Hunt et al v. Massi et al
Filing
42
Judge William G. Young: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: This Court DENIES the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count I (use of excessive force), count II and IX (malicious prosecution only as to the charges brought by the poli ce officers against Mr. Hunt), count VI (the police officers' Massachusetts Civil Rights Act violation), and count VII (battery); and GRANTS the motion as to counts II and IX (malicious prosecution as to the June 6, 2011 arrest). SO ORDERED... (Paine, Matthew) (Main Document 42 replaced on 3/25/2014) (Paine, Matthew).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
BRIAN HUNT and KIMBERLY HUNT
Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVID MASSI, JAMES PORTER, and
TOWN OF FALMOUTH
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-10656-WGY
YOUNG, D.J.
March 25, 2014
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of the arrest of Brian Hunt (“Mr.
Hunt”) pursuant to the service of an arrest warrant on June 6,
2011. Mr. Hunt and Kim Hunt (“Mrs. Hunt”) (collectively, “the
Hunts”) bring this action against two police officers, David
Massi (“Massi”) and James Porter (“Porter”), and the Town of
Falmouth, alleging ten counts, including civil rights violations
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for: (i) retaliation and excessive
force against the police officers; (ii) malicious prosecution
against the police officers; (iii) a Monell claim against Town
of Falmouth; (iv) negligence and vicarious liability against the
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Town of Falmouth; (v) conspiracy; (vi) violation of the
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws c. 12 § 111;
(vii) battery by police officers; (viii) false imprisonment;
(ix) malicious prosecution; and (x) intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Compl. 5-11.
On January 22, 2014, this Court heard oral arguments and
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on count III
(Monell claim), count IV (negligence/vicarious liability), count
V (conspiracy), count VI (Massachusetts Civil Rights Act
violation by the Town of Falmouth), count VIII (false
imprisonment), count X (intentional infliction of emotional
distress), and the loss of consortium claim; and took under
advisement the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
count I (use of excessive force), count II and IX (malicious
prosecution), count VII (battery) and count VI (Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act violation by the police officers). Mot. Hr’g
Tr., ECF No. 32. Upon review of the parties’ submissions, the
relevant portions of the record including a compact disc
depicting the arrest on video, and the applicable law, the Court
rules as follows:
A.
Procedural Posture
On March 21, 2013, the Hunts filed this complaint against
the police officers and the Town of Falmouth. Compl., ECF No. 1.
On November 27, 2013, the police officers and the Town of
2
Falmouth filed a motion for summary judgment, together with a
memorandum of law supporting the motion. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.,
ECF No. 18; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J., ECF. No. 19. The
Hunts opposed the motion on January 2, 2014. Pls.’ Opp’n Defs.’
Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 27. On January 9, 2013, the police
officers and the Town of Falmouth filed a reply to the Hunts’
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Defs.’ Reply
Pls.’ Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 30. On January 22,
2014 the Court heard oral arguments. Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 32.
B.
Undisputed Facts
On June 2, 2011, the New Bedford District Court issued an
arrest warrant and commanded officers Massi and Porter to arrest
Mr. Hunt. Defs.’ Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 2, True
Warrant – Commonwealth of Massachusetts – Warrant Management
System (“True Warrant”), ECF No. 19. The arrest was ordered due
to an unpaid traffic violation fine. Defs.’ Mem. Law Supp. Mot.
Summ. J., Ex. 6, Brian Hunt’s Examination, (“Mr. Hunt’s
Examination”), ECF. No. 19-10. It was later discovered, however,
that Mr. Hunt had paid the fine but the Town of New Bedford
mistakenly failed to record the payment.1 Id. The complaint
1
Though unrelated to the events that trigger this action,
the police officers and the Town of Falmouth state that during
2011, Mr. Hunt was involved in a major cocaine and heroin
distribution ring in Cape Cod and, after a bench trial, the
Falmouth District Court convicted him of conspiring to violate
drug laws. Mr. Hunt’s Deposition, 96-99; Defs.’ Mem. Law Supp.
3
states that the arrest warrant was a pretext for arresting Mr.
Hunt and that the real reason was Mr. Hunt publishing a book
about his son’s “sexting” issues in which he criticized the
Falmouth Police Department. Compl. 3, 5. In his deposition,
however, Mr. Hunt stated that he knew he was arrested for the
traffic violation, and denied ever criticizing the Falmouth
Police Department. Defs.’ Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 7,
Brian Hunt’s Deposition, (“Mr. Hunt’s Deposition”), ECF. No. 19,
91-92.
