Aldrich v. Young
Filing
25
Judge Douglas P. Woodlock: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (Docket No. 9) is DENIED; Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify and Discharge Assistant U.S. Attorney From Representing Defendant (Docket No. 10) is DE NIED; Plaintiff's Motion for Disqualification of the DOJ (Docket No. 17) is DENIED; Plaintiff's Motion for Hearing on the Motion for Disqualification (Docket No. 18) is DENIED; and Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Final D isposition on Whether or Not the DOJ is Disqualified From Representing Defendant (Docket No. 19) is DENIED;6.Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply With Rules of Civil Procedure (Docket No. 11) is DENIED; 7.Plaintiffs req uest for a referral of his complaint to the Commission on Judicial Misconduct is DENIED; 8.Plaintiffs Motion Requesting to be Provided with Written Notice of All Electronic Filings as a Non ECF User (Docket No. 22) is DENIED;9.Defendants Motion to D ismiss (Docket No. 4) is ALLOWED as to all claims;10.This action is DISMISSED; and11.This Court hereby CERTIFIES that any appeal by the plaintiff of any of the rulings contained in this Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good faith. (PSSA, 1)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
ROBERT ALDRICH,
Plaintiff
v.
JUDGE WILLIAM G. YOUNG,
Defendant.
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C.A. No. 13-10466-DPW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
July 18, 2013
WOODLOCK, D.J.
I.
Introduction
On or about January 10, 2013, plaintiff Robert Aldrich
(“Aldrich”) filed a civil suit against U.S. District Judge
William G. Young, in the Suffolk Superior Court.
See Aldrich v.
Young, Civil Action No. 13-00338.
On March 1, 2013, Assistant United States Attorney George B.
Henderson, II (“Henderson”), on behalf of both Judge Young and
Carmen M. Ortiz, the United States Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts, filed a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1)(providing for, inter alia, removal of a civil action
commenced in state court against any officer of the United States
sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under
color of such office).
The Notice of Removal was made on the
grounds that Aldrich had complained of actions taken in the
context of civil litigation that had been pending before Judge
Young under color of his office or in the performance of his
duties.
Aldrich’s state complaint alleged that Judge Young
wrongfully denied his motions in connection with three federal
lawsuits and denied him due process and equal protection.
He
asserted claims under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985(2).
He alleged mal-administration of justice, violation of statutory
duties, interference with his federal and state constitutional
rights to access the courts, systemic racial discrimination,
unequal treatment, and discrimination against him as a pro se
plaintiff.
He sought compensatory and punitive monetary damages,
as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
He also requested
that this Court refer his complaint to the Commission on Judicial
Misconduct.
More specifically, in the first case, Aldrich v. Breen, et
al., Civil Action No. 09-10352-WGY, Aldrich made a claim of
racial profiling in connection with a motor vehicle stop by
police.
In the instant suit, he makes a bald allegation that
Judge Young – or someone from his office – alerted the defendant
Milton Police Officer of his claims prior to service of process,
allowing the Officer time to file a petition for bankruptcy to
avoid attachment if liability was determined.
He further claims
Judge Young arbitrarily denied his complaint, creating one hurdle
after another for Aldrich to impede access to the courts.1
1
The docket reflects that Judge Young directed Aldrich to
demonstrate good cause why all claims except as to two police
officers should not be dismissed or file an amended complaint
2
Second, Aldrich filed a federal habeas corpus petition
seeking post-conviction relief based on alleged threats and
intimidation by police, which actions he claimed had interfered
with his right to access the courts.
Civil Action No. 11-10687-WGY.
Aldrich v. MacEachern,
Aldrich contends Judge Young
denied more than 20 motions without requiring an opposition from
the Government.
He also contends that Judge Young assumed the
role of prosecutor, and ultimately dismissed the petition without
notice to him.
On August 2, 2012, Judge Young dismissed the
petition without prejudice.
Aldrich’s appeal is pending.
See
Aldrich v. MacEachern, No. 12-2085 (1st Cir. 2012) and No. 131197 (1st Cir. 2013).
Thereafter, nine (9) days after Aldrich’s Motion to
Reconsider dismissal of the first civil action was denied, he
filed a third civil action that was identical to the amended
complaint attempted to be filed in Aldrich v. Breen, et al.,
Civil Action No. 09-10352-WGY.
The case initially was assigned
curing the deficiencies. See Memorandum and Order (Docket No.
5). Aldrich requested, and was granted two extensions for
compliance. He failed to file either a show cause response or
amended complaint as directed, and Judge Young dismissed the
action without prejudice. Thereafter, Aldrich filed an amended
complaint along with various other motions, including a Motion
for Reconsideration of the dismissal. Judge Young denied relief,
and denied reconsideration not on the basis of untimeliness, but
because the proposed amended complaint failed to state a cause of
action. In response, Aldrich re-filed suit. See Civil Action
No. 09-11282-WGY, discussed, infra.
3
to Judge Tauro but later assigned to Judge Young.2
See Aldrich v
Town of Milton, et al., Civil Action No. 09-11282-WGY.
Aldrich
claims that the reassignment was done without explanation;
however, the docket reflects that the transfer to Judge Young was
made pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(I)(Reassignment and Transfer of
Cases).3
Interestingly, at the time Aldrich filed the instant
action in state court in January, 2013, the third action had
already been set for trial before Judge Young for February 12,
2013.
Aldrich had filed several motions seeking to avoid trial,
such as a Motion for the Case to Return for Mediation (Docket No.
294), and a Motion to Modify Scheduling Order and Continue Trial
to April, 2013.
Those motion were denied on January 10, 2013.
