Fraid v. Barrister Global Services Network, Inc.

Filing 16

Judge Joseph L. Tauro: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM and ORDER (Geraldino-Karasek, Clarilde)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
JAMIE FRAID,
Plaintiff,
v.
BARRISTER GLOBAL SERVICES
NETWORK, INC.,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 13-10318-JLT

MEMORANDUM
September 25, 2013
TAURO, J.
I.

Introduction
Plaintiff Jamie Fraid brings this suit against Defendant for alleged violations of

Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B and the Federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978. Presently at issue is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, to Transfer
Venue to the Eastern District of Louisiana [#5]. For the following reasons, the Motion is
ALLOWED.
II.

Background1
On or about June 25, 2012, Defendant hired Plaintiff to work in IT and IT sales.2 Plaintiff
1

Because the issues analyzed here arise in the context of a motion to dismiss, this court
presents the facts as they are related in Plaintiff’s Complaint, see Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008), and construes those facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, see Pettengill v. Curtis, 584 F. Supp. 2d 348, 362 (D. Mass. 2008) (quoting
Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 96 (1st Cir. 2007)).
2

Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6, 8 [#1]; Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, or Alternative Transfer Venue
Eastern Dist. La. [#8], at Ex. B, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4 [hereinafter Fraid Aff.].

worked out of Defendant’s Las Vegas, Nevada office and serviced clients from Las Vegas to
Arizona.3 She was required to travel to Arizona “on a bi-weekly basis.”4 For the entire time that
Plaintiff worked for Defendant, she was told that her job performance was “exceptional.”5
In September 2012, Plaintiff told Defendant that she was pregnant and due to have her
child in March 2013.6
On December 1, 2012, Plaintiff moved to Boston, and then she traveled to Chicago,
Illinois “bi-weekly” to service Defendant’s clients in Chicago.7 She was in Chicago from
December 7 until December 17, 2012, and then she returned to Boston.8
On December 27, 2012, Defendant terminated Plaintiff for “lack of work.”9 Plaintiff was
not offered and did not receive a severance package, and her health insurance was immediately
terminated.10
Defendant fired Plaintiff because of her pregnancy and for no other reason.11 In fact, in

3

Compl. ¶ 7 [#1]; Fraid Aff. ¶ 3; see Compl. ¶ 8 [#1]; Fraid Aff. ¶ 4.

4

Compl. ¶ 7 [#1]; Fraid Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4.

5

Compl. ¶ 9 [#1]; Fraid Aff. ¶ 5.

6

Compl. ¶ 10 [#1]; Fraid Aff. ¶ 6.

7

Compl. ¶¶ 8, 11 [#1]; see Fraid Aff. ¶¶ 4, 10.

8

Compl. ¶ 12 [#1]; see Fraid Aff. ¶ 12.

9

Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14 [#1]; Fraid Aff. ¶¶ 14, 15.

10

Compl. ¶ 15 [#1]; Fraid Aff. ¶ 16.

11

Compl. ¶ 16 [#1]; Fraid Aff. ¶ 18.
2

December 2012, Defendant hired three new individuals to perform Plaintiff’s job in Chicago.12
On February 19, 2013, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant for Defendant’s
allegedly discriminatory actions.
III.

Discussion
A district court may exercise authority over a defendant on the basis of either general or

specific jurisdiction.13 The burden rests on the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that
personal jurisdiction exists.14 A plaintiff “‘may not rely on unsupported allegations in [the]
pleadings, but [is] obliged to adduce evidence of specific facts’ sufficient to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction over the named defendants, including evidence outside the complaint.”15
General personal jurisdiction exists if “‘the defendant has engaged in “continuous and
systematic activity” in the forum, even if the activity is unrelated to the suit.’”16 Alternatively, to
establish personal jurisdiction by way of specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show both that the

12

Compl. ¶ 17 [#1]; Fraid Aff. ¶ 19.

