Davis et al v. Grimes et al

Filing 103

Judge F. Dennis Saylor, IV: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. The 30 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Robert L. Champagne, Richard C. Grimes and the 36 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Robert Capone, Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc., Christopher Davis, Wilson Lobao, William P. Thompson are DENIED without prejudice to their renewal. (Pezzarossi, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
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CHRISTOPHER DAVIS, and
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COMMONWEALTH SECOND
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AMENDMENT, INC.,
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Civil No.
Plaintiffs,
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13-10246-FDS
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v.
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RICHARD C. GRIMES, in his official
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capacity as Chief of the Weymouth Police
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Department,
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Defendant.
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_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
SAYLOR, J.
This is a federal constitutional challenge to the policy of the Town of Weymouth
concerning firearm licenses. Plaintiff Christopher Davis has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, contending that a policy of the Weymouth Police Department that restricts his ability to
obtain gun licenses violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular, plaintiff
contends that defendant unconstitutionally restricts the firearm licenses of first-time applicants to
target and hunting purposes and exercises its licensing authority according to arbitrary
considerations. The named defendant is Richard C. Grimes, the chief of the Weymouth Police
Department.
Both parties have cross-moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff does not challenge the
constitutionality of the Massachusetts statutory framework regulating firearms, but rather the
Weymouth police department policies adopted under that framework. In substance, plaintiff
contends that (1) under District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v.

Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), individual self-defense is the central component of the Second
Amendment right to bear arms; (2) defendant here placed “target & hunting” restrictions on their
firearms licenses that “virtually preclude” him from bearing arms outside the home for selfdefense; and (3) those restrictions violate his constitutional rights under the Second Amendment.
Defendant, in turn, defends his policy as constitutionally permissible, and argues that plaintiff is
seeking nothing less than the right “to carry a loaded, concealed gun wherever [he] want[s],
whenever [he] want[s].” (Def. Mem. in Supp. at 2).
The Court denied both motions for summary judgment without prejudice to their renewal.
It also directed the parties to file supplemental memoranda, and further motions or requests for
relief, addressing certain specific topics. Specifically, the Court requested that the parties brief
(1) whether any additional discovery or fact-finding to resolve any issue in this case is necessary
or appropriate; (2) whether the Court’s analysis of the state-law issues required correction or
modification; (3) whether Pullman abstention is necessary or appropriate; and (4) whether there
are any potentially dispositive issues of state law as to which certification of a question of law to
the Supreme Judicial Court under Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 1:03 is
appropriate. In response to the Court’s order, both sides filed supplemental memoranda and
renewed their requests for summary judgment.
In its December 10, 2014 memorandum and order, the Court determined that the Town of
Weymouth’s policy concerning firearms licenses is at least somewhat unclear. As a result, the
Court held the motions for summary judgment in abeyance and directed the parties to file
supplemental memoranda addressing:
(1) whether, in fact, there is a material factual dispute as to the licensing policy of the
Town of Weymouth and/or its application to Davis; (2) if not, whether the parties can
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stipulate to some or all the relevant facts; (3) if so, whether an evidentiary hearing
is necessary; (4) if so, whether any disputed factual issues can be decided by the
Court, or whether a jury trial is necessary, in light of the fact that defendant has made
a jury demand.
(Mem. and Order 4).
On January 12, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw their jury demand. The
Court granted that motion the next day.
Plaintiff, defendant, and intervenor filed responses to the Court’s order on January 16,
2015. In his response, plaintiff acknowledged that the written evidence resulted in questions of
fact. He contends that “written articulations of the Town’s policy have ultimately made various
details of [the Town’s] policy unclear.” (Pls.’ Suppl. Mem. 2). To resolve that factual dispute,
plaintiff requested limited discovery and a hearing. (Id.).
In his response, defendant contends that there is no material factual dispute as to the
current gun-licensing policy in Weymouth. He contends that the Weymouth Police Department
“does not have a categorical policy of denying all first-time applicants an unrestricted License to
Carry Firearms.” (Def.’s Suppl. Mem. 2). In support of that contention, defendant provided
statistics that he contends “bear out that with the implementation of what might be considered a
somewhat ‘new’ or ‘revised’ policy (effective April 1, 2014), Chief Grimes does not have a
policy or practice of denying an unrestricted Class A LTD to all first-time applicants.” (Id. at 3).
As a result, defendant contends that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary to resolve the dispute.
In the intervenor’s supplemental memorandum, it contends that the summary judgment
record is not adequate to establish Weymouth’s current gun-licensing program. The intervenor
therefore suggested further discovery, a stipulation if possible, or an evidentiary hearing if
necessary. (Intervenor’s Suppl. Mem. 3).
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The record appears to contain a genuine dispute of material fact as to the exact nature of
the Weymouth licensing policy. It therefore appears that a hearing or trial is necessary to settle
that issue. The resolution of that issue may affect the determination of the constitutional (and
state law) issues. To be sure, it is by no means clear that the resolution of the legal issues
necessarily requires a resolution of the factual issue; however, in light of the potential
significance of this case and the great uncertainty as to the applicable constitutional principles, it
appears that the most prudent course is to create a clear factual record. That is true even if (and
the Court does not now decide the issue) that factual issue ultimately may not be controlling.
Accordingly, the motions for summary judgment are DENIED without prejudice to their
renewal. The Court will set a conference to discuss the format and timing of a hearing or trial to
resolve the disputed factual issue.
So Ordered.

/s/ F. Dennis Saylor
F. Dennis Saylor IV
United States District Judge
Dated: March 25, 2015

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