Sullivan v. Sullivan et al

Filing 32

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: " For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion to remand (Docket No. 12 ) is DENIED and plaintiffs' motion to strike (Docket No. 19) is DENIED. So ordered."(Moore, Kellyann)

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
)
)
LORRAINE J. SULLIVAN,
Individually and as Parent, Next )
Friend and Custodian of L.D.S., )
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
COLIN J. SULLIVAN, et al.
)
)
Defendants.
)

Civil Action No.
13-11624-NMG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This case involves a dispute between potential
beneficiaries of a life insurance plan.

Lorraine Sullivan and

L.D.S., her minor child (collectively, “plaintiffs”), seek a
declaration that they are the sole beneficiaries of the plan and
that Lisa Sullivan and Colin Sullivan (“the Sullivans”)
renounced their rights as beneficiaries.

In this and related

litigation, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”)
seeks to ascertain the proper beneficiaries of the subject
policy.

Pending before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion to

remand the case to state court.

For the reasons that follow,

the Court will deny plaintiffs’ motion and retain jurisdiction
because the case is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”), a federal statute.

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I.

Background
Daniel J. Sullivan (“the decedent”) was employed by

Textron, where he maintained a life insurance policy (“the
policy”).

The policy was sponsored by Textron and MetLife

served as the claims administrator.
The decedent’s plan included a form to designate
beneficiaries.

On the front of the form, he designated

plaintiffs as his beneficiaries.

In what has become the crux of

the problem, however, on the reverse side of the form the
decedent also named the Sullivans as “additional beneficiaries.”
The decedent died in June, 2011, survived by all of the
named beneficiaries.

In August, 2011, plaintiffs filed the

required paperwork and were paid part of the insurance proceeds.
After MetLife discovered the additional beneficiaries on the
form, it notified plaintiffs of the overpayment.

In response,

plaintiffs sent MetLife documents signed by the Sullivans
purporting to renounce their claims as beneficiaries.

Seeking

to confirm their renunciation, MetLife asked the Sullivans to
sign a general release.

They refused and filed claims under the

decedent’s plan, asserting that their prior renunciations had
been signed under “duress and false pretenses.”
Litigation ensued.

MetLife filed a federal interpleader

complaint against plaintiffs in September, 2012, in this Court,
seeking a declaration as to the proper beneficiaries of the
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plan. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan et al., No. 12-cv11794-NMG.

In May, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint in the

instant case in Middlesex Probate & Family Court seeking a
declaration under Massachusetts state law that she and L.D.S.
are the sole beneficiaries of the decedent’s life insurance
policy because the Sullivans have renounced their rights.

They

named the Sullivans, MetLife and Fidelity Management Trust
Company (“Fidelity”) as defendants.

Fidelity is presumably

named because of its role as trustee of the Textron Savings
Plan, an unrelated benefit held by the decedent.
MetLife, joined by the other defendants, removed the case
to this Court in July, 2013, and it was assigned to this session
as a related case.

Plaintiffs then moved to remand the case to

state court, asserting both that removal was jurisdictionally
improper and that MetLife had failed to secure the unanimous
consent of all the defendants.
III. Analysis
Plaintiffs make three arguments for remand.

First, they

contend that this case raises no ERISA-related issue.

Second,

they maintain that defendants’ removal was defective because not
all of the individual defendants provided written consent prior
to removal.

Third, plaintiffs assert that the lack of diversity

between the parties dooms defendants’ removal.

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Defendants

respond that the first and second contentions are incorrect and
the third is immaterial.
A state law is preempted if it “relate[s] to an employee
benefit plan” governed by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
Accordingly, ERISA preemption
involves two central questions: (1) whether the plan
at issue is an “employee benefit plan” [within ERISA]
and (2) whether the cause of action “relates to” this
employee benefit plan.
Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 29 (1st
Cir. 2009) (citing Hampers v. W.R. Grace & Co., Inc., 202 F.3d
44, 49 (1st Cir. 2000)).

ERISA expressly defines employee

benefit plans to include those maintained by employers to
provide benefits in the event of death. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
This analysis leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the life
insurance benefits held on behalf of the decedent are part of an
employee benefit plan under ERISA. See, e.g., Nicholls v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., No. 13-cv-00821, 2013 WL 5839763, at * 2 (D.
Conn. Oct. 30, 2013).
Plaintiffs’ cause of action undoubtedly relates to the
subject benefit plan.

Seeking a state law judgment under Mass.

Gen. Laws c. 231A and 191A, which govern declaratory judgments
and disclaimers of interests, respectively, does not change the
fact that the core dispute in this case concerns an employee
life insurance plan. See Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan,

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Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 199 (1st Cir. 1997).

Moreover, as

defendants point out, plaintiffs’ state court complaint itself
concedes that the subject plan is an employee benefits plan
under ERISA.
Plaintiffs’ next argument is that the lack of diversity
among the parties (and the failure to plead the requisite
amount-in-controversy) merits remand.

They are correct that the

parties are not diverse but misunderstand the basis of removal
in this case.

ERISA preemption divests the state court of

jurisdiction because the case becomes one of original federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, not because the parties are
diverse. See Fernandez-Vargas v. Pfizer, 522 F.3d 55, 63 (1st
Cir. 2008).

Indeed, defendants did not invoke diversity

jurisdiction in their notice of removal.
Finally, plaintiffs seek to remand the case on the grounds
that defendants’ failed to reach unanimous consent before the
removal.

Defendants respond that the initial notice of removal

clearly indicated such consent.
In cases with multiple defendants, federal courts require
all defendants to consent to removal. See Esposito v. Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2009).

Although consent

must be unanimous, a party need not physically sign a removal
petition for consent to be clear. See Frankston v. Denniston,
376 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D. Mass. 2005).
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Here, MetLife filed the notice of removal but also
indicated that the other defendants “consent to and/or join in
the removal of this action.”

This expression of consent,

offered by an officer of the court, is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).

All defendants

properly consented to removal.1
Defendants properly removed plaintiffs’ cause of action to
this Court.

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to remand and

motion to strike will be denied.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion to remand
(Docket No. 12) is DENIED and plaintiffs’ motion to strike
(Docket No. 19) is DENIED.

So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated February 7, 2013

1

Defendants’ supposed lack of unanimous consent is also the
subject of plaintiff’s motion to strike defendants’ “late file
assents” which will also be denied.
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