Arenella v. Malden District Court

Filing 6

Judge Douglas P. Woodlock: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Within 21 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order,plaintiff shall pay the $350.00 filing fee or he shall filea Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis along withhis cer tified prison account statement for the six-monthperiod preceding the filing of his complaint, failing which,this action will be dismissed; Within 42 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order,plaintiff shall demonstrate good cause in writing why thisaction should not be dismissed for the reasons statedherein, failing which, this action will be dismissed;Plaintiff's Letter (Docket No. 5) seeking relief is DENIED,and this Court DECLINES to construe the Letter as a new civil action.(PSSA, 1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
FRANCIS E. ARENELLA
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 12-12068-DPW

v.
MALDEN DISTRICT COURT,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
December 7, 2012
WOODLOCK, D.J.
I.

INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 2012, plaintiff Francis E. Arenella (“Mr.

Arenella”), a pretrial detainee in custody at the North Central
Correctional Institution at Gardner (“NCCI Gardner”), filed a
skeletal self-prepared complaint against the Malden District
Court.

He alleges that the Malden District Court Clerk’s Office

failed to follow correct protocol, thereby violating his
constitutional rights.

Specifically, he claims the Clerk’s

Office failed to provide him certification of three motions filed
by him, including: (1) a Motion for a Speedy Trial; (2) a Motion
for Discovery; and (3) a Motion for Copies of Sworn Statements
from the Victim.

He contends that he has a right to speedy

trial, and that the Malden District Court has not provided him
with one.

As relief, he requests that this court “bring the

Clerk’s office into Court and explain theit [sic] actions in from
[sic] of a Federal Judgeon [sic] why they Violated My
Constitutional Rights.”

Compl. at 1.

Attached to the complaint

was a copy of his pro se request for a continuance of trial and a
waiver of speedy trial rights because of alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel and “Lack of Responsibility” by the Clerk’s
Office.
Mr. Arenella failed to pay the $350.00 filing fee for this
action or to seek a waiver thereof.
On November 23, 2012, plaintiff filed a Letter (Docket No.
5) in which he reiterates his claims regarding the Malden
District Court and his lack of a speedy trial.

He seeks

complaint forms from this Court or to construe his letter as a
complaint.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

The Filing Fee for Civil Actions

A party bringing a civil action must either (1) pay the
$350.00 filing fee, see 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); or (2) seek leave to
proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (proceedings in forma pauperis).

Where, as here, the

plaintiff is a prisoner (as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h)), a
motion for waiver of prepayment of the filing fee must be
accompanied by “a certified copy of the trust fund account
statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the
6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint
... obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at

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which the prisoner is or was confined.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).1

Accordingly, I will direct that, within 21 days of this
Memorandum and Order, Mr. Arenella either shall (1) pay the
$350.00 filing fee; or (2) file an application to proceed in
forma pauperis accompanied by a certified prison account
statement.

Failure to comply with this directive may result in

the dismissal of this action.
For the convenience of litigants, this court provides a form
application to seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

The

Clerk shall provide plaintiff with an Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs.
The Clerk shall also send a copy of this Memorandum and
Order to the Treasurer’s Office at NCCI Gardner in order to
facilitate any request for a certified prison account statement.
The court requests that the Treasurer’s Office include in any
prison account statement Mr. Arenella’s average monthly deposits
for the six-month period preceding the date the complaint was

1

Unlike other civil litigants, prisoner plaintiffs are not
entitled to a complete waiver of the $350.00 filing fee,
notwithstanding the grant of in forma pauperis status. Based on
the information contained in the prison account statement, I will
direct the appropriate prison official to withdraw an initial
partial payment from the plaintiff’s account, followed by
payments on a monthly basis until the entire $350.00 filing fee
is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2). Even if the
action is dismissed upon a preliminary screening, see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A, the plaintiff remains obligated to pay the
fee, see McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir.
1997) (§ 1915(b)(1) compels the payment of the fee at the moment
the complaint is filed).
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filed, as well as the average monthly balance for that same
period.
B.

