Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Devlin et al

Filing 125

Chief Judge Patti B. Saris: MEMORANDUM AND ORDER entered. " Metropolitans motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 112) is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Summary judgment is ALLOWED for Devlin with respect to the compulsory coverage. Metropolitan must indemnify Mary Desrosier for and pay any prejudgment interest up to the compulsory bodily injury coverage amount of $20,000, but is not obligated to pay the optional bodily injury coverage " (Coppola, Katelyn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUSAN DEVLIN, MARY DESROSIER,
MATTHEW DESROSIER, and JOHN DOE,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF JOSEPH SIMEONE,
Defendants.
______________________________

Civil Action
No. 13-13126-PBS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
August 21, 2018
Saris, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
This long-running case arises from a car accident in
Saugus, Massachusetts, in 2010. Susan Devlin was injured in the
accident when a Ford Taurus, owned by Mary Desrosier but driven
by her son Matthew Desrosier, collided with Devlin’s car.1 In
state court, a jury found Matthew liable for negligent operation
of a motor vehicle and Mary liable for negligent failure to
secure her vehicle from the harmful effects of foreseeable

1

Throughout the rest of this memorandum and order, the Court
refers to the Desrosiers by their first names -- Mary and
Matthew -- to avoid confusion.
1

criminal actions. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance
Company (“Metropolitan”) filed a declaratory judgment action in
this Court in 2013, seeking an order that it has no duty to
defend or indemnify Mary or Matthew. In 2015, the Court held
that Metropolitan had no duty to defend Matthew. See Metro.
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Devlin, 95 F. Supp. 3d 278, 282 (D.
Mass. 2015).
Based on the state court verdict, Metropolitan moves for
summary judgment on the ground that the insurer has no duty to
indemnify Mary for Devlin’s injuries. Alternatively,
Metropolitan argues that it is entitled to a declaratory
judgment stating that its duties to indemnify and to pay any
prejudgment interest are capped at the compulsory coverage limit
in the policy. Devlin did not submit a cross-motion for summary
judgment, but at the hearing on June 29, 2018, she agreed that
there were no questions of fact for trial and that the Court
could decide the remaining issues of indemnification as a matter
of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (allowing court to grant
summary judgment for nonmovant “[a]fter giving notice and a
reasonable time to respond”).
Metropolitan’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 112)
is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and partial summary
judgment is ALLOWED for Devlin. Metropolitan must indemnify Mary
up to the $20,000 compulsory coverage limit.
2

FACTS
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise stated.
I.

Car Accident and State Court Trial
In 2010, Mary owned a 1998 Ford Taurus that was insured by

Metropolitan. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 2. On October 27, 2010, there
was an accident at an intersection in Saugus, in which Mary’s
Taurus rear-ended Devlin’s car. See Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 1.
Matthew was driving Mary’s Taurus at the time of the
accident, Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 16, but he did not have a valid
driver’s license, Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 18. Mary knew that he was
not licensed. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 18. On the date of the
accident, Mary did not give Matthew permission to drive her car.
Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 18. In fact, Mary had explicitly instructed
Matthew never to drive her Taurus. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 28. She
did, however, leave the car keys unsecured and available to
anyone in her house. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 29.
The state court case, brought by Devlin against Matthew and
Mary,2 was tried to a jury in February 2017. Docket No. 117-1 ¶
26. Matthew was found liable for negligent operation of the car.
See Docket No. 117-1 ¶¶ 22, 37. Against Mary, Devlin brought two

2

Devlin also brought a claim for negligent entrustment
against the Estate of Joseph Simeone, a passenger in the Taurus
at the time of the accident and the person to whom Mary gave
consent to drive that day. See Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 33. Simeone’s
estate was found not liable by the jury. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 36.
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counts: one for negligent entrustment of the Taurus, and one for
negligent failure to secure her vehicle from the harmful effects
of foreseeable criminal actions. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 23. Judge
Krupp instructed the jury on the negligent security claim as
follows:
To establish a claim for negligent security, Ms.
Devlin must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the following four elements:
One, that Ms. Desrosier had ownership or control
of a motor vehicle;
Two, that Ms. Desrosier knew or should have known
that there was a reasonable possibility of
criminal conduct involving the motor vehicle
including the use of her motor vehicle by someone
without authority to use it;
Three, that Ms. Desrosier negligently failed to
take steps reasonably available to prevent the
foreseeable criminal conducting [sic] involving
the motor vehicle;
And four, the damages caused by Ms. Desrosier’s
failure to do so and the resulting foreseeable
criminal conduct.
Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 32. Mary was found not liable for negligent
entrustment, but liable for negligent failure to secure. Docket
No. 117-1 ¶ 35. The jury awarded Devlin $210,601.80 for her
injuries, including prejudgment interest. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 37.
II.

