s authorization for
unescorted access to the Restricted Area was temporarily revoked.
Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.

On or about November 19, 2009, MIT completed the

investigation into the colleague’s complaint and concluded that
Rice had twice removed mail without authorization from another
employee’s mailbox.
oral warning.

Id. ¶ 23.

Id. ¶ 24.

The next week, Rice received an

Also, the subcommittee responsible for

reactor security found Rice not “sufficiently trustworthy” to
have unescorted access to the Restricted Area and voted
unanimously not to restore her access authorization.
27, 29.

Id. ¶¶ 6,

Rice continues to work at MIT as a Project Technician,

performing duties commensurate to her job classification, but has
since been assigned to areas other than the Laboratory.

Id. ¶

31.
During the relevant time period, MIT and the Union were
parties to a collective bargaining agreement (the “Agreement”),1
and Rice is a member of the bargaining unit at MIT that is
represented by the Union, and thus is an employee covered by the
Agreement.

Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.

The Agreement sets forth a four-step

1

The Agreement in the version submitted to the Court was
effective for the years 2008 to 2011. Compl., Ex. 4, 2008-2011
Agreement Mass. Institute of Tech. & Research, Development, &
Technical Employees’ Union (“Agreement”), ECF No. 1-5.
5

grievance and arbitration procedure which applies “[i]n the event
of any grievance between the employees and MIT concerning the
interpretation or application of [the] Agreement . . . .”
35; Agreement 4-6.

Id. ¶

The Union initiated a grievance on behalf of

Rice, the grievance procedure was exhausted, and the Union unsatisfied with the results - submitted the matter to
arbitration.

Compl. ¶¶ 37-43.

MIT concedes the arbitrability of

the issues of whether there was just cause for the oral warning
given to Rice and whether Rice was “transferred” within the
meaning of the Agreement and, if so, whether it was for proper
cause.

Id. ¶¶ 44, 45.

MIT contends, however, that the temporary

revocation of unescorted access to the Restricted Area and the
decision to decline reinstatement of Rice’s authorization are not
arbitrable under the Agreement.

Id. ¶ 46.

2. The Arbitrator’s Award
The Arbitrator scrutinized the Agreement, specifically
Article IV, containing the arbitration clause, Article XVIII,
regulating, inter alia, transfers, and Article XX, relating to
discipline, and opined that the Agreement contained no language
regarding the denial of authorization of unescorted access to the
Restricted Area.

See Award 25-27.

The Arbitrator concluded that

while the language of the arbitration clause only permits
arbitration of grievances “regarding the interpretation or
application of [the] Agreement,” and the fact that the Agreement

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is silent on the unescorted access issue seems to counsel against
arbitrability of this issue in view of the arbitration clause’s
language, see id. at 25, the revocation of unescorted access
under the circumstances of this case amounted to discipline and
thus implicated Article XX of the Agreement, see id. 25-27.

As

additional ground for his reasoning, the Arbitrator considered
the Order’s language and opined that the denial of unescorted
access “must be for specific and valid and reliable reason(s),”
and the determination of whether Rice showed a “pattern of
trustworthy and reliable behavior” necessarily relied on “an
investigation of the events leading up to her removal of access .
. . which [could] only take place if this portion of the
grievance” was arbitrable.

Id. at 28.

Lastly, the Arbitrator

reasoned that doubts as to questions of arbitrability should be
resolved in favor of arbitration and as the Agreement “contains
no provision which prohibits the grievance regarding the denial
of access to proceed to arbitration,” the issue must be
substantively arbitrable.
C.

Id. at 28-29.

Federal Jurisdiction

The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this
declaratory judgment action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1331,
28 U.S.C. section 2201, and section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
II.

ANALYSIS

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A.

Legal Standard

MIT has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (“Rule 12(c)”), a motion
that can be filed at any time “[a]fter the pleadings are closed –
but early enough not to delay trial. . . .”

Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(c).
Since a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule
12(c) ultimately fulfils the same function as a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”), the standards for decision
are very much alike.

See Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 43-44

(1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is treated much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss).

The Court thus is charged with assessing the merits of

the case by viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, here the Union, and drawing all reasonable
inferences therefrom.