About two weeks later, on January 25, 2013, Aldrich filed an
Opposition to Recusal of Judge Tauro (Docket No. 295) objecting
2
After a jury trial, on March
verdict in favor of all defendants
Lundrigan, and Kevin Doogan). The
Aldrich v. Town of Milton, et al.,
3
15, 2013, the jury returned a
(Michael Breen, Lawrence
case is pending appeal. See
No. 13-1436 (1st Cir. 2013).
Local Rule 40.1(I) provides: “In the interest of justice or
to further the efficient performance of the business of the
court, a judge may return a case to the clerk for reassignment,
whether or not the case is related to any other case, with the
approval of the Chief Judge, or, with respect to civil cases
only, may transfer the case to another judge, if the other judge
consents to the transfer.” Id. Since the complaint in the third
action was identical to the amended complaint in the first
action, it is beyond question that the action was reassigned as
related to the prior lawsuit.
4
to trial before Judge Young.4
Again, Aldrich asserts that Judge Young systematically
denied his motions without allowing the defendants an opportunity
to file oppositions.
He contends that Judge Young’s actions,
though made under the guise of judicial authority, were motivated
by his pro law enforcement partiality, racial animus towards
minorities, and bias against pro se litigants.
Aldrich contests
the fact that Judge Young presided over his habeas petition while
contemporaneously presiding over his civil rights action, and
further, that Judge Young refused to recuse himself on that
basis.
On March 21, 2013, Henderson filed, on Judge Young’s behalf,
a Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 4) with a Memorandum in Support
(Docket No. 5).
After being granted an extension of time to
respond, Aldrich filed several pleadings, including: (1) a Motion
for Leave to Amend the Complaint to remove several legal causes
of action (Docket No. 9); (2) a Motion to Disqualify and
Discharge Assistant United States Attorney Henderson from
Representing Defendant (Docket No. 10); (3) an Objection and
Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss for failure to comply with
4
A reasonable inference could be drawn, based on the timing
of the trial and denial of the motion for a continuance
immediately prior to Aldrich’s filing of a complaint in state
court, that Aldrich was posturing and filing suit in order to
thwart the trial scheduled to take place before Judge Young;
however, I will not resolve the issues raised in this case on
that basis.
5
rules of civil procedure (Docket No. 11); and (4) an Opposition
and Partial Assent to the Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 12).
On May 24, 2013, Henderson filed a Memorandum in Opposition
to the Motion to Disqualify (Docket No. 15) and a Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion to Strike the Motion to Dismiss (Docket
No. 16).
He also filed a Notice of Appearance (Docket No. 14).
On June 13, 2013, Aldrich filed a Motion for
Disqualification of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)(Docket No.
17), a Motion for Hearing on the Motion for Disqualification
(Docket No. 18), and a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Final
Disposition on Whether or Not the DOJ is Disqualified From
Representing Defendant (Docket No. 19).
On July 3, 2013, Aldrich filed a Motion Requesting to be
Provided with Written Notice of All Electronic Filings as a Non
ECF User (Docket No. 22).
He seeks a Standing Order directing
the clerk to be responsible for issuing a Notice of Electronic
Filing, and send a paper copy of the notice to him.
On July 8, 2013, the defendant filed a sur-reply in
opposition to Aldrich’s Motion to Disqualify (Docket No. 24).
II.
Discussion
A.
The Motion to Amend Complaint To Remove Claims
Aldrich contends he is entitled to amend his complaint once
as a matter of course, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, because the defendant has not filed an
6
“answer.”
The defendant asserts that, while generally plaintiffs
are granted leave to amend, any amendment would be futile in this
case.
I do not agree with Aldrich that he is permitted to amend as
a matter of right, because a Motion to Dismiss was filed and
Aldrich failed to file an amended complaint within 21 days
thereafter.
Rule 15(a)(1)(B) provides, inter alia, for amendment
as of right within 21 days after service of a motion under Rule
12(b),(e), or (f).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B)(emphasis in
underline added).5
Here, the Motion to Dismiss was filed on
March 21, 2013.
Aldrich’s Motion for Leave to Amend was filed
May 21, 2013, well after the 21-day window.
While Aldrich did
file, on April 11, 2013, a Motion to Extend Time to file an
Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in order to
research the relevant laws, he did not seek leave to extend the
5
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 15(a) address the 2009
Amendments as they pertain to amendment of the complaint once as
of right. It noted that the provision terminating the right to
amend after 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b),
(e), or (f) served to “force the pleader to consider carefully
and promptly the wisdom of amending to meet the arguments in the
motion. A responsive amendment may avoid the need to decide the
motion or reduce the number of issues to be decided, and will
expedite the determination of issues that otherwise might be
raised seriatim. It also should advance other pretrial
proceedings.” Id. Next the Advisory Committee Notes state that
“[j]ust as amendment was permitted by former Rule 15(a) in
response to a motion, so the amended rule permits one amendment
as a matter of course in response to a responsive pleading. The
right is subject to the same 21-day limit as the right to amend
in response to a motion.” Id.
7
time to file an amended complaint within the body of that
motion.6
Thus, I find that Aldrich may not amend his complaint unless
I permit it pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Here, because
the amendment of the complaint adds nothing new to the case other
than to remove several of his claims for injunctive relief and
monetary damages, and because this action will be dismissed for
the reasons stated herein, any amendment of the complaint would
be futile.
Therefore, I decline to permit Aldrich to amend his
complaint, and will DENY his Motion to Amend (Docket No. 9).7
B.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify and Discharge Defense
Counsel; the Motion for Disqualification of the DOJ;
the Motion for Hearing on the Motion for
Disqualification, and the Motion to Stay Proceedings
Pending Final Disposition on Whether or Not the DOJ is
Disqualified From Representing Defendant
Aldrich seeks to disqualify and discharge defense counsel on
two grounds.
