Myrick v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Filing 14

Judge F. Dennis Saylor, IV: Order entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. In accordance with this Court's order dated January 10, 2014, and the plaintiff not having shown good cause why this case should not be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), it is ORDERED that the within action be and it is hereby DISMISSED.(PSSA, 4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
__________________________________________
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KYL V. MYRICK,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Civil Action No.
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13-12783-FDS
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
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COMMISSION,
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Defendant.
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__________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
SAYLOR, J.
On January 15, 2014, the Court denied plaintiff’s second ex parte motion to vacate
administrative dismissals and directed him to show good cause why this action should not be
dismissed. See Docket Nos. 9, 12. Both the January 10 and January 15 Orders explained that the
only remedy for a charging party who is dissatisfied with EEOC’s actions on his charge of
employment discrimination is to bring an action against the charged employer in federal court.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). There is no right to sue the EEOC directly. Feldstein v. E.E.O.C.,
547 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D. Mass. 1982). Once the EEOC determines that there is no reasonable
cause to believe that a charge is true, it must dismiss the charge and issue the complainant a
statutory right-to-sue letter.
On January 24, 2014, plaintiff filed a response to the order to show cause and a motion to
add a defendant. See Docket No. 13. Plaintiff seeks to add the MCAD as a defendant and argues
that both MCAD and EEOC have waived absolute immunity such that this court should have
jurisdiction. Plaintiff again complains that the administrative agencies gave too much weight to
“false testimony” on respondent’s behalf. He again asks the Court to vacate the EEOC dismissal

and compel the MCAD to reverse the lack of probable cause finding.
Plaintiff’s show-cause response contains similar deficiencies as his original complaint.
Furthermore, to the extent he seeks to bring suit against the MCAD, such a claim would also be
subject to dismissal. This Court has no authority to review judgments entered by the MCAD. To
the contrary, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 6 provides that any person “aggrieved by such order of
the commission may obtain judicial review” and that “such proceeding shall be brought in the
superior court of the commonwealth.” And to the extent that plaintiff seeks money damages from
the MCAD, the Commission is a state agency and therefore such a claim would be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Welch v. State Department of Highways, 483 U.S. 468 (1987);
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
After carefully reviewing plaintiff’s response, the Court finds that he has failed to
demonstrate why this action should not be dismissed. Accordingly, and in accordance with this
Court's order dated January 10, 2014, plaintiff not having shown good cause otherwise, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), this action is hereby DISMISSED.
So Ordered.
/s/ F. Dennis Saylor
F. Dennis Saylor IV
United States District Judge
Dated: February 24, 2014

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