Williams v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al

Filing 13

Judge Douglas P. Woodlock: ORDER entered denying 8 Motion to Appoint Counsel ; granting 9 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. If Williams would like to pursue this action, he must, within 42 days of the date of this order, show good cause why this action should not be dismissed (PSSA, 3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
RONALD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
et al.,
Defendants.

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C.A. No. 13-10333-DPW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
April 4, 2013
For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff’s motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the plaintiff is
directed to show cause why this action should not be dismissed,
and the plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied
without prejudice.
I.

Background

Ronald Williams, who is incarcerated at MCI Cedar Junction,
has brought a self-prepared lawsuit in which he challenges the
constitutionality of a state criminal proceeding against him.

He

also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and appointment of
pro bono counsel.
I summarize the allegations of the amended complaint (#10).
On May 14, 2010 Williams was arrested after police alleged that
he had sold drugs to an informant.

The Worcester Police

Department searched his home pursuant to a warrant that was
illegally issued.

“There are no turret tapes no dashboard cam

surveillance nor recorded tapes of defendant nor any informant,
no drug field test kit of the allege drugs, nor the require field

test certificate nothing that consist of an constitutional drug
arrest and search warrant.”

Amend. Compl. at 1 (as in original).

The Worcester Police “conspired to arrest the plaintiff at any
cost” even if it had to resort to illegal means.”

Id. at 2, ¶ 1.

The prosecuting attorney refused to disclose Brady evidence.
Williams’s court-appointed counsel Christopher Loconto “acted as
state attorney” by refusing to follow his client’s requests and
thereby sabotaging Williams’ defense.

Id. at 2, ¶ 31

The caption of the amended complaint lists the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, Governor Deval Patrick, Attorney General Martha
Coakley, the Worcester Police Department, and Attorney
Christopher Loconto as defendants.

Williams claims that the

defendants are liable under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1985, and state law.

Williams seeks damages and

release from custody.
II.
A.

Discussion

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Upon review of the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis, I conclude that the plaintiff has sufficiently
demonstrated that he is without income or assets to pay the
1

The plaintiff attached to the amended complaint various
documents, including a copy of a civil complaint that appears to
have been filed (or was prepared to be filed) in state court. It
contains claims against Attorney Loconto and another individual
whom Williams identifies as another appointed by the state court
to represent him. Williams alleges that the attorneys violated
his rights under federal and state law for filing an
insufficiently-prepared motion to suppress. Williams also filed
documents bearing the docket number of his state criminal case in
which he claims that his attorneys failed to adequately represent
him.
2

filing fee.

Accordingly, the motion is allowed.

Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), an initial partial filing fee of $20.24 is
assessed.

The remainder of the fee, $329.76, shall be collected

in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
B.

Screening of the Complaint
Because Williams is proceeding in forma pauperis, the

complaint is subject to a preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2).

Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, prisoner

complaints in civil actions that seek redress from a governmental
entity or officers or employees of a governmental entity are also
subject to screening.

Both § 1915 and § 1915A authorize federal

courts to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the claims therein
are malicious, frivolous, fail to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.
U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28

Further, a court has an obligation to inquire

sua sponte into its own jurisdiction.
364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004).

See McCulloch v. Velez,

In reviewing the sufficiency of

the amended complaint, I liberally construe the pleading because
the plaintiff is proceeding pro se.

See Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
1.

Younger Abstention

There are several bases on which the amended complaint is
subject to dismissal.

As a threshold matter, adjudicating

Williams’s claims would severely and inappropriately intrude in a
pending state criminal proceeding.
3

“Federal courts have long

recognized ‘the fundamental policy against federal interference
with state criminal proceedings.’”

In re Justices of Superior

Court Dept. of Mass. Trial Court, 218 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000)
(quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)).

Under the

Younger doctrine of abstention, federal courts “abstain from
interfering with state court proceedings even where defendants
claim violations of important federal rights,” In re Justices,
218 F.3d at 17, as long as the federal claims can be “raised and
resolved somewhere in the state process,” Maymó-Meléndez v.
Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis
added).

Here, I have no reason to believe that Williams cannot

raise the alleged defects with the search warrant and his
attorney’s representation somewhere in the state court
proceedings, including state appellate proceedings.2

Therefore,

I will not exercise jurisdiction over any claims concerning
Williams ongoing state criminal proceedings.