First, he claims that Henderson failed to file a
separate “Notice of Appearance” with a notification of approval
6
Interestingly, as noted in this Memorandum and Order,
Aldrich has asserted technical arguments against the defendant
based on strict application of rules of procedure and failure to
comply with those rules. While this fact does not serve as a
basis for denying Aldrich’s Motion for Leave to Amend, it
nevertheless demonstrates Aldrich’s familiarity with rules of
procedure, or at least his ability to research the requirements
of Rule 15(a).
7
Aldrich’s motive to amend the complaint solely to remove
the claims for injunctive and monetary relief are unclear. To
the extent Aldrich is attempting to amend the complaint simply
to avoid possible application of the three-strike rule of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g), that is not a proper ground for amendment.
8
from United States Attorney Carmen Ortiz.
Second, he contends
that the DOJ has a conflict of interest under these
circumstances.
With respect to the Notice of Appearance issue, in his
opposition, Henderson concedes that he did not file a separate
Notice of Appearance, but contends that the Notice of Removal on
behalf of Judge Young leaves no potential for confusion about who
he is representing in this action.
Thus, he argues that any
technical omission by him was harmless, citing to Wasserman v.
Rodacker, 557 F.3d 635, 637-38 (D.C. Cir. 2009) in support.8
I agree.
Where there is no dispute by Aldrich that this
action was removable from state court because Judge Young was an
officer of the United States acting under color of office and
where there is no reasonable basis for Aldrich to dispute that
the Notice of Removal did not make it clear who Henderson was
representing, I find Aldrich’s arguments to be unpersuasive.
I
further find the Wasserman reasoning to be sound and the case
sufficiently analogous in this respect.
8
Further, Aldrich has not
In Wasserman, an action against a United States Park police
officer for the arrest of the plaintiff for walking his dogs
without a leash, the court rejected the arrestee’s claim that
because the government attorneys did not file a formal notice of
appearance, there was no way of knowing whether they were
speaking for the defendant when the case was removed. The court
found that the argument was “not a serious contention” where
there was no objection to the Notice of Removal, the Notice of
Removal was timely and properly stated the basis for removal, and
any confusion over the identity of counsel did not result in any
prejudice. Wasserman, 537 F.3d at 638.
9
shown that he suffered any prejudice by the failure to file a
Notice of Appearance, nor does he allege that it was unclear who
represented Judge Young.
I therefore reject Aldrich’s arguments
and will not discharge or disqualify Henderson on this basis.
Next, with respect to Aldrich’s argument that the DOJ has a
conflict of interest, I find that his first Motion to Disqualify
(Docket No. 10) failed to set forth any factual basis from which
I could find any actual or apparent conflict of interest exists.
In his supplemental Motion (Docket No. 17), Aldrich argues that
the DOJ has a conflict of interest because there is currently a
pending criminal case against him in state court, Commonwealth v.
Robert Aldrich, Middlesex Sup. Ct. No. 2008-00164, and the DOJ
has an “active interest” in this criminal matter (which he
characterizes as “related”) because one of the DOJ’s
agents/informants, Alan Mason, provided incriminating information
against him that formed the underlying basis for Aldrich’s
conviction and current incarceration.
Motion for
Disqualification of the DOJ (Docket No. 17 at 1, ¶ 1).
Additionally, Aldrich argues that since Judge Young presided
over his § 2254 habeas petition regarding his criminal
conviction, and the alleged wrongful actions in that § 2254 case
formed the basis of this civil action, the DOJ’s “inter-agency”
relationship with the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office in
opposing the habeas petition should “automatically” disqualify
10
the DOJ from representing Judge Young here.
Id. at ¶ 2.9
Further, Aldrich contends that under these unusual
circumstances, he will be substantially prejudiced by the DOJ’s
representation of Judge Young in light of its dual role as
prosecutor and civil defense counsel.10
Finally, Aldrich claims that he has recently completed the
presentment requirements to proceed with a civil action against
the United States, DOJ, and certain federal agents under, inter
alia, the Federal Tort Claims Act, where he alleges that he will
present evidence of government misconduct, thereby resulting in
an “appearance of a conflict” in the DOJ’s representation of
Judge Young.
In its sur-reply, the defendant argues that Aldrich’s habeas
corpus petition made no mention of the testimony of Alan Mason,
and no claim of error relating to the use of a government
informant.
The defendant also contends that the related criminal
matter to which Aldrich referred was prosecuted by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and not by the United States.
9
Aldrich cites to Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238
(1980) as support for his claim that the role of prosecutor and
defense counsel presents an inextricable conflict that runs afoul
of the Separation of Powers Clause. I do not find that this
case, involving an employer suit challenging civil penalty
provisions to the Fair Labor Standards Act, is relevant to the
issues here.
10
In support, Aldrich attaches, inter alia, copies of
pleadings in connection with his state criminal case.
11
Moreover, the defendant contends that the United States was not a
party to the habeas action, and that the Department of Justice
did not participate in that action in any fashion.
Rather, the
action was dismissed by Judge Young for failure to exhaust state
remedies.
Next, the defendant argues that Aldrich has not alleged that
Henderson had any involvement or role in any of the underlying
proceedings forming the basis of this suit, nor has he set forth
any particular benefit to Henderson or to the United States
Attorney’s Office that would enure to them from the outcome of
this action.
Finally, defendant argues that Aldrich fails to
identify any actual prejudice to him from the alleged conflict of
interest, and, for these reasons, his claim of conflict of
interest and prejudice has no merit.
As a general matter, “courts disfavor motions to
disqualify.”