The arrest occurred during the early morning of June 6,
2011. Pls.’ Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 2. Porter, Massi, and
other Falmouth police officers went to the Hunts’ house to serve
the warrant and arrest Mr. Hunt. Defs.’ Mem. Law Supp. Mot.
Summ. J., Ex. 3, Falmouth Police Reports (“Police Reports”), ECF
No. 19. Porter and Massi rang the bell and told Mrs. Hunt that
they needed to speak to Mr. Hunt. Pls’ Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ.
J. 1. Mrs. Hunt turned around and, followed by the police
officers, walked to the bedroom where they found Mr. Hunt. Id.
2. Prior to this day, the Hunts had never seen officers Massi or
Porter. Id. Massi told Mr. Hunt that he was under arrest and
that he had to go with them. Mr. Hunt’s Deposition 49.
Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 1, “Operation Buzzards Prey Disrupts Cape Cod
Drug Ring” capenews.com, (“Newspaper article”), ECF. No. 19-1.
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The Hunts informed the police officers that Mr. Hunt had
been released from the hospital a week before after having had
stomach surgery, and that he needed to be handcuffed in the
front because he was still recovering from the surgery. Defs.’
Mot. Summ. J. 3; Defs.’ Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 4, Kim
Hunt’s Examination, (“Mrs. Hunt’s Examination”), ECF. No. 19-39;
Mr. Hunt’s Deposition 51-53. The officers saw Mr. Hunt’s
stitches but refused to handcuff Mr. Hunt in the front because
they considered that no injury could result from handcuffing him
in the back. Id.
Massi thereafter grabbed Mr. Hunt´s arm and pushed him back
down on the bed and to the floor. Id. 54. According to Mr.
Hunt’s testimony, he did not try to defend or protect himself
because he was too weak due to the surgery. Id. 55. After being
pushed on the floor, Porter jumped over Mr. Hunt and sat on his
legs while Massi grabbed his arm and handcuffed him in the back.
Id. 57. The officers then lifted up Mr. Hunt and pushed him down
to the floor again, where he was kneed in the leg and the back.
Id. 58. Part of the altercation was captured on a video tapped
by Mr. Hunt’s son. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3; Defs.’ Mem. Law Supp.
Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 9, Mr. Hunt Son’s Video, (“The Video”), ECF.
No. 19. Mr. Hunt also asked the officers to loosen up the
handcuffs but again they refused and took him to the police
station. Mr. Hunt’s Deposition 61. As a result of Mr. Hunt’s
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complaints about pain, he was taken by ambulance from the police
station to the Falmouth Hospital, where he remained for
approximately 10 hours. Id. 79. The emergency room report states
that nothing could have been damaged during the altercation
because the surgery was a laparoscopic lysis of adhesions.
Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3; Defs.’ Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Summ. J., Ex.
11, Falmouth Hospital Emergency Record, (“Emergency Room
Report”), ECF. No. 19. While Mr. Hunt was at the hospital, the
Clerk Magistrate of the Falmouth District Court arrived and
released Mr. Hunt on his own personal recognizance. Pls.’ Opp’n
Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 2.
After the altercation, the Police Officers charged Mr. Hunt
with resisting arrest and assault and battery on a police
officer but, after a two-day trial, Mr. Hunt was found not
guilty. Id.
Mr. Hunt claims that he suffered from knee and back pain
after the incident. Mr. Hunt’s Deposition 27-33. He alleges that
he finds it emotionally distressing to see officers Massi and
Porter, and that local newspaper coverage of the incident caused
him embarrassment. Id. at 138. He has suffered neither from
depression nor anxiety, nor has he visited any therapist or
mental health counselor. Id. at 139.
C.
Federal Jurisdiction
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This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
because the Hunts allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
II.
ANALYSIS
The police officers and the Town of Falmouth moved for
summary judgment arguing that: (i) the officers are entitled to
qualified immunity, (ii) the officers did not use excessive
force in effectuating Mr. Hunt’s arrest, and (iii) there was
probable cause for Mr. Hunt’s arrest. Defs.’ Mem. Law Supp. Mot.
Summ. J. 1.
At the January 22, 2014 motion hearing, this Court from the
bench allowed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to
the counts set forth in section I above. This memorandum,
therefore, addresses the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
only as to counts I (use of excessive force), II (malicious
prosecution), and VI (Massachusetts Civil Rights Act violation
by the police officers), and VII (battery).
A.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The Court must “view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable
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inferences in that party's favor.” Barbour v. Dynamics Research
Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1995). As a prerequisite to
summary judgment, a moving party must demonstrate “an absence of
evidence to support the non-moving party's case.” Id. (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). The Court
must disregard evidence proffered by a party bearing the burden
of proof wherever a jury would be free to disbelieve such
evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 135 (2000).
