Martinez-Lopez v. Colvin
Filing
35
Magistrate Judge Judith G. Dein: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER denying 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Order Reversing the Commissioner's Decision, and allowing 26 Defendant's Motion to Affirm the Commissioner's Decision. (Dambrosio, Jolyne)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
JAYLEN MARTINEZ-LOPEZ,
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 13-10996-JGD
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS REGARDING
DENIAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
October 22, 2014
DEIN, U.S.M.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Jaylen Martinez-Lopez (“Martinez-Lopez”), has brought this action
pursuant to sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g) and 1383(c)(3), in order to challenge the final decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her claims for Social Security
Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. The
matter is before the court on the “Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Reversing the
Commissioner’s Decision” (Docket No. 13), by which the plaintiff is seeking an order
reversing the Commissioner’s decision and remanding the matter back to the Social
Security Administration for further consideration. It is also before the court on the
“Defendant’s Motion to Affirm the Commissioner’s Decision” (Docket No. 26), by which
the Commissioner is seeking an order upholding her decision to deny the plaintiff’s
claims for benefits. At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), in
reaching his conclusion that Martinez-Lopez was not disabled, failed to apply the appropriate analysis in connection with his determination that her physical impairments were not
“severe.” Also at issue is whether the ALJ appropriately weighed the available opinion
evidence regarding the extent of the plaintiff’s mental limitations. For all the reasons
described below, this court finds that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence. Therefore, the plaintiff’s motion to reverse and remand is DENIED, and the
defendant’s motion to affirm is ALLOWED.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Martinez-Lopez was born on March 15, 1984, and was 25 years old at the time she
applied for Social Security benefits. (Tr. 67, 812). Although she left high school shortly
before completing her senior year, Martinez-Lopez was able to earn a GED in 2002. (Tr.
96, 833-34). She also has held a variety of jobs, including jobs as a waitress, a cashier at
a grocery store, a car rental agent, a customer service representative, and a gate agent for
an airline company. (Tr. 97, 834-44). However, the plaintiff left her last job as a gate
agent in April 2009, after her obstetrician advised her to stay out of work due to an
outbreak of scabies among employees at the airport. (Tr. 96, 235). At that time,
1
References to pages in the transcript of the record proceedings shall be cited as “Tr.
__.” The ALJ’s Decision shall be cited as “Dec.” and can be found beginning at Tr. 14.
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Martinez-Lopez was pregnant with her third child and was experiencing a number of
complications with the pregnancy. (Tr. 235; see also Tr. 813). Following the delivery of
her child in May 2009, Martinez-Lopez suffered severe post-partum depression and
anxiety for which she obtained psychiatric treatment. (Tr. 233-35). She claims that her
mental impairments, as well as a number of physical impairments, have prevented her
from returning to work or from carrying out any alternative type of gainful employment.
(Tr. 845).
Procedural History
On January 14, 2010, the plaintiff filed applications for SSI and SSDI, claiming
that she had been unable to work since July 15, 2009 due to post-partum psychosis. (Tr.
67-69, 95, 812-819). She later alleged disability due to depression, anxiety, asthma,
arthritis, and obesity as well. (See Tr. 106, 845). Her applications were denied initially
in March 2010, and upon reconsideration in September 2010. (Tr. 820-23, 824-27; see
also Dec. 1; Tr. 14). The plaintiff then requested and was granted a hearing before an
ALJ, which took place on October 18, 2011. (Tr. 66, 828-67). Martinez-Lopez, who was
represented by counsel, appeared and testified at the hearing. (Tr. 828, 833-60). The
ALJ also elicited testimony from a Vocational Expert (“VE”), who described the
plaintiff’s vocational background based on her past work experience, and responded to
hypothetical questions designed to determine whether jobs exist in the national and
regional economies for an individual with the same age, educational background, work
experience, and residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as Martinez-Lopez. (Tr. 861-65).
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On January 31, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision denying the plaintiff’s
applications for benefits. (Tr. 11-33). Martinez-Lopez then filed a request for review of
the ALJ’s decision by the Social Security Appeals Council. (Tr. 9-10). On February 21,
2013, the Appeals Council denied the plaintiff’s request for review, thereby making the
ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner for purposes of review. (Tr. 5-7).
Accordingly, the plaintiff has exhausted all of her administrative remedies, and the case is
ripe for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ concluded that from July 15, 2009 through the date of his decision on
January 31, 2012, Martinez-Lopez “ha[d] not been under a disability within the meaning
of the Social Security Act[,]” which defines “disability” as “the inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment or combination of impairments that can be expected to result in death or that
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
(Dec. 1; Tr. 14). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). There is no
dispute that the ALJ, in reaching his decision that Martinez-Lopez was not disabled,
performed the five-step sequential evaluation required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and
416.920. The procedure resulted in the following analysis, which is detailed further in
the ALJ’s “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.” (See Dec. 3-19; Tr. 16-32).
The first inquiry in the five-step evaluation process is whether the claimant is
“engaged in substantial gainful work activity[.]” Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
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Cir. 2001). If so, the claimant is automatically considered not disabled and the
application for benefits is denied. See id. In this case, the ALJ found that MartinezLopez had not engaged in such activity since July 15, 2009, the alleged onset date of her
disability. (Dec. Finding #2; Tr. 16). Therefore, the ALJ proceeded to the second step in
the sequential analysis.
The second inquiry is whether the claimant has a “severe impairment,” meaning an
“impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [her] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If
not, the claimant is deemed not to be disabled and the application for benefits is denied.
See Seavey, 276 F.3d at 5. Here, the ALJ determined that Martinez-Lopez suffered from
two severe mental impairments – depression and anxiety – but that her asthma, arthritis
and obesity were not severe. (Dec. Finding #3; Tr. 16). The plaintiff challenges this
conclusion, and contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating the severity of her physical
conditions.
