De Matos et al v. William A.Hinton State Laboratory et al

Filing 12

Judge Rya W. Zobel: ORDER entered. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that this action is DISMISSED in its entirety.(PSSA, 4)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

JUSTIN DE MATOS, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action
No. 13-12885-RWZ

WILLIAM A. HINTON STATE LABORATORY,
ET AL.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ZOBEL, D.J.
On November 12, 2013, plaintiff Justin De Matos ("De Matos"), a prisoner in
custody at MCI Cedar Junction, filed a civil rights complaint alleging that his arrest in
Fall River for trafficking a controlled substance within a school zone and the subsequent
2007 conviction and sentence may have been affected by the misconduct of chemist
Annie Dookhan at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory.
On November 21, 2013, this Court issued a Memorandum and Order (Docket
No. 5) granting the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, assessing an initial,
partial filing fee, dismissing the claims of plaintiff’s minor children, and directing plaintiff
to show good cause why this action should not be dismissed. The Memorandum and
Order explained that De Matos' § 1983 claim based on the alleged use of tainted
evidence is barred because his underlying conviction has not been "reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d
383 (1994).

Now before the Court is De Matos’ Show Cause Response. See Docket No. 11.
De Matos responds that Heck doesn’t apply and he should be permitted to proceed with
a civil rights action to challenge his conviction because he is no longer in custody and
therefore cannot obtain habeas relief from his conviction. Id. at p. 2. De Matos states
that the Court should not require him to “untangle a moot argument and/or attempt to
prove his conviction [has] become reversed, expunged, or obtain a declaration of
invalidation prior to filing for federal relief [because this is] contrary to established law,
as well as the Federal Constitution. Id. at p. 3. De Matos’ response references a
concurring opinion in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 2d 43
(1998) (five justices agreeing that Heck's favorable termination requirement did not
apply to "a former prisoner, no longer in custody"). Id. at p. 2. De Matos also
references several appellate opinions that have held that Heck’s favorable termination
requirement cannot be imposed against § 1983 plaintiffs who lack a habeas option for
the vindication of their federal rights. Id. at pp. 2-3, e.g. Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124,
1127 (7th Cir. 1999); Huang v. Johnson, 251, F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001); Wilson v.
Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2008); Powers v. Hamilton County Public
Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 582, 603 (6th Cir. 2007); Klen v. City of Loveland, 661
F.3d 498, 516 (10th Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
The Court has carefully considered plaintiff’s argument. De Matos is correct that
the Spencer opinion contains favorable language that Heck does not bar an individual
not “in custody” from seeking damages under § 1983. However, the Supreme Court
failed to directly address whether Heck applies to prisoners, such as De Matos, who are
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no longer in custody or otherwise ineligible for habeas relief. More important is that
plaintiff’s argument fails under controlling precedent from the First Circuit Court of
Appeals. See Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 80-81 and n. 3 (1st Cir. 1998) (family
members of deceased inmate filed § 1983 claims on behalf of estate and court rejected
their argument that “strict application of Heck works a fundamental unfairness,” since
the inmate “was attempting to impugn his conviction when death intervened,” mooting
his then-pending petition for habeas relief).
Figueroa is one of the first post-Spencer opinions to address the applicability of
the favorable termination requirement to prisoners who are unable to seek a habeas
remedy. Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable
Termination Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121 Harv.
L. Rev. 868, 875 (2008). The circuits are split on whether prisoners whose sentences
have expired can bring § 1983 claims. De Matos failed to reference Figueroa as well as
similar holdings from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d
300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000); Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007).
Although the First Circuit recognized that “this plaint strikes a responsive chord,”
the Court decided against “[c]reating an equitable exception” to the rule announced in
Heck. Figueroa. 147 F. 3d at 81. Because Figueroa rejects the argument that Heck
does not apply when the plaintiff can no longer obtain habeas relief from the conviction
that his § 1983 suit calls into question, see also Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 180 (1st
Cir. 2006) (“Figueroa held that there are no equitable exceptions to the Heck rule.”),
plaintiff’s argument fails. See Batavitchene v. O'Malley, C.A. No. 13–10729-GAO, 2013
WL 1682376, at *4–*5 (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2013) (“[t]he Heck rule is applicable even
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where ... [the plaintiff] is no longer in custody and thus does not have a habeas
remedy,” since Figueroa “explicitly held that Heck applies even where habeas relief is
unavailable” and “is still the law in this circuit”).
Accordingly, this case will be DISMISSED sua sponte in its entirety for failure to
show good cause why this action should not be dismissed for the reasons set forth in
the Court’s November 21, 2013 Memorandum and Order.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby Ordered that this action is DISMISSED in its
entirety.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Rya W. Zobel
RYA W. ZOBEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: February 10, 2014

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