As the entire

amended complaint concerns pending state criminal proceedings,
Younger abstention requires dismissal of the whole case.
2.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Even if Younger abstention were not a consideration, the
amended complaint suffers other deficiencies.
Williams cannot pursue his claims against the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts because it enjoys immunity under the Eleventh

2

The plaintiff’s filings suggest that he was a pretrial
detainee when he commenced this action, but that he has since
been convicted.
4

Amendment of the United States Constitution.3

This provision is

generally is recognized as a bar to suits in federal courts
against a state, its departments and its agencies, unless the
state has consented to suit or Congress has overridden the
state’s immunity.

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519

U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14
(1985); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam);
Hudson Sav. Bank v. Austin, 479 F.3d 102, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2007).
Here, I cannot discern any claim for relief for which the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts has waived its immunity or Congress
has overridden it.4
3.

Attorney General Coakley and Governor Patrick

Williams has failed to state claims against Attorney General
Coakley and Governor Patrick because he has failed to allege any
misconduct by these parties.

Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must include “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

At a minimum, the

complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Calvi

3

The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI.
4

Further, a state is not a “person” within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 65-66 (1989).
5

v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 430 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting
Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61,
66 (1st Cir.

2004)).

This means that the statement of the claim

must “at least set forth minimal facts as to who did what to
whom, when, where, and why.”

Id. (quoting Educadores, 367 F.3d

at 68).
Other than identifying General Coakley and Governor Patrick
in the caption of the amended complaint as defendants, Williams
does not make any allegations against them.

In the absence of

any factual allegations against these parties, the plaintiff has
not met the minimum pleading requirements of a claim for relief.5
4.

Claims Against Attorney Loconto Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Williams also fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“§ 1983”) against Attorney Loconto.

To state § 1983 claim, a

plaintiff must allege that an official acted under color of state
law to deprive an individual of a federally protected right.
42 U.S.C. § 1983;

See

Perez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d 26,

29 (1st Cir. 2008).
Here, Williams has not alleged facts from which I may
reasonably infer that Attorney Loconto acted under color of state
law in representing Williams.

Although private conduct may be

deemed to be “under color of state law” when it is “fairly

5

To the extent that Williams is attempting to bring claims
against Attorney General Coakley and Governor Patrick in their
official capacities, such claims would be subject to the
limitations imposed by the Eleventh Amendment, discussed supra.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 10102 (1984); J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 82 (1st Cir. 2010).
6

attributable” to the state, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457
U.S. 922, 937 (1982), an attorney “performing a lawyer’s
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal
proceeding” does not act under color of state law, even when
court-appointed.
(1981).

Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325

Williams’s conclusory allegation that Attorney Loconto

“acted as state attorney” by refusing to follow his client’s
directions, Amend. Compl. at 2, ¶ 3, does not transform Attorney
Loconto’s allegedly insufficient representation into state
action.
5.

18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242

Williams has failed to state a claim for relief under 18
U.S.C. §§ 241 and 241, which prohibit the violation of civil
rights.

These statutes provide for criminal prosecution by the

United States-not by a private citizen.

See Cok v. Cosentino,

876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Only the United States as a
prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242.”).
C.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), I “may request an attorney to

represent any person unable to afford counsel.”
§1915(e)(1).

28 U.S.C.

However, a civil plaintiff lacks a constitutional

right to free counsel.
(1st Cir. Cir. 1991).

See DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 23
To qualify for appointment of counsel, a

party must be indigent and exceptional circumstances must exist
such that the denial of counsel will result in fundamental
unfairness impinging on the party’s due process rights.

7

See id.

In determining whether there are exceptional circumstances
sufficient to warrant the appointment of counsel, I must examine
the total situation, focusing on the merits of the case, the
complexity of the legal issues, and the litigant’s ability to
represent himself.

See id. at 24.

Here, because the amended complaint is subject to dismissal
for the reasons set forth above, exceptional circumstances that
would justify the appointment of pro bono counsel do not exist.
I therefore deny the motion without prejudice.
III.

Conclusion

Accordingly:
(1)

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (#9)

is GRANTED.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), an initial

partial filing fee of $20.24 is assessed.

The remainder of the

fee, $329.76, shall be collected in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(2).

The Clerk shall send a copy of this Order to the

treasurer of the institution having custody of the plaintiff.
(2)

If Williams would like to pursue this action, he must,

within forty-two (42) days of the date of this order, show good
cause why this action should not be dismissed for the reasons
discussed above.

The show cause response may be in the form of a

legal memorandum and/or a second amended complaint.

Failure to

respond to this directive will result in dismissal of the action.
(3)

The motion for appointment of counsel (#8) is DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

8

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Douglas P. Woodlock
DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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