Insurance Policy
A.

Bodily Injury Coverage

Mary’s Taurus was insured by Metropolitan under the
standard Massachusetts Automobile Insurance Policy (Seventh
Edition). Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 2. The insurance contract
“consist[ed] of [the standard auto policy], the Coverage
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Selections Page, any endorsements agreed upon, and [Mary’s]
application for insurance.” Docket No. 114-1 at 15. When the
policy actually took effect is not clear in the record because
there are multiple dates on the document. First, the policy says
that it is “effective from” March 28, 2010, to March 28, 2011.
Docket No. 114-1 at 8. The Coverage Selections Page is dated
July 6, 2010, but it also includes the date of July 3, 2010,
next to the words “Change 4.” Docket No. 114-1 at 8. Regardless
of the precise effective date, at the time of the accident,
Mary’s Taurus was covered by Metropolitan policy number
2398528494. Docket No. 114-1 at 8.
Under her policy, Mary had $20,000 of compulsory coverage
and up to $100,000 of optional coverage for bodily injury to
others. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 3. The compulsory coverage section -“Part 1. Bodily Injury to Others” -- reads in relevant part:
Under this Part, we will pay damages to people
injured or killed by your auto in Massachusetts
accidents. The damages we will pay are the
amounts the injured person is entitled to collect
for bodily injury through a court judgment or
settlement. We will pay only if you or someone
else using your auto with your consent is legally
responsible for the accident.
. . .
The law provides a special protection for anyone
entitled to damages under this Part. We must pay
their claims even if false statements were made
when applying for this policy or your auto
registration.

5

Docket No. 114-1 at 16. The optional coverage section -- “Part
5. Optional Bodily Injury to Others” -- reads in relevant part:
Under this Part, we will pay damages to people
injured or killed in accidents if you or a
household member is legally responsible for the
accident. We will also pay damages if someone
else using your auto with your consent is legally
responsible for the accident. The damages we will
pay are the amounts the injured person is
entitled to collect for bodily injury through a
court judgment or settlement.
This Part is similar to Compulsory Bodily Injury
To Others (Part 1). Like the Compulsory Part,
this Part pays for accidents involving your auto
in Massachusetts. Also like the Compulsory Part,
this Part does not pay for the benefit of anyone
using an auto without the consent of the owner.
Docket No. 114-1 at 25.
B.

Operator Exclusion Provisions

Long before the accident, Mary and Matthew had signed an
“Operator Exclusion Form” dated February 4, 2005. Docket No.
114-1 at 50. The form states that Matthew is an excluded
operator for a 1998 Honda under policy number 0313492094 -- a
different number than the one assigned to the 2010 policy,
number 2398528494. Docket No. 114-1 at 50. The 2005 Operator
Exclusion Form also states: “It is agreed that the person named
below will not operate the vehicle(s) described below, or any
replacement thereof, under any circumstance whatsoever.” Docket
No. 114-1 at 50.
Randy Daniels, a Senior Claims Examiner for Metropolitan,
swears in his affidavit that in July 2010, Mary requested that
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Metropolitan substitute the Taurus for the 1998 Honda under her
2010 insurance policy. Docket No. 114-1, Daniels Aff. ¶ 11.
Mary, on the other hand, testified that she sold her 1998 Honda
and canceled that insurance policy months before initiating a
new Metropolitan policy to cover the Taurus. Docket No. 117-1 ¶
7. Regardless of what actually occurred, the parties agree that
the 2010 insurance contract was a new policy, not a continuation
of a previous policy.
On the Coverage Selections Page for the 2010 policy, in the
section titled “Identification Numbers of Endorsements Forming a
Part of This Policy,” the only codes listed are “V911,” “MA660,”
and “MPY-0016-S.” Docket No. 114-1 at 8. The list does not
include “M-106-S,” which is the identification number for the
2005 Operator Exclusion Form. Docket No. 114-1 at 50. The
Coverage Selections document also lists Mary (Operator 1),
Matthew (Operator 2), and Jennifer Mason (Operator 3), as
operators of the Taurus. Docket No. 114-1 at 9. Matthew has a
“Y” next to his name in the “Approved Driver Training” column.
Docket No. 114-1 at 9. On the next page, “DRIVER 2” and “DRIVER
3” are listed as “EXCLUDED FROM VEHICLE(S) 1.” Docket No. 114-1
at 10.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Legal Standards
A.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To succeed,
the moving party must demonstrate that there is an “absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Sands v.
Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). The burden
then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. Quinones v. Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 2006). A
genuine issue exists where the evidence is “sufficiently openended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in
favor of either side.” Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham,
43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995). A material fact is “one that
has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case.” Calero–
Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004)
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50
(1986)).
Here, Metropolitan and Devlin agreed at the hearing that
there is no dispute as to any material fact and that the only

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remaining questions are pure legal issues of insurance contract
interpretation.
B.

