Cox v. Rushie et al

Filing 5

Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered: Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 2) is ALLOWED; Plaintiff's Motion to Submit Documents Electronically (Docket No. 3) is DENIED; Plaintiff's request for appointment of pro bono counsel (contained in the body of her complaint) is DENIED; This action is DISMISSED in its entirety sua sponte for improper venue; andThis Court hereby CERTIFIES that any appeal of the rulings contained in this Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good faith. (PSSA, 1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CRYSTAL L. COX, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.
JORDAN RUSHIE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

C.A. NO. 13-11308-PBS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
June 18, 2013
SARIS, C.D.J.
I.

Introduction

On May 30, 2013, plaintiff Crystal L. Cox (“Cox”), a
resident of Port Townsend, Washington and a self-proclaimed
“Anti-Corruption Blogger” filed, on behalf of herself and 1-50
John and Jane Doe plaintiffs,1 a sweeping 201-page complaint
against a number of individuals and entities located in
Pennsylvania, Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, California,
Switzerland, Wisconsin, New York, Oregon, Illinois, Arizona,
Texas, Montana, and Maryland.

1

She also listed as defendants 1-

Cox sets forth in the caption of her complaint that the
plaintiffs include herself and John and Jane Does 1-50. Those
plaintiffs have not signed the complaint nor indicated any
intention to prosecute claims in this action. To the extent that
Cox seeks to represent their interests, she may not do so in this
Court because she is not a duly-licensed attorney admitted to
practice in this Court. Section 1654 of Title 28 of the United
States Code does not allow unlicenced lay-people to represent
other individuals. See Feliciano v. DuBois, 846 F. Supp. 1033,
1039 (D. Mass. 1994); Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d
1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991); 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Further, the Local
Rules of this Court prohibit such representation. See Local Rule
83.5.3(c).

500 unidentified John and Jane Does.2
Apart from defendants Marc Randazza (“Randazza”) and
Randazza Legal Group (“RLG”), none of the other listed defendants
appear to be located in Massachusetts.

Cox alleges, however,

that Randazza’s location is in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the RLG is
located in Miami, Florida.

In contravention to those

descriptions, however, Cox alleges further into her complaint
that RLG is a Massachusetts Law Firm and Randazza is a
Massachusetts attorney.

She contends that (unspecified) law

firms, attorneys, individuals and corporations acting under

2

The defendants named in the complaint include:
(1)Jordan Rushie; (2) Mulvihill and Rushie LLC; (3) Roxanne
Grinage; (4) Randazza Legal Group; (5) Marc J. Randazza; (6)
Greenberg Traurig; (7) Proskauer Rose; (8) Matthew M. Triggs; (9)
Peter L. Michaelson; (10) Kashmir Hill; (11) World Intellectual
Property Organization (Switzerland); (12) Francis Gurry; (13)
Eric Wilbers; (14) Tracy L. Coenen; (15) Sequence Inc.; (16)
David Carr; (17) New York Times; (18) Edward Kwakwa; (19) Forbes,
Inc.; (20) Kevin D. Padrick; (21) David S. Aman; (22) Steven
Wilker; (23) Tonkin Torp Law Firm; (24) David Coursey; (25) Bob
Garfield; (26) New York Public Radio; (27) Jason M. Jones; (28)
Multnomah County Sheriff Office; (29) Daniel Staton, Sheriff;
(30) Marshall Ross, Senior Deputy; (31) Judge Gloria Navarro;
(32) Stephen Lamont; (33) Gregg Mashberg; (34) Joseph Lecesse;
(35) Jenifer DeWolf Paine; (36) Douglas Melamed; (37) Steven R.
Rodgers; (38) Warner Bros.; (39) Bob Parsons Godaddy; (40)
Goddaddy Inc.; (41) Jessica Griffith; (42) Michael Whiteacre
a/k/a Ari Bass; (43) Ronald D. Green; (44) Malcolm DeVoy; (45)
Sean M. Tompkins; (46) Manwin Mark Bennett; (47) Bennett and
Bennet Law Firm; (48) Scott H. Greenfield; (49) Eric Turkewitz;
(50) Turkewitz Law Firm; (51) Ellie Mystal; (52) Breaking Media,
Inc.; (53) Sean Boushie; (54) University of Montana; (55) Martin
Cain; (56) Dylan Energy; (57) Steve Dowling; (58) Bruce Sewell;
(59) Douglas Chey; (60) Mark Vena; (61) David Wang; (63)
Synaptics; (64) Free Speech Coalition; (65) Diana Duke; and 1-500
John and Jane Doe defendants.
2

Massachusetts law have targeted her.3
Cox alleges diversity jurisdiction over her state-law claims
of libel, assault, slander, breach of duty of care, and
negligence.

