Broadcast Music, Inc. et al v. Tommy Doyles Hyannis, LLC, et al

Filing 19

Judge Indira Talwani: ORDER entered. ORDER ON STATUTORY DAMAGES & REQUEST FOR COSTS AND FEES. (MacDonald, Gail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
TOMMY DOYLES HYANNIS, LLC et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 13-cv-12258-IT

ORDER ON STATUTORY DAMAGES & REQUEST FOR COSTS AND FEES
June 10, 2015
I.

Introduction
The court has entered default against Defendant Tommy Doyles Hyannis, LLC and

Defendant Alan O’Sullivan for having failed to appear in this action. See Notice Default [#9];
Notice Default [#10]. Plaintiffs now move for default judgment in the amount of $29,777,
consisting of $24,000 in statutory damages, $5,080 in attorney’s fees, and $697 in costs. See
Mot. Default J. [#14] [hereinafter Pls.’ Mot.]; Decl. William S. Strong ¶¶ 2-4 [hereinafter Strong
Decl.]. Having considered Plaintiff’s complaint, moving papers, and supporting affidavits, the
court awards a statutory award of $3,000, attorney’s fees of $1,000, and costs of $400.
II.

Statutory Damages
As a result of Defendants’ default, all well-pleaded allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint

are deemed admitted. See KPS & Assocs., Inc. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 24 (1st Cir.
2003); Franco v. Selective Ins. Co., 184 F.3d 4, 9 n.3 (1st Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs complaint
alleges that they have a protected copyright interest in four songs—“Boxer a/k/a The Boxer” by
Paul Simon, “In Your Eyes” by Peter Gabriel, “Respect” by Otis Redding, and “Wonderwall” by
Noah Gallagher. See Verified Compl. ¶¶ 18-19, Ex. A. The complaint further alleges that on
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June 8, 2013, Defendants publicly performed, or caused to be performed at an establishment they
owned, the four protected musical works without license or permission. See id. ¶ 22, Ex. A.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have plausibly pleaded a claim of copyright infringement, and
Defendants are deemed to have admitted their liability for that infringement. See Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975) (stating that a copyright holder has an
“exclusive right . . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit” (citation and alterations
omitted)).
The Copyright Act provides that a copyright owner may receive either actual or statutory
damages for infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1)-(2). Absent a showing of willful
infringement, statutory damages shall be “with respect to any one work, for which any one
infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and
severally, . . . not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” Id. §
504(c)(1).
Plaintiffs seek statutory damages in the amount of $6,000 per musical work, for a total of
$24,000. Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Their Mot. Default J., 4 [#15] [hereinafter Pls.’ Mem.]. Plaintiffs
justify this statutory award request on the ground that, if Defendants had purchased a yearly
“blanket license agreement” for 2011, 2012, and 2013, they would have spent $8,811. See Decl.
Renee S. Wolfe ¶ 3 [#17] [hereinafter Wolfe Decl.]; Decl. Brian Mullaney ¶ 17 [#18]
[hereinafter Mullaney Decl.]. According to Plaintiffs, “[c]ourts consistently have held that a
statutory damages award between two and five or six times the amount that the plaintiff would
have received in licensing fees is appropriate.” Pls.’ Mem. at 5. Therefore, Plaintiffs suggest
that an award of $24,000 (less than three times the total in alleged licensing fees) is “modest,
just, and appropriate.” Id.

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As a preliminary matter, the complaint alleges that each of the four songs was infringed
on June 8, 2013. See Verified Comp. at Ex. A. Accordingly, it is not apparent why licensing
fees for 2011 and 2012 would be justified. Moreover, in support of their motion for default
judgment, Plaintiffs explain that purchase of a “blanket license agreement” would “permit music
users to perform any of . . . over 8.5 million musical compositions.” Wolfe Decl. ¶ 3. If a fee of
$3,011 would have provided Defendants the rights to play 8.5 million songs for all of 2013, see
Mullaney Decl. ¶ 17, it does not follow that an award of $24,000 is justified for the unlicensed
performance of four songs, one time each. In light of the nature and scope of the infringement as
compared against the yearly cost for a “blanket licensing agreement,” the courts finds that the
statutory minimum award of $750 per song is appropriate, for a total award of $3,000. This
amount will adequately serve the purposes of deterring putative infringers.
III.