See Eaves v. City of Worcester, 2012 WL 6196012, *2
(D. Mass. Dec. 11, 2012)(Civil No. 12-10336-TSH)(citing, inter
alia, Cohen v. Oasin, 844 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
In Eaves, Judge Hillman explained, in relevant part:
Such motions must be considered in light of the
principle that “ ‘court[s] should not lightly interrupt
the relationship between lawyer and client,’ ” Adrion
v. Knight, 2008 WL 5111084 (D.Mass. Dec.4, 2008)
(quoting Adoption of Erica, 426 Mass. 55, 58, 686
N.E.2d 967 (1997)), and “[u]nless the underlying
judicial process will be tainted by an attorney's
conduct, courts should be reluctant to grant
disqualification motions.” Gray v. R.I. Dep't. of
Children, Youth and Families, 937 F. Supp. 153, 156
12
(D.R.I.1996)....The movant bears the burden of proving
a conflict.
Eaves v. City of Worcester, 2012 WL 6196012 at *2 (citations
omitted).11
Vague and unsupported allegations of conflict of
interest are not sufficient to meet the movant’s burden.
844 F. Supp. at 1067.
494 (D. Del. 2006).
Cohen,
See Conley v. Chaffinch, 431 F. Supp. 2d
“The disqualification of Government counsel
is a drastic measure and a court should hesitate to impose it
except when necessary.”
Gray v. Rhode Island Dept. of Children,
Youth and Families, 937 F. Supp. 153, 161 (D.R.I. 1996).
Further, “motions to disqualify opposing counsel are disfavored
... not only because disqualification robs one’s adversary of her
counsel of choice, but also because of the risk ... that one
could subvert the ethical rules in an attempt to use them as a
procedural weapon.”
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis–Cohen LLP, 2006
WL 680915, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
In this case, I do not find that Aldrich has set forth any
bona fide basis to find that a real or apparent conflict of
interest exists merely because the DOJ may have had some
11
“The district court's power to disqualify an attorney
derives from its inherent authority to supervise the professional
conduct of attorneys appearing before it.” United States v.
Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir.1980)(citations omitted).
Disqualification is an “‘extreme sanction’ that should not be
imposed lightly.” Reg’l Emp'rs' Assurance Leagues Voluntary
Emps.’ Beneficiary Ass'n Trust v. Castellano, 2009 WL 1911671, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. 2009)(quoting Shade v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 72 F. Supp.2d 518, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).
13
involvement either with his state criminal case or with his
habeas petition (a fact that defense counsel denies).12
First, Aldrich has not named Henderson as a defendant in
this action, nor has he claimed the U.S. Attorneys Office
violated his civil rights in connection with this action.
Second, the fact that Aldrich “anticipates” that he will
file suit against the DOJ and other federal officials or agents
for unspecified alleged misconduct, does not serve as a basis for
disqualification in a pending suit.
Indeed, Aldrich may not
manipulate the judicial system simply by stating that he intends
to file suit against those defendants in the future, in order to
disqualify defense counsel in this suit.
In other words, a
litigant may not rely on possible future lawsuits in order to
disqualify counsel in a present suit.
At any rate, the issue of
conflict of interest would arise, if at all, in the later-filed
suit if the DOJ assigned counsel to represent those named federal
defendants.
It cannot serve as a basis for disqualification in
this case.
Third, Henderson’s role is solely that of an attorney
representing a defendant in a civil suit.
Neither the DOJ nor
the United States Attorneys Office, nor Henderson for that
12
Aldrich’s allegation of an “active interest” in his
criminal case, and an inter-agency relationship with the
Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office are bald assertions;
nevertheless, for purposes of this Memorandum and Order only, I
will credit Aldrich’s allegations as true.
14
matter, have any financial, personal, or political conflict of
interest raised here.13
Fourth, the allegation that the DOJ and the United States
Attorneys Office have an active interest in Aldrich’s state
criminal case has no bearing on the disqualification issue, where
there is no evidence from the criminal case that is relevant to
the legal issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss (e.g., absolute
judicial immunity).
Moreover, there are no confidences or
communications involving the criminal case that would be relevant
here.
The issues in this case can be resolved solely on the
record before me.
In light of this, there is no objective basis
for me to find that the circumstances of the criminal action
would taint this litigation if Henderson were to continue his
representation of Judge Young.
See United States v. Zagami, 374
Fed. Appx. 295, 297 (3d Cir. 2010)(finding as frivolous the
argument that there was a conflict of interest requiring
disqualification where the Assistant United States Attorney who
handled the case had previously prosecuted the defendant in an
unrelated matter).14
Moreover, the allegation that the DOJ and
13
As discussed in more detail in this opinion, and as
Aldrich concedes, his claim for monetary damages against Judge
Young is not cognizable because it is barred by absolute judicial
immunity.
14
In Keyter v. Bush, 2004 WL 3591125, *3 (D.D.C. 2004), the
pro se plaintiff brought a Bivens suit against President Bush for
alleged reckless disregard of his statutory duties and other
violations of law, arguing that he colluded with the Washington
15
United States Attorney’s Office had an interest in his habeas
case also has no bearing on the facts and law in this case, for
the same reasons.
Finally, I do not find that Aldrich has shown he has been
prejudiced by any alleged conflict of interest, particularly
where it is clear, for the reasons set forth herein, that Aldrich
fails to set forth any plausible claims upon which relief may be
granted.
Even if no Motion to Dismiss had been filed by
Henderson, I nevertheless have authority to dismiss this action
sua sponte.15
Thus, even if I struck Henderson’s appearance or
state court system. The United States Attorney filed a Motion to
Dismiss, and plaintiff moved to disqualify the United States
Attorney on the grounds that there was a conflict of interest
that precluded representation of President Bush. The theory was
that the U.S. Attorney had a duty to prosecute the President for
alleged crimes, and thus could not also defend the President.