B.
Overview of Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects public officials from civil
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as long as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights which a reasonable person would have known. See Veilleux
v. Perschau, 101 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)). This privilege constitutes
immunity from suit rather than a defense against liability and,
therefore, the immunity question ought be answered before the
case goes to trial. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001).
When an individual alleges that police officers violated
his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court analyzes whether
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qualified immunity applies under a three-part test. See id.
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First, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the party
alleging the injury, the question is whether the facts alleged
show that the officer violated a constitutional right. See id.
The second step is to ask whether the right was clearly
established. See id. The third prong of the analysis focuses on
whether an objectively reasonable officer in the defendant's
position would have understood that his action violated the
plaintiff's rights. See id. at 205.
C.
Count I. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Retaliation
and Excessive Force
For the purposes of this motion, Mr. Hunt concedes there was
a right to arrest him and narrows his opposition to the claim of
excessive force. Pls.’ Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3. This
analysis, therefore, does not address Mr. Hunt’s retaliation
claim but only the use of excessive force in the course of the
arrest.
1.
Prong One. The Constitutional Violation
The inquiry before this Court becomes whether the routine
procedure of handcuffing an arrestee behind the back can
constitute excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
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The Supreme Court gave lower courts the flexibility to
determine whether following the three-step Saucier procedure was
appropriate in each case. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
242 (2009). Thus, the analysis is not mandatory but subject to
the court´s discretion.
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when a non-threatening arrestee for a minor crime (like a
traffic violation) informs the police that he has just been
released from the hospital after surgery, and requests that he
be handcuffed with his hands in front.
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against use of
excessive force in the course of an arrest. See Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). The use of force is contrary
to the Fourth Amendment if it is excessive under objective
standards of reasonableness. See id. at 396. In evaluating the
objective reasonableness of the force used, the Graham case
considers three factors: “(i) the severity of the crime at
issue, (ii) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and (iii) whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9
(1985)).
Here, all three Graham factors weigh heavily in Mr. Hunt’s
favor. Parties to this case agree that Mr. Hunt was being
arrested for a minor offense, allegedly not paying a traffic
violation fine. Defs.’ Mem. Law. Mot. Summ. J. 5. It is also
undisputed that the Hunts told the officers that he had recently
been through a surgery and needed to be handcuffed in the front
to avoid being injured. Mr. Hunt’s Deposition 51. Despite seeing
the stitches, the police officers pushed him down the floor,
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kneed him and handcuffed him in the back. Id. at 53. Mr. Hunt
also claims that he did not try to protect himself or resist the
arrest in any way. Id. at 55-56. Mr. Hunt allegations are
strengthened by the video recorded by his son, which shows the
officers pushing Mr. Hunt to the floor and kneeing him. See The
Video.
The role of the video in the present analysis bears a
resemblance to the video at the center of Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372 (2007), and the devastating analysis of that opinion in
Dan M. Kahan, et. al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122
Harv. L. Rev. 837 (2009) (“Whose Eyes”).
I have reviewed the video. What I personally think of it is
immaterial. Cf. Whose Eyes at 839-840 (quoting the transcript of
the oral argument in Scott).
The legal question is akin to ruling on the sufficiency of
the evidence, i.e. could an American jury, properly impaneled
and accurately instructed as to the controlling law, reasonably
conclude upon the evidence favorable to the Hunts that the
police officer used excessive force in making the arrest?
Recognizing the jury as the “conscience of the community,”
Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968), it
must be accorded a wide range of judgment in addressing this
issue. Whose Eyes at 901.
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This Court rules that the Hunts’ evidence is sufficient to
get Mr. Hunt to the jury. Of course this ruling contains an
evaluative element. It is significant to note, however, that the
evaluation is in no way an evaluation of the video. It is,
rather, of what this Court thinks a jury could infer from the
video.
Here, the Hunts’ evidence is sufficiently strong for a fact
finder to conclude that that officers violated Mr. Hunt´s
constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable exercise of
force when they handcuffed him in the back, pushed him down the
floor and kneed him in the back and leg, ignoring his request
that he needed to be handcuffed in the front.
2.
Prong Two. The Right was Clearly
Established.
The First Circuit has observed that a right is clearly
established when there is existing case law giving “the
defendants fair warning that their conduct violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights.” Suboh v. District Attorney's
Office of Suffolk District, 298 F.3d 81, 93 (1st Cir. 2002); see
also Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2010)
(holding that the right is clearly established if courts have
previously ruled that similar conduct was unconstitutional, or
if the conduct is such an obvious violation of the Fourth
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Amendment that a reasonable officer would not have required
prior case law on the point).
