Gourdeau v. City of Newton

Filing 70

District Judge Leo T. Sorokin: ORDER entered denying 67 Motion for Entry of Separate and Final Judgment and to Stay the Remaining Claim (Montes, Mariliz)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

JO ANNE GOURDEAU,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF NEWTON and NEWTON
POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 13-12832-LTS

ORDER
October 18, 2016
SOROKIN, J.
For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Jo Anne Gourdeau’s Motion for
entry of partial final judgment on her dismissed claims and for a stay of her remaining claim
(Doc. 67).

I.

BACKGROUND
On October 24, 2013, Plaintiff, a Newton Police Department (“NPD”) patrol officer, filed

a Complaint in Massachusetts Superior Court against Defendants City of Newton and NPD.
Doc. 1-3. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated various laws in rejecting her application for an
NPD position and in choosing a male candidate for the position instead. Doc. 1 at 2. The
Complaint contains three counts, which respectively allege that Defendant (1) discriminated
against Plaintiff on the basis of gender, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B (“Chapter
151B”); (2) retaliated against Plaintiff for complaining of gender discrimination, in violation of

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Chapter 151B; and (3) considered leave time that is protected by the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) against Plaintiff, in violation of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-619. Defendants
removed the case to this Court and, after discovery, filed a motion for summary judgment on all
counts. Docs. 1, 37.
On August 2, 2016, Magistrate Judge Cabell issued a Report and Recommendation to
allow summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the two Chapter 151B claims, and to deny
summary judgment on the FMLA claim. Doc. 61 at 1. Plaintiff objected to the Report and
Recommendation. Doc. 63. On September 16, 2016, the Court issued an Order accepting
Magistrate Judge Cabell’s Report and Recommendation and dismissing the Complaint’s Chapter
151B claims. Doc. 64 at 7.
On September 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion, requesting (1) “an order of
separate and final judgment for the two” dismissed Chapter 151B claims, and (2) a stay of “the
remaining [FMLA] claim.” 1 Doc. 67 at 1. Plaintiff argues that “[b]oth parties will be prejudiced
by the lack of finality if the entry of judgment is delayed, as Plaintiff desires to appeal the
dismissed claims.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff argues that a stay of the FMLA claim would serve the
interest of “judicial economy” because the “material facts” supporting that claim “are inherently
interrelated” to the facts supporting the Chapter 151B claims. Id. Plaintiff argues that it would
be inefficient to litigate the FMLA claim because, if she is successful in appealing the dismissal
of the Chapter 151B claims, then a second trial will have to occur “in which many of the same
issues would be re-litigated and many of the same witnesses would have to appear in Court for a
second time.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff cites no authority to support any of her arguments.
On October 11, 2016, Defendant filed an opposition to the Motion. Doc. 68.

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At one point in the Motion, Plaintiff erroneously states that she seeks “a stay of Counts I and II.” Doc. 67 at 2.

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II.

DISCUSSION
“Ordinarily a judgment is final (and, thus, appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291) only if it

conclusively determines all claims of all parties to the action.” Nichols v. Cadle Co., 101 F.3d
1448, 1449 n.1 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citation omitted). However, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) permits a district court to “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims or parties,” provided that “the court expressly determines that there is no
just reason for delay.” Fiorentino v. Rio Mar Associates LP, SE, 626 F.3d 648, 653 (1st Cir.
2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If a district court abuses its discretion in
issuing Rule 54(b) certification, then the circuit court lacks appellate jurisdiction. Id. The First
Circuit has “warned, time and again, that Rule 54(b) should be used sparingly,” and that the
district court “must explain the need for entering an earlier-than-usual judgment.” Nichols, 101
F.3d at 1449.
In Nichols, the First Circuit held that the district court “improvidently granted” partial
final judgment under Rule 54(b) on claims that it had dismissed on summary judgment. Id. In
reaching that decision, the Court emphasized that that the “claims adjudicated on summary
judgment and certified for appeal [were] inextricably intertwined with the claims left pending in
the district court, and the parties to both sets of claims [were] precisely the same.” Id. Plaintiff,
apparently unaware of Nichols, argues that this Court should issue an order of partial final
judgment on her dismissed Chapter 151B claims because they are intertwined – or, in her
parlance, “inherently interrelated” – with her FMLA claim, and for the sake of “judicial
economy.” Doc. 67 at 2. Given the strong similarity between this case and Nichols, and given
the absence of any authority stating that partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) is appropriate

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merely because it might be more efficient, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for an order of
partial final judgment on the dismissed Chapter 151B claims.
The Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for partial final judgment is effectively a denial
of her request for interlocutory appeal. Thus, there is no reason to stay Plaintiff’s remaining
FMLA claim pending such an appeal.

III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for entry of a final

appealable judgment on her dismissed claims and for a stay of her remaining claim (Doc. 67).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Leo T. Sorokin
Leo T. Sorokin
United States District Judge

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