Attorney’s Fees
Under the Copyright Act, “the court may . . . award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the

prevailing party.” 17 U.S.C. § 505; Spooner v. EEN, Inc., 644 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 2011). For
claims under the Copyright Act, “attorney’s fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a
matter of the court’s discretion.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994). The party
seeking an award of fees bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of its fee request
through submission of appropriate evidence. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983). Where the party fails to present sufficient evidence to justify its fee request, “the district
court may reduce the award accordingly” or deny it entirely. Id.; see also Gay Officers Action
League v. Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 297 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[P]revailing parties who intend to
seek counsel fee awards ordinarily must ensure that contemporaneous time records are kept in

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reasonable detail. . . . [F]ailure to do so may have deleterious consequences (such as the slashing
or disallowance of an award).” (internal citations omitted)).
Plaintiffs filed a declaration in support of their motion for default judgment that states
“[t]he total amount of attorney’s fees incurred in this matter . . . is $5,080.” Strong Decl. ¶ 2.
However, Plaintiffs failed to provide hourly time records, indicate the hourly rate charged to
reach this total, or otherwise provide information to the court justifying their requested award of
fees. Moreover, the court entered default against Defendants for failure to answer. See Entry
Default [#9]; Entry Default [#10]. Accordingly, litigation in this case consisted only of filing
and serving the complaint and moving for default. The complaint is a form complaint.1 It is not
apparent that $5,080 in fees is reasonable for those actions. Based on Plaintiffs’ failure to
provide sufficient information to justify their requested fees, the court could disallow attorney’s
fees entirely. However, in its discretion, the court will instead award attorney’s fees of $1,000.
This amount reasonably compensates Plaintiffs for the work done on this case without turning
the discretionary award of fees into a windfall.
IV.

Costs
The Copyright Act allows a court, in its discretion, to grant an award of full costs to a

prevailing party. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Plaintiffs request $697 in costs, which they state is “primarily
for filing fees and process-server fees.” Strong Decl. ¶ 3. The filing fee paid was $400. The
court is unable to ascertain what portion of the remaining $297 is process server fees, and
Plaintiffs provide no information regarding what other costs are claimed. Accordingly, the court

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For comparison, this complaint is substantially identical in form and substance to at least three
other complaints filed in this session. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Michael J. Quinn, No.
14-cv-10700-IT; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. King Cormac, Inc., No. 14-cv-11939-IT; Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. PJML, Inc., No. 13-cv-12212-IT.
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cannot determine if the sought-after costs are properly recoverable. Therefore, the court in its
discretion awards only the $400 in costs from the filing fee in this case.
V.

Permanent Injunction
Injunctive relief may be appropriate “where (1) the plaintiff has prevailed on the merits,

(2) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief, (3) the harm to
the plaintiff would outweigh the harm to the defendants from an injunction, and (4) the
injunction would not adversely affect the public interest.” Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 720 F.3d
12, 25 (1st Cir. 2013). “To be entitled to a forward-looking remedy, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic requisites of equitable relief—‘the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable
injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.’” Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 16
(1st Cir. 2004) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)). This requires a showing
“either that some past unlawful conduct has continuing impact . . . , or else . . . a likelihood of
future unlawful conduct on the defendant’s part.” Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 67 (1st Cir.
1990) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiffs have failed to make a showing that they are entitled to a permanent injunction.
Plaintiffs’ complaint does not plead that Defendants continue to infringe the musical works at
issue or that they are likely to infringe those works again in the future. According to Plaintiffs,
Defendant Tommy Doyles Hyannis is no longer in business. Pls.’ Mem. at 6. Accordingly, the
court denies the request for a permanent injunction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
June 10, 2015

/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge

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