Interpretation of Insurance Policies

The interpretation of an insurance contract is a question
of law. Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London, 871 N.E.2d 418, 425 (Mass. 2007). “An insurance policy
is construed under Massachusetts law using the general rules of
contract interpretation.” CWC Builders, Inc. v. United Specialty
Ins. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 589, 597 (D. Mass. 2015). This means
that the policy is “to be interpreted ‘according to the fair and
reasonable meaning of the words in which the agreement of the
parties is expressed.’” Allmerica Fin. Corp., 871 N.E.2d at 425
(quoting Cody v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 439 N.E.2d 234, 237
(Mass. 1982)). Each word is “presumed to have been employed with
a purpose and must be given meaning and effect whenever
practicable.” Id. (quoting Jacobs v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 627
N.E.2d 463, 464 (Mass. 1994)).
Courts resolve ambiguities in the standard Massachusetts
car insurance policy according to their fair meaning. See
Chenard v. Commerce Ins. Co., 799 N.E.2d 108, 110 (Mass. 2003)
(“Because the language of the standard Massachusetts automobile
policy is set by the Commissioner of Insurance . . . , it is
exempt from the rule of construction requiring ambiguities to be
resolved against the insurer. Rather, the language should be
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construed in its usual and ordinary sense.” (internal citations
omitted)).
II.

Part 1 (Compulsory Insurance for Bodily Injury to Others)
Metropolitan argues that it is entitled to a declaratory

judgment that it has no duty to indemnify Mary -- even under the
compulsory coverage provision -- because the undisputed facts
show that Matthew was operating the Taurus without her
permission. In Metropolitan’s view, both Part 1 and Part 5
expressly disclaim any duty to indemnify when the operator was
driving without the owner’s consent. However, Devlin argues that
in these circumstances, where the jury found Mary “legally
responsible” for the accident, the contract language requires
Metropolitan to indemnify her.
Metropolitan hinges its argument on language contained in
Part 5: “This Part is similar to Compulsory Bodily Injury To
Others (Part 1). . . . [L]ike the Compulsory Part, this Part
does not pay for the benefit of anyone using an auto without the
consent of the owner.” Docket No. 114-1 at 25. Part 1 also says:
“We will pay only if you or someone else using your auto with
your consent is legally responsible for the accident.” Docket
No. 114-1 at 16. Taking these two clauses together, Metropolitan
maintains that the policy “clearly excludes coverage for
accidents caused by an individual operating the vehicle without
the permission of the owner.” Docket No. 113 at 9–10.
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Massachusetts courts have held that when the operator is driving
without the insured’s consent, the insurance company has no duty
to indemnify the driver. See Picard v. Thomas, 802 N.E.2d 581,
588–89 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Locke, 624
N.E.2d 615, 616–17 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). Here, however,
Metropolitan goes further and argues that because Matthew was
driving without Mary’s consent, it owes no duty to indemnify the
insured (Mary).
In support, Metropolitan cites to Higgenbottom v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 425 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), a
rescript the company says is “decidedly on point to the instant
matter.” Docket No. 113 at 11. In that case, the insured’s son
took the car keys while the insured was asleep and injured
someone in an accident. Higgenbottom, 425 N.E.2d at 371–72. The
insured’s son did not have permission to drive. Id. The injured
person brought a tort action against the insured and the
insured’s son, and judgment was entered in the plaintiff’s
favor. Id. at 371. The injured person then brought an action
against the insurance company, “alleging that its refusal to
investigate the accident fully, to settle the plaintiff’s claim,
and to defend its insured were unfair and deceptive acts” under
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A and ch. 176D. Id. The Massachusetts
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding
that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because the
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operator was driving without the insured’s consent.3 See id. at
372.
But the Court finds Higgenbottom is not controlling
authority in this case. The Higgenbottom court did not engage in
any interpretation of the standard auto insurance contract or
quote any contract language.4 It did not need to undertake this
analysis because the plaintiff never disputed that “because the
insured’s son had driven the car without the insured’s
permission, there was no coverage under the policy.” Id. But
here, Devlin is disputing the issue of coverage. Moreover,
because the opinion was a rescript, it does not specify whether
the insured was found to be “legally responsible” for the
accident, as Mary was in this case. See id. at 371. Although the
court stated that the plaintiff sought damages against the
insured and his son, the only claim discussed in the case is for
the “son’s negligent operation of the insured’s motor vehicle,”
which “caused” the accident. Id.