One judge in this District has previously held that a police
officer had no qualified immunity and might be found to have
used excessive force when he refused to handcuff an injured
traffic violation arrestee in the front. Aceto v. Kachajian, 240
F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 (D. Mass. 2003) (Saris, J.) (denying motion
for summary judgment even though the arrestee did not have any
sign of injury, because she informed the officer of her injured
shoulder). Other courts have also held that refusing to handcuff
an arrestee in the front constitutes excessive force when the
arrestee claims that he is injured. See, e.g., Howard v.
Dickerson, 34 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 1994) (denying officer's
motion for summary judgment because he showed deliberate
indifference to a medical condition by handcuffing arrestee
behind her back when she was wearing a neck brace, she told the
officer of her injury and recent surgery, and third party
confirmed that plaintiff should not be handcuffed behind her
back); Eason v. Anoka-Hennepin E. Metro Narcotics & Violent
Crimes Task Force, No. 00-311 PAM/SRN, 2002 WL 1303023 at *5 (D.
Minn. June 6, 2002) (concluding that arresting officers are
required to take an arrestee's preexisting injury into account,
assessing the level of force needed in each case); Caron v.
Hester, No. 00-394-M, 2001 WL 1568761 at *5 (D.N.H. Nov. 13,
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2001) (recognizing courts generally agree that officers must
take note of the suspect's complaints about injuries and make
some effort to accommodate the claimed conditions).
The cases cited establish that when a non-threatening, nonflight-risk arrestee for a minor crime tells the police he
suffers from an injury that would be exacerbated by handcuffing
his arms behind his back, a factual issue implicating excessive
force is raised, even if the injury is not visible.
3.
Prong Three. Whether a Reasonable Officer
Would Understand his Conduct was Unlawful.
The dispositive inquiry is whether a reasonable officer
would understand that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
he confronted. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987). Although not “every push or shove” will reach the level
required for an actionable excessive force claim, Alexis v.
McDonald's Restaurants of Massachusetts, Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 352
(1st Cir. 1995), no reasonably competent officer would have
thought that a non-threatening arrestee like Mr. Hunt, who had
just been released from the hospital and was charged with a
traffic violation posed a risk of flight or evading arrest. Any
reasonable officer confronting Hunt’s situation should have
known that handcuffing his arms behind his back in such
circumstances could constitute unlawful excessive force. See
Aceto, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 127.
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The use of violence against individuals who pose no safety
threat is unreasonable, and that fact would have been understood
by an objectively reasonable officer. See Asociacion de
Periodistas de Puerto Rico v. Mueller, 529 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir.
2008).
Accordingly, officers Massi and Porter are not entitled to
qualified immunity and this Court DENIES their motion for
summary judgment on the excessive force claim.
D.
Count VII. Battery by the Police Officers.
Under Massachusetts law, police officers are liable for
assault and battery when they use excessive force in conducting
an arrest. Powers v. Sturtevant, 199 Mass. 265, 266 (1908). The
First Circuit has ruled that when a plaintiff alleges both a
section 1983 excessive force claim and common law claims for
assault and battery, the court’s “determination of the
reasonableness of the force used under section 1983 controls
[the] determination of the reasonableness of the force used
under the common law assault and battery claims.” Raiche, 623
F.3d at 40. Because the police officers are not entitled to
qualified immunity as to Mr. Hunt’s section 1983 claim and
potentially used excessive force when arresting him, this Court
DENIES the police officers’ motion for summary judgment on the
battery claim.
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E.
Count II. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Though
Malicious Prosecution. Count IX. Common Law Malicious
Prosecution
Although it is not completely clear from Mr. Hunt´s
complaint and opposition to the motion for summary judgment, it
appears that he attempts to raise dual malicious prosecution
claims against the police officers based upon two events: (1)
his arrest on June 6, 2011; and (2) his prosecution for assault
and battery by the police officers. Compl. 6; Pls.’ Opp’n Defs.’
Mot. Summ. J. 5-6.
The elements of the common law action for malicious
prosecution in Massachusetts are: “(i) the commencement or
continuation of a criminal proceeding against the eventual
plaintiff at the behest of the eventual defendant; (ii) the
termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (iii) an
absence of probable cause for the charges; and (iv) actual
malice.” Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001)
(citing Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314 (1991)).
Malicious prosecution can sometimes imply a violation of
the Fourth Amendment and, thus, constitute ground for a cause of
action under section 1983. See id. at 54. To prevail in such
cases, the plaintiff must prove “the absence of probable cause
to initiate proceedings.” Meehan v. Town of Plymouth, 167 F.3d
85, 89 (1st Cir. 1999).
