Stote v. UMass Correctional Health Care et al

Filing 20

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ORDER entered. The Clerk shall terminate all plaintiffs except Stote as parties to this action.(2)The Clerk shall open separate, individual civil actions for each plaintiff other than Stote and shall docket the complaint i n this action in all of the individual cases. The cases shall be randomly assigned to the Judges of this Court. The case filing date for each of these new cases shall be the date of this order, although for statute of limitations purposes the plain tiffs may rely on the dates on which documents were filed in this action. (3)Each plaintiff, including Stote, must, within sixty (60) days of the date of this order (1) pay the $400 filing fee; or (2) seek leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee by filing an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs and a certified six-month prison account statement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Failure to pay the fee or seek leave to proceed without p repayment of the fee may result in dismissal of an individual action without prejudice. (4)Each plaintiff who desires to file an amended complaint must do so within sixty (60) days of the date of this order. (5) The Clerk shall send to every plainti ff who signed the complaint: (1) a copy of this order; and (2) an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. (6)The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of this order to counsel for Massachusetts Department of Correction. (PSSA, 3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
)
)
)
)
)
)
v.
)
)
UMASS CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, )
et al.,
)
Defendants.
)
)
JOHN E. STOTE, et al.,
(plus 125 John
Does,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No.
13-10267-NMG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GORTON, J.
Before the Court is the complaint (Docket No. 13) of more
than 100 current and past MCI Norfolk inmates who allege that
they have received inadequate medical care at the prison.

For

the reasons set forth below, the Court will sever the claims of
the individual plaintiffs from one another.
I.

Background
This action was commenced by MCI Norfolk inmate John E.

Stote (“Stote”), who, in motions for preliminary injunctive
relief filed without a complaint, represented that he was
bringing a class action on behalf of 125 other “John Doe” inmates
at MCI Norfolk for prison officials’ systemic failure to provide
adequate medical care at that institution.

The Court directed

Stote to file a complaint and explained that he could not
represent other parties or serve as a class representative if he
did not have an attorney.
Stote later filed a voluminous complaint.

It is 190 pages

long, typed and single-spaced; it is signed by more than 100

inmates.1
The first 20 pages of the complaint contain general
allegations common to some or all of the plaintiffs. (See Compl.
¶¶ 1-37.)

The subject paragraphs contain a summary of the

alleged systemic problems with the provision of medical services
at MCI Norfolk, including (1) lack of inmate access to medical
professionals and specialists, (2) failure to provide services in
a timely fashion, (3) failure to perform medically necessary
tests, (4) failure properly to diagnose and treat a variety of
conditions, including severe pain and dental conditions, (5)
premature termination of treatment and medication, (6) failure to
allow consistent access to medications, (7) failure to follow the
direction of outside specialists, and (8) refusal to provide
medical treatment because an inmate is new to MCI Norfolk,
subject to disciplinary proceedings or going to be released. (See
id. ¶ 2.)

The plaintiffs also allege inadequate staffing, an

ineffective grievance procedure and inmate difficulties in
accessing their own medical records because they are charged a
fee even to look at their medical files.
In the following 150 pages or so, allegations specific to
each individual plaintiff are set forth, with each plaintiff
signing his name after the section applicable to him.

In the

final pages of the complaint, the plaintiffs state their causes

1

A few more persons are named as plaintiffs but did not sign
the complaint, apparently because they do not understand English,
are located at a prison other than MCI Norfolk or have been
released.
2

of action and prayers for relief and demand a trial by jury.

The

plaintiffs seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
II.

Severing of the Claims
Under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

persons may join in one action if
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or
in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences [and] any question of law
or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the
action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1).
On review of the present complaint, the Court finds that the
allegations of over 100 plaintiffs lack the requisite similarity
in transaction or occurrence to justify joinder.

Although the

plaintiffs allege systemic unconstitutional practices by the
defendants, each inmate’s cause of action arises from application
of the defendants’ practices to deprive him individually of his
rights.

Each inmate’s right to relief will therefore turn on

matters of proof involving his own medical conditions, injuries
suffered, treatment received or denied.

