Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Filing 216

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ORDER entered denying 214 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of and Relief from Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment of May 1, 2017. (Montes, Mariliz)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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JOHNATHAN FOLEY,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Civil Action No. 1:13-CV-12107-LTS
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WELLS FARGO, N.A.,
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s/h/m to Wachovia Mortgage FSB,
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f/k/a World Savings FSB,
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Defendants.
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ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
May 22, 2017
SOROKIN, J.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of and Relief from the Court’s Order on
Summary Judgment citing numerous grounds. Doc. No. 214. “Irrespective of how a party titles
his motion, a post-judgment motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions
the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).” Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir.
2007) (quotation marks omitted). “As a general matter, a motion for reconsideration may only
be granted if the original judgment evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is newly
discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow situations.” Id.
First, Plaintiff contends that the record evidence establishes that he qualified for a HAMP
loan modification or, alternatively, that he submitted sufficient facts to create a triable issue of
fact. The Motion is DENIED as to this argument, however, as Plaintiff does not contend in his
Motion for Reconsideration that defendant breached its obligations under the settlement
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agreement, or otherwise, by failing to find that he qualified for a HAMP loan modification.
Plaintiff is not asserting that the formulas used by Wells Fargo said that he qualified for a
modification and Wells Fargo denied him anyway. Rather, he argues that he would have
qualified if different inputs were used.
Second, Plaintiff contends that the Court should have considered evidence that he had a
substantially higher income than the $5,783 discussed in the Court’s decision. Plaintiff did not
properly raise this argument to the Court in his opposition to Wells Fargo’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. Additionally, Plaintiff has not submitted admissible evidence or pointed the Court to
previously-submitted admissible evidence in the record that supports his assertion that his
income was higher than $5,783 per month. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED as to this
ground. See De Giovanni v. Jani-King Intern., Inc., 968 F. Supp 2d 447, 450 (D. Mass. 2013)
(“Motions for reconsideration are not to be used as a vehicle for a party to undo its own
procedural failures or allow a party to advance arguments that could and should have been
presented to the district court prior to judgment.” (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v.
Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009))).
Third, Plaintiff contends that the Court erred in ruling that the HTI applied in this case by
Wells Fargo was the same as the DTI defined in the Settlement Agreement. For support he cites
“Exhibit B to Document 200,” Doc. No. 214 at 6, but document number 200 is Wells Fargo’s
Reply which was submitted without further exhibits. Plaintiff did submit an Exhibit B with his
Motion, however. That Exhibit is a new calculation of the loan modification with no citations
establishing the basis for the numbers nor an argument explaining how the Court should consider
the submission or why it should consider it now. Plaintiff does point out in his Motion that some
Wells Fargo documents list different DTI and HTI values. For example, the Loss Mitigation

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Worksheet, Doc. No. 185-5, for “Current Ratio” appears to list an HTI of 99.89% and a DTI of
153.24%. Thus, Plaintiff argues, the two terms necessarily represent different values and the
Court erred in saying they were the same. Without a fuller explanation of the source of the terms
on the documents Plaintiff cites and the meaning of these terms in the context of the loan
modification process, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden. In addition, the Court notes that the
Plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he qualified for a
MAP2R loan modification. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED on this third ground.
Fourth, Plaintiff contends that the Court focused too greatly on whether Plaintiff qualified
for a loan modification while disregarding the other issues advanced by Plaintiff. The Motion is
DENIED on this ground as Plaintiff identifies no argument he advanced in the course of
summary judgment which the Court failed to consider on the merits.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Reconsider, Doc. No. 214, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Leo T. Sorokin
Leo T. Sorokin
United States District Judge

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