Eason v. Marriott International Inc.

Filing 42

Judge Denise J. Casper: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting Marriott's renewed motion for summary judgment, D. 32.(Hourihan, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
__________________________________________
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MICHAEL EASON,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Civil Action No. 12-11779
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MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
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Defendant.
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__________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CASPER, J.
I.

May 28, 2014

Introduction
Defendant Marriott International, Inc. (“Marriott”) has renewed its motion for summary

judgment on the single negligence claim of the Plaintiff Michael Eason (“Eason”)’s complaint.
D. 32. For the reasons discussed below, the Court ALLOWS the motion.
II.

Factual Allegations
These facts are as represented in Marriott’s Statement of Material Facts, D. 33, and

undisputed by Eason, D. 35, unless otherwise noted. On September 16, 2009, Eason reserved a
room at the Boston Marriott Burlington Hotel (“the Hotel”). D. 33 ¶ 1; D. 35 ¶ 1. Eason
checked into the Hotel around 8:00 p.m. D. 33 ¶ 4; D. 35 ¶ 4. Upon arrival to his room, Eason
and his guest opened the door and stepped into the room. D. 33 ¶ 7; D. 35 ¶ 7. The room was
dark except for light coming from the door, which was partially open, and a small gap in the

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curtains at the opposite end of the room. D. 33 ¶ 8; D. 35 ¶ 8. When Eason first entered the
room, he could see only above a wet bar, located in the entryway, and a clear spot in front of
him. D. 33 ¶ 9; D. 35 ¶ 9. Eason proceeded farther into the room and the room door closed
behind him, leaving the room in darkness. D. 33 ¶ 10; D. 35 ¶ 10. Eason then took another step
forward into the foyer area. Plaintiff’s Statement of Materials Facts, D. 35 at 5, ¶ 8. Eason
tripped and fell over a coffee table and sustained injuries. D. 33 ¶ 14; D. 35 ¶ 14.
III.

Procedural History
Eason initiated this lawsuit in Middlesex Superior Court in Massachusetts on or about

September 4, 2012. D. 1-1 at 1. The case was removed to this Court on September 25, 2012. D.
1. Marriott moved for summary judgment on November 21, 2012. D. 16. The Court denied the
motion without prejudice to be renewed at the close of discovery. D. 29. After the close of
discovery, Marriott renewed its motion for summary judgment. D. 32. After a hearing on May
1, 2014, the Court took the matter under advisement. D. 41.
IV.

Standard of Review
The Court may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the undisputed
facts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party “need only show that there is an absence of
evidence in support of at least one element of the plaintiff’s case in[] order to succeed on
summary judgment.” Cellco P’ship v. Town of Grafton, Mass., 336 F. Supp. 2d 71, 82 (D.
Mass. 2004).
Once the moving party meets its burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of
material fact, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, with respect to each issue on
which []he would bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that a trier of fact could

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reasonably resolve that issue in [his] favor” through specific admissible facts. Borges ex. rel.
S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “If the nonmovant
fails to make this showing, then summary judgment is appropriate.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court “view[s] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing
reasonable inferences in his favor.” Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted).
V.

Discussion
A.

Marriott Did Not Owe the Plaintiff a Duty of Care In These Circumstances

To succeed on his negligence claim, Eason must show that Marriott owed him a legal
duty, the defendant’s breach of which caused his injury. O’Sullivan v. Shaw, 431 Mass. 201,
203 (2000) (citation omitted). “Whether a defendant has a duty of care to the plaintiff in the
circumstances is a question of law for the court, to be determined by reference to the existing
social values and customs and appropriate social policy.” Id. While a landowner has a duty to
lawful visitors of its property to maintain reasonably safe conditions and to warn of unreasonable
dangers, landowners “are relieved of the duty to warn of open and obvious dangers on their
premises because it is not reasonably foreseeable that a visitor exercising (as the law presumes)
reasonable care for his own safety would suffer injury from blatant hazards. . . Stated otherwise,
where a danger would be obvious to a person of ordinary perception and judgment, a landowner
may reasonably assume that a visitor has knowledge of it . . . .” Id. (citations omitted). An
“open and obvious danger obviates not only the duty to warn but also ‘operates to negate the
existence of a duty of care.’” Ogni v. Schlien, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 1104, at *2 (June 26, 2008)
(unpublished) (quoting O’Sullivan, 431 Mass. at 206).