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1.
Malicious Prosecution as to Mr. Hunt’s
arrest on June 6, 2011
In his complaint, Mr. Hunt alleges that by arresting him on
June 6, 2011, the police officers maliciously prosecuted him,
violating several constitutional rights, including his right to
be free from arrest without probable cause. Compl. 6. In his
opposition to the police officers’ motion, however, he concedes
that “a right to arrest” existed. Pls.’ Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ.
J. Accordingly, this Court concludes that Mr. Hunt has dropped
his claim for malicious prosecution on this ground and grants
the police officers’ motion for summary judgment thereon.
Even assuming Mr. Hunt has not waived his malicious
prosecution claim arising out of this arrest, other
considerations drive this Court to the same conclusion. The
arrest was made pursuant to an arrest warrant, and there is no
indication that the arrest warrant was not facially valid or
that the police officers lacked the authority to execute it.
Furthermore, other than executing the warrant, there is no
evidence that the police officers otherwise took part in the
legal process or were involved in collecting the traffic
violation fine. See Felix v. Lugas, No. 122250, 2004 WL 1775996
at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 2, 2004) (Bowler, M.J.) (recommending to
grant summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim
because police officers had an arrest warrant, and they were not
17
involved in the proceedings that originated the warrant). Mr.
Hunt's malicious prosecution claim against the police officers
as to the June 6, 2011 arrest fails to survive summary judgment.
2.
Malicious Prosecution as to the Charges
Brought by the Police Officers After the
Altercation
As to the second event that might trigger a malicious
prosecution claim, the inquiry is whether the defendants had
probable cause to initiate the criminal charges against Mr. Hunt
for resisting arrest, and assault and battery.
Probable cause is judged by an objective standard, asking
whether “the facts and circumstances were sufficient to warrant
a reasonable person in believing that the suspect had or was
committing a crime.” Felix, 2004 WL 1775996 at *6. “The quantity
and quality of proof necessary to ground a showing of probable
cause is not the same as the quantity and quality of proof
necessary to convict.” Roche v. John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 81 F.3d 249, 255 (1st Cir. 1996).
The police officers charged Mr. Hunt with resisting arrest
and assault and battery. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 12, Criminal
Docket and Criminal Complaint, (“Criminal Records”), ECF. No.
19-1. In their reports, they claim that Mr. Hunt initially
refused to see the police officers, resisted being handcuffed,
and hit one of the officers. Police Reports 3-12. According to
Mr. and Mrs. Hunt’s versions, however, Mr. Hunt did not try to
18
protect himself or resist in any way. Mr. Hunt’s Deposition 55;
Mrs. Hunt’s Deposition 62.
Because the parties’ testimonies about Mr. Hunt resisting
the arrest differ, there are disputed issues of material fact as
to whether the police officers had probable cause to initiate
prosecution against Mr. Hunt for resisting arrest, thus
precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, this court DENIES the
police officers’ motion for summary judgment for malicious
prosecution as to the charges brought by the police officers
after the altercation.
F.
Count VI. Violation of Massachusetts Civil Rights Act
(“MCRA”)
At the January 22, 2014 motion session, this Court granted
the Town of Falmouth’s motion for summary judgment on this count
because a municipality is not a person subject to liability
under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”). See Howcroft
v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 592-593 (2001). The
analysis here is limited to the police officers’ motion for
summary judgment.
The MCRA provides a cause of action for an individual whose
rights under the Constitution or laws of either the United
States or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have been violated
by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12,
§§ 11H & I.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the First
Circuit have held that MCRA claims are subject to the same
standard of immunity for police officers that is used for claims
asserted under section 1983. See Duarte v. Healy, 405 Mass. 43,
46 (1989); Raiche, 623 F.3d at 40. Mr. Hunt's MCRA claim, like
his section 1983 claim, is based on the allegation that the
officers used excessive force when they arrested him. Because
the police officers are not protected by qualified immunity with
respect to the section 1983 excessive force claim, this Court
likewise conclude that they are not entitled to qualified
immunity against the MCRA claim alleging excessive force. The
Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
this count.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to count I (use of
excessive force), count II and IX (malicious prosecution only as
to the charges brought by the police officers against Mr. Hunt),
count VI (the police officers´ Massachusetts Civil Rights Act
violation), and count VII (battery); and GRANTS the motion as to
counts II and IX (malicious prosecution as to the June 6, 2011
arrest).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ William G. Young
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE
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