3

The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.
See Devlin, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 281 (“If the Court finds that
Metropolitan has no duty to defend, the insurance company as a
matter of course also has no duty to indemnify.”).
4

Metropolitan has provided the Court with the standard
Massachusetts Automobile Insurance Policy that was in effect in
1978. See Docket No. 124-1. The 1978 policy appears to include
language similar to the compulsory bodily injury coverage
section in Mary’s policy. See Docket No. 124-1 at 8. However,
the Higgenbottom court did not expressly rely on the language.
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Interpreting the contract language of Mary’s policy, Devlin
emphasizes the disjunctive construction of Part 1: “We will pay
only if you or someone else using your auto with your consent is
legally responsible for the accident.” Docket No. 114-1 at 16
(emphasis added). “It is fundamental to statutory construction
that the word ‘or’ is disjunctive, ‘unless the context and the
main purpose of all the words demand otherwise.’” Bleich v.
Maimonides Sch., 849 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Mass. 2006) (quoting E.
Mass. St. Ry. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 214 N.E.2d 889, 892
(Mass. 1966)). Based on this construction, Devlin says that
Metropolitan must indemnify Mary, regardless of the fact that
Matthew was driving without her consent, because the jury found
Mary liable -- “legally responsible” -- for the accident under a
negligent failure to secure theory. See Docket No. 117 at 6-9;
Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 35.
This construction also does not conflict with the language
in Part 5, which states that neither Part 5 nor Part 1 will “pay
for the benefit of anyone using an auto without the consent of
the owner.” Docket No. 114-1 at 25. By indemnifying Mary,
Metropolitan would not be paying for the benefit of a driver
operating without the owner’s consent; rather, it would be
paying for the benefit of the owner herself, who was the
insured.

13

Finally, Metropolitan tries to rely on this Court’s earlier
opinion in the case to say that Mary had to be “using” the car
during the accident for the insurance policy to apply. See
Devlin, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 282. The earlier opinion, however, was
focused on the negligent entrustment claim against Mary, rather
than the negligent security claim. See id. at 282–83. Under the
terms of the policy, Mary’s use of the car is not required. See
Docket No. 114-1 at 14 (defining “[a]ccident” as “an unexpected,
unintended event that causes bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the owner-ship, maintenance or use of an auto”).
She needs only to be “legally responsible” for the accident to
be indemnified.
Because Mary was found “legally responsible” by the jury,
Devlin’s injuries are covered under the fair and reasonable
meaning of the policy. Metropolitan’s motion for summary
judgment is denied on this issue. At the hearing, the parties
agreed that the issue should be decided as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment for the
nonmovant, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), and holds that
Metropolitan must indemnify Mary up to the $20,000 compulsory
coverage limit.
III. Part 5 (Optional Insurance for Bodily Injury to Others)
Under the same analysis, Devlin’s injuries fall within the
coverage of Part 5. See Docket No. 114-1 at 25 (“Under this Part
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[5], we will pay damages to people injured or killed in
accidents if you or a household member is legally responsible
for the accident.”). Metropolitan argues, however, that Mary
executed the 2005 Operator Exclusion Form for Matthew, but
failed to prevent him from driving her car. See Docket No. 113
at 14–15. Metropolitan says this was either a material
misrepresentation, which increased Metropolitan’s risk of loss,
or a material breach of the contract, either one of which would
vitiate the insurance company’s obligation to indemnify Mary
beyond the compulsory limit. See Docket No. 113 at 12–13, 15.
Metropolitan is correct that if an insured makes a material
misrepresentation about a fact that could influence the premium,
the insurer may refuse to pay out on the policy, see Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 175, § 186(a); Barnstable Cnty. Ins. Co. v. Gale, 680
N.E.2d 42, 44 (Mass. 1997), except for the compulsory coverage
amount, see Docket No. 114-1 at 16 (“The law provides a special
protection for anyone entitled to damages under this [compulsory
part]. We must pay their claims even if false statements were
made when applying for this policy or your auto registration.”).
Moreover, the SJC has held that allowing an excluded operator to
drive is a material breach of the insurance contract, which
relieves the insurer of the duty to pay optional bodily injury