In connection with his finding at step two, the ALJ provided a detailed description
of the medical evidence relating to the plaintiff’s physical conditions. (Dec. 3-7; Tr. 1620). In particular, the ALJ reviewed the medical records relating to the plaintiff’s history
of arthritis and asthma, as well as medical records reflecting the plaintiff’s complaints
about her weight. (Id.). He also considered the opinion of a State agency physician, R.C.
Brown, M.D., who reviewed the plaintiff’s medical records and determined that her
physical impairments were not severe. (Dec. 4; Tr. 17). In addition, the ALJ considered
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the plaintiff’s testimony regarding the nature and extent of her pain and other symptoms,
including the impact of her symptoms on her ability to perform day-to-day activities.
(Dec. 5; Tr. 18). Based on his review of the evidence, the ALJ determined that there was
no support for a finding that the symptoms caused by the plaintiff’s asthma “are of such
duration or intensity to interfere with her ability to perform work activities.” (Dec. 6; Tr.
19). Accordingly, he determined that her asthma was not severe. (Id.). With respect to
the plaintiff’s arthritis and obesity, the ALJ rendered the following conclusion:
The medical evidence as a whole does not support a finding that
the claimant suffers from symptoms and/or limitations due to
arthritis or obesity that are not associated with pregnancy or not
controlled with medication when she is not pregnant. I find that the
claimant’s arthritis and obesity are only severe impairments while
she is pregnant, and as such are not expected to last 12 months (20
CFR 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and 416.920(a)(4)(ii)). I give weight to the
assessment of Dr. Brown at Exhibit 10F. No treating source has
identified greater physical limitation.
(Dec. 7; Tr. 20). Therefore, he determined that those impairments too were not severe for
purposes of the disability analysis. (Dec. 3; Tr. 16). For the reasons described below,
this court finds that there is substantial support for these findings.
Because the ALJ determined that Martinez-Lopez suffered from severe mental
impairments, he proceeded to step three in the sequential analysis. The third inquiry is
whether the claimant has an impairment equivalent to a specific list of impairments
contained in Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. See Seavey, 276 F.3d at 5;
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). At this step, the ALJ concluded that
the plaintiff’s impairments, either alone or in combination, did not meet or medically
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equal any of the listed impairments. (Dec. Finding #4; Tr. 20). Accordingly, his analysis
continued.
The fourth inquiry asks whether “the applicant’s ‘residual functional capacity’ is
such that he or she can still perform past relevant work[.]” Seavey, 276 F.3d at 5. In the
instant case, the ALJ determined as follows with respect to the plaintiff’s RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range
of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional
limitations: the claimant is able to understand and remember simple
instructions; she is able to concentrate for 2-hour periods over an
8-hour workday on simple tasks; she is able to interact appropriately
with co-workers and supervisors, but should avoid work which
requires frequent contact with the general public; and she is able to
adapt to changes in the work setting.
(Dec. Finding #5; Tr. 22).
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered the plaintiff’s symptoms and the
extent to which her symptoms could “reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
objective medical evidence and other evidence[.]” (Dec. 9; Tr. 22). He also considered
opinions that had been expressed by several treating and non-treating sources. (Id.).
Martinez-Lopez contends that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions of an advising
State agency psychologist, Carol McKenna, Ph.D., and the plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Tony Lim, M.D. For the reasons discussed below, this court disagrees and finds
that the ALJ’s handling of the opinion evidence was proper.
After explaining the basis for his RFC determination, the ALJ concluded that
Martinez-Lopez was unable to perform her past relevant work as a retail cashier, custo-7-
mer service agent, automobile rental agent or gate agent. (Dec. 18; Tr. 31). Consequently, he reached the fifth and last step in the sequential analysis.
The fifth inquiry is whether, given the claimant’s RFC, education, work experience and age, the claimant is capable of performing other work. See Seavey, 276 F.3d at
5; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). At step five, the Commissioner has the burden
“of coming forward with evidence of specific jobs in the national economy that the applicant can still perform.” Seavey, 276 F.3d at 5. Here, the ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony to conclude that Martinez-Lopez was capable of performing work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy. (Dec. 18-19; Tr. 31-32). Therefore, the
ALJ found that she was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Dec. 20; Tr. 33).
Additional factual details relevant to this court’s analysis are described below
where appropriate.
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
By her complaint, Martinez-Lopez is seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s “final decision” pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) (the “Act”). Section 205(g) provides in relevant part as follows:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party,
irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of
such decision by a civil action .... The court shall have power to
enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment
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affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has defined “substantial
evidence” to mean “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L. Ed. 126
(1938)); accord Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st
Cir. 1991).
As the First Circuit has explained,
In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, we are to keep in
mind that “issues of credibility and the drawing of permissible
inference from evidentiary facts are the prime responsibility of the
[Commissioner].” The [Commissioner] may (and, under his regulations, must) take medical evidence. But the resolution of conflicts in
the evidence and the determination of the ultimate question of
disability is for him, not for the doctors or for the courts. We must
uphold the [Commissioner’s] findings in this case if a reasonable
mind, reviewing the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to
support his conclusion.
Lizotte v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 654 F.2d 127, 128 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting
Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981)).
Therefore, “the court’s function is a narrow one limited to determining whether there is
substantial evidence to support the [Commissioner’s] findings and whether the decision
conformed to statutory requirements.” Geoffroy v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 663
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F.2d 315, 319 (1st Cir. 1981). The Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, “even if
the record arguably could justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by
substantial evidence.” Rodriguez Pagan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 819 F.2d 1,
3 (1st Cir. 1987).
“Even in the presence of substantial evidence, however, the Court may review
conclusions of law, and invalidate findings of fact that are ‘derived by ignoring evidence,
misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts[.]’” Musto v. Halter, 135 F.
