Moton v. Grondolsky

Filing 15

Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that Motons petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DENIED for the reasons set forth in the governments opposition and this action is DISMISSED. The Clerk shall terminate the pending motions and enter a separate order of dismissal. (PSSA, 4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
LEONARD MOLTON,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFF GRONDOLSKY-WARDEN,
Respondent.

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CIVIL ACTION No.
13-12397-NMG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GORTON, J.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies
petitioner’s pending motions and dismisses the petition for writ
of habeas corpus.
A. Background
On September 23, 2013, Leonard Moton (“Moton”), now detained
at FMC Devens pending a hearing on the government’s motion to
civilly commit him pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246, filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Moton

challenges the civil commitment proceedings commenced by the
government pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 4246 less than a week before
Moton’s anticipated release date.1

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See United States v. Moton,

Upon receipt of a § 4246(a) dangerousness certification,
the district court must conduct a hearing to determine whether
the defendant “[i]s presently suffering from a mental disease or
defect as a result of which his release would create a
substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
damage to property of another.” Id. A dangerousness certificate
stays the defendant's release pending completion of procedures
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). Id. After a dangerousness
hearing is conducted and, upon a clear and convincing finding the
defendant is too dangerous to be released, the defendant is

C.A. No. 12-12241-IT (pending).

Moton contends that the

government’s claims of his dangerousness are false and alleges
that his constitutional rights have been violated.
Moton makes numerous allegations related to the legal
premise that the civil commitment statute is unconstitutional.
He complains that he was not allowed to present any witnesses or
evidence at any hearing for civil commitment and that
inadmissible evidence was presented against him at this hearing.
Among other things, Moton seeks immediate release as well as
declaratory relief recognizing that there is a danger that
respondent and others will engage in acts of retaliation.
At the time of filing, this action was assigned to
Magistrate Judge Boal pursuant to the Court's Program for Random
Assignment of Civil Cases to Magistrate Judges.

Moton’s motion

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis was granted and the
petition was served by the clerk.

Because a party did not

consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction, this action was
reassigned to the undersigned.

See Docket No. 10, 02/03/14

Electronic Notice of Reassignment.
On January 9, 2014, Moton filed a motion for summary
judgment seeking immediate release.

See Docket No. 9.

On

January 28, 2014, the government filed an opposition to the

subject to indefinite commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See 18
U.S.C. § 4246(a), (d).
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petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Docket No. 8.

On

February 6, 2014, Moton moved to strike the government’s
response.

See Docket No. 11.

On April 3, 2014, Moton filed a

motion for new appointed counsel.

See Docket No. 14.

B. Discussion
Habeas corpus review is available under § 2241 if a person
is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

“[P]rudential concerns, such as comity and the orderly
administration of criminal justice, may require a federal court
to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”
Johns, 647 F.3d 545, 530 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing

Timms v.
Munaf v. Geren,

553 U.S. 674, 693, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).

“The principle that a

habeas court is not bound in every case to issue the writ follows
from the precatory language of the habeas statute, and from its
common-law origins.” Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693, 128 S.Ct. 2207
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As noted by the government, the Supreme Court held that
civil commitment was constitutional under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
(2010).

See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126

However, it is clear that Congress specifically dictated

that “[n]othing contained in section 4243, 4246, or 4248
precludes a person who is committed under either of such sections

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from establishing by writ of habeas corpus the illegality of his
detention.” See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(g).

“[T]he essence of habeas

corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is
to secure release from illegal custody.”

Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
However, a federal pretrial detainee must first exhaust
other available remedies to be eligible for habeas corpus relief
under Section 2241. See, e.g., Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390,
391 (1918) (“in the absence of exceptional circumstances in
criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed
and habeas corpus not be granted in advance of a trial.”);
Fassler v. United States, 858 F.2d 1016, 1018-1019 (5th Cir.
1988)(there is potential for abuse of the writ and unnecessary
duplication of appeals when a defendants challenge to pretrial
detention could have ben handled by review under § 3145); United
States v. Pipito, 861 F.2d 1006, 1009 (7th Cir. 1987) (§ 2241
challenge to challenge pretrial detention order inappropriate
when it can be challenged under 18 U.S.C. § 3145); Kotmair v.
United States, 143 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534 (E.D.N.C. 2001)
(“Principles of judicial economy and efficiency weigh against
allowing federal defendants to file separate habeas petitions
where an appropriate remedy is with the trial court.”).
Here, the Court concludes that Moton’s claims are premature.

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The Court’s records indicate that Moton’s civil commitment
proceeding is ready for a hearing on the petition.
States v. Moton, C.A. No. 12-12241-IT (pending).

See United
Last month,

the civil commitment matter was reassigned to Judge Talwani upon
her appointment to the federal bench.

Id.

C. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Moton’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DENIED for
the reasons set forth in the government’s opposition and this
action is DISMISSED.

The Clerk shall terminate the pending

motions and enter a separate order of dismissal.
So ordered.
/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge
Dated July 31, 2014

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