The Court found the plaintiff’s claim to be wholly without merit,
noting that under 28 U.S.C. § 547(2), the United States Attorney
was acting within his statutory authority in representing the
President. In Palmer v. O’Connor, 2013 WL 1326207, *1 (E. D.
Cal. Mar. 29, 2013), a pro se federal prisoner who filed a suit
under Bivens, sought to disqualify the Assistant United States
Attorney, as well as the entire United States Attorneys Office,
based on an alleged conflict of interest because plaintiff wrote
a letter to the United States Attorneys about a criminal
complaint against the DOJ and the Bureau of Prisons, to which he
never received a response. The court denied the motion to
disqualify, finding the record devoid of facts showing that the
United States Attorney had any interest in the outcome of the
Bivens case, or that the assigned United States Attorney had a
conflict of interest. The fact that he wrote a letter about a
criminal matter had no bearing to the relevance of the Bivens
action (a civil, not criminal action).
15
See Bustos v. Chamberlain, 2009 WL 2782238, *2 (D.S.C.
2009)(noting that the court has inherent authority “to ensure a
16
held that the DOJ is disqualified from representing Judge Young
(which I do not find), and even if I disregarded all of
Henderson’s arguments, the outcome of this case would fair no
better.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I will DENY
Aldrich’s Motion to Disqualify and Discharge Assistant United
States Attorney From Representing Defendant (Docket No. 10) in
its entirety.
I will also DENY the Motion for Disqualification
of the DOJ (Docket No. 17), the Motion for Hearing (Docket No.
18), and the Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Final Disposition
(Docket No. 19).
C.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss For
Failure to Comply With Rules of Procedure
As noted above, Aldrich seeks to strike the Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the motion is defective in that it
failed to set forth -- within the body of the motion itself --
plaintiff has standing, that subject matter jurisdiction exists,
and that a case is not frivolous”) citing, inter alia, Mallard v.
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
490 U.S. 296, 307-308 (1989); Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17
(2d Cir. 1995)(where a § 1915 screening was not applicable
because a pro se party paid the filing fee, the Court still had
inherent authority “wholly aside from any statutory warrant” to
act sua sponte); and Rolle v. Berkowitz, 2004 WL 287678, *1
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)(sua sponte dismissal in fee-paying pro se case is
warranted where the claims presented no arguably meritorious
issue to consider). See also Gaffney v. State Farm Fire and Cas.
Co., 294 Fed. Appx. 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008)(unpublished decision
stating: “[t]his court has on numerous occasions recognized the
inherent authority of a district court to dismiss a complaint on
its own motion for failure to state a claim.”).
17
the basis for the request for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Rather, the reasons were set forth only in the Memorandum in
Support.
The argument is hyper-technical.
More importantly, the
Motion to Dismiss expressly incorporated by reference the
Memorandum in Support (Docket No. 7) by stating: “The grounds for
this motion are set forth in the accompanying memorandum of law.”
Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 4 at 1).
That memorandum did, in
fact, address with specificity the basis for a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal.
I deem the Memorandum in Support to constitute part
of the motion itself, thus complying with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Further, I agree with the defendant that the
presentation of the issues were in compliance with well-settled
pleading practices pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(b)(1).16
Aldrich
has not submitted any legal authority for the proposition that a
supporting memorandum referenced in a motion to dismiss is
insufficient to meet the rules.
Accordingly, Aldrich’s Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss
For Failure to Comply With Rules of Procedure (Docket No. 11)
will be DENIED.
16
Local Rule 7.1(b)(1) provides for the submission of a
Motion, and states: “(1) Submission of Motion. A party filing a
motion shall at the same time file a memorandum of reasons,
including citation of supporting authorities, why the motion
should be granted. Affidavits and other documents setting forth
or evidencing facts on which the motion is based shall be filed
with the motion.” L.R. 7.1(b)(1).
18
D.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
1.
Claim For Monetary Damages
The defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is based on Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Memorandum in
Support stated the basis for the motion, by arguing that
Aldrich’s action for monetary damages was barred by the doctrine
of absolute judicial immunity.
Memorandum in Support (Docket No.
5 at 6), citing Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)(per
curiam).
Defense counsel asserts that in Mireless, the U.S.
Supreme Court has stated that “judicial immunity is an immunity
from suit, not just from the ultimate assessment of damages.”
Id. (other citations omitted).
Here, defense counsel contends
that the acts complained of all were taken in Judge Young’s
judicial capacity and were acts normally performed by a judge
within the scope of his jurisdiction.
Thus, notwithstanding any
allegations of prejudice, bias, corruption, or other bad faith,
Aldrich is not entitled to relief in the form of monetary
damages.
Aldrich does not dispute that absolute judicial immunity
bars his claim for monetary damages, and he states that he
consents to dismissal of such claim.
2.
Claim for Injunctive Relief
Next, with respect to Aldrich’s request for injunctive
relief, Henderson asserted that there is no legal authority to
19
allow injunctive relief against federal judges, and to do so
would, in essence, permit a “horizontal appeal” from one district
judge to another.
Further, under the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-317, Title III, § 309(c)(“FCIA”), which
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983, injunctive relief is precluded against
a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity...unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”
Id.
Aldrich does not dispute that his claim for injunctive
relief is barred, and he also consents to dismissal of such
claim.
3.
Claim for Declaratory Relief
With respect to Aldrich’s request for declaratory relief,
defense counsel contends that, as with injunctive relief, Aldrich
may not obtain declaratory relief from another district judge,
for three reasons.