Supp. 2d 220, 225 (D. Mass. 2001) (quoting Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir.
1999) (per curiam)) (internal citations omitted). “Thus, if the ALJ made a legal or factual
error, the court may reverse or remand such decision to consider new, material evidence
or to apply the correct legal standard.” Ross v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 09-11392-DJC,
2011 WL 2110217, at *2 (D. Mass. May 26, 2011) (internal citation omitted).
B.
Failure to Find a Severe Physical Impairment
The plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision to deny her claim for benefits must be reversed and remanded because the ALJ erred at step two of the disability
analysis when he found that her asthma, arthritis and obesity were not severe impairments. Specifically, Martinez-Lopez contends that the ALJ failed to comply with Social
Security Ruling (“SSR”) 85-28, which provides guidance for finding that a claimant’s
impairments do not meet the severity requirements of the Social Security regulations. (Pl.
Mem. (Docket No. 16) at 14-16). She further contends that Dr. Brown’s assessment that
her physical impairments were not severe was flawed, and that the ALJ’s decision to
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credit Dr. Brown’s opinion was improper. (Pl. Reply Mem. (Docket No. 30) at 2-3). For
the reasons that follow, this court finds that the ALJ’s analysis at step two was appropriate, and does not warrant a remand to the Social Security Administration.
SSR 85-28
SSR 85-28 was issued in 1985 in order “[t]o clarify the policy for determining
when a person’s impairment(s) may be found ‘not severe[.]’” SSR 85-28, 1985 WL
56856, at *1 (S.S.A. 1985). Pursuant to the ruling,
[a]n impairment or combination of impairments is found “not
severe” and a finding of “not disabled” is made at this step when
medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a
combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than
a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work even if the
individual’s age, education, or work experience were specifically
considered (i.e., the person’s impairment(s) has no more than a
minimal effect on his or her physical or mental ability(ies) to
perform basic work activities).
Id. at *3. Therefore, “[t]he severity requirement cannot be satisfied when medical
evidence shows that the person has the ability to perform basic work activities[.]” Id.
See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a), 416.921(a) (“An impairment or combination of
impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit your physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities”).
Evidence Regarding Plaintiff’s Physical Impairments
The record does not support the plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ failed to comply
with the standard described in SSR 85-28. At step two, the ALJ conducted a detailed
review of the medical evidence pertaining to Martinez-Lopez’s physical conditions. With
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respect to the plaintiff’s asthma, the ALJ found that the plaintiff’s records described the
condition as mild, requiring only rare use of an albuterol inhaler. (Dec. 6; Tr. 19). He
also found no evidence that Martinez-Lopez had ever sought treatment primarily for
symptoms of asthma. (Id.). Because the ALJ determined that there was nothing to
support a finding “that the claimant has asthma symptoms that are of such duration or
intensity to interfere with her ability to perform work activities[,]” he found that her
asthma was “non-severe.” (Id.). The plaintiff has pointed to no evidence, and has
presented no arguments, which would support an alternative conclusion.
With respect to the plaintiff’s complaints of arthritis and obesity, the ALJ found,
based on his review of the medical records, that the only time Martinez-Lopez suffered
symptoms or limitations from these impairments, which could not be controlled with
medicine, was when she was pregnant. (Dec. 7; Tr. 20). Under the Social Security
regulations, an impairment is only considered severe at step two if it is expected to result
in death or if it has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12
months. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Because the ALJ
determined that the plaintiff’s arthritis and obesity were only severe during pregnancy, he
determined that they did not satisfy the duration requirement, and thus were “non-severe”
for purposes of the disability analysis. (Dec. 3, 7; Tr. 16, 20). This court concludes that
these findings were supported by substantial evidence.
As the ALJ noted in his written decision, the plaintiff first presented with arthritislike symptoms in October 2003, when she was admitted to the hospital after complaining
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of pain in her left shoulder, knees and neck. (Dec. 6; Tr. 19; see also Tr. 124-25).
Martinez-Lopez was seen in consultation with a rheumatologist, who believed that she
was experiencing a reactive process to a virus or chlamydia. (Tr. 125). She was
diagnosed with polyarthralgia, possibly reactive, and was started on naproxen and
doxycycline. (Tr. 124-25). As a result of the treatment, Martinez-Lopez felt better and
was discharged home. (Tr. 125).
The plaintiff complained of joint pain again in March 2004. (See Tr. 447, 449,
459). She was given a medrol dose pack and MTX, which improved her symptoms. (Tr.
447, 449). However, Martinez-Lopez did not refill her prescription and failed to appear
for a follow up appointment. (Id.). Subsequently, on November 16, 2004, MartinezLopez met with Deborah Saudek Collier, M.D., a rheumatologist. (Tr. 449). The
plaintiff reported pain and swelling in her knees and right wrist, as well as morning
stiffness in her knees, wrists, and metacarpophalangeal joints. (Id.). Upon examination,
Dr. Collier found point tenderness in the plaintiff’s right wrist and right knee effusion
with no warmth and mild pain with flexion. (Id.). However, the examination was
otherwise normal. (Tr. 449-51). Dr. Collier diagnosed Martinez-Lopez with inflammatory polyarthritis, RF negative, but could not determine whether it was seronegative
rheumatoid arthritis or reactive arthritis due to chlamydia. (Tr. 451). She noted that if it
were reactive arthritis, the condition should resolve over time. (Id.).
Martinez-Lopez met with Dr. Collier again in April 2005, and reported only mild,
occasional pain in her knees. (Tr. 447). Dr. Collier found that the plaintiff’s symptoms
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had improved significantly with the use of only naprosyn, and that her inflammatory
arthritis appeared to be resolving on its own. (Id.). She continued to prescribe naprosyn
and encouraged the plaintiff to exercise and follow a healthy diet. (Id.). Dr. Collier also
determined that there was no need to schedule another appointment unless further issues
arose or the plaintiff’s arthritis returned in the future. (Id.).