Screening of the Complaint

Because Mr. Arenella is a prisoner, he is subject to the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

The Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), Title VIII of Pub.L.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-1375 (1996), enacted several provisions
which grant the court the authority to screen and dismiss
prisoner complaints.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (proceedings in forma

pauperis); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (screening of suits against
governmental officers and entities).
Section 1915A authorizes the Court to review prisoner
complaints in civil actions in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity, or officers or employees of a
governmental entity, and to dismiss the action regardless of
whether or not the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if the
complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, fails to state
a claim, or seeks relief from a defendant immune from such
relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Here, Mr. Arenella has not yet been allowed to proceed in
forma pauperis, and therefore the screening of his complaint is
conducted under the auspices of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A only.

In

connection with the preliminary screening, his pro se complaint
is construed generously.

Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980);

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Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Instituto de
Educacion Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Education, 209 F.3d
18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000).

However, even under a broad reading, his

claims are subject to dismissal for the reasons set forth below.
C.

Lack of Respondeat Superior Liability

Here, Mr. Arenella has named the Malden District Court as a
defendant.

In the body of the complaint, however, he appears to

include the Malden District Court Clerk’s Office as a party.

In

any event, he fails to state plausible civil rights (due process)
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against either the Malden District
Court or the Malden District Court Clerk’s Office because these
two entities are not liable under § 1983 under a respondeat
superior liability.2

See Capozzi v. Department of Transp., 135

F. Supp. 2d 87, 98 (D. Mass. 2001)(citing Ruiz Rivera v. Riley,
209 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2000)).

“It is well-established that ‘only

those individuals who participated in the conduct that deprived
the plaintiff of his rights can be held liable’” under § 1983.
Velez-Rivera v. Agosto-Alicea, 437 F.3d 145, 156 (1st Cir.
2006)(quoting Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 129 (1st

2

As an additional matter, plaintiff does not seek monetary
damages as relief. Presumably, he is seeking some unspecified
prospective injunctive relief in addition to a hearing in federal
court. I need not address the issues of sovereign immunity
raised by the claims; however, I note that the Malden District
Court and the Malden District Court Clerk’s Office are not suable
entities; as instrumentalities of the state, and plaintiff has
not named any public official to whom an injunction could be
issued.
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Cir. 2005)).
D.

Failure to Comply With Fed. R. Civ. P. 8

To the extent that Mr. Arenella seeks to hold liable any
individual clerks (or other employees) of the Malden District
Court or its Clerk’s Office, he fails to set forth plausible
claims upon which relief may be granted, in accordance with Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 8(a) requires a

plaintiff to include in the complaint, inter alia, “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

This statement must “‘give

the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests,’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(alteration in original)(quoting Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see Rivera v. Rhode Island,
402 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2005).

It must afford the defendant(s)

a “[‘]meaningful opportunity to mount a defense,’”

Díaz-Rivera

v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 377 F.3d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 2004)(quoting
Rodríguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1172 (1st Cir.
1995)).

See also Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and

Urban Dev., 421 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005).

“In a civil rights

action as in any other action ...., the complaint should at least
set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when, where,
and why.”

Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernandez, 367

F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2004).

Although “the requirements of Rule
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8(a)(2) are minimal . . .[,] ‘minimal requirements are not
tantamount to nonexistent requirements.’”

Id. (quoting Gooley v.

Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Here, apart from the failure to identify the individuals who
allegedly failed to provide him with certification of three of
his motions, Mr. Arenella also fails to set forth the date(s) and
other relevant information (i.e. the why) necessary to state a
plausible civil rights claim.

As pled, he alleges the failure to

follow protocols of the Clerk’s Office, and the “malfeasance” of
the Clerk’s Office; however, these assertions, at best, raise
negligence (state tort) claims rather than civil rights
violations.3

Further, Mr. Arenella fails to set forth

circumstances from which it could be inferred that he complied
with the requirements of the Clerk’s Office such that staff had a
duty, or knowledge of a duty, under existing protocols to provide
such certification (e.g., that he paid the requisite copy and
certification fees, if any is required by that court).

Finally,

plaintiff fails to set forth circumstances that would require
court staff provide the requested discovery (victim statement) to
him.

That duty seemingly would fall on the District Attorney’s

Office.

3

Absent a plausible federal claim, I cannot find that there
is subject matter jurisdiction over an action alleging only state
claims insofar as it is presumed that any defendant would not be
of diverse citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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E.

