Trustees of Boston University v. Everlight Electronics Co., Ltd. et al

Filing 1914

Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM and ORDER entered. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 1899 ) is DENIED. Defendants' request for attorney fees (Docket No. 1909 ) is DENIED.SO ORDERED. (Lara, Miguel)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
________________________________
)
TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY, )
Plaintiff,
)
) Consolidated Civil Action
v.
) No. 12-11935-PBS
)
EVERLIGHT ELECTRONICS CO.,
)
LTD., et al.,
)
Defendants.
)
)
)
TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY, )
Plaintiff,
)
) Civil Action
v.
) No. 12-12326-PBS
)
EPISTAR CORPORATION,
)
Defendant.
)
)
)
TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY, )
Plaintiff,
)
) Civil Action
v.
) No. 12-12330-PBS
)
LITE-ON INC., et al.,
)
Defendants.
)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
March 24, 2020
Saris, D.J.
This long-running case involves a patent dispute between
the Trustees of Boston University (“Plaintiff”) and certain
manufacturers of components of LED lightbulbs (“Defendants”).
After a jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor and the
Court denied Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law,
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Defendants appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit
held that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on a lack of enablement defense and reversed.
Plaintiff then moved in this Court to, among other
remedies, amend its complaint to allege infringement of claims
11 and 12 of the ’738 patent, which Plaintiff argues are not
susceptible to Defendants’ lack of enablement defense. On July
18, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion by written order.
It found Plaintiff had “delayed far too long” given that
Plaintiff was aware of the enablement defense as early as
November 2014 and yet never sought to amend its complaint in
response. Docket No. 1890 at 15.
Now, Plaintiff has moved for reconsideration of that order
and to amend the Court’s final judgment in Defendants’ favor,
arguing that manifest injustice will result. After review of the
parties’ briefing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration (Docket No. 1899). The Court DENIES Defendants’
application for attorney fees contained in their opposition
(Docket No. 1909).
I.

Motion for Reconsideration
The granting of a motion for reconsideration is “an

extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” Palmer v.
Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted). A court may grant a motion for reconsideration “only
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in a limited number of circumstances,” namely, “[1] if the
moving party presents newly discovered evidence, [2] if there
has been an intervening change in the law, or [3] if the movant
can demonstrate that the original decision was based on a
manifest error of law or was clearly unjust.” United States v.
Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff relies only on the third ground of manifest
injustice. 1 The standard for “manifest injustice” is “difficult
to achieve” and “requires a definite and firm conviction that a
prior ruling on a material matter is unreasonable or obviously
wrong.” Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636, 648 (1st Cir.
2002). It is not met anytime a court made “an arguably erroneous
ruling.” Id. A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)
cannot be used to “rehash arguments previously rejected.” SotoPadro v. Pub. Bldgs. Auth., 675 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012).
The high standard for manifest injustice is not met here.
Plaintiff argues it should not have been expected to foresee
Defendants’ lack of enablement defense and to amend its
pleadings earlier in response. The Court considered and rejected
that argument in its July 18, 2019 Order. The Court’s reasoning

1

Plaintiff initially argued that the Court committed legal
error by failing to “properly apply the liberal standard
favoring amendment” of pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
Docket No. 1900 at 4. Plaintiff’s reply brief rightly does not
press the argument. Rule 16’s “good cause” standard applied
because the deadline for amendments had long passed.
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was based on a full review of the record and a finding that
Plaintiff was on notice to Defendants’ lack of enablement
defense as early as November 2014. Plaintiff disagrees with the
Court’s analysis but has not shown that the Court’s finding was
so “obviously wrong” that it constitutes manifest injustice. See
Ellis, 313 F.3d at 648.
Because Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion does no more than
relitigate arguments already rejected by the Court in its July
18, 2019 Order, the motion is DENIED.
II.

Attorney Fees

In their opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration, Defendants request attorney fees and costs
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which allows the court to award
fees when an attorney “multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously.” Docket No. 1909 at 8. “The term
‘vexatious' means that the losing party’s actions were
‘frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not
brought in subjective bad faith.’” Local 285, Serv. Employees
Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Nonotuck Res. Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d
735, 737 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Here, I conclude
that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was without merit,
but it was not frivolous or filed in bad faith.

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ORDER
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 1899) is
DENIED. Defendants’ request for attorney fees (Docket No. 1909)
is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge

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