As the ALJ found and the record shows, Martinez-Lopez next complained of joint
pain in November 2005, when she was nearly 27 weeks pregnant. (See Dec. 7; Tr. 20,
413). Thus, on November 28, 2005, she reported lower back pain, which radiated down
her legs and made it difficult to walk, as well as a burning sensation in her left calf. (Tr.
413). The plaintiff had experienced a significant weight gain, and was over 200 pounds.
(Dec. 7; Tr. 20, 416). She was counseled about her weight and the physiological changes
of pregnancy, and was encouraged to take Tylenol, apply warmth to her back, massage
the affected area, and wear a maternity support belt. (Tr. 413).
In February 2006, when she was over 38 weeks pregnant, Martinez-Lopez
reported that she was experiencing back and knee pain, which was exacerbated by her
continued weight gain. (Tr. 378). She also reported that she was having trouble sleeping
and felt exhausted. (Id.). The plaintiff met with a midwife, who provided reassurance
with respect to her pregnancy. (Id.).
The record demonstrates that Martinez-Lopez was able to perform work as a gate
agent from 2007 to late April 2009, despite her physical impairments. (See Tr. 97).
Additionally, the evidence shows that she did not seek further treatment for joint pain
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until 2011, when she was pregnant with her fourth child. (See Tr. 97, 667). Thus, on
May 6, 2011, Martinez-Lopez was admitted to Massachusetts General Hospital (“MGH”)
after arriving at the emergency room with complaints of back pain, left-sided abdominal
pain, joint pain, and swelling. (See Tr. 667-72). She was diagnosed with a possible
pelvic inflammatory disease, and placed on antibiotics. (Tr. 661). Although there was no
clear relationship between the symptoms that resulted in her hospitalization and her
history of arthritis, she was treated in consultation with a rheumatologist, who started her
on a prednisone taper. (Tr. 661, 665). The plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on
May 10, 2011, and on May 16, 2011, during an appointment with her gynecologist, the
plaintiff reported that she felt “way better” and that her pain was under control. (Tr.
661).
Subsequently, on June 17, 2011, Martinez-Lopez met with Luis Arias-Urdaneta,
M.D., a rheumatologist at MGH. (Dec. 4; Tr. 17, 761-63). During the appointment, the
plaintiff informed Dr. Arias-Urdaneta that she had stopped taking ibuprofen, which she
had been taking to control joint pain, after discovering that she had become pregnant.
(Tr. 760). As a result, she experienced worsening pain and intermittent swelling in her
joints, as well as peripheral morning stiffness lasting approximately 30-45 minutes. (Id.).
Dr. Arias-Urdaneta examined the plaintiff and found tenderness to palpation in a few of
the plaintiff’s metacarpophalangeal joints, as well as in her proximal interphalangeal
joints, left wrist, knees, ankles and left hip. (Tr. 761). He also determined that MartinezLopez had a full range of motion in her lumbosacral spine, full muscle strength in her
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extremities, no sensory deficits, normal gait, and intact reflexes. (Id.). Dr. AriasUrdaneta advised the plaintiff that her treatment options were limited due to her pregnancy. (Tr. 762). However, with her obstetrician’s consent, she was placed on 5 mg per
day of prednisone. (Tr. 756).
The medical evidence indicates that Martinez-Lopez had no complaints of joint
pain while she remained on the prednisone. (See Tr. 751-57). It also indicates that she
failed to attend her scheduled follow-up appointments with Dr. Arias-Urdaneta. (Tr. 742,
748). Thus, the record supports the ALJ’s finding that Martinez-Lopez’s physical
impairments could be controlled with medication, and only became severe when she was
pregnant and stopped taking her medicine.2
The plaintiff argues that “[a] condition that requires medication as strong as
prednisone cannot be considered mild or minimal.” (Pl. Mem. at 15). This argument is
insufficient to undermine the ALJ’s decision. As an initial matter, the record shows that
2
In her Reply Memorandum, the plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s finding that Ms.
Martinez-Lopez’s arthritis was only a severe impairment while she was pregnant amounts to an
impermissible hunch or lay opinion by the ALJ[,]” and that the ALJ should have sought additional
evidence to determine whether her arthritis would resolve following the delivery of her baby. (Pl.
Reply Mem. at 4). However, “[a]t Step 2, the claimant has the burden of proving, through
objective medical evidence, that her impairments are severe.” Teves v. McMahon, 472 F. Supp.
2d 82, 86 (D. Mass. 2007). As described above, the objective medical evidence supports the
ALJ’s determination that Martinez-Lopez’s arthritis was only severe when she was pregnant, and
that it was otherwise controlled with medication. To the extent the plaintiff believed that
additional evidence was necessary, her counsel was free to pursue it. See Faria v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 187 F.3d 621 (Table), 1998 WL 1085810, at *1 (1st Cir. Oct. 2, 1998) (per curiam)
(where claimant is represented, the ALJ is “entitled to rely on claimant’s counsel to structure and
present the claimant’s case in a way that claimant’s claims are adequately explored” (quotations
and citations omitted)).
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prior to her admission to the hospital in May 2011, the plaintiff’s arthritis had been
controlled for years with anti-inflammatory medication such as naprosyn or ibuprofen.
(See Tr. 760). It also shows that the plaintiff stopped taking ibuprofen, and required
treatment with prednisone, only after discovering that she had become pregnant. (Tr.
756, 760). There is no evidence to suggest that such a change in treatment would have
been necessary if the plaintiff’s treatment options had not been limited by her pregnancy.
