Galletly v. Coventry Health Care, Inc. et al

Filing 29

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. In accordance with the foregoing, defendants motion todismiss (Docket No. 6) for want of personal jurisdiction is, with respectto defendant Christopher Watson, DENIED, but, with respect to David Young, ALLOWED; and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is, with respect to Count II, DENIED, but, with respect to Counts III and IV, ALLOWED. So ordered. (Patch, Christine)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
________________________________
)
JAMES GALLETLY, III
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
Civil Action No.
)
13-10658-NMG
COVENTRY HEALTHCARE, INC.,
)
COVENTRY HEALTHCARE WORKERS
)
COMPENSATION, INC., DAVID YOUNG, )
and CHRISTOPHER WATSON,
)
Defendants.
)
________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants, his employer and former
supervisors, unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of
his age when they terminated him.

He also claims breach of

contract and two state law torts arising out of the same
discriminatory actions.

Defendants now move for partial

dismissal.
I.

Background
A.

Parties

Plaintiff James Galletly, III (“plaintiff”) was employed by
defendants Coventry Healthcare Workers Compensation, Inc.
(“CHWC”) and Coventry Healthcare, Inc. (“CHC”) (together,
“Coventry”) between April, 2007 and July, 2010.

During that

time, defendant David Young (“Young”) served as

CHWC’s Chief

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Executive Officer and President and defendant Christopher Watson
(“Watson”) served as CHWC’s Chief Operating Officer.
B.

Allegations Related to Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff began his employment with CHWC in April, 2007 as
Vice President of CHWC’s Worker’s Compensation Division in
Burlington, Massachusetts.

In August, 2008 he became the manager

of CHWC’s Independent Medical Examinations (“IME”) unit.
During that time, CHWC maintained a disciplinary policy set
forth in an Employee Handbook (“the Handbook”) that called for
the placement of employees who were perceived to be in need of
rehabilitation on a Positive Improvement Plan (“PIP”) prior to
termination.

Although plaintiff did not have a written

employment contract, he claims that the Handbook constituted a
contract between CHWC and plaintiff and, in support of that
claim, he noted that he was required to place his own
subordinates on a PIP prior to their termination.
Plaintiff further alleges that he was terminated without
notice and without being enrolled in a PIP in July, 2010.

At the

time of his termination, plaintiff was 58 years old and he claims
that he was replaced by an individual more than five years
younger than he is.
C.

Jurisdictional Facts

The Court accepts the following allegations as true, for the
purpose of resolving defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of

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personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants, Watson and
Young.
Defendant Watson served as plaintiff’s direct supervisor
during the final six months of his employment and, in that role,
Watson contacted plaintiff frequently by telephone and email
while plaintiff was working at Coventry’s office in Burlington,
Massachusetts.

Defendant Watson also visited plaintiff’s office

on three occasions during that six-month period in order to
provide further supervision to plaintiff.

Defendant Watson

ultimately terminated plaintiff by telephone, while plaintiff was
working in that office.
Defendant Young, in turn, supervised defendant Watson and
the individual preceding Watson who acted as plaintiff’s direct
supervisor.

Young visited Coventry’s Burlington, Massachusetts

office several times each year in order to supervise the overall
operations and to meet with senior members of Coventry’s staff
there.
D.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the Complaint against defendants in
Massachusetts Superior Court for Essex County in December, 2012
alleging four counts. Count I alleges age discrimination in
violation of the Massachusetts Anti-Discrimination Statute,
M.G.L. c. 151B (“Chapter 151B”) against all defendants; Count II
alleges breach of contract/reliance against Coventry; Count III

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alleges negligent supervision and retention against Coventry; and
Count IV alleges interference with prospective economic relations
against Young and Watson.
Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 in March, 2013 and filed the pending
motion to dismiss shortly thereafter.

This Court heard oral

argument on the motion on July 2, 2013.
II.

Analysis
Defendants move to dismiss the claims against Young and

Watson for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(2), and to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
A.

Dismissal of Defendants Young and Watson for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction

Defendants contend that Young and Watson do not have
sufficient contacts with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to be
subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court because their
in-state contacts are not sufficiently related to plaintiff’s
claims.
1.

Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction,
the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction
is 1) statutorily authorized and 2) consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
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Astro-Med,

Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009).
Because the Massachusetts long-arm statute reaches to the full
extent that the Constitution allows, the Court may proceed
directly to the Constitutional analysis to determine if
defendants have “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that
the “maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.”

Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70

F.3d 1381, 1388 (1st Cir. 1995).
The First Circuit employs a tripartite analysis to determine
whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction, i.e. personal
jurisdiction over the opposing party for the instant matter, is
appropriate: 1) whether the claims arise out of or are related to
the defendant’s in-state activities, 2) whether the defendant has
purposefully availed itself of the laws of the forum state and 3)
whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under the
circumstances.

See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1389; accord Platten v.

HG Bermuda Exempted, Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 135 (1st Cir. 2006).
Relevant here, the “relatedness” test is a “flexible,
relaxed” standard that focuses on the nexus between the
plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state.

Astro-Med, 591 F.3d at 9.

The defendant need not be

present in the forum state to conduct activity or cause injury
therein.

See id. at 10.

In assessing an employee’s contacts

with the forum state, employees are

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not to be judged according to their employer’s activities
[but by whether they were] primary participants in the
alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed at the forum.
See LaVallee v. Parrott-Ice Drink Prods. of Am., Inc., 193 F.
Supp. 2d 296, 301 (D. Mass. 2002).
2.

Application

Defendant Watson has had enough contacts with the forum
state that are sufficiently related to the cause of action for
this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him.