15

coverage. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Gentile, 36 N.E.3d 1243, 1245
(Mass. 2015) (rescript).5
In Gentile, policyholders executed an Operator Exclusion
Form for their grandson that said he would not operate the
insured vehicle or any replacement “under any circumstances
whatsoever.” Id. at 1244. After the initial term, the policy was
renewed, and the grandson showed up on subsequent declarations
pages “as having a status of ‘E’ for excluded.” Id. By excluding
their grandson, the policyholders paid lower premiums for the
policy and renewals. Id. at 1244–45. Despite the Operator
Exclusion Form, the grandson did drive the car covered by the
policy and caused serious injuries to others in an accident. Id.
at 1244. The SJC held that “[b]y allowing [their grandson] to
operate their vehicle, or by not preventing him from doing so,
the [policyholders] committed a breach of this material term of
their insurance contract.” Id. at 1245. “As a result of this
breach, the Gentiles relieved [the insurer] of a duty to pay the
optional coverage for bodily injury.” Id.
Devlin raises the argument that the 2005 Operator Exclusion
Form was not part of the 2010 insurance contract that covered
Mary’s Taurus. The Court agrees with Devlin on this point.
Tellingly, the Coverage Selections Page does not list the

5

The insurer in Gentile paid the compulsory coverage amount,
however. See 36 N.E.3d at 1244 n.4.
16

Operator Exclusion Form’s identification number as one of the
“Endorsements Forming a Part of This Policy.” See Docket No.
114-1 at 8. An additional fact demonstrating that the 2005
Operator Exclusion Form is not incorporated into the 2010 policy
is that the policy numbers on the two documents differ. Compare
Docket No. 114-1 at 8, with Docket No. 114-1 at 50.
But this conclusion does not defeat Metropolitan’s argument
that Mary’s failure to prevent Matthew from driving her car
constituted a material breach of the 2010 insurance policy. The
2010 Coverage Selections Page document lists Matthew as the
second operator of the Taurus. Docket No. 114-1 at 9. Then, the
next page reads: “DRIVER 2 EXCLUDED FROM VEHICLE(S) 1.” Docket
No. 114-1 at 10. In Gentile, the SJC discussed a similar fact
pattern in a footnote and determined that the record supported
the conclusion that the insurer and the insureds had agreed to
exclude the grandson as an operator. See 36 N.E.3d at 1245 n.8.
The insurer had automatically renewed the policy and Operator
Exclusion Form without making any changes. Id. The insurer
“provided notice to the Gentiles on the declarations page that
[their grandson] was an excluded operator,” and the Gentiles did
not object to his exclusion on the renewed policy. Id. The SJC
then noted that an insured who does not complain about a new
policy’s terms is presumed to have assented to those terms. See

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id. (citing Epstein v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 166 N.E. 749, 750
(Mass. 1929)).
There is no indication in the record that Mary objected to
Matthew’s exclusion on the 2010 Coverage Selections Page when it
was issued. Furthermore, the record shows that Mary understood
that, under the 2010 policy, Matthew was not allowed to drive
the Taurus. See, e.g., Docket No. 117-2 at 29:13-31:3; Docket
No. 117-3 at 15:11-24. Based on the undisputed facts in the
record, the Court concludes that Matthew’s exclusion as an
operator of the Taurus was a material term of the 2010 insurance
policy, which Mary breached by failing to prevent him from
driving the car. Accordingly, Metropolitan’s motion for summary
judgment is allowed with respect to the optional bodily injury
coverage.
IV.

Prejudgment Interest Cap
Finally, Metropolitan asks for a declaratory judgment

capping any award of prejudgment interest at the compulsory
bodily injury limit of $20,000. Docket No. 113 at 15-17. Devlin
does not oppose Metropolitan’s request for a cap on the amount
of prejudgment interest. See generally Docket No. 117. Because
the Court has found that Metropolitan is only obligated to
indemnify Mary up to $20,000, and because Devlin has not opposed
this part of Metropolitan’s motion, it is allowed.

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ORDER
Metropolitan’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 112)
is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Summary judgment is
ALLOWED for Devlin with respect to the compulsory coverage.
Metropolitan must indemnify Mary Desrosier for and pay any
prejudgment interest up to the compulsory bodily injury coverage
amount of $20,000, but is not obligated to pay the optional
bodily injury coverage.

/s/ PATTI B. SARIS
____
Patti B. Saris
Chief United States District Judge

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