Accordingly, the record indicates that the prednisone was nothing more than a temporary
alternative to the use of anti-inflammatory medications.
In any event, “[i]f an impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it
cannot be considered disabling.” Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2004)
(quotations and citations omitted). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530(b), 416.930(b) (“If
you do not follow the prescribed treatment without a good reason, we will not find you
disabled”). Because the medical evidence shows that the plaintiff’s arthritis could be
controlled with medication, she has not established that it interfered more than minimally
with her ability to perform work.
The plaintiff also argues that “[b]y December 2011, Ms. Martinez-Lopez’s arthritis
symptoms had worsened to the point that she required the assistance of a walker and
wheelchair, despite restarting prednisone treatments.” (Pl. Mem. at 15). Accordingly,
she contends that her arthritis must be considered severe. (Id.). Again, the plaintiff’s
argument is not persuasive. While the medical evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff’s
ability to walk became increasingly compromised during the course of her 2011 preg-17-
nancy to the point where she decided to obtain a wheelchair, it does not support the
plaintiff’s assertion that those difficulties were caused by her arthritis rather than by her
pregnancy.
As the ALJ described in his analysis at step two, in late August 2011, when
Martinez-Lopez was nearly 20 weeks pregnant, she complained to her obstetrician that
she was experiencing low pressure and pelvic pain that was greater on the left than the
right. (Dec. 5; Tr. 18, 743-44). The plaintiff was prescribed a maternity belt, and was
advised to use Tylenol for pain. (Tr. 743). One month later, during a prenatal visit on
September 18, 2011, Martinez-Lopez complained of lower abdominal pain radiating to
her back and legs, along with some nausea and vomiting. (Tr. 739). However, the cause
of her symptoms remained unclear, and the plaintiff was encouraged to consider physical
therapy in order to treat her musculoskeletal discomfort. (Id.).
On October 5, 2011, the plaintiff met with Alissa Evangelista for a physical
therapy evaluation. (Tr. 792-94). According to Ms. Evangelista’s records, MartinezLopez stated that she had been experiencing increasing back, right buttock and pubic pain
since the start of her pregnancy. (Tr. 792). She also stated that she had been wearing a
maternity belt, but that it had not given her any relief. (Id.). In addition, the plaintiff
stated that she had a history of chronic back pain as a result of a car accident and a fall at
work in 2008. (Id.). Upon examination, Ms. Evangelista determined that the plaintiff’s
presentation was consistent with sacroiliac joint dysfunction (“SIJ”) and pelvic
hypermobility, which was limiting her level of function. (Tr. 793). She also indicated
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that she expected Martinez-Lopez to benefit from physical therapy, and that she anticipated a good resolution of the plaintiff’s symptoms. (Id.).
The plaintiff met with Ms. Evangelista again on October 31, 2011, and reported
that she had been experiencing terrible pain in her hips and lower back. (Tr. 782). Ms.
Evangelista noted that Martinez-Lopez “continues to present with SIJ and pubic insufficiency due to pregnancy, position of fetus and pre-existing chronic back pain.” (Id.). She
further indicated that the plaintiff would benefit from wearing an SIJ belt and using a
walker. (Id.). However, she did not indicate that the plaintiff’s pain or need for a walker
was related to her history of arthritis. (See id.).
During another physical therapy session on November 10, 2011, Ms. Evangelista
noted that the plaintiff was continuing to have a high level of pain, as well as difficulty
with her mobility. (Tr. 777). She also noted that Martinez-Lopez was experiencing pain
in her pubic symphysis while sitting. (Id.). Ms. Evangelista determined that the plaintiff
would benefit from exercising at home, but did not require further physical therapy at that
time. (Id.).
On December 1, 2011, when Martinez-Lopez was in her 33rd week of pregnancy,
she met with Allison Bailey, M.D. after complaining of severe bilateral groin and anterior
pelvic pain that was interfering with her ability to walk. (Tr. 772). Dr. Bailey noted that
the plaintiff had been experiencing pain in the pubic symphysis area since early on in her
pregnancy, and had also experienced worsening knee pain after she stopped taking antiinflammatory medication. (Id.). Following an examination, Dr. Bailey determined that
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Martinez-Lopez was likely suffering from an intra-articular hip disorder in the setting of
pelvic girdle pain and instability of pregnancy, as well as knee pain due to arthritis. (Id.).
She recommended the use of a short-acting opioid analgesic to control the plaintiff’s pain.
(Id.).
Subsequently, on December 7, 2011, the plaintiff met with her obstetrician for a
pre-natal appointment. (Tr. 771). Martinez-Lopez reported that she continued to suffer
from pubic pain and pressure, but that it became tolerable with the use of prednisone and
dilaudid. (Id.). She also stated that she was resting more, and would be picking up a
wheelchair later that day. (Id.). However, there is no evidence that the plaintiff’s
condition was caused by her physical impairments rather than complications from her
pregnancy, or that she would have experienced any such symptoms in the absence of
pregnancy. Moreover, the plaintiff’s assertion that her physical impairments were
“severe” within the meaning of the Social Security regulations is undermined by the fact
that the alleged onset of her disability did not occur until nearly five years after she was
first diagnosed with arthritis in November 2004, and by the fact that she was able to
remain employed until April 2009, well after her diagnosis. (See Tr. 96-97, 451).
Accordingly, there is no merit to the plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ failed to adhere to
the applicable standard or that he erred by finding that her physical impairments only
became severe during pregnancy.
Reliance on Dr. Brown’s Opinion
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The plaintiff also attributes error to the ALJ’s reliance on the opinion of Dr.
Brown. (See Pl. Mem. at 14-16; Pl. Reply Mem. at 2-3). On August 10, 2010, Dr.