R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d

178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Rivera-Gomez v. DeCastro, 843
F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1988)).
To succeed with its motion and attain a declaratory judgment
on the pleadings, MIT must include in its complaint enough
factual allegations to “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level”, assuming all factual allegations are true.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see

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Pérez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008).
In that sense, unlike a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion
under Rule 12(c) “implicates the pleadings as a whole” rather
than solely drawing from the complaint.

Curran v. Cousins, 482

F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D. Mass. 2007) (Lindsay, J.), aff'd, 509 F.3d
36 (1st Cir. 2007)(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted).
“[Q]uestions of statutory interpretation are questions of
law ripe for resolution at the pleadings stage.”

Simmons v.

Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing General Motors
Corp. v. Darling’s, 444 F.3d 98, 107 (1st Cir. 2006)).

The Court

may consider “documents the authenticity of which are not
disputed by the parties; . . . documents central to plaintiffs'
claim; [and] documents sufficiently referred to in the
complaint.”

Curran, 509 F.3d at 44 (quoting Watterson v. Page,

987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)) (alterations original); see also
Beddall v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st
Cir. 1998) (“When . . . a complaint's factual allegations are
expressly linked to — and admittedly dependent upon — a document
(the authenticity of which is not challenged), that document
effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can
review it . . . .”).
B.

MIT Has Presented the Court With an Actual Controversy

The Union contends that no actual controversy exists as

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necessary under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
Opp’n 1.
Indeed, the Court ought grant declaratory judgment only if a
“controversy ‘ripe’ for judicial resolution” exists.

Verizon New

England, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 2322, 651
F.3d 176, 188 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)).

According to First Circuit law, to

determine whether an actual controversy exists, a court ought
“consider both fitness for review and hardship,” the former
involving “questions of finality, definiteness, and the need for
further factual development,” and the latter being concerned with
“whether the challenged action create[d] a direct and immediate
dilemma for the parties.”

Id. at 188 (quoting Ernst & Young v.

Depositors Economic Protection Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 535 (1st Cir.
1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Rhode Island v.

Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir. 1994), the First
Circuit held that courts ought consider whether granting
declaratory judgment would serve a “useful purpose.”

Id. at 693.

Furthermore, as conceded by the Union, Opp’n 5, the First Circuit
has concluded in Tejidos de Coamo, Inc. v. Int'l Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, 22 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994), that the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., does not prohibit prearbitration declarations of arbitrability.
F.3d at 15.

10

Tejidos de Coamo, 22

Considering the history of this case, the Court is mindful
of the fact that the issue of whether unescorted access denials
are arbitrable is likely to arise again and this Court’s decision
in this case will hopefully aid judicial economy, clarify this
particular issue, and thus help obviate similar disputes in the
future.
C.

Thus, an actual controversy exists.
The Issue of Arbitrability is a Question to be Decided
by the Court.

It is well settled that the issue of arbitrability, namely
whether a particular grievance was excluded from arbitration, is
a matter for a court to decide.

AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns

Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986) (“Unless the parties
clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the
court, not the arbitrator.”).

In Marie v. Allied Home Mortg.

Corp., 402 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), the First Circuit reviewed
then recent Supreme Court decisions reiterating that there were
“at least two sorts of questions . . . presumptively for the
court to decide: (1) whether the parties [were] bound by a given
arbitration clause, and (2) whether a concededly binding
arbitration clause applied to a particular type of controversy.”
Id. at 9-10 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537
U.S. 79, 84 (2002)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

In making this decision, however, the Court

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ought not decide the merits of the underlying claim.

AT&T

Techs., 475 U.S. at 649.
D.

MIT’s Decision to Deny Unescorted Access Privileges is
Subject to Arbitration Under the Agreement.
1.

The Presumption of Arbitrability Governs

Although it is an issue of first impression under this
collective bargaining agreement whether this particular grievance
- the denial of unescorted access to a nuclear facility - ought
be subjected to arbitration, there is well established case law
as to the common principles that guide the determination of
whether an issue is arbitrable or not.
at 650.

See AT&T Techs., 475 U.S.

Because interpreting an arbitration clause contained in

a collective bargaining agreement ultimately is a matter of
contract law, the parties will only be required to arbitrate the
issue if they agreed to submit such dispute to arbitration.

Id.

at 648-49 (“The first principle . . . is that arbitration is a
matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Having said that, there is a — possibly competing —
principle that where an agreement contains an arbitration clause,
the intent to arbitrate a particular grievance is presumed and
hence “[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that

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the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute.”