She also alleges legal malpractice in connection

with the defense of certain suits.

Additionally, she alleges

civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and conspiracy to
interfere with civil rights and deprivation of rights under 18
U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, as well as tortious interference with
business, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, inter alia,
violations of RICO and anti-trust laws.

She requests this Court

liberally construe her pro se complaint, and also to appoint
counsel for her if her complaint is not clear.

Much of her

complaint contains argument and case law in support of her
assertion that her case should not be dismissed because of the
fact that she is proceeding pro se.
Notably, within the past six months or so, Cox has filed a
number of law suits making related allegations and/or naming many
of the same defendants as in this action.

See Cox v. Randazza,

et al., 2:13-cv-00297-MMD-VCF (D. Nev (Las Vegas))(filed Feb. 24,
2013); Cox v. Hill et al., 4:13-cv-02046 (N.D. Ca. (Oakland))
(filed May 2, 2013); Cox v. Godaddy, et al., 2:13-cv-00962-MEA
(D. Ariz.(Phoenix Division))(filed May 8, 2013); Cox v.

3

In another lawsuit filed by Cox on May 14, 2013 in the
District of New York, she alleged that Randazza was a Nevada
resident. Cox v. Carr, et al., 1:13-cv-03257-LAP (Docket No. 2).
3

Michaelson, et al., 3:13-cv-03136-AET-DEA (D. N.J.(Trenton)))
(filed May 9, 2013); Cox v. Coenen, et al., 2:13-cv-00534 (E.D.
Wisc.(Milwaukee))(filed May 13, 2013); Cox v Coenen, et al.,
1:13-cv-03633 (N.D. Ill.(Chicago))(filed May 14, 2013); Cox v
Carr, et al., 2:13-cv-00938-APG-GWF (D. Nev.(Las Vegas))(filed
May 28, 2013)(transferred from the Southern District of New York,
see 1:13-cv-03257-LAP).4
The complaint is not entirely intelligible or organized.

It

is set forth in rambling narrative rather than in paragraph form,
is repetitive, and contains bald allegations of defamation and
conspiracy.

Interspersed in the complaint are copies of e-mail

correspondence.

From what can be gleaned from the complaint and

public records, the relevant background is as follows.
In 2011, Cox was the defendant in a lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon.

See Obsidian

Finance Group, LLC, et al. v Cox, 3:11-cv-00057-HZ (D. Or.
(Portland)).

In that action, Obsidian Finance Group LLC (“OFG”)

4

Additionally, Cox was a defendant in the case Randazza,
et al. v. Cox, et al., 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL (D. Nev (Las Vegas)
(filed Nov. 28, 2012). Cox also filed an antitrust suit against
parties not named in this action, and included 1-5000 unnamed
defendants. See Cox v. National Association of Realtors, et al.,
3:13-05364-BHS (W.D. Wash. (Tacoma))(filed May 14,
2013)(antitrust action). Further, she has filed other multidefendant suits. See Cox v. Bank of America, N.A., et al., 1:12cv-00998-CAP (N.D. Ga. (Atlanta))(filed March 23, 2013); Cox, et
al. v. Curry, et al., 9:13-cv-00089-DWM-JCL (D. Mont.
(Missoula))(filed May 7, 2013).
4

and Kevin D. Padrick (“Padrick”) alleged that Cox defamed them,
causing them to incur substantial financial injury.
Specifically, they claimed that in Cox’s numerous blog posts and
websites, she stated that Padrick and OFG had engaged in, inter
alia, tax fraud, bribery, and money laundering.

A jury trial was

held before District Judge Marco A. Hernandez, and on November
29, 2011, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs.