13

E.g., Cossaboon v. Me. Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2010); Brown Rudnick
Berlack Israels LLP v. Brooks, 311 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132 (D. Mass. 2004) (Tauro, J.).
14

Schaefer v. Cybergraphic Sys., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D. Mass. 1994) (“Under
the prima facie analysis, the Court considers only whether the admissible evidence that the plaintiff
has submitted in the record is sufficient to support findings on each jurisdictional element.” (citing
Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1992))); see Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d
1381, 1387 (1st Cir. 1995).
15

Berklee Coll. of Music, Inc. v. Music Indus. Educators, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208
(D. Mass. 2010) (Tauro, J.) (quoting Platten v. HG Berm. Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 134 (1st
Cir. 2006)).
16

Brown Rudnick, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (quoting Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt,
Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2002)).
3

Massachusetts long-arm statute17 grants jurisdiction over the defendant and that “‘the exercise of
jurisdiction under the statute is consistent with the [United States C]onstitution.’”18 Specific
jurisdiction exists only if “‘the cause of action arises directly out of, or relates to, the defendant’s
forum-based contracts.’”19 To establish specific personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must establish
three elements: “relatedness,” “purposeful availment,” and “reasonableness.”20

17

G.L. ch. 223A, § 3. The statute provides, in relevant part:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent,
as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person’s
(a) transacting any business in this commonwealth;
(b) contracting to supply services or things in this commonwealth; . . .
(d) causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this
commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered, in this commonwealth . . . .
Id.
18

Brown Rudnick, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (alteration in original) (quoting Daynard, 290
F.3d at 52); see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process
requires[, inter alia, that] . . . [a defendant] have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))); see also Plunkett v. Valhalla
Ins. Servs., Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 39, 42 (D. Mass. 2006) (“In order to obtain specific personal
jurisdiction in this case, the plaintiff must demonstrate 1) the Massachusetts long-arm statute . . .
grants jurisdiction over each defendant and 2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with
Constitutional [sic] Due Process.” (citing Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d
138, 144 (1st Cir. 1995))); A-Connoisseur Transp. Corp. v. Celebrity Coach, Inc., 742 F. Supp.
39, 42 (D. Mass. 1990) (“[A] plaintiff must show not only that the Long Arm Statute applies but
that its application comports with due process.” (citing Shipley Co. v. Clark, 728 F. Supp. 818,
821 (D. Mass. 1990) (Tauro, J.); Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. 1, 6
(1979))).
19

Cossaboon, 600 F.3d at 31 (quoting Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 1994)).

20

Negron-Torres v. Verizon Commc’ns, 478 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Platten,
437 F.3d at 135).
4

Under the relatedness inquiry, “‘causation is central.’”21 That is, this element “‘requires a
showing of a material connection’” between a plaintiff’s cause of action and the defendant’s
forum-state contacts.22 The state where an employment contract is “formalized and entered into”
is an important consideration in analyzing the relatedness requirement.23
In the purposeful availment inquiry, a court must ask whether a defendant, “through its
own affirmative conduct, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in
Massachusetts such that it could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”24 Under this
element, “the focus is on the defendant’s intentions, and the cornerstones are voluntariness and
foreseeability.”25 Voluntariness requires that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state
“‘proximately result from actions by the defendant himself.’”26 To that end, the contacts “‘must be

21

Id. at 25 (quoting Harlow v. Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 62 (1st Cir. 2005)).

22

Id. (quoting Harlow, 432 F.3d at 61); see Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 27
(1st Cir. 2008) (“There must be more than just an attenuated connection between the contacts and
the claim; ‘the defendant’s in-state conduct must form an important, or [at least] material, element
of proof in the plaintiff’s case.’” (quoting Harlow, 432 F.3d at 61)); Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1387
(“The relatedness requirement is not met merely because a plaintiff’s cause of action arose out of
the general relationship between the parties; rather, the action must directly arise out of the
specific contacts between the defendant and the forum state.”).
23

Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 27 (quoting Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir.

2007)).
24

United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d
1080, 1091 (1st Cir. 1992); see Bluetarp Fin., Inc. v. Matrix Constr. Co., 709 F.3d 72, 82 (1st
Cir. 2013).
25

Bluetarp, 709 F.3d at 82 (internal citations omitted).

26

Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 28 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 475 (1985)).
5

deliberate, and not based on the unilateral actions of another party.’”27 Foreseeability requires that
the contacts “be of a nature that the defendant could ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.’”28
Finally, the reasonableness inquiry focuses on the following factors, known as the “Gestalt
factors”:
(1) the defendant’s burden of appearing, (2) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and
(5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies.29
The weaker a “plaintiff’s showing on the first two prongs (relatedness and purposeful availment),
the less a defendant need show in terms of unreasonableness to defeat jurisdiction.”30
Here, this court does not have authority over Defendant on the basis of either general or
specific personal jurisdiction.
No general jurisdiction exists because Defendant has not engaged in “‘continuous and
systematic activity’”31 in Massachusetts. Indeed, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant has
engaged in any continuous or systematic activity in Massachusetts.

