Bradford & Bigelow v. Richardson

Filing 22

Judge Rya W. Zobel: ORDER entered granting in part and denying in part 16 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Richardson's amended counterclaims is allowed as to Counts II and IV and denied as to counts 1 and III. A further scheduling conference is set for 4/3/14 at 2:30 (Urso, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-11025-RWZ

BRADFORD & BIGELOW, INC.
v.
HEATHER T. RICHARDSON

******************

HEATHER T. RICHARDSON
v.
BRADFORD & BIGELOW, INC.,
and JOHN GALLIGAN

ORDER
March 11, 2014
ZOBEL, D.J.
Bradford & Bigelow, Inc. (“B&B”), filed this suit against its former employee,
Heather T. Richardson, asserting numerous claims including breach of contract,
conversion and misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information, and
unjust enrichment. Richardson brought counterclaims against B&B and its president,
John Galligan.1 B&B and Galligan now move to dismiss Richardson’s amended
counterclaims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

1

Richardson initially brought a third-party complaint against Galligan and counterclaim against
B&B (Docket # 6), but later filed an amended counterclaim (Docket # 9) naming both B&B and Galligan
as “Counter-claim Defendants.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(h).

which relief may be granted.
The motion is denied as to Count I, which alleges abuse of process. Richardson
claims that B&B and Galligan initiated a meritless lawsuit against her in order to
interfere with her current employment and improperly distract both Richardson and her
employer (a competitor of B&B) from their business. Though thin, these allegations
sufficiently set forth a claim that B&B and Galligan have used process “to accomplish
some ulterior purpose for which it was not designed or intended, or which was not the
legitimate purpose of the particular process employed.” Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 947
N.E.2d 520, 533 (Mass. 2011) (quotation omitted). Similarly, Count III sufficiently
states a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices on the basis of abuse of
process.2 Fafard Real Estate & Dev. Corp. v. Metro-Boston Broad., Inc., 345 F. Supp.
2d 147, 154 (D. Mass. 2004) (“The misuse of legal process to obtain a commercial
advantage has long been recognized as a violation of Chapter 93A.”).
Count II, in contrast, is dismissed. That count charges tortious interference with
advantageous relations – namely, that B&B and Galligan are levying false accusations
against Richardson in order to damage her reputation and her relationship with her
current employer. The claim fails, however, because there is no allegation of any
actual business harm that has resulted from the purported misconduct. Tech Plus, Inc.
v. Ansel, 793 N.E.2d 1256, 1262-63 (Mass. 2003) (plaintiff must show actual pecuniary
loss); Ratner v. Noble, 617 N.E. 2d 649, 650 (Mass. 1993) (“[T]he essence of the tort is
damage to a business relationship or contemplated contract of economic benefit.”).
2

Based upon the parties’ briefs, the court assumes this claim is brought under M.G.L. c. 93A.

2

Count IV appears to allege sex discrimination. Because Richardson has failed
to first file a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act as required by M.G.L. c. 151B, the
claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the
expiration of the statute of limitations. Alston v. Massachusetts, 661 F. Supp. 2d 117,
122-23 (D. Mass. 2009).
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Richardson’s amended counterclaims (Docket
# 16) is ALLOWED as to Counts II and IV and DENIED as to Counts I and III.

/s/Rya W. Zobel
RYA W. ZOBEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

March 11, 2014
DATE

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