They

awarded $1,000,000.00 to OFG and $1,500,000.00 to Padrick.
Thereafter, Judge Hernandez denied Cox’s motion for a new trial.
See Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, 2012 WL 1065484 (D. Or.
Nov. 29, 2011).

Cox’s appeals are pending.

and 12-25319 (9th Cir. 2012).

See Nos. 12-35238

Apparently, the watershed moment

in that case was Judge Hernandez’s ruling that Cox, an internet
blogger, failed to produce any evidence suggestive of her status
as a journalist.

Thus, she was not deemed to be a “journalist”

or part of the media, and therefore she was not entitled to the
protection of the state’s shield law in the defamation suit.
After that lawsuit, Randazza, his wife Jennifer Randazza,
and their (then) three-year old daughter, brought suit through
their attorney, Ronald D. Green (a defendant in this action)
against Cox alleging that she registered no less than 32 internet
domain names that incorporated all or part of the plaintiffs’
names, in an effort to extort and harass them and capitalize upon

5

and damage the goodwill that Randazza has in his name.5

See

Randazza, et al. v. Cox, et al., 2:12-cv-02040-GMN-PAL (D. Nev
(Las Vegas))(filed Nov. 28, 2012).

The case was assigned to

Judge Gloria M. Navarro, also a named defendant in this action.
Specifically, the Randazzos alleged that Cox acted in a
manner similar to that alleged by OFG and Paddick, arguing that
Cox had a bizarre pattern of online harassment, by identifying
her victims, registering (through herself or under proxy)
multiple domain names using their full names, and accusing them
of various wrongdoings.

They claimed that Cox informed her

victims that she would not cease her false attacks unless they
agreed to purchase her fee-based “reputation management” service
to “clean up” her search engine results.6

She also offered to

sell a registered domain name to Randazza or another purchase for
$5,000,000.00.

They claimed that Cox violated, inter alia, the

Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.

They also claimed

she violated individual cyberpiracy protections, committed
cyberpiracy, cybersquatting, and civil conspiracy.

Cox has

5

Randazza is the managing partner of Marc J. Randazza
PA, d/b/a RLG. He provides legal commentary for various media
organizations.
6

In the body of the complaint, Cox attaches an e-mail
from her to defendant David Aman (Padrick’s attorney)(also a
named defendant in this action), dated January 19, 2011
indicating to him and OFG that she is “offering PR Services and
Search Engine Management Services starting at $2500 a month to
promote Law Firms...Finance Companies.. And to promote online
reputations and promote businesses.” Compl. at 24.
6

defended the action claiming violations of her First Amendment
rights as media.
Of significance here is the fact that, in that Nevada
action, Cox filed a counter-complaint against many of the
defendants named in this action, alleging criminal and civil
conspiracy, defamation, harassment, violations of anti-trust,
fair trade violations, violation of her constitutional rights,
abuse of process, tortious interference with her prospective
business advantage, and other causes of action.

Among many other

named defendants-in-counterclaim, the following defendants are
also named in this action: Jordan Rushie; Mulvihill and Rushie
LLC; Roxanne Grinage; Randazza Legal Group; Marc J. Randazza;
Greenberg Traurig; Proskauer Rose; Peter L. Michaelson; Kashmir
Hill; World Intellectual Property Organization; Francis Gurry;
Eric Wilbers; Tracy L. Coenen; David Carr; New York Times; Kevin
D. Padrick; David S. Aman; Steven Wilker; Tonkin Torp Law Firm;
New York Public Radio; Jason M. Jones; Judge Gloria Navarro;
Gregg Mashberg; Joseph Lecesse; Jenifer DeWolf Paine; Bob Parsons
Godaddy; Goddaddy Inc.; Jessica Griffin; Ronald D. Green;

Mark

Bennett; Bennett and Bennet Law Firm; Scott H. Greenfield; Eric
Turkewitz; Turkewitz Law Firm; Sean Boushie; Dylan Energy; Steve
Dowling; Bruce Sewell; and Douglas Chey.
On January 11, 2013, Judge Navarro issued a preliminary
injunction and directed, among other things, that Cox and others

7

were temporarily enjoined and restrained from registering or
trafficking in any domain name containing the Randazzas’ names or
confusing similar variations thereof.

Cox was also prohibited

from operating or maintaining any website that included the
Randazzas’ names.