United Steelworkers of Am. v.

Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).

This so-

called presumption of arbitrability is dictated by a clear
government policy favoring the resolution of such labor disputes
by means of arbitration and also demands that if in doubt the
Court ought interpret the agreement to have covered the issue.
Id.; see AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650 (holding that the
presumption is “particularly applicable” in the case of a broad
arbitration clause, such as one submitting to arbitration “any
differences arising with respect to the interpretation of th[e]
contract or the performance of any obligation [t]hereunder . . .
.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Granite Rock Co.
v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2858-59 (2010)
(discussing application of the presumption of arbitrability).
The Supreme Court has likewise held that unless a particular
grievance is excluded from a general arbitration clause by
express provision, “only the most forceful evidence of a purpose
to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.”

Warrior &

Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. at 584-85.
Applying these common principles to the case at hand, the
Agreement contains what the Court considers a “broad” arbitration
clause.

The arbitration clause in place covers “any grievance .

. . concerning the interpretation or application of [the]

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Agreement.”

Agreement 4.

MIT hotly disputes that the access

denial grievance concerns the interpretation or application of
the Agreement, arguing instead that it falls outside the scope of
the Agreement.

See Mem. Supp. 17-18.

It is not apparent why the question of whether the denial of
Rice’s site-access authorization does not concern the
interpretation of the Agreement, namely the definition of
“transfer” or “discipline” under the Agreement’s Articles XVIII
and XX respectively.

In this regard, the Arbitrator’s opinion

that based on the facts of this particular case, the denial of
access could well have constituted a disciplinary measure, Award
26-27, while not binding, persuades the Court.

See McCabe

Hamilton & Renny Co., Ltd. v. Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union,
Local 142, AFL-CIO, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245-46 (D. Haw. 2008)
(granting the union’s motion to confirm the arbitration award and
noting that the arbitrator acknowledged the employer’s discretion
to transfer the aggrieved but found that based on the facts of
that case it was apparent that the employer used its discretion
“as a means of disciplining [the aggrieved] without meeting the
[collective bargaining agreement’s] substantive and procedural
requirements for discipline”).
The absence of a specific provision does not necessarily
equate to an intentional exclusion of a particular grievance or
issue from arbitration.

The failure specifically to regulate

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site access in the Agreement may be due to any number of reasons,
yet faced with the strong presumption of arbitrability and having
failed to allege a reason to have intentionally abstained from
regulating the issue, let alone “forceful evidence of the purpose
to exclude,” MIT cannot make its case.

See Warrior & Gulf Nav.

Co., 363 U.S. at 585.
2.

The Presumption of Arbitrability Is Not
Inapplicable Here Due to Public Policy

Having established that according to the general principles
of arbitration and labor contract interpretation the issue of
unescorted access to a nuclear facility is one to be submitted to
arbitration, the Court must consider MIT’s argument that site
access denials fall outside the scope of the Agreement for public
policy reasons involving the safety and security of nuclear
facilities.

Mem. Supp. 17-19.

MIT points to two decisions, one

from the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, upheld by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and one in
which a labor arbitrator, acknowledging the New Jersey court’s
reasoning, came to the same conclusion, namely that the issue of
revocation of access authorization was not arbitrable under the
applicable collective bargaining agreement.

Public Serv. Elec. &

Gas Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 94, 140 F. Supp. 2d
384, 401-02, 406 (D.N.J. 2001) aff'd, 27 Fed. App'x 127 (3d Cir.
2002); In re WE Energies & Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
2150, 122 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1122, 2006 WL 2641749, at *8 (2012)
15

(Suntrup, Arb.).
The court in Public Service noted that the collective
bargaining agreement in question did not contain any provisions
“specific or otherwise, related to site access authorization
determinations,” 140 F. Supp. 2d at 398, and interwove this
argument with a holding that due to the “unique and critical
issue of the safety of the public at large” it was “necessary and
appropriate” for the parties “to expressly agree to submit site
access issues to arbitration and that this be specifically
provided in the [collective bargaining agreement],” id. at 400.
The Public Service court explained that it read the applicable
Commission regulations to “permit arbitration to be the appeal
process for revocation or denial of site access decisions,” but
“due to public policy reasons,” required a “separate, clear, and
specific provision in the collective bargaining agreement if
arbitration is to be the review process.”