Brown, a State agency physician, reviewed the available medical records and opined that
Martinez-Lopez was “physically not severe.” (Tr. 540). The ALJ explained that he had
given weight to Dr. Brown’s assessment, and reasoned that “[n]o treating source has
identified greater physical limitation.” (Dec. 7; Tr. 20). The plaintiff contends that this
was improper because Dr. Brown’s assessment reflected a misreading or misunderstanding of the evidence regarding Martinez-Lopez’s arthritis. (Pl. Mem. at 14; Pl. Reply
Mem. at 2). While this court agrees that Dr. Brown’s opinion is problematic in that he
failed to properly consider evidence related to plaintiff’s arthritis, this court finds that no
remand is warranted on this basis.
In rendering his opinion that the plaintiff’s physical impairments were not severe,
Dr. Brown considered the plaintiff’s claim of worsening back and knee pain resulting
from her obesity. (Tr. 540). After reviewing the medical evidence, Dr. Brown found that
Martinez-Lopez had a body mass index of 37.5 kg/m, and that her physical examinations
showed musculoskeletal strain in the L/S area. (Id.). However, Dr. Brown also noted
that the plaintiff’s spine was well aligned, with minimal degenerative changes, and that
her knees did not exhibit any laxity. (Id.). In addition, Dr. Brown found it significant
that Martinez-Lopez was able to engage in various activities of daily living, including but
not limited to, caring for her children, cooking, driving and caring for a dog. (Id.).
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Dr. Brown recognized that Martinez-Lopez was also claiming disability based on
symptoms of arthritis. (Id.). Significantly, however, Dr. Brown determined that
“[a]rthritis is not mentioned in the [medical evidence of record], nor is [there] objective
evidence of the disorder.” (Id.). As described above, the record substantiates a history of
arthritis and polyarthralgia dating back as early as 2003. Therefore, Dr. Brown’s assessment conflicts with the objective medical evidence.
Notwithstanding Dr. Brown’s failure to recognize the evidence of arthritis, this
court finds that the ALJ did not commit reversible error by giving some weight to Dr.
Brown’s opinion. As described above, Dr. Brown did consider the plaintiff’s claims of
disabling back and knee pain even though Dr. Brown did not attribute those symptoms to
arthritis. (See Tr. 540). However, Dr. Brown found that the plaintiff’s alleged limitations were inconsistent with x-rays of her spine and physical examinations of her knee, as
well as with her ability to perform various activities of daily living. (Id.). Moreover, as
the ALJ found, none of Martinez-Lopez’s treating physicians suggested that the plaintiff’s
physical impairments would interfere with her ability to work. Therefore, Dr. Brown’s
opinion provides some support for the ALJ’s conclusion that those impairments were not
severe.
More importantly, while the ALJ explained that he had given “weight” to Dr.
Brown’s opinion, he emphasized that his conclusions were based on a review of “[t]he
medical evidence as a whole[.]” (Dec. 7; Tr. 20). As discussed supra, that evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding at step two of the sequential analysis. Therefore, even
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assuming, arguendo, that the ALJ committed error by crediting Dr. Brown’s opinion, any
such error was harmless and does not warrant a remand.3 See Ward v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 211 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 2000) (ruling that “remand is not essential if it will
amount to no more than an empty exercise”).
C.
The ALJ’s Treatment of the Opinion Evidence
The plaintiff’s next challenge concerns the ALJ’s handling of the available opinion
evidence in connection with his finding that Martinez-Lopez retained the mental RFC to
understand and remember simple instructions, concentrate on simple tasks for 2-hour
periods over an 8-hour workday, interact appropriately with co-workers and supervisors,
and adapt to changes in the work setting, but should avoid work requiring frequent
contact with the general public. In support of this finding, the ALJ gave “great weight” to
the assessments of Dr. McKenna, a State agency psychologist, and Dr. Kleinman, a State
agency psychiatrist, but rejected the opinions of Dr. Lim, the plaintiff’s treating
psychiatrist, to the extent those opinions were inconsistent with his assessment of the
plaintiff’s RFC. (Dec. 17; Tr. 30). Martinez-Lopez contends that the ALJ committed
error by relying on the outdated opinion of Dr. McKenna, substituting his own assumptions and conclusions for the opinions of Dr. Lim, and crediting some aspects of Dr.
3
In light of this court’s conclusion that there was substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s decision at step two of the disability analysis, it is unnecessary to address the Commissioner’s argument that any error was harmless because the ALJ resolved this step in the plaintiff’s
favor in connection with her mental condition and proceeded to consider the combined effects of
all of her impairments at steps three and four. (See Def. Mem. (Docket No. 27) at 14-15).
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Lim’s assessment while rejecting others. (Pl. Mem. at 16-19). For the reasons that
follow, this court finds that the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion evidence was proper and
does not support a ruling in Martinez-Lopez’s favor.
Relevant Opinion Evidence
On March 20, 2010, Dr. McKenna completed a Psychiatric Review Technique
form and an assessment of Martinez-Lopez’s mental RFC based on a review of the
medical evidence through December 17, 2009. (Tr. 494-511). Therein, Dr. McKenna
found that Martinez-Lopez was suffering from a major depressive disorder (post-partum)
with psychotic features in partial remission, and an anxiety disorder with symptoms of
panic and generalized anxiety. (Tr. 496). Moreover, as the ALJ described in his decision, Dr. McKenna assessed the plaintiff as having mild restrictions in her activities of
daily living, moderate difficulties in social functioning, moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, and one or two episodes of decompensation.
(Dec. 14; Tr. 27; see also Tr. 508). She further opined that the plaintiff was able to
comprehend and recall simple information, complete the same level tasks for 2-hour
increments over the course of an 8-hour workday for 5 days per week, adapt to routine
changes following a brief period of adjustment, and engage in adequate social interaction,
although she could be sensitive to perceived criticism. (Dec. 14; Tr. 27; see also Tr.