First, defense counsel argues that Aldrich had adequate
remedies at law, i.e., he could have pursued an appeal or sought
an extraordinary writ, rather than seeking a declaration from
another judge at this time.18
Second, Henderson argues declaratory relief is not warranted
because Aldrich seeks declaratory relief only as to past acts.
18
As previously noted, Aldrich has pending an appeal of his
third civil action, 09-11282-WGY.
20
He argues, and cites case law in support, that the purpose of
declaratory relief is to determine the rights of parties with
respect to future events, not to declare liability for past
wrongs.
Third, courts have broad discretion to decline to enter a
declaratory judgment, and defense counsel contends I should use
that discretion and decline to do so here.
See DeNovellis v.
Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 313 (1st Cir. 1997).
4.
The Court’s Rulings
As noted above, with respect to his claims for both monetary
damages and injunctive relief, Aldrich concedes he fails to state
any claims upon which such relief can be granted, and he consents
to the dismissal of those claims.
Nevertheless, he asserts he is
entitled to pursue his claim for declaratory relief.
As an initial matter, notwithstanding Aldrich’s concessions
and assent to dismissal of some claims, I will not dismiss those
claims on that basis; rather, I will make independent findings on
the merits.
In this regard, I agree with the defendant’s
arguments set forth in the Memorandum in Support, that, in the
circumstances here, absolute judicial immunity bars Aldrich’s
claims for monetary damages.19
Most recently, the United States
19
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-554 (1967)(absolute
judicial immunity protects integrity of judicial process); Allard
v. Estes, 197 N.E. 884, 886 (1935)(stating that is it “too well
settled to require discussion, that every judge, whether of a
higher or lower court, is exempt from liability to an action for
any judgment or decision rendered in the exercise of jurisdiction
21
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the scope of
absolute judicial immunity.
See Goldstein v. Galvin, 2013 WL
2466861 (1st Cir. June 10, 2013).
In Goldstein, the Court
stated:
Absolute immunity applies to a narrow swath of public
officials, including “judges performing judicial acts
within their jurisdiction,” “prosecutors performing
acts intimately associated with the judicial phase of
the criminal process,” and agency officials with
functions similar to judges and/or prosecutors.
Bettencourt v. Bd. of Regist. in Med. of Mass., 904
F.2d 772, 782 (1st Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508–17,
98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). The protection
afforded by an absolute immunity endures even if the
official “acted maliciously and corruptly” in
exercising his judicial or prosecutorial functions.
Wang, 55 F.3d at 702 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It likewise endures “in the presence of
‘grave procedural errors.’ “ Nystedt v. Nigro, 700 F.3d
vested in him by law.”).
The reason for recognizing this form of immunity is that:
[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a
judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense
and ungovernable desires that people can have....
[T]his is the principal characteristic that
adjudication has in common with legislation and with
criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in
which absolute immunity has most generously been
provided. If judges were personally liable for
erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits,
most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide
powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering
decisions likely to provoke such suits. The resulting
timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it
would manifestly detract from independent and impartial
adjudication.
Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d
Cir. 2000)(quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27
(1988)).
22
25, 32 (1st Cir.2012) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)).
The imperviousness of this protection is no accident:
“[a]lthough this concept of absolute immunity allows
some abuses of official power to go unredressed, it is
necessary for the effective administration of
government that government workers be able to perform
their jobs without fear of liability.” Ricci v. Key
Bancshares of Me., Inc., 768 F.2d 456, 462 (1st Cir.
1985).
Id. at *4.
Further, Goldstein stated:
An inquiry into the existence vel non of judicial
immunity encompasses three questions. First, we ask
whether the defendant carries out traditional
adjudicatory functions. See Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at
783. If so, we ask whether the defendant is called upon
to decide cases that are “sufficiently controversial
that, in the absence of absolute immunity, he would be
subject to numerous damages actions.” Id. If the
answers to these two queries are affirmative, we then
ask whether the defendant performs his adjudicatory
functions “against a backdrop of multiple safeguards
designed to protect [the plaintiff's] constitutional
rights.” Id....Judicial acts are those that are
‘intimately associated’ with the judicial function.”
Nystedt, 700 F.3d at 31 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at
486). The bedrock judicial function is, of course, the
adjudication of disputes. Id. Other traditional
judicial functions include such things as “weighing
evidence, making factual findings, reaching legal
determinations, choosing sanctions, and expounding
reasons for [ ] decisions.” Coggeshall, 604 F.3d at
663.
Id. at *5.
Here, all of the wrongful acts complained of were all taken
by Judge Young in his judicial capacity and were acts normally
performed by a judge within the scope of his jurisdiction.
Thus,
notwithstanding any allegations of malice, prejudice, bias
against pro se litigants, negligence or other bad faith acts in
23
connection with Judge Young’s rulings, I find that he is immune
from suit.
Next, with respect to Aldrich’s claim for injunctive relief,
I find the claim is barred because this case does not involve a
situation where a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable.
Finally, with respect to the remaining claim for declaratory
relief, I reject Aldrich’s argument that once a request for a
declaratory judgment is presented, there must be declaration one
way or the other, even if declaratory relief ultimately is denied
on the merits.
“The plain language of the FCIA indicates that declaratory
relief is available against judicial officers under § 1983.”
Crotty v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 2012 WL 3628904 (D. Mass.
2012) citing Nollet v. Justices of the Trial Ct. of Com. of
Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209–210 (D. Mass. 2000).
Because
§ 1983 is a method for vindicating rights rather than a source of
substantive rights itself, the remaining action for declaratory
judgment brought under § 1983 must identify the specific
constitutional or federal statutory right infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).20
20
See
See also
Declaratory Judgment is not a separate not a substantive
source of rights; rather, the “operation of Declaratory Judgment
Act is procedural only.” Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950)(citation omitted); see Akins v.
Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 490 n. 9 (1st Cir. 1997)
(Declaratory Judgment Act does not, by itself, create a
substantive cause of action).
24
Phillips v. Conrad, 2011 WL 309677, *8 (D. Mass. 2011).
Even presuming that Aldrich raises constitutional due
process or equal protection claims in support of his request for
declaratory relief, in the exercise of my discretion, I will
GRANT the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the remaining claim for
declaratory relief.
I do not find that any further development
of the record is needed; rather, the the issue may be resolved on
the record presently before me, as there simply are no
circumstances in which declaratory relief would be warranted.
Again, I reject Aldrich’s legally unsupported contention that I
am obligated to make a declaration one way or the other, even if
the declaration is adverse to him.
First, Aldrich fails to present valid due process claims in
light of the fact that he neglected to, or chose not to, pursue
the legal process that was available to him to challenge Judge
Young’s judicial rulings in his first and second suits.
is true with respect to any equal protection claim.
The same
Given his
apparent ability to research law and present arguments (both in
this litigation and in prior lawsuits), there is no basis from
which I reasonably could infer that Aldrich was in any way
hindered from pursuing those avenues of relief.
Moreover, to the
extent that Aldrich currently has an appeal pending, those issues
might be raised in that context, and to the extent they were not,
he has forfeited his right to pursue those claims in a civil
25
action.
In any event, for purposes of determining whether
declaratory relief is warranted, there is no basis to have both
the First Circuit and this court reviewing the case.
Second, I find no equitable basis for the grant of
declaratory relief where Aldrich does not seek prospective
relief, but seeks only a declaration as to alleged past
wrongdoings.
2010).21
See Clay v. Osteen, 2010 WL 4116882 (M.D.N.C.
Declaratory relief applies only to prospective relief,
to define legal rights in connection with future conduct.
Id.
See Willner v. Frey, 421 F. Supp. 2d 913 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d
243 Fed. Appx. 744 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 128 S.Ct. 1125
21
In rejecting a request for declaratory relief against a
judge, Clay stated:
Although Section 1983, as amended in 1996 by the FCIA,
does not immunize judges against civil actions for
declaratory relief, Plaintiffs are not seeking
declaratory relief in the true legal sense. Plaintiffs
seek a declaration that Judge Osteen’s dismissal of
their claim against the IRS was not a judicial act
because it denied Plaintiffs their right to a jury
trial. “Declaratory judgments, however, are meant to
define the legal rights and obligations of the parties
in anticipation of some future conduct.” Johnson v.
McCuskey, 72 Fed. Appx. 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that declaratory relief was improper where
Plaintiff merely sought a declaration that Defendants
had acted improperly when deciding a change of venue
motion). They are not “meant simply to proclaim that
one party is liable to another.” Id. at 478.
Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief merely seeks
to strip Defendants of judicial immunity and thereby
impose liability. As such, Plaintiffs are not entitled
to declaratory relief.
Clay, 2010 WL 4116882 at *4.
Such is the case here.
26
(2008); Abebe v. Seymour, 2012 WL 1130667 (D.S.C. 2012), aff’d
479 Fed. Appx. 464, *2 (4th Cir. 2012)(denying injunctive relief
based on alleged wrongs occurring in prior cases before a judge,
stating: “[a] declaratory judgment is meant to define the legal
rights and obligations of the parties in anticipation of some
future conduct, not simply to proclaim liability for a past act.”
quoting Lawrence v. Kuenhold, 271 F. App’x 763, 766 (10th Cir.
2008)).
In other words, “[d]eclaratory judgments are designed to
declare rights so that parties can conform their conduct to avoid
future litigation, and are untimely if the questionable conduct
has already occurred or damages have already accrued.”.
Id.
Here, again, Aldrich is not seeking any specific prospective
declaratory relief -- he simply asks for a declaration that the
alleged acts and omissions contained the complaint violated his
rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States and
Massachusetts.
Perhaps most importantly, I agree with the defendant that I
have wide discretion whether to grant declaratory relief or not.
In DeNovellis, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit stated, in relevant part:
The Declaratory Judgment Act is “an enabling Act, which
confers a discretion on the courts rather than an
absolute right upon the litigant”; courts have broad
discretion to decline to enter a declaratory judgment.
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287, 115 S.Ct.
2137, 2142-43, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995) (quoting Public
Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241,
73 S.Ct. 236, 239, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952)). “By the
Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a
remedial arrow in the district court’s quiver; it
27
created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a
new form of relief to qualifying litigants. Consistent
with the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a district
court is authorized, in the sound exercise of its
discretion, ... to dismiss an action seeking a
declaratory judgment before trial.” Wilton, 515 U.S.
at 288, 115 S.Ct. at 2143....In the declaratory
judgment context, the normal principle that federal
courts should adjudicate claims within their
jurisdiction yields to considerations of practicality
and wise judicial administration.” Wilton, 515 U.S. at
288, 115 S.Ct. at 2143.
DeNovellis, 124 F.3d at 313.
Utilizing my broad discretion, I find declaratory relief is
not appropriate in this case for all the reasons discussed above.
As an additional matter, it appears that Aldrich’s attempt to
obtain declaratory relief may be, at least in part, to serve as a
basis for him to seek vacation of the rulings of Judge Young.22
If that is so, the policy behind the finality of judgments would
be circumvented in that event, to the prejudice of the parties
involved in the prior civil suits, where those parties have no
opportunity to weigh in on the propriety of granting declaratory
relief against Judge Young.
Because this motivation is
speculative, however, I do not factor this into my determination
as to whether declaratory relief is warranted.