Further, each individual

plaintiff must have exhausted his administrative remedies.2
Although it is certainly possible for two or more inmates to join
2

Even assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs are properly
joined, a single lawsuit with more than 100 unrepresented inmate
plaintiffs presents a significant practical difficulty for the
inmates, such as (1) the need for each plaintiff to sign a
document for filing, (2) the risk of pleadings being filed
without the consent of each plaintiff, and (3) the logistics of
holding hearings. See e.g., Ward-El v. Heyns, C.A. No. 13-13595,
2013 WL 4776114, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2013); Curry v. Cal.
Dep’t of Corr. & Rehabilitation, C.A. No. 09-03408, 2011 WL
855828, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011).
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their claims for allegedly inadequate medical care, see, e.g.
Allen v. Woodford, C.A. Nos. 05-01104, 05-01282, 2006 WL 3825008,
at *16 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2006) (two inmates who had nearly
identical claims concerning the same medical procedure performed
in the same prison were properly joined as plaintiffs), this
action is one that does not meet the joinder requirements of Rule
20, see, e.g., McFadden v. Fuller, C.A. No. 13-02290, 2013 WL
6182365 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2013) (claims of 91 inmates, who claimed
they suffered from a variety of medical conditions due to
improper nutrition, improperly joined); Odom v. Hiland, C.A. No.
12-00124, 2012 WL 6203966 (W.D. Ken. Dec. 12, 2012) (claims of
two inmates, who complained about denial of appropriate medical
treatment, not properly joined); Hendricks v. Kasich, C.A. No.
12-00729, 2013 WL 2243873, at **1, 4 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2013)
(same).
In light of the Court’s broad discretion to separate
parties or claims, see Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547,
558 (1st Cir. 2003), the Court will separate the claims of each
of the plaintiffs into separate actions.
III. Filing of an Amended Complaint
The Court will order that the Clerk open up a separate
action for each of the plaintiffs except Stote and that the
complaint in this action be docketed in each of the newly-opened
cases.

Each plaintiff will be responsible for the full filing

fee in his case.
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Any plaintiff may also file an amended complaint, which
would supercede the original complaint. In deciding whether to
file an amended complaint, each plaintiff should ensure that his
pleading fulfills the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Under that rule, a complaint must include “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”

At a minimum, a complaint or amended complaint must

“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Calvi v. Knox County, 470

F.3d 422, 430 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Educadores Puertorriqueños
en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir.

2004)).

The

claim must set forth at least “minimal facts” as to what each
defendant did to whom, when, and where, see id., and it is each
plaintiff’s obligation to provide more than mere labels and
conclusions that inadequate medical care was provided, see Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

A court is

not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation [and] [f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Id. (quoting in part Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of a cause action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
Further, the plaintiffs should be aware that the bar is

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somewhat high for stating a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an
Eighth Amendment violation based on inadequate medical care.

A

prisoner must allege facts from which the Court may reasonably
infer that a prison official’s failure to provide adequate
medical care was “sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.”
U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

Estelle v. Gamble, 429

A prison official is deliberately

indifferent if she is “aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
Leavitt v. Corr. Med.

and [she] must also draw the inference.”

Servs., Inc., 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).

A

medical need is

“serious” if it is one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.
Id. (quoting Gaudrealt v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203,
208 (1st Cir. 1990)).

“[T]he subjective deliberate indifference

inquiry may overlap with the objective serious medical need
determination.”

Id. (quoting Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178,

187 n.12 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Whether a plaintiff relies on the original complaint or
files an amended complaint, he should make sure that the pleading
sufficiently states his own claim.

The allegations should

clearly identify the nature and severity of his own medical

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condition, who he contacted for medical care, approximately when
he made such requests, the response(s) or lack thereof to the
requests, the persons who responded (or failed to respond) to the
requests, and the degree to which the medical condition continued
after the alleged lack of adequate care.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the memorandum above:
(1)

The Clerk shall terminate all plaintiffs except Stote

as parties to this action.
(2)

The Clerk shall open separate, individual civil actions

for each plaintiff other than Stote and shall docket the
complaint in this action in all of the individual cases.

The

cases shall be randomly assigned to the Judges of this Court.
The case filing date for each of these new cases shall be the
date of this order, although for statute of limitations purposes
the plaintiffs may rely on the dates on which documents were
filed in this action.
(3)

Each plaintiff, including Stote, must, within sixty

(60) days of the date of this order (1) pay the $400 filing fee;
or (2) seek leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee
by filing an Application to Proceed in District Court Without
Prepaying Fees or Costs and a certified six-month prison account
statement.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).

Failure to pay the fee or seek leave to proceed without
prepayment of the fee may result in dismissal of an individual
action without prejudice. Any prisoner plaintiff who is allowed to
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proceed without prepayment of the filing fee will still be required
to pay a $350 filing fee over time by making installment payments,
regardless of the outcome of the case.
(4)

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

Each plaintiff who desires to file an amended complaint

must do so within sixty (60) days of the date of this order.
(5) The Clerk shall send to every plaintiff who signed the
complaint: (1) a copy of this order; and (2) an Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs.

If a

plaintiff’s copy of the order is returned as undeliverable, the
Clerk shall make a reasonable effort to determine if the named
plaintiff is still within the custody of the DOC and, if so, send
the documents to the plaintiff at the appropriate institution.
(6)

The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of this order to

counsel for Massachusetts Department of Correction.

So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated: 6/25/2013

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