496). Subsequently, on July 28, 2010, Dr. Kleinman conducted an analysis of the
medical records and completed a Case Analysis form in which he affirmed Dr.
McKenna’s opinions. (Dec. 15; Tr. 20; see also Tr 539). The ALJ explained that he had
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given these opinions “great weight” because they were “consistent with the record as a
whole.” (Dec. 17; Tr. 30). This court concludes that the ALJ’s decision on this matter is
entitled to deference.
The ALJ also considered the opinions of Dr. Lim. (Dec. 15; Tr. 28). Thus, as the
ALJ described in his written decision, on July 9, 2010, Dr. Lim completed a Psychiatric
Disorder questionnaire in which he stated that Martinez-Lopez had been diagnosed with a
major depressive disorder with psychotic features, as well as an anxiety disorder, and that
she had a current GAF score of 59. (Id.; see also Tr. 535). He also explained that the
plaintiff’s anxiety had started during the eighth month of her pregnancy, and had
worsened after delivery of her baby to the point where she began to show symptoms of
depression with auditory and visual hallucinations. (Id.). When asked to describe the
plaintiff’s current mental status, Dr. Lim stated that Martinez-Lopez appeared clean and
well-groomed, was able to maintain direct eye contact, was “[a]lert + oriented x 3,” had
clear and coherent speech, a full affect, and was able to maintain a direct thought process
that occurred at a normal rate. (Id.). He further indicated that she had no delusions or
hallucinations, no suicidal or homicidal ideation, and fair/good insight and judgment, but
that she suffered from poor sleep and exhibited a labile mood. (Id.).
Dr. Lim opined that Martinez-Lopez had no problems with memory, had the
capacity to sustain concentration and attention, required no excessive supervision, was
able to get along with others, and would be capable of handling monthly benefits. (Tr.
535-37). However, he indicated that she had a low stress tolerance and experienced
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panic attacks on public transportation or in other enclosed and crowded places. (Tr. 536).
Furthermore, according to Dr. Lim, Martinez-Lopez had been “unable to work” since her
most recent depressive episode “due to fluctuating mood and psychotic [symptoms].”
(Tr. 535). He described her prognosis as “Guarded,” and stated that she “is currently
doing ok but stability is tenuous. She has had an up and down course without significant
periods of stability since [her] initial [evaluation] on 8/31/09.” (Tr. 537).
The ALJ explained that he had given “less weight” to Dr. Lim’s opinions, to the
extent they were inconsistent with his finding regarding the plaintiff’s RFC, because
“[t]he medical evidence as a whole establishes that when the claimant is on medication,
she does not have the same level of impairment as she has while off her medications.”
(Dec. 17; Tr. 30). Thus, although the ALJ stated that he had given “some weight” to Dr.
Lim’s treatment notes, “which consistently show improvement in [Martinez-Lopez’s]
symptoms when she is compliant with treatment and medication,” and had also given
“some weight to Dr. Lim’s “assessment . . . of a current GAF of 59, which indicates a
moderate level of limitation[,]” the ALJ rejected Dr. Lim’s opinion that the plaintiff’s
stability was tenuous because “[t]he evidence indicates that the claimant was stable if she
complied with medication, and the only thing making her stability ‘tenuous’ was her
continuing noncompliance.” (Id.). For the reasons described below, this court finds that
there is substantial support for these conclusions.
Plaintiff’s Challenge to the ALJ’s Decision
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The plaintiff first challenges the ALJ’s decision to credit Dr. McKenna’s assessment of Martinez-Lopez’s mental limitations on the grounds that it was based on a partial
review of the record. (Pl. Mem. at 18). As the plaintiff argues in support of her position,
Dr. McKenna’s opinions were based on a review of the medical records through December 17, 2009. (Id.; see also Tr. 510). Consequently, she did not have an opportunity to
consider records of the plaintiff’s treatment with Dr. Lim on January 28, March 23, April
15, and July 2 of 2010, or to consider the Psychiatric Disorder questionnaire that Dr. Lim
completed on July 9, 2010. (Pl. Mem. at 18). The plaintiff contends that Dr. McKenna’s
failure to consider the additional evidence rendered her assessment outdated, and that the
ALJ’s reliance on that assessment was improper.
This court finds that the ALJ’s decision to credit Dr. McKenna’s assessment was
reasonable. As an initial matter, the record demonstrates that Dr. Kleinman had an
opportunity to review all of Dr. Lim’s records and opinions before completing his Case
Analysis form on July 28, 2010. (See Tr. 539). Dr. Kleinman expressly affirmed the
opinions expressed by Dr. McKenna in her March 20, 2010 Psychiatric Review
Technique form and mental RFC assessment. (Id.). Thus, the plaintiff’s assertion that
Dr. McKenna’s opinions were unreliable because they were outdated is belied by
evidence in the record.
In any event, the fact that a State agency consultant “did not have access to all of
the records . . . does not prevent the ALJ from assigning significant weight to [her]
assessment if the ALJ conducted an independent review of the evidence, which included
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treatment notes the consultant had not considered.” Carter v. Astrue, 886 F. Supp. 2d
1093, 1112 (N.D. Iowa 2012). See also Thacker v. Astrue, Civil No. 3:11CV246-GCMDSC, 2011 WL 7154218, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 2011) (“The fact that the state
agency physician did not have access to the entire evidentiary record – because the record
was incomplete a[t] the time of the assessment – is inconsequential as the ALJ considered
the entire evidentiary record and substantial evidence supports his determination”),
adopted by 2011 WL 380052, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2012). In the instant case, the
ALJ specifically considered Dr. Lim’s treatment notes from each of the dates at issue, and
reviewed the opinions expressed by Dr. Lim in his July 9, 2010 Psychiatric Disorder
questionnaire. (See Dec. 13-15; Tr. 26-28). Indeed, the ALJ specifically relied on Dr.
