Vrusho v. Creative Transportation Services, Inc.
Filing
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Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: "In accordance with the foregoing, defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Docket No. 8 ) is ALLOWED, defendant's motion for sanctions (Docket No. 14 ) is DENIED and plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 18 ) is DENIED. So ordered." (Moore, Kellyann)
United States District Court
District of Massachusetts
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PAUL E. VRUSHO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CREATIVE TRANSPORTATION
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.
Civil Action No.
13-11724-NMG
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
This case began with a botched contract to deliver trees to
a North Carolina nursery but now focuses on inter-governmental
jurisdictional rules.
Perceiving unfairness and, specifically,
a due process violation in his treatment at the hands of state
courts in North Carolina and New Hampshire, pro se plaintiff
Paul Vrusho (“plaintiff” or “Vrusho”) comes to this Court for
relief against defendant Creative Transportation Services
(“defendant” or “Creative”).
Unfortunately for plaintiff, this Court is without
jurisdiction to review an appeal of a final decision of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, let alone one involving conduct between
parties in New Hampshire and North Carolina.
Accordingly,
plaintiff’s claim fails for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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I.
Background
The Court understands the facts of this case to be
undisputed as summarized in the opinion of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court. See Creative Transp. Serv. v. Paul E. Vrusho
d/b/a Granite State Nursery & Evergreen, No. 2012-0453, Final
Order of April 11, 2013.
While plaintiff dwells on the facts
undergirding his due process arguments and his disputed
liability, a description of the rather convoluted procedural
history of this case suffices for present purposes.
In 2006, a North Carolina trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of Creative (the plaintiff in that action)
against Vrusho and awarded Creative $35,000 plus costs and
interest.
Creative sought, for the first time, to enforce the
North Carolina judgment in New Hampshire.
Vrusho then retained
counsel in North Carolina and successfully vacated the summary
judgment order against him.
In 2011, however, Vrusho failed to
appear at a hearing on the merits of the claim and the North
Carolina court subsequently entered a default judgment against
him.
After Vrusho failed to appeal that order in North Carolina,
Creative successfully moved to enforce the revised North
Carolina judgment in New Hampshire.
Defendant is engaged in an
ongoing effort in New Hampshire Superior Court to require Vrusho
to make periodic payments on the judgment against him.
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Vrusho filed the subject complaint in this Court in July,
2013. 1
He sought to remove the portion of the proceedings
currently pending in New Hampshire Superior Court but this Court
denied the subject motion in November, 2013.
In the meantime,
Creative moved to dismiss this action and for sanctions against
plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed an opposition only to defendant’s
motion for sanctions but appears to address both of defendant’s
motions in his supporting memorandum.
Finally, Vrusho filed a
motion for “reconsideration” on December 16, 2013, which the
Court treats as an opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss
rather than a request for reconsideration of any court order.
For good measure, defendant opposes Vrusho’s “motion.”
II.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Vrusho’s complaint is styled as an appeal to this Court in
light of his prior exhaustion of appeals in the New Hampshire
Supreme Court.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that his due
process rights were violated by the initial proceedings in North
Carolina and the subsequent proceedings in New Hampshire.
Creative challenges plaintiff’s complaint on multiple grounds,
contending that it fails for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of
1
Other than an oblique reference to a “conflict” that plaintiff
has with the District Court in Concord, New Hampshire, it
remains unclear why plaintiff filed the subject complaint in
this Court.
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process and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
The Court addresses subject matter jurisdiction first
and foremost.
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and are subject to
the “Rooker-Feldman doctrine” which
precludes “the losing party in state court [from
filing] suit in federal court after the state
proceedings [have] ended, complaining of an injury
caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review
and rejection of that judgment.”
Coggeshall v. Mass. Bd. Of Registration of Psychologists, 604
F.3d 658, 663 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)).
This
somewhat obscure doctrine stands for a straightforward
proposition: a federal district court cannot exercise appellate
jurisdiction over a state court decision unless specifically
authorized by Congress.
Limited exceptions to Rooker-Feldman
exist where Congress has expressly authorized such review,
principally in the context of habeas corpus review of state
court convictions, bankruptcy court review of state judgments
and federal court authority to vacate state court judgments
violating United States treaty obligations. See, e.g., Doe v.
Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2005).
None of those exceptions applies in this case.
Plaintiff’s
appeal plainly does not fall under the aegis of habeas corpus or
bankruptcy jurisdiction and no statute allows for district court
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review of the subject New Hampshire Supreme Court judgment.
Moreover, plaintiff clearly labels his complaint as an appeal of
the final order of the New Hampshire Supreme Court of April 11,
2013.
Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes this
Court from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint.
In light of this finding, the Court need not address
defendant’s other arguments.
III. Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions
Following on its motion to dismiss, defendant Creative also
moves for the imposition of sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
against plaintiff Vrusho for his allegedly improper complaint.
Rule 11 protects defendants and the Court from frivolous
lawsuits. See Navarro-Ayala v. Nunez, 968 F.2d 1421, 1426 (1st
Cir. 1992).
It provides that all litigants, represented parties
and pro se litigants alike, must certify to the court that their
filings are not submitted for an improper purpose, the legal
claims are non-frivolous and any factual allegations have, or
will have, reasonable evidentiary support. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b).
Sanctions under Rule 11 should be “limited to what suffices
to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated.” Id. § (c)(4); see also Lamboy-Ortiz
v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 247 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[The]
purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to
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compensate.”).
In determining sanctions against unrepresented
parties, courts may consider “the state of the pro se party’s
sophistication and experience, or lack thereof.” Hughes v.
McMenamon, 379 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80 (D. Mass. 2005).
Ultimately,
imposing sanctions under Rule 11 is committed to the sound
discretion of the court.
In this case, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff’s
filings were submitted for an improper purpose.
Plaintiff’s
legal theory is, admittedly, precluded by a straightforward
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Nonetheless, the
instant record does not demonstrate that plaintiff’s filings
were intended to harass, delay or increase litigation costs. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).
Although defendant avers that
plaintiff is, in fact, represented by “competent counsel,” the
Court similarly finds no evidence in the record that plaintiff
retained counsel for the subject complaint.
In light of those
findings and plaintiff’s plain lack of legal sophistication, the
Court concludes that a warning is sufficient to deter any future
unfounded filings by plaintiff.
Monetary sanctions are
uncalled-for.
Accordingly, the Court declines to impose Rule 11 sanctions
against plaintiff.
Plaintiff is forewarned, however, that he
must hereafter address any appeal to the appropriate appellate
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tribunal.
In the event of any repetitive filings by plaintiff,
the Court will entertain a renewed motion for sanctions.
ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing, defendant’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Docket No. 8)
is ALLOWED, defendant’s motion for sanctions (Docket No. 14) is
DENIED and plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (Docket No.
18) is DENIED.
So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton______
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated December 31, 2013
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