Other

sessions of this Court have exercised specific jurisdiction over
individual corporate officers where such officers mailed
solicitation letters, placed numerous telephone calls and
personally visited the forum on behalf of their employer.

See,

e.g., Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 573 F.
Supp. 1106, 1111 (D. Mass. 1983).

Here, plaintiff alleges that

Watson was his direct supervisor, that Watson personally
supervised Galletly at CHWC’s Burlington office approximately
three times in the six months prior to Galletly’s termination,
and that plaintiff was terminated by Watson over the telephone
while plaintiff was at CHWC’s office in Burlington.
On the other hand, defendant Young’s contacts with the
Commonwealth are limited and unrelated to the cause of action and
this Court will decline to exercise specific jurisdiction over
him.

Plaintiff does not allege that he had any personal contact

with Young nor that Young supervised him in any specific manner.

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Rather, plaintiff merely claims that, generally, Young conspired
to terminate him due to his age and interfered with his
relationship with Coventry.

Such vague allegations do not

suggest that Young played any specific role in plaintiff’s
termination and the Court finds that they are insufficient to
provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over Young.

See Wang

v. Schroeter, No. 11-10009, 2011 WL 6148579, at *5 (D. Mass. Dec.
9, 2011) (court lacked personal jurisdiction over individual
defendant where plaintiff’s allegations that defendant “failed to
pay” him and “terminated” him were insufficient to establish
sufficient contacts ).

Similarly, although Young did visit

plaintiff’s office on several occasions, those visits do not
provide a basis for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over
Young because he was not plaintiff’s direct supervisor at the
time nor were the visits otherwise related to plaintiff’s claims
here. See Interface Group-Massachusetts, LLC v. Rosen, 256 F.
Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D. Mass. 2003) (individual defendant’s
business trips and telephone calls to plaintiff’s office were
insufficient to establish jurisdiction because they bore no
relation to plaintiff’s tortious interference claim).
Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction will be denied with respect to defendant
Watson but allowed with respect to defendant Young.

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B.

Dismissal of Common Law Claims

Defendants also contend that plaintiff’s common law claims
must be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim because they are barred by the
exclusivity provision of Chapter 151B.
1.

Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
“sufficient factual matter” to state a claim for relief that is
actionable as a matter of law and “plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A claim is facially

plausible if, after accepting as true all non-conclusory factual
allegations, the court can draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ocasio-Hernandez

v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).

A court may

not disregard properly pled factual allegations even if actual
proof of those facts is improbable. Id.

Rather, the relevant

inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of
liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw. Id. at
13.

When rendering that determination, a court may not look

beyond the facts alleged in the complaint, documents incorporated
by reference therein and facts susceptible to judicial notice.
Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011).

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2.

Exclusivity under Chapter 151B

Under Massachusetts law, Chapter 151B provides the exclusive
remedy for employment discrimination “not based on preexisting
tort law or constitutional protections.”

Charland v. Muzi

Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 586, 631 N.E.2d 555, 559 (1994).
Nevertheless, when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant’s conduct
violates both Chapter 151B and pre-existing common law, the
common law claims that are “merely recast versions” of
allegations of employment discrimination are barred by Chapter
151B and must be dismissed.

See Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422

Mass. 551, 557-58, 664 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996) (citing Charland,
631 N.E.2d at 555).
3.

Application

Counts III and IV, alleging negligent supervision and
interference with beneficial economic relations, appear to be
“merely recast versions” of plaintiff’s age discrimination claim
because plaintiff does not allege any facts to support those
claims other than his wrongful termination.

As another Session

of this Court put it when addressing a negligent supervision
claim:
The fact that plaintiff describes what he suffered as
damages flowing from negligent supervision, rather than from
employment discrimination, does not change the essence of
his claim which he originally characterized as a
discrimination claim.
Choroszy v. Wentworth Inst. of Tech., 915 F. Supp. 446, 450-51
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(D. Mass. 1996).

Accordingly, Counts III and IV are barred by

the exclusivity provision of Chapter 151B and will be dismissed.
With respect to Count II, however, plaintiff alleges that
Coventry breached its obligations under his employment contract.
Although the parties dispute whether the Handbook actually
constitutes a contract, for the purpose of resolving the instant
motion to dismiss the Court will assume that it does.

See

Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 1998)
(explaining that question of whether personnel manual constitutes
binding contract is reserved for fact-finder and depends upon
multiple factors).

Assuming then that the Handbook was a

contract, plaintiff’s breach of contract claim proceeds as
follows: defendant was obligated to afford alternative discipline
to plaintiff before terminating him, they failed to do so and
therefore breached that contract.

Those allegations do not

“merely recast” plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim
because the breach of contract claim rests on defendant’s failure
to fulfill its additional obligation to provide initial
discipline to plaintiff before termination, rather than its
statutory obligation to comply with state law at the time of
termination.

Courts have permitted breach of contract claims to

proceed alongside employment discrimination claims under similar
circumstances, and this Court will do so the same.

See Harrison

v. Foodcrafts, Civ. No. 07-10233-RWZ, 2007 WL 3232552, at *3 (D.

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Mass. Oct. 30, 2007) (denying dismissal of suit for breach of
contract rooted in previous settlement agreement and not in
defendant’s statutory duties under Chapter 151B); Long v. Am.
Int’l Adjustment Co., Inc., Civ. No. 86-0060-MA, 1986 WL 9806, at
*2 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 1986) (same).
Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied
with respect to Count II.
ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing, defendant’s motion to
dismiss (Docket No. 6)
1)

for want of personal jurisdiction is, with respect
to defendant Christopher Watson, DENIED, but, with
respect to David Young, ALLOWED; and

2)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted is, with respect to Count II, DENIED,
but, with respect to Counts III and IV, ALLOWED.

So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated July 25, 2013

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