Id. at 403-04.

The

court concluded that it would not uphold an agreement that lacked
such provisions, as enforcement would be contrary to public
policy.

See id. at 404.

Other courts examining the question of whether public policy
justified an exception to arbitration on site access issues have
come out a different way.

To make an argument that the Agreement

was against public policy one has to determine the public policy
behind the regulations, especially the regulatory history and the

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Commission’s intent.

The Seventh Circuit and district courts

therein have been concerned with the nuclear power plant site
access revocation issue after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, and the resulting amendments of the Commission
regulations to tighten security.

Exelon Generation Co., LLC v.

Local 15, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, No. 10 C 4846,
2011 WL 2149624, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2011) (Gettleman, J.),
rev’d and remanded, 676 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc
denied, 682 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Exelon Generation
Co. v. Local 15, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, No. 06 CV
6961, 2008 WL 4442608, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008) (Lefkow,
J.).

In each of these cases, the court took great care to

analyze the regulatory history in search of a prohibition or
conflict with arbitration as a means of resolution of site access
disputes and held that the Commission had indeed intended to
permit arbitration procedures to exist alongside any review
mechanisms established pursuant to the regulations.

See Exelon

Generation Co., LLC, 676 F.3d at 574 (quoting Access
Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants, 56 Fed. Reg.
18997-01, 19002 (Apr. 25, 1991) (codified at 10 C.F.R. Part 73))
(citing from the regulatory guide the Commission’s comment that
“the Commission never intended that any review procedure that
already exists in a bargaining agreement be abandoned.”); see
also id. at 575 (holding that this interpretation remained in

17

force, even after the regulation was subsequently amended, as
"[n]othing in the text of the amended regulation or the
rulemaking history suggests the Commission came to a different
conclusion in 2009.").
Likewise, Judge Posner, in a concurrence to the denial of en
banc rehearing, noted that “[t]he Commission could amend its
regulations to forbid collective bargaining agreements to empower
arbitrators to resolve disputes over security clearances . . . .
As could Congress.”

Exelon Generation Co., 682 F.3d at 622

(Posner, J., concurring).

Judge Posner added that while it was

“time that the Commission, or failing that Congress, instituted
administrative review of decisions by private arbitrators
granting or denying security clearances to employees of nuclear
facilities,” it was “beyond judicial authority to command” such
review procedures.

Id. at 622-23.

This Court is persuaded by the Seventh Circuit’s approach.
While it is arguably in the public interest for a publicly
accountable judiciary to review site access disputes for our
nuclear facilities, it is not in fact the Commission’s or
Congress’s policy or intent to exclude access revocation disputes
from private (and largely secret) arbitration.

Thus, MIT’s

policy argument must fail.
In addition, the Court takes note of the fact that the
Agreement in the version made available to the Court was in

18

effect from 2008 to 2011 and therefore was (re-)negotiated after
MIT received the Commission’s (April 2007) Order which it argues
acts as a bar to arbitration of the site access issue.

Suffice

it to say one would assume MIT, put on notice by the Order of its
duties as a licensee to monitor site access and convinced that
site access was not (or at least was no longer) a grievance
arbitrable under the Agreement, would have asserted its rights by
negotiating an explicit provision to that effect to the
Agreement.
In conclusion, the presumption of arbitrability stands and
can neither be overcome by MIT’s public policy arguments nor by
the facts alleged to be sufficient to create “forceful evidence”
that the site access revocation grievance was intentionally
unregulated by the Agreement.
E.

A Permanent Injunction Is Not Warranted

MIT also seeks injunctive relief, asking the Court to enjoin
the Union from “pursuing any claim in the arbitration relating to
decisions to grant or deny authorization for unescorted access .
. . .”

Compl. ¶ 56.

As MIT is not entitled to a declaratory

judgment that the unescorted access denial grievance is not
arbitrable, the claim for such an injunction is moot.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
(1)

DENIES MIT’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and
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request for declaratory judgment, ECF No. 20,

(2)

DENIES MIT’s request for a permanent injunction, ECF
No. 1; and

(3)

ORDERS the case administratively closed. It may be
reopened upon motion of any party once the arbitration
has concluded.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ William G. Young
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE

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