Lim’s 2010 treatment notes to support his determination that the plaintiff was stable when
she remained on her psychiatric medications. (See Dec. 13-15, 17; Tr. 26-28, 30).
Accordingly, the plaintiff has not shown that there was any error in his decision to afford
significant weight to Dr. McKenna’s assessment.
To the extent Martinez-Lopez suggests that the ALJ erred by failing to adopt Dr.
Lim’s opinions, that argument too is unpersuasive. Under the Social Security regulations,
“the determination of the ultimate question of disability is for [the Commissioner], not for
the doctors or for the courts.” Monroe v. Barnhart, 471 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211 (D. Mass.
2007) (quoting Lizotte v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 654 F.2d 127, 128 (1st Cir.
1981)) (alteration in original). Consequently, the opinion of an examining source that a
claimant is disabled from working “[is] not given special significance by mere virtue of
-28-
the existence of a treating relationship.” Amaral v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 797 F. Supp. 2d
154, 162 (D. Mass. 2010). Thus, the ALJ had no obligation to credit Dr. Lim’s opinion
that Martinez-Lopez’s fluctuating mood and psychotic symptoms rendered her incapable
of working.
This court also finds that it was appropriate for the ALJ to reject Dr. Lim’s opinion
that the plaintiff’s stability was “tenuous.” “The law in this circuit does not require the
ALJ to give greater weight to the opinions of treating physicians.” Arruda v. Barnhart,
314 F. Supp. 2d 52, 72 (D. Mass. 2004) (quoting Arroyo v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 932 F.2d 82, 89 (1st Cir. 1991)). Rather, the ALJ is entitled to “downplay the
weight afforded a treating physician’s assessment of the nature and severity of an
impairment where . . . it is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with other evidence in
the record including treatment notes and evaluations by examining and nonexamining
physicians.” Id. Here, the ALJ found that Dr. Lim’s assessment did not account for the
plaintiff’s repeated failures to remain on her prescribed medications or otherwise comply
with her treatment. (See Dec. 17; Tr. 30). He also found that the medical records,
including Dr. Lim’s own treatment notes, indicated “that the claimant was stable if she
complied with medication, and the only thing making her stability ‘tenuous’ was her
continuing noncompliance.” (Dec. 17; Tr. 30). As detailed in the ALJ’s decision, the
record contains substantial support for this conclusion. (See Dec. 10-18; Tr. 23-31; see
also Tr. 206-08, 215-16, 221, 226, 233, 591-92, 605, 615, 617, 619, 683, 693, 720, 722,
756).
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The plaintiff nevertheless contends that the ALJ’s decision in this regard was
inconsistent with evidence “that indicates that Ms. Martinez-Lopez continued to suffer
from her mental conditions despite taking medication, or even improved at times without
it[.]” (Pl. Mem. at 18). However, the medical records cited by the plaintiff in support of
this argument do nothing to undermine the ALJ’s decision. Those records indicate that
the plaintiff experienced confusion, irritability and hallucinations after missing her last
few appointments with Dr. Lim and skipping doses of seroquel, which she was taking to
treat her psychosis. (Tr. 229-30). They also show that she was “doing well in regard to
mood and anxiety” after remaining on a higher dose of zoloft for approximately two
weeks. (Tr. 210). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s argument that her mental condition was
not controllable with mediation lacks merit.
The plaintiff also contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by substituting
his own opinion for Dr. Lim’s opinion that Martinez-Lopez was unable to remain stable.
(Pl. Mem. at 18-19). This argument is also unconvincing. As described in his decision,
the ALJ conducted a detailed review of the evidence relating to the plaintiff’s mental
health and cited various records, including Dr. Lim’s own treatment notes, showing
significant improvement in the plaintiff’s mental health symptoms when she complied
with her treatment. (See Dec. 10-17; Tr. 23-30). He also relied on the opinions of the
State agency physicians regarding the extent of the plaintiff’s mental limitations, as well
as Dr. Lim’s July 9, 2010 assessment that Martinez-Lopez was able to sustain concentration and attention, had no trouble with her memory, was able to get along with others,
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and had a GAF score of 59, “which indicates a moderate level of limitation.” (Dec. 17;
Tr. 30). In short, the ALJ relied on evidence in the record rather than his own assumptions and opinions to conclude that the plaintiff remained capable of performing a limited
range of work at all of the relevant exertional levels.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly “credited Dr. Lim’s opinion
piecemeal” by accepting those portions of Dr. Lim’s opinion which supported his own
conclusions, but rejecting Dr. Lim’s opinion to the extent it was inconsistent with his
assessment of the plaintiff’s RFC. (See Pl. Mem. at 18-19; Pl. Reply Mem. at 5-8).
Again, her argument is unavailing. In Social Security cases, the “resolution of . . .
conflicts is the province of the Commissioner” and “[t]he hearing officer is entitled ‘to
piece together the relevant medical facts from the findings and opinions of multiple
physicians.’” Lacroix v. Barnhart, 352 F. Supp. 2d 100, 112 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting
Evangelista v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 826 F.2d 136, 144 (1st Cir. 1987)). In
this case, as detailed above, the ALJ considered all of Dr. Lim’s findings and gave them
weight to the extent they were consistent with the medical evidence as a whole. Therefore, his decision to deny the plaintiff’s claim for benefits was appropriate and must be
upheld.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons detailed herein, the “Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Reversing the
Commissioner’s Decision” (Docket No. 13) is DENIED, and the “Defendant’s Motion to
Affirm the Commissioner’s Decision” (Docket No. 26) is ALLOWED.
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/ s / Judith Gail Dein
Judith Gail Dein
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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