Further, she was ordered to immediately cease

and desist any and all use of the Randazzas’ names, including the
use of the domain names, and to take all necessary actions to
transfer the domain names to the plaintiffs.

Thereafter, on

February 22, 2013, Judge Navarro struck Cox’s counter-complaint,
stating that she could only file her counter complaint as a
separate lawsuit.

This action remains pending.

The instant action apparently arises out of the
circumstances surrounding both the OFG lawsuit and the Randazza
lawsuit.

Here, Cox alleges that Randazza was her attorney, and

that he committed legal malpractice and other torts by knowingly
lying to judges, media, and others regarding a trademark with
respect to RLG.

She claims the defendants “took massive online

media and intellection [sic] property from [her].”

Compl. at 10.

Included in her allegations are claims for loss of domain names
and business, destruction of online content, and deleted
websites.7

7

In connection with these claims, it appears that Cox
has iterated claims already made in the District of Arizona,
based on her statement in the body of the complaint, to the
effect that: “The District of Arizona should take serious
interest in this matter...” Id.
8

Next, she claims Randazza conspired with other defendants in
connection with the OFG case to sabotage her appeal in the Ninth
Circuit, and to defame her.8

Without reiterating each of Cox’s

allegations against the multitude of defendants (which is
virtually impossible to organize and discern in any meaningful
way), suffice it to say that generally, she claims the various
media defendants conspired to defame her by publishing false and
defamatory statements that Cox was guilty of extortion and
attacking a three-year old, and that she acted in an unethical
and criminal manner.

She also contends that Judge Navarro’s

grant of preliminary injunctive relief to the Randazzos caused a
backlash of defamation, harassment, retaliation, loss of
reputation, clients, and friends and family, and that Kevin
Padrick sent a false e-mail in order to put her in a false light
to entrap her for extortion.

In short, she challenges actions in

connection with the OFG lawsuit and the Randazza lawsuit, and the
aftermath from those actions.
As relief, Cox seeks $100 million in damages from each of
the defendants Forbes, Inc., New York Public Radio, New York
Times, Sequence, Inc., Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office, and

8

She claims that Randazza used false and defamatory
statements by Forbes and the New York Times (made by its
reporters Kashmir Hill and David Carr), as well as statements
made by Attorney Jordan Rushie, as proof in his federal court
case that Cox had acted in bad fath, had extorted him, and
attacked his child.
9

1-50 John and Jane Doe defendants.

She seeks $10 million in

damages against each of the remaining defendants.

Finally, she

seeks injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from publishing
false and defamatory statements about her.
Along with the complaint, Cox filed a Motion for Leave to
Proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 2), and a Motion to Allow
Plaintiff to Submit Documents Electronically (Docket No. 3).
II.
A.

DISCUSSION

The Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Upon review of Cox’s financial disclosures, including her

substantial debt, this Court finds that she lacks sufficient
funds to pay the $400.00 filing fee for this action.
Accordingly, her Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
(Docket No. 2) will be ALLOWED.
B.

Screening of the Complaint
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a district court has

authority to review the merits of a plaintiff’s complaint prior
to the issuance of summonses whenever a plaintiff seeks to
proceed without prepayment of filing fees.

Section 1915

authorizes a federal court to dismiss an in forma pauperis action
if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

Neitzke

In forma pauperis

complaints may be dismissed sua sponte and without notice under
§ 1915 if the claims are based on an indisputably meritless legal
10

theory or if the factual allegations are clearly baseless.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).

Further, a

complaint may also be dismissed if it is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).9

For purposes of preliminary screening, Cox’s complaint is
construed liberally because she is proceeding pro se. See Hughes
v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972); Instituto de Educacion Universal Corp. v. U.S. Dept.
of Education, 209 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000).

Nevertheless,

even under a liberal construction, this action must be dismissed
for the reasons discussed below.