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The Court concludes, as have Massachusetts courts, that “traversing unfamiliar terrain in
complete darkness [is] an open and obvious danger,” Ogni, 72 Mass. App. Ct. at *2, and
therefore, summary judgment in favor of Marriott is appropriate. See also Benton v. Watson,
231 Mass. 582, 584 (1919) (holding that defendant was not liable for negligence as a matter of
law because plaintiff “knew and appreciated [] the nature and degree of darkness, [] was not
misled by an act or omission of the defendants, and [] knew, as all men of ordinary experience
must know, that one who walks in the total darkness of a strange hall is likely to encounter
obstructions to his passage and pitfalls to his feet”). Here, the undisputed facts show that upon
arrival at the hotel room, Eason entered the room, which was dark “except for light coming from
the partially open door and a small gap in the curtains at the opposite end of the room.” D. 33 at
3, ¶¶ 7–8; D. 35 at 3, ¶¶ 7–8. Eason proceeded to walk farther into the room and the door closed
behind him, leaving the room in darkness. Id. ¶ 10. Still – by Eason’s own admission – even
though he saw only what “appeared to be” a lamp upon entering the room, D. 35 at 6, ¶ 12, he
continued to step further into the foyer area after the room had become completely dark. Id. ¶ 8.
As in Ogni, where the plaintiff traversed a “pitch black” backyard he had never before visited, 72
Mass. App. Ct., at *2, and Benton, where the plaintiff walked around in a completely dark room,
231 Mass. at 583–84, here, despite the total darkness in the hotel room, Eason nevertheless
continued to proceed farther into the room and then tripped over a coffee table. D. 35 at 5, ¶ 8.
Although Eason contends that a wet bar in the entranceway prevented him from seeing portions
of the aisle leading into the room, D. 35 at 8, the Court concludes that the danger of tripping over
furniture upon venturing into a dark hotel room is open and obvious. Further, Eason has directed
the Court to no evidence suggesting that he was otherwise familiar with the layout of the

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Marriott’s hotel rooms such that he would expect certain furniture to be placed in specific
locations in the room.
While Eason cites Tetrault v. Ghibellini, 316 Mass. 477 (1944), in support of his position,
that case is inapposite. In Tetrault, the court found that the defendant induced the plaintiff to go
through the wrong door in directing him to the restroom, resulting in the plaintiff’s falling into a
grease pit, and having invited him to do so, the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable
care. Id. at 479. That is not the case here. A person of average intelligence would expect that a
hotel room would contain furniture that may not be visible in darkness.
Therefore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Marriott owed Eason
a duty of care and summary judgment in favor of Marriott is appropriate.
B.

There Is No Admissible Evidence on This Record that the Named Defendant
Controlled the Premises on Which Plaintiff Was Injured_________________

Marriott further argues that summary judgment is also appropriate on the grounds that
Eason has not produced evidence that Marriott International, Inc., the named Defendant,
controlled the premises where Eason was injured. D. 33 at 9.
“Liability for injury or damage caused by the dangerous or defective condition of
premises depends upon control of the offending instrumentality, either through ownership or
otherwise.” Marsden v. Eastern Gas & Fuel, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 29 (1979) (quoting Frizzell v.
Metropolitan Coal Co., 298 Mass. 189, 191 (1937)) (quotations omitted). Here, Marriott has
presented admissible evidence, by way of an affidavit from the Assistant Secretary of Marriott
Hotel Services, Inc., stating that Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. “had day-to-day responsibility for
the management of the hotel” and that the named Defendant “Marriott International, Inc. never
owned, operated or otherwise controlled the Boston Marriott Burlington Hotel.” Affidavit of
Chanel Maelia Bradden, D. 33-2 at 2. The only evidence Eason offers to refute these statements
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is printouts of the Marriott.com webpage, which Eason contends is evidence that “Marriott
International, Inc., through its webpage, controls and manages guest reservations.” D. 35 at 6, ¶
16; see also id. ¶¶ 14–18. Eason has not demonstrated how Marriott International’s role in the
advertising and online facilitation of hotel reservations amounts to control of the hotel room
where he incurred injury. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the
Defendant Marriott did not control the premises where Eason was injured.
VI.

Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court ALLOWS Marriott’s renewed motion for summary

judgment, D. 32.
So Ordered.
/s/ Denise J. Casper
United States District Judge

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