27

Bluetarp, 709 F.3d at 82 (quoting Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 28); see Prairie Eye Ctr.,
530 F.3d at 28 (“‘Jurisdiction cannot be created by and does not travel with the plaintiff . . .
wherever she goes.’” (quoting Harlow, 432 F.3d at 63)).
28

Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 28 (quoting Adelson, 510 F.3d at 50).

29

Harlow, 432 F.3d at 67 (quoting 960 F.2d at 1088).

30

Nowak v. Tak How Inv., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 717 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Ticketmaster N.Y. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir. 1994)).
31

Brown Rudnick, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (quoting Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51).
6

Nor may this court exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. First, Plaintiff
has not demonstrated a sufficient nexus between her cause of action and Defendant’s conduct in
Massachusetts. When Defendant hired Plaintiff, she was hired to work out of Defendant’s Las
Vegas office and service clients in Las Vegas and Arizona, not Massachusetts. Plaintiff has
provided no evidence that she and Defendant negotiated their employment contract in
Massachusetts.32 Indeed, given the facts Plaintiff has alleged, it seems likely that the contract was
negotiated in Las Vegas, where Plaintiff resided at the time. Defendant does not have an office or
clients in Massachusetts, and Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of such an office or clients.
Moreover, Defendant is not currently registered to do business in Massachusetts.33 In other
words, there is no connection whatsoever between Plaintiff’s cause of action and Defendant’s
actions inside Massachusetts.34
Second, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant “purposefully availed itself of the

32

See Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 27.

33

In her opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff contends that Defendant
“filed Corporate Documents in Massachusetts,” “registered in Massachusetts as a foreign
corporation on September 8, 2000,” and “filed a Foreign Certificate of Amendment with the
Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth’s Office, naming a new Registered Agent’s
Office.” Pl.’s Mem. Law Supp. Her Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, or, Alternative, Transfer Venue
Eastern Dist. La., 2 [#9] [hereinafter Pl.’s Mem.]. Plaintiff’s only support for these bald assertions
is a copy of a print-out from the website of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, Corporate
Division. See Pl.’s Mem., Ex. A [#9]. Plaintiff fails to mention that although Defendant was
registered to do business in Massachusetts four years ago, further inspection of the same website
makes clear that Defendant’s registration as a foreign corporation in Massachusetts was revoked
in 2008. See Reply Br. Supp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, or, Alternative, Transfer Venue Eastern Dist.
La., 1–2 [#12]. Aside from the fact that Plaintiff is not permitted to rely on unsupported
allegations in order to demonstrate the existence of personal jurisdiction, see Berklee Coll., 733 F.
Supp. 2d at 208, there is clear evidence that these unsupported allegations, at least, are false.
34

See Negron-Torres, 478 F.3d at 25.
7

privilege of conducting activities in Massachusetts such that it could reasonably anticipate being
haled into court” here.35 Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant benefits from the
Commonwealth’s laws or regulations in any way. Moreover, it was Plaintiff, not Defendant, who
initiated contact with Massachusetts by unilaterally deciding to move here.36 Defendant’s
extremely limited contact with Massachusetts, in the form of communications with Plaintiff after
she had moved here, thus were not “voluntary” contacts with the Commonwealth.37
Finally, because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate relatedness or purposeful availment,
this court addresses the reasonableness prong only out of an abundance of caution.38 Quite simply,
it would not be reasonable for this court to exercise jurisdiction over Defendant. Although it
would obviously be most convenient for Plaintiff to litigate this dispute in Massachusetts, the
burden on Defendant, who has no contacts with Massachusetts, would be quite high.39 Further,
the interest of the Commonwealth in adjudicating this dispute is quite low, given that there is no
evidence that the employment contract was negotiated here, nor is there evidence that Plaintiff
conducted any work for Defendant here.40
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that this court may exercise
personal jurisdiction, either generally or specifically, over Defendant.

35

163 Pleasant St., 960 F.2d at 1091.

36

See Bluetarp, 709 F.3d at 82.

37

See Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d at 28.

38

See Negron-Torres, 478 F.3d at 24; see also Nowak, 94 F.3d at 717.

39

See Harlow, 432 F.3d at 67.

40

See id.
8

IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, to

Transfer Venue to the Eastern District of Louisiana [#5] is ALLOWED. Plaintiff’s Complaint is
dismissed and this case is CLOSED.
AN ORDER HAS ISSUED.

/s/ Joseph L. Tauro
United States District Judge

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