In sum, because Aldrich has not stated any claims for which
monetary, injunctive, or declaratory relief can be granted, I
will GRANT the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss all claims for
22
Indeed, I cannot discern any other basis for the request
for declaratory relief against Judge Young apart from a desire to
be vindicated.
28
relief, including all of his claims raised under both federal and
state law, and this case will be DISMISSED in its entirety.
For
purposes of 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(g), I intend this ruling to
constitute a decision on the merits.
E.
Request for Referral of Complaint to Commission on
Judicial Misconduct
In light of the above, I DECLINE to refer Aldrich’s
complaint to the Commission on Judicial Misconduct as he
requests.
Further, I find that Aldrich has not shown good cause
to grant such relief.
A complaint for judicial misconduct is not
the proper vehicle for challenging a judge’s rulings.
See
Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on Judicial
Conduct and Disability (document 3.2010, explaining the legally
prescribed process under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 and under the Rules for JudicialConduct and Judicial Disability Proceedings, 248 F.R.D. 674
(2008), for complaining that a federal judge has committed
misconduct or become disabled).
A judicial misconduct complaint
relating to a judicial decision that is unfavorable or alleged to
be wrong must be dismissed, as such conduct does not in itself
establish misconduct or disability.
Challenges to the
correctness of a judge’s decision must be made in court under the
proper procedural rules.
Id. at 2.23
23
This document is available on the First Circuit’s website,
www.ca1.uscourts.gov/forms-instructions. This ruling does not
prohibit Aldrich from filing a judicial misconduct complaint;
rather, it simply denies Aldrich’s request for me to refer the
29
F.
Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting to be Provided with
Written Notice of All Electronic Filings as a Non ECF
User
Aldrich seeks an Order to make the clerk responsible for
notifying him of any electronic filing, since he has no PACER
access.
Such an Order would unnecessarily burden the clerk
insofar as paper versions of any rulings of the Court are sent to
non-participating litigants.
Further, this would eradicate the
responsibility of a defendant to comply with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure regarding service of pleadings.
More
importantly, however, in view of the dismissal of this action,
Aldrich’s motion is rendered moot, as it is not anticipated that
additional filings would be made by the defendant in this case.
Accordingly, Aldrich’s Motion Requesting to be Provided with
Written Notice of All Electronic Filings as a Non ECF User
(Docket No. 22) will be DENIED.
G.
Certification That Any Appeal Would Not Taken in Good
Faith
In the Motion to Dismiss, defense counsel asks that
Aldrich’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint be denied, and
that I certify that any appeal of adverse rulings in this action
would not be taken in good faith.
I have previously addressed
the Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint herein, and thus turn
to the question of certification.
Aldrich contends that the defendant’s request for me to
complaint to the Commission on Judicial Misconduct.
30
certify that any appeal of the dismissal of this action be
certified as not taken in good faith is beyond the scope of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion and thus was not presented properly to this
court.
I need not resolve the issue whether the defendant’s
motion properly raises the issue because, pursuant to my inherent
authority and in accordance with the rules of district court and
appellate procedure, I will make an independent finding that any
appeal of any of the matters contained in this Memorandum and
Order would not be taken in good faith, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3) and Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A).
Such a
certification prohibits in forma status on appeal even though
Aldrich has been found to be indigent.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) “[a]n appeal may not be taken
in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it
is not taken in good faith.”
Id.
Similarly, under Fed. R. App.
P. 24(a)(3)(A), a party who has been permitted to proceed in
forma pauperis in the district court may proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis without further authorization, unless the district
court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith.
Id.
Because Aldrich has conceded and assented to the dismissal
of his claims seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief, and
because I have found the law to be clear in this regard,
Aldrich’s appeal of the dismissal of those two claims clearly
would not be taken in good faith.
Further, with respect to Aldrich’s claim for declaratory
31
relief, I also find, for the reasons stated herein, that any
appeal of the denial of declaratory relief based on my wide
discretion, would not be taken in good faith.
“The applicant's
good faith is established by the presentation of any issue that
is not plainly frivolous.”
Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674,
674 (1958)(per curiam); see Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026
(7th Cir. 2000); Wooten v. District of Columbia, 129 F.3d 206,
208 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
A complaint is “frivolous” if “it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Neitzke v. Williams,
Such is the case here.
I find that
any appeal would be one that plainly does not deserve additional
judicial attention.
Accordingly, I will CERTIFY that any appeal of the rulings
contained in this Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good
faith.
Should Aldrich seek in forma pauperis status on an appeal,
he must obtain permission to do so directly from the First
Circuit Court of Appeals.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing it is here by ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint (Docket No. 9) is
DENIED;
2.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify and Discharge Assistant
U.S. Attorney From Representing Defendant (Docket No. 10) is
DENIED;
3.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Disqualification of the DOJ (Docket
No. 17) is DENIED;
32
4.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Hearing on the Motion for
Disqualification (Docket No. 18) is DENIED; and
5.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Final
Disposition on Whether or Not the DOJ is Disqualified From
Representing Defendant (Docket No. 19) is DENIED;
6.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Comply With Rules of Civil Procedure (Docket No. 11) is
DENIED;
7.
Plaintiff’s request for a referral of his complaint to the
Commission on Judicial Misconduct is DENIED;
8.
Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting to be Provided with Written
Notice of All Electronic Filings as a Non ECF User (Docket
No. 22) is DENIED;
9.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 4) is ALLOWED as
to all claims;
10.
This action is DISMISSED; and
11.
This Court hereby CERTIFIES that any appeal by the plaintiff
of any of the rulings contained in this Memorandum and Order
would not be taken in good faith.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Douglas P. Woodlock
DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
33
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