Plaintiff Has An Adequate State Remedy

Mr. Arenella cannot state a plausible civil rights claim for
denial of due process, where he has not alleged that he does not
have an adequate state court remedy available to him.

See

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541
(1981); O’Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 2000);
Riordan v. Martin, 51 F.3d 264, 1995 WL 146215 at *1 (1st Cir.
1995)(unpublished disposition)(“Since inadequacy of the state’s
remedy is a material element of the § 1983 claim, plaintiff had
the burden of setting forth supporting factual allegations,
either direct or inferential, to sustain an actionable legal
theory.” citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st
Cir. 1988)).
While plaintiff has alleged that the Clerk’s Office will not
provide him with copies of his three pro se motions, he has not
alleged that he sought relief from the judge presiding over his
criminal case (as, for example, by filing a motion to compel
copies of court documents or discovery to be provided by the
Clerk, the District Attorney, or his defense attorney).
F.

Abstention Bars Claims Relating to Plaintiff’s State
Criminal Case

While plaintiff expressly complains only about the inability
to receive copies of documents from the court, his underlying
allegations relate to asserted rights as a criminal defendant,
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such as the right to a speedy trial, discovery of evidence, and
other matters involving his criminal defense.

It appears that

Mr. Arenella is implying that the Malden District Court or the
Malden District Court Clerk’s Office is interfering substantively
with his criminal defense.
Thus, to the extent that this complaint actually seeks
relief in the form of some federal court interference with the
criminal proceedings, the doctrine of abstention seemingly would
bar plaintiff’s claims.

See generally Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37, 46 (1971); In re Justices of the Superior Court, 218
F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000).

Under this doctrine, a federal

court should abstain from reaching the merits of a case over
which it otherwise has jurisdiction when the requested federal
relief would interfere with: (1) an ongoing state judicial
proceeding, instituted prior to the federal proceeding (or, at
least, instituted prior to any substantial progress in the
federal proceeding); that (2) implicates an important state
interest; and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the
plaintiff to raise the claims advanced in his federal lawsuit.
See generally Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2007);
Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 638 (1st Cir.
1996) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).

Under the circumstances

alleged here, it appears that all three requirements for Younger
abstention are satisfied.

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G.

The Letter Requesting Complaint Forms or Other Relief

For the reasons set forth above, I will DENY plaintiff’s
request for relief.

Although a sample complaint form is

available to pro se litigants (as part of this Court’s Step-ByStep Guide), this Court does not have a standard form.
Nevertheless, the Clerk shall send plaintiff the Step-By-Step
Guide.
I will DECLINE to construe plaintiff’s Letter (Docket No. 5)
as a new complaint.

First, it fails to comport with the pleading

requirements of Rule 8.

Second, plaintiff has not submitted the

$350.00 filing fee or sought a waiver thereof with respect to his
Letter.

Moreover, it is unclear whether plaintiff intended to

obligate himself to pay a second $350.00 filing fee pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

Finally, construction of this Letter as a

new complaint could prejudice plaintiff in connection with the
three-strikes rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
III. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
In light of the above, in addition to the directive to
satisfy this court’s filing fee requirements, Mr. Arenella will
be ordered to demonstrate good cause in writing within 42 days
why this action should not be dismissed for the reasons stated
herein.

In demonstrating good cause, he should not reiterate his

allegations; rather, he should address the various legal
impediments to his claims (i.e., lack of respondeat superior

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liability, failure to comply with Rule 8, lack of an inadequate
state remedy, and abstention).
Failure to comply with this directive will result in a
dismissal of this action.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby Ordered that:

1.

Within 21 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order,
plaintiff shall pay the $350.00 filing fee or he shall file
a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis along with
his certified prison account statement for the six-month
period preceding the filing of his complaint, failing which,
this action will be dismissed;

2.

Within 42 days of the date of this Memorandum and Order,
plaintiff shall demonstrate good cause in writing why this
action should not be dismissed for the reasons stated
herein, failing which, this action will be dismissed;

3.

Plaintiff’s Letter (Docket No. 5) seeking relief is DENIED,
and this Court DECLINES to construe the Letter as a new
civil action.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Douglas P. Woodlock
DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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