9

Moreover, a district court has inherent authority to
screen and dismiss a frivolous or malicious complaint sua sponte.
See Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08
(1989)(courts have authority to dismiss a frivolous or malicious
lawsuits even in absence of any specific statutory provision);
Bustos v. Chamberlain, 2009 WL 2782238, *2 (D.S.C. 2009)(noting
that the court has inherent authority “to ensure a plaintiff has
standing, that subject matter jurisdiction exists, and that a
case is not frivolous”) citing, inter alia, Mallard, 490 U.S. at
307-308; Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995)(where a
§ 1915 screening was not applicable because a pro se party paid
the filing fee, the Court still had inherent authority “wholly
aside from any statutory warrant” to act sua sponte); and Rolle
v. Berkowitz, 2004 WL 287678, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)(sua sponte
dismissal in fee-paying pro se case is warranted where the claims
presented no arguably meritorious issue to consider). A court
may also dismiss a complaint on its own motion for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Gaffney v.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 294 Fed. Appx. 975, 977 (5th Cir.
2008) (unpublished decision).
11

C.

Improper Venue
Given the litigation history discussed above, it is crystal

clear that the District of Massachusetts is not the proper forum
to address Cox’s claims.

Because the defense of improper venue

is “obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual
record is required to be developed,” this action will be
dismissed.

See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th

Cir. 2006).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer the
action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

Because Cox has many lawsuits

pending in other districts (e.g., Nevada, California, Arizona,
Wisconsin, and Illinois), this Court declines to transfer this
action to any particular court.
D.

Declination to Appoint Counsel
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a “court may request an attorney to

represent any person unable to afford counsel.”
§ 1915(e)(1).10

28 U.S.C.

In view of the dismissal of this action for

10

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
provides the following set of factors to consider when
determining whether to appoint counsel to an indigent under
§ 1915: “[1] the indigent's ability to conduct whatever factual
investigation is necessary to support his or her claim; [2] the
complexity of the factual and legal issues involved; and [3] the
capability of the indigent litigant to present the case.”
Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986) (per
curiam); see Bemis v. Kelley, 857 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1988).
Ultimately, to be eligible for this assistance under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, Cox “must demonstrate that she [is] indigent and that
12

improper venue, appointment of pro bono counsel cannot be
justified.
Accordingly, this Court will DENY Cox’s request to appoint
pro bono counsel (contained in her complaint).
E.

The Motion to Submit Documents Electronically
Cox seeks permission to electronically file in this case.

She claims to be familiar with this process.

Presumably, this

would permit faster filing/docketing and would reduce the need to
serve paper documents to 100+ defendants.

Nevertheless, in light

of the dismissal of this action, there is no good basis for
granting her access to CM/ECF or PACER.

Accordingly, this Court

will DENY her Motion to Submit Documents Electronically (Docket
No. 3).
F.

Certification That Any Appeal Would Not Be Taken
In Good Faith
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) and Fed. R. App. P.

24(a)(3), the Court finds, and will CERTIFY, that, based on Cox’s
litigation history as set forth herein and the finding of
improper venue, that any appeal by Cox of the matters contained
in this Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good faith.
Such a certification prohibits in forma pauperis status on appeal
even though Cox has been found to be indigent, unless permission

exceptional circumstances [are] present such that a denial of
counsel [is] likely to result in fundamental unfairness impinging
on his due process rights.” DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 23
(1st Cir. 1991).
13

is obtained from the appellate court.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) “[a]n appeal may not be taken
in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it
is not taken in good faith.”

Id.

Similarly, under Fed. R. App.

P. 24(a)(3), a party who has been permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis in the district court may proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis without further authorization, unless the district court
certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith.

Id.

(emphasis added).
For the reasons stated herein, this Court finds that any
appeal of the rulings contained in this Memorandum and Order
would not deserve additional judicial attention.
Should Cox seek to appeal the dismissal of this action, she
must pay the appellate filing fee or she must seek leave to
proceed in forma pauperis from the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit.
A copy of this Memorandum and Order shall be transmitted to
the First Circuit’s Clerk's Office.
III.

Conclusion

1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
(Docket No. 2) is ALLOWED;

2.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Submit Documents Electronically
(Docket No. 3) is DENIED;

3.

Plaintiff’s request for appointment of pro bono counsel
(contained in the body of her complaint) is DENIED;

4.

This action is DISMISSED in its entirety sua sponte for
14

improper venue; and
5.

This Court hereby CERTIFIES that any appeal of the rulings
contained in this Memorandum and Order would not be taken in
good faith.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patti B. Saris
PATTI B. SARIS
CHIEF, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

15